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## THE UNION OF ITALY (1815—1895)

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THE  
UNION OF ITALY

1815—1895

BY

W. J. STILLMAN  
L.L.D. (CONCORDIA)

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## PREFACE.

IF the conclusions respecting the political position and tendencies of the Kingdom of Italy, to which the author of the following pages has been led, differ from those which in the main are held by his English readers, he may adduce in support of a somewhat pessimistic judgment, that it has not been formed under the influence of any prejudice, or in ignorance of any evidence that may be adduced by those who hold opposite opinions. From boyhood a romantic lover of Italy, he went thither in 1861, with the most exalted and confident anticipations of the future of the Italian people, just when unity, so long craved as a panacea for all the troubles of division, was practically attained; and during subsequent years there has been no long interval in which he was not intimately conversant with the course of events. Nor does the author's pessimism extend to the character of the people of the peninsula in general, or affect his opinion of the many sterling qualities of the race, in which are included all those necessary for the realization of the ideals of its most sanguine patriots. If, in his judgment, the present state of Italy is a disappointment to hopes founded on the exalted patriotism of the men who by suffering and self-immolation opened the way to liberty and unity, and whose lives are unsurpassed

records of devotion to freedom, he is still confident that those virtues exist in the nation, waiting only for an occasion to call them out, and latent perhaps only because the educational course was too soon terminated and because Italy did not realise the lofty ambition of Carlo Alberto—that she should accomplish her destiny unaided.

It is with no unkindly feeling that the author has alluded to failures in the execution of the political programme, but in the confidence that sincere and friendly criticism may strengthen the hands of earnest and patriotic Italians, of whom there are, within his personal knowledge, many who entertain the same apprehensions that have troubled him in these later years, viz. that the rapid formation of the Kingdom has introduced elements of political weakness which retard, and even endanger, the consolidation of national unity. The Italian people will survive its errors and those of its rulers, and those who believe in the inexorable laws of human progress will find comfort therein, against the evident decay of constitutional government in Italy at this moment. When we recall the horrible series of persecutions and oppressions to which the peninsula has been subjected from the days of Charlemagne to our own, it is marvellous that there is still such a thing as a national sentiment and the passion for unity; and we may hope that the present disease of personal and sectional politics, which has brought parliamentary institutions to so futile a condition that saner public opinion has not infrequently desired the abolition of an elective House, will, like other epidemics, work its own cure. Admiration for the attractive qualities of the Italian people must not blind its friends to the fact that it still retains, in some sections at least, the defects which made Italy impossible in the Middle Ages—among others, those rancorous

personal and local animosities which destroy parliamentary government, and which not only corrupt the legislature, but, through the favouritism and partisanship to which they give rise, undermine justice and sound administration.

No critic can be more fully conscious than is the author himself of his deficiencies as a historian, and he is well aware how difficult it is for one who has lived in the midst of the events he describes and in personal relations with the actors, to keep a perfectly unbiassed mind. But his love for Italy has always been vivid and disinterested, and if the position has its drawbacks, he trusts that his personal experience of Italian political life and the intimate and often confidential relations in which he has lived with some of the best and wisest of Italian public men, may confer on his work some compensating qualities which nothing else would have given it.

To the great Italian archivist and historian, Senator Chiala, the author tenders thanks for advice and direction in the selection of authorities, always judicious and impartial, as befits the custodian of the documents which constitute his country's historical vindication. Amongst the authorities from which he has received most assistance the author places first the compendious history of Tivaroni. This admirable study of the Italian regeneration, based on contemporary and documentary evidence, is unsurpassed as a monument of erudition and research, of historical impartiality and unbiassed perception of the strength and weakness of the great Italian movement. The studies of Tivaroni have, in fact, rendered it almost superfluous to peruse the innumerable experiences of the actors and martyrs in that movement, and have made the inner history of modern Italy comprehensible to all who will approach it in a similar spirit. Unfortunately that part of



Tivaroni's book which relates to the period subsequent to 1860 was not published when the pages of this work which bear upon it were being written: on this part of the subject the author had to depend on personal knowledge of events, on works such as those of Corsi and Sorin, and on public documents and the files of contemporary journals. To the contemporary records of Signora Jessie White Mario, Italian history owes a debt not to be overestimated. Finally the author has to acknowledge a great indebtedness to the Editor of the series, to whom the arrangement of his subject, and many emendations and additions are due.

W. J. STILLMAN.

ROME, May 1898.

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## INTRODUCTION.

THE most important problems of European politics have been largely connected with Italy, ever since the northern tribes found their way across the Alps to its fertility and sunshine. The early developments of its fire-and-sword wrought civilization belong to archaeology and ancient history, but there is in the period of which the following pages are a condensed record, one phase of the struggle for the domination of Italy which has a peculiar interest for the English reader. It is that in which the British power, having led the forces of Europe to the overthrow of Napoleon, began to repair the ravage his conquests and invasions had wrought, by the promotion of that constitutional liberty which the imperial experience of British statesmen had found to be the only barrier against similar convulsions. For though Napoleon had left the field of action, all the moral and material forces which he had so long and successfully employed were still ready to the hand of another possible master. The Revolution, which had prepared them for him, had entered into the blood of Europe, and especially into that of Italy, where his action had been most thorough. Perhaps no task was ever undertaken by any government, more difficult than that which lay before the rulers of England, to check the progress of anarchy, and yet foster the real interests of constitutional government.

The circumstances in which we live do not permit us to judge fairly of the difficulties thus encountered. We are too much in the habit of regarding the conservative British aristocracy—at that time the most potent influence in the direction of European affairs—as sympathetic with absolutism, forgetting that the only example of popular liberty then known to Europe had filled it with blood and ruins, and that the European populations were in a state of political ignorance. It was this ignorance which had made the French revolution possible, and which made it necessary to guard against the uncontrolled extension of political liberty in the interest of liberty itself.

And England was the only power in a position to undertake this work. Russia could hardly be considered an European country in the sense of being interested in the task, and her armies had only been the brute instruments of the conservative powers in repelling an unmitigated oppression which menaced every section of the existing order of things in the old world. Prussia was relatively a small and weak power; conservative France was paralysed for all good, and helpless; Austria alone offered valid support in carrying out any scheme of civic restoration. Austria was, moreover, the only power with which England came into contact in the solution of the problem of what to do with Italy, the country which, lying between France and Austria, was destined to be the battle-field of their rivalries, or the ally of one against the other. The problem was complicated by two considerations, viz. that France, England's hereditary enemy, had from time immemorial shown a determination to absorb Italy or reduce it to the condition of a vassal province; and that, while any addition to the power of France was a matter of vital importance to England, all the rulers of France from Richelieu downward, had considered the erection of Italy into a strong and united nation as a menace to French predominance. Unquestionably there was so much of self-interest in the friendship which England, from the first,

has shown towards the progress and prosperity of Italy. This friendship has been somewhat influenced by the necessity of maintaining the best relations with Austria, but national politics are necessarily conducted on those lines. Sound statesmanship is careful of permitting sentimental motives to control international dealings, but even these were not absent from the sympathy which a large majority of Englishmen, official and private, have always shown for Italian emancipation.

While English sentiment and policy always favoured that emancipation, those of France have as constantly operated for Italian subjection. In the duel over the shaping of Italian institutions which began in 1815 and which has not yet been fought out, the maintenance of good relations with Austria was indispensable to the success of England. In none of the difficult problems which British statecraft has had to solve has greater mastery of its difficulties been needed or shown, than in this, of baffling the constant efforts of France to reduce Italy to subjection, diplomatic or military, and of keeping touch with Austria while urging the progressive liberation and constitutional evolution of Italy. If in this work the statesmen of England differed, and in differing more or less, approved or opposed the methods of government of Austria, there is no ground for surprise. There was always before them the terrible lesson of liberty carried to excess. For us, with the problem worked out before our eyes, it is easy to see what might have been, had statesmen possessed the gift of prescience. But the Italian proverb—"Of the wisdom of yesterday, the ditches are full"—can never be better applied than here.

Taking into account all the conditions of time, growth and circumstance, no one has a right to say that England could have done more to show her sympathy for the healthy liberty of Italy than she did from 1812, when she gave a constitution to Sicily, to the year 1882, when she invited Italy to join her in the control and civilization of Egypt. Her pressure was constant on Austria in the disastrous years of 1848-9, to induce

the Emperors of Austria to develop gradually the free institutions which the people could wisely use. But it is in entire consonance with the conditions I have above pointed out, that, while she never relaxed her urgency to that end, she as invariably opposed any tendency which should render Italy more subject to France. It was a sound apprehension, growing out of the perception of the danger of French friendship, that led her to oppose those tendencies of Cavour which ended in the war of 1859 and the emancipation of Lombardy. And, studying the problem as worked out, with no personal interest in the question, and certainly no partiality for Austria, I am profoundly convinced that most of the morbid conditions of current Italian politics are due to the germs planted in the national constitution by that initial mistake. On that occasion Italy was betrayed, as English statesmen anticipated, by her ally, as she always has been, and always will be, because the real strength and independence of the Italian nation are obstacles to French ambition. It might have been better for Italy to wait many more generations in order to fulfil the prophecy, *Italia farà da se*, than to be helped a step by France. One of the wisest of Italian patriots once said to me, "Italy was made too quickly and too easily."

If the following pages do not insist more strongly on this central lesson of Italian history, it is because the continual repetition of the moral of a story is wearisome, and is indeed useless when one has read the story itself. The wisdom of England's constant friendship for Austria is shown, it seems to me, by the present position of Italy in the Triple Alliance, which, if not the ideal league it was planned to be, has at least displayed Austria, so long the scourge of Italy, as her constant, and on the Continent her only constant, friend, and after England her wisest and firmest. Studied in this light the history of the Kingdom of Italy becomes one of the most interesting examples of national evolution, of which political philosophy can take account.

## CHAPTER I.

### VITTORIO EMMANUELE I.

THERE can be no question that at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars Italy was in fact a "diplomatic expression." Any conception of the unity of Italians as a nation was only to be found in rare and enlightened individuals. Napoleon had left the country deprived of its youth, of its energy, but also of a great many of its ancient prejudices, and had succeeded in demolishing many ancient traditions without laying the foundations of the new edifice. The Lombards hated the Neapolitans as the Tuscans did the Piedmontese; Sicily was a nation apart by race and history, and had been given during the English protectorate in 1812 a brief term of constitutional government which left reminiscences rather than habits; all else had been exposed to despotic government without any trace of constitutionalism<sup>1</sup>, and Piedmont alone seemed to have developed any trace of that national character which was to become the basis of Italian nationality. The French had made themselves detested to such an extent through the barbarities and exhaustive policy of Napoleon, that even the Austrians were accepted in northern Italy as saviours. But

<sup>1</sup> The Republics of Venice and Genoa could hardly be considered constitutional governments in the true sense of the word, and they were to the last anti-Italian.



the French régime through the whole peninsula had pretty thoroughly demolished the popular traditions of reverence for the "legitimate" rulers.

In Piedmont circumstances were fortunate for the beginnings of the new nation. Conservative in character, independent, attached to its own institutions, Piedmont had, undoubtedly, resisted better the invasion of Napoleonic influences than any other part of Italy, and formed a fixed point to which it was possible for the other loose elements of Italian nationality sooner or later to gravitate. King Vittorio Emanuele I, a character rather feeble than vigorous, without great intelligence and disposed to despotic government, had nevertheless a keen sense of the importance of his dynasty and a strong repugnance to the influences which had been left behind by the French. He was easily persuaded to efface everything that remained of the French domination. He abolished the Code Napoleon, annulled all the legislation for the administration of the country, and went back to the general conditions of government in 1790. He destroyed entirely the French system of administrative magistracy and of military organization, and even went to the excess of dismissing from official employment the functionaries who had been employed under the French administration.

The first step toward the union of the states of Italy into one nation was the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont. At the same time there were negotiations, leading rather to moral than political results, for the annexation of Lombardy to the new kingdom. The annexation of Genoa was however the only indication, at the beginning of the career of the officially recognised Piedmont, of the agglomeration which has since become the kingdom of Italy. The conservatives, even in Piedmont, distrusted the unitarian spirit to such an extent that the most conservative Piedmontese regarded it as revolutionary. Bersezio says that Piedmont was so little united in habits to the rest of Italy, "that by the great mass

of people it was not even known that they were Italians." One of the most intelligent and original Italians of that day, Count de Maistre, had written from St Petersburg, "Cultivate the Italian tendencies; they are born of the revolution. Your method of proceeding—timid, neutral, suspensive, balancing—is destructive. Let the King make himself head of the Italians; let him call to all the civil and military employments, and even to those in his court, people of revolutionary tendencies, even those who are prejudiced. This is vital, essential; words fail me, but this is my last word, my last expression: if we stand uncertain and become an obstacle,—*requiem eternam*." But the King was not a man to listen to such bold counsel. The Piedmontese Minister in London urged on Lord Castlereagh the union of Lombardy with the duchies of central Italy as a step towards the formation of an Italian group separating lower Italy from Austrian influence; and the Italians residing in London, forerunners of the exiles of '48, had sent agents into Italy to agitate for the accession of Lombardy to Piedmont. Vittorio Emmanuele would have willingly accepted the enlargement of his state as far as the Mincio, sacrificing to such a result even the legitimacy of the royal line, but he was unwilling to give a constitution. He hated the Germans and desired to remove them out of Italy, but rather because he desired to be master in his own house than because he hated despotism. The treaty of Paris of 1814 had assigned to Piedmont, Savoy, Genoa and Nice, which satisfied the ambitions of the King, although he had by the treaty lost Annecy.

Nor was the annexation to Piedmont better received by the Genoese. That ancient republic, although it suffered from the French domination, reconciled itself with great difficulty to the annexation to Piedmont, and received the new administration with repugnance and even hostility. The people refused to be assimilated to the Piedmontese and the most conspicuous members of the aristocracy declined to recognize

the Piedmontese administration, retiring to their villas, and withdrawing from public life until the revolutionary epoch in 1848. A revolutionary committee was formed in Genoa in which an aspiration for Italian unity was, curiously enough, coupled with revolt from Piedmont.

The Queen of Vittorio Emmanuele, Maria Teresa of Austria, played an important part in the politics of the period. Personally attractive, with great vivacity and intelligence, she returned to her kingdom from the exile of Sardinia, her despotic tendencies intensified, and a sentiment of royal importance exaggerated. She re-established in greater magnificence the forms and ceremonies of royalty—chamberlains, masters of the royal house, grantees of the court—as if Piedmont were a great empire; and added her influence to the series of arbitrary measures which marked the period of the first years of the reign of Vittorio Emmanuele I.

The restoration of the court proved the restoration of the old system of public corruption, and perversion of justice; titles, privileges, charges at court, decisions of the magistrates, became the property of an aristocracy ruined by the past vicissitudes of the national life, while measures adopted for the enforced liquidation of the debts of the state were turned to the profit of the favoured classes. The Minister of Finance, Gian Carlo Brignole of Genoa, issued a decree of liquidation of the state debt, which, taken together with the general suspension of payments and rumours of failures, produced a great reduction in the value of the public funds. People in the intelligence of the court were best enabled to acquire the bonds at low prices, and it is even said that the Queen herself shared in these speculations. The legal transactions which had taken place under the French administration were declared null and void. The royal authority, by annulling contracts made under the French administration, and authorizing debtors to refuse to pay their debts, disturbed the entire system of credit. Against the remonstrances of wiser counsellors the

King had been persuaded by his advisers that, as everything in the state belonged to him in his sovereign quality, so even the private affairs of his subjects were under his control. •

Ecclesiastical relations played again an important part in the state policy. The tendencies of the King had always been strongly clerical, and the privileges of the Church, destroyed by the revolution, were restored with usury. The clergy had always been a secondary support to the throne and the King had no intention of allowing the injuries inflicted by the revolution to remain. All the public edifices which had been confiscated by the French, with the convents, gardens and lands, were restored to the Church, as well as the direction of the schools. The privileges of the Jesuits were restored, and in the years 1816 and 1817 the Church returned substantially to its original condition in Piedmont. Colleges, hospitals and other beneficent institutions were turned into convents and monasteries; and the Jesuits resumed absolute control over public instruction in Piedmont. The current conception of educational requirements during this period is thus given by Bersezio. Two years of elementary instruction in which the scholar learned to read, to write and to know numbers were sufficient for the people. A priest was always the schoolmaster, and in the provinces the scholars left the school knowing scarcely how to read print and to write badly their own names. The supreme director of the schools was the parish priest. For the children of the middle classes, six years in Turin, four years in the provinces, of instruction in literature and rhetoric, in which the Latin language, arithmetic in the first four operations, a little knowledge of geography, some notion of philosophy and the history of the House of Savoy, were all that was imparted. Neither modern languages nor art was included. A single teacher for each class, himself not very wise; the method of instruction, rod for the back and rulers for the fingers. After this came two years of philosophy, logic, ethics, natural history, geometry, physics, ancient history and a little Greek. Of these

schools, the supreme direction was in the hands of the bishops. Priests and friars were everywhere in the secondary schools and in the university. There was no chair of the philosophy of history, of the philosophy of law, of comparative philology or political economy. The lecture-rooms were miserable, scarcely tolerable. Clinical instruction was considered of no importance; the sanitation was under the clergy; great favouritism in examinations was shown, so that those who did not pass in the University of Turin were sure to be passed at Genoa. The students were not permitted to enter a billiard-room or a café or to be present at any public spectacle, and they were compelled to retire at nightfall. Teachers were treated in the same manner; they were even obliged to present their certificates of pastoral communion, and the secondary professors were obliged to wear the priestly garments and be under the orders of the bishops and parish priests.

The deadening influence of absolutism, reinforced by the system of education of the Jesuits, paralyzed all scientific as well as literary study. The academy of sciences, reconstituted under ancient regulations, excluded literature; and the Agrarian Society, as it was reconstituted, only showed the intellectual misery of its surroundings. The only notable literary characters were Grassi and Napione; Doctor Edoardo Calvo in the popular dialect, Alberto Nota in the drama,—both mediocre—and Silvio Pellico outside of Piedmont, were the only writers who reflected the least honour on Italian literature.

In the war department, on the contrary, the Marquis of San Marzano accomplished something. The ten million francs indemnity received from France he used in reconstructing the forts of Exilles and Exillon and in restoring the bridge of Lesseillon destroyed during the war. San Marzano instituted a military academy with aristocratic tendencies, but useful, and founded the military order of Savoy. General Dessaix was imprisoned for five months in pure animosity to those who had served the Emperor, so great was the hatred

of everything French. San Marzano perceived that the system of enlistment would not serve to form an army, and so re-established in 1816 the conscription in place of voluntary enlistment. Every young man from eighteen to twenty-four was bound to service in the army—eight years in the cavalry and twelve years in the infantry and artillery; for the light infantry six years. The army of Piedmont in 1818, consisting of thirty thousand men on a peace-footing, might be raised in time of war, through the calling in of the other contingents, to seventy thousand. The war budget amounted to twenty-two million nine hundred and forty-four thousand three hundred and sixteen francs, but the minister made economies when requested by the minister of finance. It is understood that under the old system the nobility had preference in all the superior grades of the army, and from 1816 to 1821 officers who had served under Napoleon could only serve in the lower ranks, the loss of their former grades being imposed on them, and they were forbidden to wear their decorations. The higher grades belonged to the old faithful royalists, and the cadres were formed of veterans. The navy was in the hands of Giorgio Desgenèys, who had signalized himself in Sardinia against the Algerians. He was ruled by a woman of the island of Maddalena who compelled him to name her husband official barber of the navy and promote all her townsmen, so that none of the respectable Genoese were willing to serve.

In 1817 the Count di Vallesa, who had served with great efficiency as minister of foreign affairs, resigned his office. A man of no great ability, but extremely jealous of the national honour, he had resisted the interferences of high personages about the court in the affairs of his ministry and protested against those of the queen. His resignation was due to the resentment of the queen at his having declined to accept her dictation. She had desired to change the order of succession so as to exclude the house of Carignano,

a lateral branch of the royal family. On his declaring himself opposed to the change in the succession, the queen, irritated, asked him if he had any other duty than to render an account of his work to the King. He replied, "to my conscience, to the country and to history." To which the queen replied, "For me a minister is only a servant." The resignation of Vallesa, if it did not deprive the kingdom of a great statesman, withdrew from the service of the state an honest servant of the old Piedmontese school and one whose ambition was the constant aggrandizement of the kingdom. In his instructions to the Count of Brusasco, who was sent in 1817 to the court of St Petersburg, he said: "We can only regard as a premature movement, produced by the legitimate desire of national independence, the favour shown by Italians toward us, which indicates that, tired of foreign domination little calculated to render them happy, they are willing to pass under the rule of an Italian prince who is not disposed to counteract their sentiments and destroy their institutions, but rather to bring them back to their national character, which they were losing. All Lombardy only aspires to the fortune of forming a solid nation, and its union to our state is the only thing that will satisfy it." In pursuance of this policy Brusasco consigned to the Czar Alexander a memorial which deserves to be noticed as the earliest indication of the formation of the future Italian state. It said: "The only means of extinguishing the rivalry hitherto existing between France and Austria is the constitution of a state in the north of the Italian peninsula sufficiently strong to defend the Alps and close the gates of Italy to every stranger. The limits of this state are traced by nature, and are the Alps and Apennines surrounding the basin of the Po, that beautiful valley which begins at Mt Cenis and extends to the mountains of Carniola. Language divides the Italian Tyrol from German Tyrol, the Venetian states from the Illyrian states. Not only the mountains and history indicate the true and natural limits

of such a kingdom, but the habits and customs, and the relations of the inhabitants with each other. In effect, while there is nothing in common between the Piedmontese and the inhabitants of Dauphiné, nothing between the Austrians and the Venetians, all that northern part of Italy is of the same grade of civilization and so has a community of influence and interest. I should say that in the highest respects the inhabitants of this part of Italy have amongst themselves closer resemblances than those which the Tuscans can have with the Lombards or with the Neapolitans."

But the reactionary tendencies still prevailed and the hostility to constitutional institutions was insuperable. The old conservative party, directed by the King, the court, and the high nobility, continued as in 1793, to detest revolution and its cradle, France, and although they did not love, as they had not in time past loved, the encroachments of Austria,—to prevent which they had desired to constitute a league of lesser states,—they preferred Austrian aid in every case of interest as the foundation of their ideal government. This did not exclude negotiations and intrigues for greater influence. The marriage of Ferdinand the Seventh of Spain, that of Carlo Luigi of Lucca, and that of the Prince of Carignano with the daughter of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, occupied the care of the queen as well as that of the court of Naples.

The appearance at this time of one of the most distinguished statesmen of Piedmont in this early period, Prospero Balbo, makes a turning-point in the personal history of the time. His tendencies to reform, although not so advanced as to be considered now notable, were for the time remarkable, and his abilities made him one of the most influential men of the epoch. From 1817 to 1820 he occupied an important position in the Piedmontese administration by his advocacy of constitutional reform. He instituted provincial schools, in which Italian was taught, restored Giobert to public instruction, urged the introduction of vaccination,



and by the legitimists became marked as an innovator whom it was necessary to oppose. Balbo was at first disposed to resign before the opposition of the legitimists, supported by the court, but finally contented himself with efforts to remove from the opposition the individuals who were the most obstructive to his reform. Being an enlightened minister of an absolute king, almost the initiator of an attempt to transform an unintelligent despotism, such as existed in the preceding century, into an intelligent autocracy, although originally disposed to insist on his reforms and on improvement of the administration, he shrunk from using his full power to carry out his own projects. Another statesman, the minister of war, Count Alessandro Saluzzo, assumed office in 1820 with the same tendencies and endeavoured to bring back into the ranks of the army the young men who had fought with Napoleon.

From various sources came encouragement for the introduction of reforms. A letter to Balbo clandestinely printed demanded the reasons for the delay of these reforms, and in August 1820 Count Brusasco wrote from St Petersburg, "The Austrian Court would have been able to draw to itself the sympathies of its Italian subjects, and to found its new possessions on solid bases, if immediately after the acquisition of Venice it had done what the emperor Alexander had done in Poland. It has committed a grave error in attempting to conform them to the rest of the empire, but at present the die is cast." He also advises the government of Piedmont to adopt measures for the propagation of institutions calculated to maintain the military spirit active in the population, to inspire the sentiment of national independence, to favour the sciences and the cultivation of all the arts and all the industries, and to give them a completely Italian character. "In this way," he says, "the strength and prosperity of Piedmont will offer a marked contrast to the state of moral languor which afflicts the people subject to Austria, a contrast

which will win over firmly to his Majesty the hearts of all the Lombards." "Austria," he adds, "will certainly hold all these innovations which the King may make, as actual hostilities; but its remonstrances will be so ill-founded that it will hardly dare to make them. On the other hand, the right of his Majesty would be so clear and legitimate that his decisions would be approved by all Europe."

## CHAPTER II.

### VITTORIO EMMANUELE I. THE RISING OF 1821.

IN this state of things Italy approaches the critical period of 1821. The leading public men of Piedmont continued to urge the King to introduce reasonable reforms. If the dynasty of Savoy had an ideal, this was the moment to show it and to prove itself worthy of its position by introducing those reforms which had been already urged by the ministers of the King. The revolution in Spain seemed to be established. That in Naples had broken out and was in full blaze, and if the King had taken up a national attitude all the Piedmontese liberals would have gathered around him, while the conservatives who were devoted to him personally would not have opposed his will. Fortune offered to Piedmont at this moment its proper position if the King had been willing, but the King was not.

The abuses in the Piedmontese state were stronger than the impulse to reform, and the resistance which was offered by the courtiers and the aristocracy proved an immovable barrier to any change. The interest in abuses was overwhelming. Extravagance had become inveterate, and the old privileges which had been extinguished during the period of Napoleonic rule were revived more keenly and with greater avidity than ever before. At the same time the employés who had been dismissed, and the former officers, offended in their dignity; all

that middle class which had been favoured by the conquests of the revolution; many of the clergy who had gained by the reforms, all the students and many of the younger aristocracy, chafed against and found unendurable the return to the middle ages after the liberty of the revolution.

"Piedmont," said the constitutional committee of the Canavese<sup>1</sup> in its revolutionary proclamation, "which, with twenty-four millions of income, managed very well once, no longer recognised its carelessly created debts nor made economies with the more than sixty millions which it now raised by the aggravation of taxation. The taxes which had been so willingly suppressed by the King were revived under forms still more oppressive. The postal service had degenerated into a system of vexation for every class of society. The privileges of the aristocracy, only changed in name from those of 1797, ruined many communities and citizens by the exaggeration of local and provincial taxation to which their restoration led. The religious houses, invited to reorganize, were unable to obtain the incomes necessary, the cathedrals were robbed of the revenues assured to them by the former government, and the promises made them were never realized. The old laws and even those which had been passed after 1814 were no longer observed. The magistrates, ignorant or partisan, neglected them and the new legislation which had been promised never came forward. Enormous expenses hampered litigation and the tribunals were corrupt. Civil and military employments were accorded without any regard to merit and with the greatest irregularity. Titles and decorations intended to encourage virtue were prostituted like the retiring pensions, and so was wasted that treasure of distinction which sustains so economically the prosperity of the state. The minister of police, in sheer wantonness and caprice, violated with impunity the laws which guaranteed what little security, liberty, and right

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<sup>1</sup> The Canavese is the district between Turin and Alessandria.

of property remained, not observing even those limits which the decree of his appointment had established. And although it was not permitted to kill unarmed and orderly people so long as they were not inscribed in the catalogue of bandits, it happened that by the order of certain ministers, studious youths, unarmed, and protected by the constitution of the university, were privately put to death. The laws were silenced, justice was denied, the flower of the state assassinated. The King and his word were put in contradiction, made ridiculous, and the King himself made odious. Proprietors and merchants were robbed, the nobility was degraded, and all was in chaos and veritable confusion. Piedmont could no longer go on in this state."

Open agitation for constitutional liberty was impossible. Public discussion was forbidden. Professors were dismissed for having advocated liberalism in the past. But the most determined and the most courageous of the young men determined not to be crushed without a movement in behalf of liberty. Freemasonry and the Carbonari already existed under the French Government and naturally spread. Secret societies and open organizations less extreme, multiplied. Society was undermined by conspiracy more or less subversive, but the idea of Italian unity had not yet entered into the plans of the conspirators. A call for a constitution and the expulsion of the Germans, as the Austrians were called, were the limits of the expression of dissatisfaction in Piedmont. Officers of the army and students were drawn little by little into the secret associations, and the revolution developed itself almost involuntarily. The apathy of the court and the despotic tendencies of the King left no other issue but popular discontent, and a violent expression of it. The most liberal of the ministers did not go to the extent of advising the granting of a constitution. The impatience of the younger liberals took no account of the effect which was produced by the advice of honest conservatives. It was under these conditions

that the influence of the Spanish and Neapolitan revolutionary movements finally reached Piedmont.

Four students of the University of Turin appeared on the 11th of January, 1821, in the theatre of Angennes, wearing the red cap of the students, and were considered by the government as the authors of the first revolt. Santarosa, however, affirms that it was an isolated occurrence, and but the outbreak of youthful indiscretion; and more, that from January to March it had no consequence and did not arouse the activity of the conspirators; but, as it occurred during the revolution at Naples, it was considered a symptom of the times. The government, instead of judging the students according to the privileges of the university, by the magistrates whose duty it was to judge university offences, arrested one and confined him in the fortress. There arose, as is customary in such cases, an agitation among the students, his companions, who in great numbers paraded the streets to the university, and attacked with stones the carabinieri who were there assembled. Thereupon the troops were called out, and the students from the provincial college, going to the assistance of their associates of the university, were stopped by the soldiers. The ministers harangued them in vain to induce them to disperse, and on the night of the 12th, the agitation still continuing, the Governor of Turin came on the scene with four companies of grenadiers. He was received by the students with a volley of stones, upon which swords were drawn upon the unarmed young men, who numbered about three hundred. The body-guard and young noble officers—long afterwards ironically known as “the swordsmen”—attacked without reserve. Colonel Ciravegna, Cesare Balbo, Collobiano and others in vain attempted to arrest the fury of the soldiers. Of the number of killed or wounded on the part of the students there is no authentic record. The authorities declared that no one was killed, but the report of the students published on the 19th of January, directed to the students of the universities

of Italy, called it a massacre. This report stated that the red caps worn at Angennes were in customary use in Lombardy and in the provinces of Piedmont: it maintained that the arresting and imprisonment of the students violated the constitution of the university, which attributed to a special magistrate the recognition of all acts committed by the students of the university; and it accused of cruelty the officers of the regiment of the guards, while thanking the lower officers and soldiers for their moderation. According to the report, eleven of the students were killed and thirty-four wounded. The officers pursued the flying students into the school sword in hand. The bodies of the dead were carried by night out of the city.

The hopes of all the liberals were at this time based on the Prince of Carignano, the heir to the throne and nephew of the King, who had no direct heir. The Prince of Carignano was twenty-three years old. He had hitherto taken no part in public affairs which could have roused expectations of advanced liberalism; but at eleven years of age he was an officer in the Napoleonic army; he had lived in democratic surroundings, and was supposed to have more or less sympathy with constitutional aspirations. Returning early to his native country he associated with the young, and had been under the influence of Count Grimaldi, who was noted for his liberal tendencies. He had taken as secretary a scholar and dramatic writer, Alberto Nota. In his conversation with his friends he had openly spoken in a liberal sense, and was known to have expressed religious and political sentiments which for the time were extremely liberal. It is said that in 1814, after reading the proclamation of Schwartzburg which announced the restoration of King Vittorio Emanuele, he exclaimed,—“To wipe out this disgrace it is necessary to drive the Austrians out of Italy.” Numerous public men of that time have recorded indications of the hopes which, in default of any more definite indications in authoritative quarters, the constitutionalists centred on the Prince.

Martini adds that at the banquet of the officers of the artillery on the 4th of December, 1820, the Prince had displayed his pleasure at patriotic expressions. He wrote to Ugo Foscolo a letter seen by Lord John Russell which called Foscolo to come to Italy to defend the cause of liberty and independence. After the revolutions of Naples and Spain he said to one of the confederates, "And what are we doing?" And to Giacinto di Collegno he said, "Let us do something at home." A month before the outbreak of the revolutionary movement, Caraglio, Balbo and Collegno had begun to discuss with him the constitution. He replied to them, according to his own account, that he should always conform to his duties and especially to his duties towards the King, but did not exclude any line of action. The young men who led the conspiracy, some of whom were his intimates, looked to him as their chief, believing from his conversation that he was favourable to the movement so long as it was not hostile to the King. On the 6th of March everything was ready for the insurrection, and it only remained with the Prince to decide the manner of procedure. It is apparent that at this moment, while he had not expressed any opinions compromising himself or his position, he had not discouraged the overtures made to him. As the principal character at this stage of the liberal movement, and the man on whom the greatest responsibility rested, the Prince of Carignano remains the one dominant problem in the history of the time. Historical estimates of his position are widely different. To one writer he is the traitor of liberalism; to another the timid apologist of constitutionalism. He is considered to have been the Hamlet of the regeneration of Italy; one moment under the influence of his duty to the King and his earliest superstitions; and another under the pressure of the necessities of reform and obedience to popular tendency. Yielding frankly to neither, he vacillated between loyalty to the King and his desire to make himself head of the patriotic movement.

When, therefore, the chiefs of the conspiracy, Carlo di



San Marzano, Santarosa, Collegno, and Lisio, captain in the royal cavalry, waited on him to announce their readiness for the movement, they found with the Prince another person,—his own personal confidant. Who this person was history does not record. San Marzano opened the discussion. His language was that of a man perfectly convinced and recognizing no obstacles or difficulties which their plans had not foreseen and would not overcome. He foresaw obstacles, but believed that resolution and firmness would overcome all. He showed the Prince that they had before them Italy and posterity, and that the Piedmontese revolution would be the most glorious epoch of the house of Savoy, adding (and the future showed that his words were true), that in the movement which was being prepared there was no injury to be apprehended for the King or his family. Santarosa in turn exposed his views as to the manner in which the revolution should secure liberty within and the independence of the country. Every detail was explained to the Prince and the deputation finished with these words: "Prince, everything is ready; your consent alone is wanting. Our friends united wait for our return to give either the signal of salvation to the country, or the melancholy declaration that their hopes are vain." The consent was accorded by Carlo Alberto, and Santarosa grasped his hand with the freedom of a free citizen.

This is the precise, clear and particular account given by the conspirators of the Prince's action and of his relations with the movement at the outset. The Prince, in a document directed to the Great Powers in 1822, admits this conversation and recognizes the persons present. He puts the date as the 3rd, 4th or 6th of March and says, "They came to me to demand of me secrecy as to an important confidence which they were about to make to me. After having made a long dissertation on liberal ideas they finished by confessing themselves members of a society which for a long time had laboured for the interests of Italy; they said that I had always shown

a great attachment to my country and that I should in future enjoy great honour. Their conclusion was that they hoped that I would put myself at the head of their movement to obtain from the King slight concessions. I replied that I could not follow any other method of action than that which religion and honour prescribed to me, and that nothing in the world would make me depart from my duties. I attempted to persuade them and prove to them the folly of their enterprise, but they replied that what I had said to them was useless because they were bound by the strongest oaths. I then replied that I could not prevent them from doing what they desired, but that I should at least oppose them with my artillery. They then replied that this would be useless since all the regiments of the garrison were at their orders, and that I should not be able to command my own troops. To prove this to me they showed me a list in which I saw the names of the greater portion of the officers inscribed as confederates. I then said to them that since such a disgrace had befallen me I should go in person to the King. They left, saying to me that they counted on the secret, that they hoped that I would change my opinion, and that the revolution would break out on the day on which the King should come to Moncalieri."

Between these two accounts there is an open contradiction. Santarosa affirms that the consent of Charles Albert was given. Charles Albert says, "I said that I should oppose them with my artillery." Is it possible that Santarosa should have misunderstood the disposition of the Prince? No. There were five people present and between the two versions the difference is too great to be mistaken. Is it possible that Santarosa should have invented the story? No: not only because he was an honest man and incapable of falsehood, so that nobody, not even the Prince, would have dared to make such an accusation against him, but because he had no need to express himself with such precision if he had doubts or if he had wished to exaggerate. It was only necessary in such a case to say something

general. "Did Carlo Alberto lie? Yes; he lied because it was profitable for him to lie, and because his narrative not being destined to publicity gave him no reason to fear detection." "He did not deny his relations with the men of 1821," writes the minister of France at Florence, Maisonforte, after a conversation with the Prince, "but he assured me that they exaggerated and that the whole thing was nothing but a conversation without any conclusion." "The work of Santarosa," wrote the Prince to De Sonnaz, as soon as it was published, "is certainly very painful to me, but I ought to have expected it; I have not yet read it but I am sure that, in spite of his apparent sincerity, Santarosa has not spoken of the word of honour which he came to give me with Caraglio, that they had repounced their project entirely. They have not kept their word; they fled before the danger; they were hanged in effigy and in consequence they cannot make valid depositions."

In 1839, Carlo Alberto, then King, wrote from Racconigi another defence with the title, "*Ad majorem Dei gloriam*," quoted by Cibrario in his recollections of his mission to Portugal. He says, "I have been accused of Carbonarism; I have been accused of conspiracy," and then replies, "I should have been led to this by a sentiment more noble, more elevating than that of the Carbonari. I confess that it would have been more prudent, notwithstanding my extreme youth, if I had been silent when I heard their talk about war, about the desire of enlarging the possessions of the King, of contributing to the independence of Italy, and of obtaining at the price of our blood a power and an extension of territory which might increase the happiness of the country; but this patriotic impulse of a young soldier need not be denied by my grey hairs. Certainly at that moment I should not have been capable of any act contrary to the maxims of our holy religion, but I feel that to my last breath my heart will beat quickly at the name of country and the hope of independence of the foreigner."

"The relation of 1822," says Enrico Poggi, "is written with heat, with inexactness of dates and with many omissions; that of 1839 after having lost the real memory of the facts. Both, however, are interesting. On the critical points Carlo Alberto is silent." Neither San Marzano, nor Collegno, nor Lisio ever wrote a word, although they lived many years afterwards. Collegno was Minister of the King, and Lisio was deputy in 1848. Their omission to deny the important fact of the assent of the Prince in the conversation of the 6th of March is a crushing confirmation of the story of Santarosa, if there had been any need of it. The fifth person who was present at the conversation is supposed to have been Roberto d'Azeglio, and he never contradicted the assertion of Santarosa. But when Molinari asks, "How is it that no guarantee was ever asked of the Prince?"—should we not remember that the word of a Prince given to four gentlemen and Piedmontese officers was sufficient, and that in an engagement of this kind one does not draw up reports nor sign papers or guarantees?

Finally, as Santarosa affirms, in no document destined for publication did Carlo Alberto ever deny his consent to the Piedmontese revolution of 1821, therefore we must consider that consent as established. It is certain that on the night of the 6th the Prince, excited by the eloquence and by the convictions of his visitors, promised formally his cooperation in the revolution which was being prepared. This consent constitutes the first and greatest error of the Prince, from which follow all the others.

When Balbo in his autobiography says, "Before the outbreak I believed firmly that the Prince had entirely separated himself from the revolutionists and declared his resolution to them,—a resolution correct, good and useful to them," this does not exclude that before breaking with the conspirators he had been bound to them, and that after having been bound to them he denounced the conspiracy. That is to say, it does not

exclude the accusation of duplicity which is the best founded among all those made against Carlo Alberto regarding his conduct in this difficult crisis. If he had declared to those young men in the first conversation, that he desired like them the independence of Italy, but did not consider that the moment had come to act, and that in his position as heir to the throne, while deploring the state of government in Piedmont, he could not attempt to induce the King to change it; had he in short refused to be that head of the conspiracy which the conspirators considered necessary for the movement, he would have retarded the movement and reserved the liberal forces for some future time. Again, as Beauregard remarks, "if the Prince, instead of accepting explicitly or explicitly refusing, urged, excited and drawn on by Collegno, had sought compromises and little expedients to hinder the movement---such as talking with the King on the pretext that the King did not clearly understand the question,—even this equivocal conduct would have been an error, and a distinct refusal would have been the safest way of all." But on the 6th he was not uncertain; he became so afterwards. On the 6th he was decided and unequivocally accepted the revolution.

On the 7th of March the conspirators, in consequence of their conversation with the Prince, set to work to prepare everything. Santarosa says that the dawn of the 8th was the moment appointed for the outbreak of the revolution. The Prince knew it, because nothing was concealed from him. It was decided that Santarosa and Collegno should pass the night with the Prince in order to go with him to the arsenal at five o'clock in the morning. It is affirmed by Beolchi that it was arranged that at the dawn of the 8th, Collegno, with the officers of artillery and the regiment of Aosta, should take possession of the citadel, where the regiment was quartered, and then pass the Po and take possession of the Capuchin Hill which dominates the city. The King's regiment of light cavalry, from Pinerolo, the Queen's dragoons from Vercelli and those

of Piemonte Reale from the Veneria were to have assisted; they were to arrest Thaon de Revel, General de Vanonson and Majors Montezemolo, Regis and Ansaldi, and were to take possession of the citadel of Alessandria. "The evening of the 7th," says Santarosa, "Carlo Alberto declared to San Marzano and to Collegno that he withdrew his word. Therefore San Marzano and Collegno recalled the arrangements made for the next day." What took place in the Prince's mind between the night of the 6th and the night of the 7th? The morning of the 7th the Prince had called to the palace Cesare Balbo and General Giffenga, and both had confessed that nothing was ready for taking the field. The Prince urged the artillery officers to withdraw from the affair and then disclosed to the Minister of War that the conspiracy was formed and revealed to him everything that had been done; not, however, the names of the conspirators. Had he given his consent to the revolution on the 6th and then betrayed what he had then learned? This is one of the foundations for the accusation of treachery.

The same day the King left for Moncalieri accompanied by the Prince. "On the morning of the 8th," continues Santarosa, "we were told that the Prince had complained of our timidity and had blamed us for being too soon discouraged, and of having abandoned the undertaking." Beolchi says that the conspirators were joined here by Count Sanmichele, colonel of the light cavalry of Piemonte, and the chiefs prepared the insurrection for the 10th. The night of the 8th San Marzano and Santarosa, accompanied by Sanmichele, at the same hour as on the two preceding days, went again to the Prince. They notified him that the revolution was to be commenced. They concealed the day and omitted all details as to the measures taken, fearing that the Prince in another attack of weakness would again oppose all their projects. The Prince, who had on the 7th taken the only correct way that remained open to him, that of disengaging himself from every pledge, adopted

for himself a conduct more reserved and did not give them all the information that he had, but he renewed his consent to the Piedmontese revolution. On the 6th the acceptance; on the 7th the denial; on the 8th a new consent. He reasoned with the officers and under-officers of the artillery, while a single energetic word would have been sufficient to hold them to their duty.

On the evening of the 8th, a meeting of the conspirators was held, in which the final measures were taken. On the 9th the Prince sent for Santarosa and gave him instructions to be adopted for the safety of the King. Santarosa suspected in this an artifice to find out the day which had been fixed, and replied that they were conspiring against Austria and her agents, but that the conspirators were the best and most faithful friends of the King. "What remains to be said," continues Santarosa, "is what pains me most. In the moment at which Carlo Alberto had seemed to promise the conspirators his adhesion, he had already given the order and disposed affairs in such a manner as to render impossible any movement at Turin, and probably make Santarosa and Collegno the victims of the love of their country." "A fatal contradiction which can only be explained by accusing the Prince of treachery, and one would rather say that Carlo Alberto was uncertain." Then the conspirators sent orders to Alessandria, to Fossano and to Vercelli to revoke the arrangements. The Minister of War, warned by the Prince, had not taken energetic measures for the arrest of the chiefs, which can be explained only by the weakness of the Government, by the desire to take no serious responsibility, and by the hope that they might still be able to persuade the chiefs to desist from action.

The counter-orders did not arrive in time, or nobody thought fit to obey them. On the 9th General Sanmichele with the light horse of Piemonte marched from Fossano to Moncalieri. The same night at a meeting of officers and citizens at Alessandria, it was debated in the house of Chevalier

Baronis what to do, and it was decided to revolt in the name of Italy and to occupy the citadel in the night. At the same time a proclamation issued to the soldiers said: "Hasten to surround a Prince, who, although he is heir to the throne and is faithful to his King, has sworn to fall with you rather than survive your and his own dishonour."

The morning of the 10th, Captain Count Palma with a Genoese regiment raised in the citadel a cry for the constitution of Spain. The Queen's dragoons with Captain Baronis, Lieutenant Bianco and several citizens joined him. A committee of government was formed: Colonel Ansaldi, President; members, Baronis, Bianco, Giovanni Dosena, Count Palma, Urbano Rattazzi, and Luzzi, Secretary General.

The proclamations of the committee of Alessandria, which derived their origin and strength from the Carbonari, are the only utterances of the revolution of '20 and '21 which have a decidedly unitarian character. In one of them allusion is made to the King as "King of Italy" and also to the national parliament. In another, "In the name of the Italian confederation and of Italian independence, the constitution of Spain is promulgated," and "no more hereditary children of despotism shall hold the dignities, but they shall be elective, and merit alone shall have preeminence in them, and only in law shall be found the power of the state." Another said, "The national committee shall be considered legitimately formed when the King shall have made his person sacred and inviolable by the legitimisation of his authority as King of Italy." Another concluded, "Long live the King, the constitution of Spain, and Italy."

At the news of the movement in Alessandria the conspirators of Turin considered themselves in honour engaged to support it, and although the head was still wanting, Dr Carta went to Vercelli, Vanni to Fossano, Beolchi to Pinerolo to call the regiments to Turin. Collegno hurried to Alessandria, where he arrived on the morning of the 11th with Captain



Ravice of the artillery ; San Marzano to Vercelli, where he in vain attempted to draw away from its colonel the regiment of the Queen's dragoons. Lisio went to Pinerolo, where he called together Ghini, Pecorara, Conti, Calosso, Bruno, Capanni and others, and drew off three hundred of the King's light horse. Here Santarosa raised the cry of "War to Austria," and he and Lisio signed at Carmagnola, on the way to Alessandria, the following declaration: "The Piedmontese army, in the gravity of the present condition of Italy and in Piedmont, cannot abandon the King to the influence of the Austrians. This influence hinders the best of Princes from satisfying the wishes of his people, who desire to live under the government of law and to see its proper interests guaranteed by a liberal constitution. This ruinous influence is the reason of Vittorio Emmanuele remaining a spectator, and of his approving in a certain way war made diplomatically by Austria on the sacred rights of nations in order that she may govern the whole peninsula, and degrade and rob Piedmont, the object of her hatred because she is not yet subject to her. We have two purposes ; to put the King in a position to be able to follow the impulses of his Italian heart, and to claim for the people the just and honourable liberty of expressing their desires to the King as to a father. If we have violated somewhat the laws of military discipline, we have been drawn to it by the supreme need of the country, and our guide is the example of the Prussian army, which in 1813 saved Germany by the spontaneous war undertaken against the oppressor ; but we swear to defend at once the person of the King and the honour of his crown against any enemy,—if Vittorio Emmanuele should ever have any other enemies than those of Italy."

As they entered the citadel of Alessandria, the Governor di Varax went with the regiments of Savoy, with the superior officers of the regiment of Genoa and the Queen's dragoons, direct to Susa, having decided to remain faithful. The revolutionary troops occupied the city ; Ansaldi took the

command of the division, Santarosa that of the city and of the national guard, Collegno took charge of the citadel, while San Marzano, with four hundred cavalry and a strong detachment of national guards, marched against Casale. At Turin on the 9th of March the Minister of War, Saluzzo, and Governor Revel announced to the Prince of Carignano the movement of Fossano. The Prince accompanied the Minister to the barracks, called together the officers and the troops and reminded them of the fidelity they owed to the King. On the 10th, on the announcement of the pronunziamento of Alessandria, Cesare Balbo went to tell him that at the royal palace they counted upon his influence to obtain from the King some sort of constitution. The Prince very prudently replied that such a demand should be made by a minister, on account of which Balbo returned with his father and Valesa. To them the Prince still more prudently replied that he would make a proposal to the King only in the presence of the Council and if assured of their support. The Prince, accordingly, notified the King that, to calm the public, it seemed to him necessary to promise some concession. The ministers Balbo and Valesa sustained the proposal; Count Saluzzo and Marquis Brignoli were silent, the other members of the Council were opposed. The King declared that he would make no concession. So the Council, after having provided for the safety of the King and of the throne, was able to go to sleep.

The conspirators, on the other hand, did not go to sleep. On the morning of the 11th eighty soldiers led by Captain Ferrero, going from Carignano, called, as Beolchi says, "conspirators" by the Turinese, planted at San Salvatio in front of the city the flag of the Neapolitan revolution. Eighty men outside proposed to fight about six thousand inside. The six thousand did not move, but the eighty were joined by about one hundred young men, some citizens and some students from the provincial college, led by their tutors. The advocate Giulio Simondi and Pollone brought sixty muskets

people, but the King refused. Under the windows of the palace were four or five regiments. The Prince, according to Beauregard, insisted that the King should put himself at their head and declared that he would finish quickly with the insurrection. Energetic decisions seemed to be about to prevail when, according to the Prince's account, Revel and Saluzzo represented to his Majesty that he was exposing himself uselessly. The King went to see the Queen to inform her of his intention to abdicate. The Council being called together, some of the military chiefs were disposed to guarantee the fidelity of the troops. Colonel Ciravegna, of the regiment of Aosta, said that he could only depend upon his regiment for the defence of the King. Count Lodi said that thirty thousand armed men were marching on the citadel. It is also said that the King had on the table the constitution of Spain, and that the communication from Laibach above alluded to prevented him from accepting it. Having heard this discussion the King decided to consult the Queen.

Of their conversation there was no witness. Balbo affirms that the Queen demanded the regency and the faculty of conceding the constitution. The King returning to the Council declared that he would not grant the constitution of Spain, and therefore he abdicated and charged the Prince of Carignano with the regency. Carlo Alberto declares that he repeatedly refused the offer, but that two hours afterwards, when again requested by the King, in the presence of all the ministers, he said that he considered it his duty to accept it, demanding nevertheless that the Queen should be present at the abdication. The King confirmed his abdication, and the Prince of Carignano was legally invested with the regency of the kingdom on the night of the 12th of March. Vittorio Emanuele, accompanied by General Giffenga, left the next day. He was neither willing to oppose the rebellion by force, nor to promise, after the manner of Ferdinand of Naples, the constitution with the intention of withdrawing it. He behaved as

an honest man but his action was disastrous to the hopes and interests of the country.

On the 13th Count Palma, Marquis of Prie, proclaimed at Ivrea the constitution of Spain. Vercelli, Asti and Casale adhered to the movement. On the same day at Turin the regiment of Aosta, commanded by Colonel Ciravegna, called for a constitution. The municipality went to the royal palace calling for the constitution of Spain. The King had abdicated the throne and given the regency to the Prince; why did the Prince accept it if not to grant the constitution? Carlo Alberto relates that it was late in the evening, and the citadel threatened to fire on the city. "The syndics renewed their pressure, and I said to them after five hours of refusal that I could not change the fundamental law of the state; that they should await the orders of the new King; that all that I should do would be illegal, but that to prevent a fight which would be only a massacre, and to avert the disorders with which we were menaced, I would permit the Spanish constitution to be proclaimed pending the orders of the new King."

This declaration of Carlo Alberto is only another of the evasions and equivocal declarations with which he covers the whole of his conduct through this conflict. It is confirmed by no other declaration made known by anybody at the time. He evidently desired simply to divide with his advisers the responsibility of an act which he throughout fully approved. He therefore demanded of the Council and the functionaries of the various orders the following declaration: "We, the undersigned, at the demand of his Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, declare that the actual circumstances are so grave, the dangers of a civil war so imminent, and the vote of the people so strongly expressed, that we consider it indispensable for the public safety and imposed by the situation, that the Spanish constitution should be promulgated, with such modifications as His Majesty, in agreement with the national representation, shall consider advisable." This declaration was signed by the

Syndics, Ministers, Generals and others present at Turin, after which the Spanish constitution was proclaimed.

The Spanish constitution was more democratic than the English or French. It recognized the sovereignty of the nation; it declared the Catholic religion the only true one, and the religion of the state, and forbade any other worship; it restricted the making of laws to the assembly, leaving only the faculty of putting them into execution to the King; every citizen was an elector in the parish and elected secondary electors who in their turn elected district electors, who again elected electors of provinces on whom depended the choice of the deputies. To be deputy it was necessary to have a certain income, but the ministers and counsellors of the state and the employes in the King's household were ineligible as deputies. The deputies were paid and elected for two years. The King might veto a law twice, but on its passing a third time the consent of the King was dispensed with. The King could neither dissolve nor prorogue the assembly, nor could he absent himself from the kingdom or marry without its consent. The details of local administration were needlessly complicated.

It seems proved by various contemporary documents that the Prince immediately on the proclamation of the constitution set to work to deprive it of all moral authority, and himself of all credit for having consented to its proclamation. He himself declares that he wrote to the Governors of Genoa, Novara and Savoy on the 17th of March that he considered the proclamation of no value until it had been approved by the King. This is the second confessed duplicity of the Prince of Carignano, and one which complicated still more his position and that of the country. Such is the opinion of the liberal writers, but in view of the singular mixture of qualities in the Regent it seems to me fair to admit that being only Regent he may have had honest convictions that on the King alone depended the final confirmation of the constitution, let the proclamation be made by whom it might. He might well believe sincerely

that his acts as Regent were capable of invalidation by the King. The inborn reverence for the Crown never deserted Carlo Alberto. But subsequent events showed that his political conceptions had no stability. Had he been King, much of this defect might have disappeared, but, as it was, his hesitations and his alternate acceptances and refusals destroyed all his moral authority and led the country into dangerous complications. The subsequent details of the organization of the constitutional kingdom, in view of the utter failure of that organization, have no importance. On the 15th of March the Prince and the government took the oath of fealty to the Spanish constitution and of allegiance to the new King, without any reserve as to his approbation.

The decision to declare war on Austria was an absurdity, and only gave Austria the desired opportunity to intervene in Piedmontese affairs. On the 15th of March the emperors of Austria and Russia at Laibach had decided to increase the Austrian army in Italy to sixty thousand, and to mobilize one hundred thousand Russians. The discord in the councils of the late insurgents continued and paralysed all preparations for war abroad and all organization at home. Carlo Felice, absent at Modena, repudiated the concessions made by the Regent and issued the following edict: "We, Carlo Felice, Duke of Genoa, declare by the present document, that in virtue of the act of abdication of King Vittorio Emmanuele, our well-beloved brother, which has been communicated to us, we enter into possession of the fulness of royal power, postponing, however, the assumption of the title until our august brother, in the possession of entire freedom, shall communicate to us his pleasure. We declare, moreover, that far from consenting to any innovation in the form of government in force at the epoch of the abdication of the King, our beloved brother, we shall regard as rebels all those of the subjects of his Majesty who have taken part with the insurgents, or who may hereafter join them, or who permit themselves either to proclaim

the constitution or to commit any act whatever contrary to the fulness of the royal authority. We declare as null all other acts of sovereign competence which may have taken place since the aforesaid abdication but which have not emanated from us or have not received our sanction. At the same time we invite all subjects of the King who have remained faithful, to persevere in their sentiments, to resist with energy the few rebels, and to hold themselves ready to obey our orders and reply to all appeals that we may make to them for the re-establishment of legitimate order. On our part we shall do everything to aid them as quickly as possible. Full of confidence in the grace and assistance of God, who always protects the cause of justice, and sure that our august allies are disposed to come promptly to our help to re-establish order and tranquillity, we promise to recompense those who shall have merited to be particularly distinguished by us. By the present proclamation we notify all the subjects of the King our will and rule of conduct. Carlo Felice."

Accompanying this was a private letter from the King to the Regent enjoining him to go to Novara, to surrender his authority into the hands of General La Tour, and to await his orders. The Prince paid no attention to the private letter and hesitated to give full effect to the proclamation. Duplicity and indecision continued, and while, on the one hand, the chiefs of the insurgents continued their preparations, the Prince neither took measures to resist the King nor prepared to submit to him. Here appears in its full gravity the vacillating character of the Regent. Had he had that reverence for the authority of the King which would partially have justified his infidelity to his supporters, he could not have hesitated to resign: if he had it not, he must still have recognized the absolute necessity of resignation, being in no position to contest the order. Had he supported his followers he would probably have been defeated, but events might have justified him: as it is, he cannot be justified. On the 27th of March, on receiving another letter

from Carlo Felice, the Prince addressed himself to Vittorio Emanuele begging him to resume the crown. The Austrian preparations for effective assistance to Carlo Felice continuing, the Regent repaired to Milan, where he was received by the Austrian authorities and whence he ultimately went into exile according to the orders of the King. The revolution, thus abandoned by all authority, opposed by the King and by the powers of Austria and Russia, had no alternative but to become an active insurrection or to submit and dissolve.

Santarosa, now the head of the insurrection and legitimate Minister of War by appointment of the Regent, decided energetically to remain in effective authority and to continue the work already begun. Refusing to accept Carlo Felice's repudiation of the accomplished facts, he continued the military and civil organization, and prepared for war. He called out the national guard, prepared for the defence of Turin and summoned the country to arms. The proclamation of the 27th of March declares: "The Prince Regent has abandoned the capital on the night of the 21st to the 22nd of this month without notifying the national committee or his own ministers. Let no Piedmontese impeach the intentions of a prince whose heart is liberal and whose zeal for the Italian cause has been thus far the hope of all good men. A small number of men, deserters of the country and servants of Austria, have certainly deceived with detestable fabrications a young prince without experience in these difficult times. A declaration signed by Carlo Felice has appeared in Piedmont, but a Piedmontese king in the midst of Austrians, our inevitable enemies, is a king in prison; nothing of what he may say can or ought to be accepted as coming from him. We will prove to him that we are his children. Our standard is the royal standard, the noble eagle of Savoy, and we are proud of it.\* Piedmontese soldiers, national guards, do you wish civil war? Do you wish the devastation of your fields, the conflagration and sacking of your cities and your villages?



Do you wish to forfeit your glory and defile your standards? Shall Piedmontese in arms rise against Piedmontese in arms? Shall brothers oppose brothers? Corps commanders, officers, under-officers and soldiers, there is and can be only one way of safety. Gather around our flag; surround it; take it and hasten with it to the banks of the Ticino and the Po. The Lombard land at our appearance will devour its enemies. Companions in arms, this is a turning point for Europe."

The plans were in agreement with these exhortations. General Bellotti was to take the place of General La Tour at Novara, Ciravegna to take the field with the legions and Bussolino to unite with Ansaldi at Alexandria. But Lombardy was not prepared to assist in the insurrection; the generals delegated to the different services were not prepared to accept the alternative of active insurrection; the army was divided, one half demoralized, or faithful to the King. The troops who still supported the revolution, amounting to fifteen thousand, were dispersed in the cities of Genoa, Turin and Alexandria. Revolutionary bands assembled here and there without order or coherence. The Austrians arrived at Novara early in the following month and after slight encounters in various localities, the insurrection came to an end.

## CHAPTER III.

### CARLO FELICE AND THE REPRESSION. THE SUCCESSION OF CARLO ALBERTO AND THE REVIVAL.

THE insurrection having been suppressed by the Austrian forces, Count La Tour entered Turin on the 10th of April, 1821, and instituted tribunals for the punishment of the insurgents. A military commission judged and condemned five hundred and twenty-three of the insurgents, of whom ninety-one were condemned to death, fifty-three to perpetual imprisonment, while four hundred and twenty-one officers and soldiers were reprimanded. The university was closed, the students deprived of their privileges, and the regiments that had taken part in the revolt were dissolved. On the 30th of September Carlo Felice published from Modena a general amnesty, from which, however, various categories of persons were excepted, including the authors or promoters of the conspiracies or agitations to obtain a change of government; those in whose houses meetings were held for revolutionary purposes; those who had corrupted, or attempted to corrupt, the fidelity of the troops; those who, presiding over educational institutions, had misled the young; and those who in writings, published or not, had advocated the institution of the new form of government. The private soldiers who had taken

part in the movement were pardoned ; the non-commissioned officers and guards were obliged to justify their conduct ; the officers were all declared guilty of felony.

The character of Carlo Felice, the new King, has been variously judged according as his judges were liberal or conservative. He was simply a determined despot, kindly and even generous when no question of his authority was involved, inflexible when it was a question of royal authority. He detested etiquette and ceremonial, was devoted to Austria and the church, and abhorred liberalism in all shapes and forms. He entered Turin on the 18th of October and was received with great ceremony by the authorities but with absolute indifference by the population. He re-established in Piedmont all the ancient forms of despotic personal government. The universities were reorganized with the following regulations. All the heads of the university must be ecclesiastics ; the students could not leave the houses chosen for them as dwellings without the permission of the prefect ; they were obliged to observe the fasts under the supervision of the prefect ; every student was obliged every year to give in his certificate of communion ; they were forbidden to go to cafés, billiard-rooms or public spectacles, and were obliged to retire at certain hours. All the professors of the secondary schools, even if by chance they happened to be laymen, were obliged to wear the ecclesiastical dress. All the examiners of the schools in the provinces were to be either parish priests or bishops, and if in the departments of theology or letters, they were to be Jesuits.

Carlo Felice had neither children nor direct heirs. The Duke of Modena, an Austrian Archduke and husband of the eldest daughter of Vittorio Emanuele, ambitious and intriguing, desired the abolition of the Salic law, which prevented his wife from occupying the throne, in order that by succeeding she might unite Modena to Piedmont. Austria, on the other hand, had a distinct aspiration to extend her

dominion over Piedmont and had for many years nourished this ambition as a measure of hostility against France. The opposition of England chiefly, and secondarily of Russia, prevented Austria from attaining her purpose. Piedmont was preserved by European policy rather as a barrier between France and Austria than from any sympathy with Italian aspirations felt by the Great Powers, with the single exception of England, which was however carried away by the others. The principle of legitimacy made the succession of the Prince of Carignano inevitable. It was said that Vittorio Emanuele proposed that, on condition of the cession of Lombardy in addition to Modena to Piedmont, he would consent to the abolition of the Salic law and the succession of the Duke of Modena; but the actuality of this proposition is a matter as to which the leading authorities differ widely. The contrary is indicated rather by the conduct of Carlo Felice toward the Prince of Carignano, and the probability is that accession to the throne developed in Carlo Felice a spirit of individuality and nationality which he had never felt in private life, and that pride of dynasty to a certain extent took the place of pride of nation.

The question of succession was settled definitely in favour of Prince Carlo Alberto by his accepting the obligation of constituting, so soon as he should succeed to the throne, a Council of State, which should include certain bishops and archbishops, and all the knights of the Annunziata, in order to maintain and watch over the organic constitution of the monarchy as he found it at the death of his predecessor. In 1825 Carlo Felice drew up a testament, in which he recognized as true and legitimate heir of the states subject to him, Prince Carlo Eduardo Alberto of Savoy, Prince of Carignano, "my very dear nephew," and his descendants in perpetuity. In the same year Carlo Felice received the emperor Francis at Genoa. At this interview it is supposed that the Italian league, under the presidency of the Emperor

of Austria, was urged, but Carlo Felice, in his jealousy of Austria's ambitions, preferred England's protection. The remainder of his reign passed in tranquillity. In 1831 he died at Turin and Carlo Alberto succeeded to the throne. His previous history naturally augmented the hopes of the liberals, but the character of the King preserved the same hesitancies, the same alternations between recognition of liberal claims and assertion of royal prerogatives, which made any regular liberal progress impossible for the state.

The administration of the state remained what it had been, and the French revolution of 1830 did not seem to affect the institutions of Piedmont. The pressure of Austria may have produced its influence on the King, but the probability is that the obstinacy of his character would have prevented him from drawing back from his promise to preserve political institutions in the condition in which he had found them. Meanwhile, however, the secret societies spread and the conspiracies for the realization of constitutional government under Mazzini became the leading feature of the political life of Piedmont. The society of Young Italy organized at this epoch by Mazzini became a powerful agency; spreading from Genoa it affected the entire state, and involved the army. In 1833 the reactionary tendency of the authorities developed a rigorous course of judicial proceedings, exile and imprisonment. Many liberals were imprisoned, or went into voluntary exile, and the usual course of persecution was followed by the usual consequences—a more effective propaganda.

The society of Young Italy became one of the most effective institutions of progress which Italy has ever seen. It was distinctly republican, and the first two articles of its constitution are a formal declaration of war against all monarchical institutions. They say, "Article I. This society is instituted for the destruction, now become indispensable, of all the governments of the peninsula, to unite all Italy in a single state under republican government." Article II says,

"Having recognized that absolute government is the cause of many horrible evils, and that constitutional monarchy does not in any respect diminish them, we all ought to work for the foundation of the republic, one and indivisible." The conspiracies of Young Italy, when discovered, led to acts of suppression and vengeance on the part of the royal authorities such as even the active insurrection of Alessandria had not caused. A period of savage persecution and repression followed, and the conduct of the King during this period, 1833 to 1835, repeats the worst type of the despotism of the past governments of Italy: none of the aggravations of political oppression—prison, torture, death—were lacking, and some of the executions remain signalized in the history of Italy as amongst the worst deeds of despotic government. No period of the Austrian domination in Lombardy and Venice equalled the brutality of the government of Carlo Alberto during this period. He not only gave himself up entirely to the influence of the Austrians, but seemed to invite the approbation of the Austrian authorities by the excess to which he carried measures of oppression.

At a meeting of the Prince with the King and Metternich at Genoa in 1825, Carlo Alberto had already shown his devotion to Austrian principles. Metternich writes: "Our stay at Genoa will be productive of good results. The King is perfect, and the Prince of Carignano, who appears to be afraid both of the emperor and of myself, as everybody says, conducted himself very well. He uttered frankly his *pater peccavi*, and seemed in fact firmly resolved never more to be made an instrument. If the contrary should ever happen, I do not know what evil star will have brought it about, because he thoroughly knows his former friends. He passed several hours with me and told me all the particulars of the liberal organization as I have never before heard them. Amongst other things he gave me important information as to the conduct of the Duke of Angoulême and his famous head-quarters. As to experience,

the time that he passed with the French army and at Paris has been very useful. He speaks with all the frankness which gives one the air of a convert. In the case of his conversion not being genuine, he could never justify himself to the emperor and much less to me. 'I was a tool,' he said, taking leave of me, 'and I was so completely; to-day I do not wish to be so and I will be so no more. I have learned liberalism and its directors, and I am disgusted with them.' His entire conduct is in fact conformed to this declaration, and the Emperor thinks, as I do, that he is not likely to be recaptured easily. God grant it." This attitude of the King gives the key to his conduct in the treatment of Young Italy. The facts of 1833 show that he thought then to make Italy by ordering to the gallows and the galleys whoever dared to pronounce its name. If in 1821 he had been able to excuse himself by the inexperience of his youth and by the difficulties of his position, his conduct in 1833, when a man grown and in secure possession of the crown, and the extreme severities to which he abandoned himself without any justification, show that he had no desire to give constitutional government to Italy.

But the terrible persecutions inflicted on Young Italy and on all who were suspected of being affiliated to it, produced no relaxation in the energy of the conspirators. Mazzini was indefatigable, and during this period his influence was the dominant influence in the evolution of Italy; he devised an undertaking which was intended by active measures to raise the spirits of the party, and organized an expedition which from Switzerland and from different points should raise the standard of revolution in Savoy. At the same time he proposed risings in various other quarters with the expectation of diverting the attention of the authorities and preventing a concentration against the republican movement. Genoa, Parma, Romagna, the Valtelline and Brescia were to rise, to call off the attention of Austria; and an agitation was commenced in France with

the hope of obtaining French assistance. The forces to be raised were put under the command of a soldier of Napoleon by the name of Ramorino.

But the organization of the expedition lacked every element of success, and it did not even succeed in meeting the royal forces. Attacked in detail by the population, it was everywhere defeated and ignominiously suppressed. The chief point of interest in its history is the appearance of Garibaldi, who undertook to direct the movement at Genoa. The expedition, like many other dreams of Mazzini, had no practical possibility. The forces proposed to be raised, one thousand men, mainly refugees collected here and there without congruity or organization, revealed his complete incapacity to conceive the conditions of success in an armed movement, and the consequences of complete failure involved the suppression and exile of all the principal agents. Garibaldi in after years used to refer to this expedition as an indication of the incapacity of Mazzini as a revolutionist. His abilities as a conspirator were unequalled.

With the suppression of the insurrection of Savoy ended all active movements for the constitutional reform of Italy. The government of Carlo Alberto, despotic, suspicious, resembled in all respects that of his predecessors, and during the ten years following, the state was given up to despotism in civil affairs and bigotry in religion. The government was carried on through the police and the real power was vested in the church. La Farina and Brofferio say "the police and the clergy became in Piedmont the curse of the state." The police were more powerful than ever. In the principal cities of the provinces, the governor; in the smaller towns, the directors of the carabinieri; and in the villages, the syndic and the parish priest, governed. From Genoa, the directors of the Jesuits, and with them the ladies of the Sacred Heart and other religious orders for various classes, guided the policy and opinions of the state.\* The Austrian Minister, writing in 1834 to the Governor of Milan, says: "If we may judge by appearances,



the people of Turin are the farthest from any ideas of revolution, and the most firmly religious; the army is devotedly faithful; the King was received with perfect cordiality during all the festivities, at which between thirty and forty thousand persons were assembled."

The great outbreak of cholera in Nice, Genoa, and Piedmont depressed public feeling and public prosperity, and probably hindered any revival of patriotic sentiment. In 1835 a reaction against Austrian influence made a faint appearance, probably due to the exaggerated pressure exercised by Austrian agents on the King. The more intelligent and more patriotic friends of the King stimulated this reaction, and while in its own affairs Piedmont scarcely realized the severity of the despotism which characterized the King's early career, the tendency to independence from Austria became more evident. The political ideas of the King, while opposed to Austria, were no more liberal than the Austrian, but the spirit of the time produced certain results in the codification of law. The civil code, proclaimed in 1837, gave to Piedmont for the first time a body of law, harmonious indeed but adapted to the principles of the Catholic religion and monarchical privilege rather than to modern purposes. In 1839 the penal code was published. This was a reactionary code, in which heresy was punished by prison, and attempted homicide, the concealment of crime, sacrilege and the theft of sacred objects by death—the axe for noblemen and the gallows for the common people. In 1840 the military code was published, and in 1842 the commercial. The priesthood was governed by special laws; but, after all, the principle was recognized of the subjection of all classes to law. On the other hand local reforms progressed slowly; political, not at all.

In 1838 the King met the Emperor of Austria at Pavia, and Metternich again testifies to the King's fidelity to his former professions. The King wrote: "It is with great impatience that I have waited for the fortunate moment in

which, after so many years have passed since our meeting at Genoa, I permit myself to ask you, are you contented with me, and do you find that I have been faithful to the engagements I took in 1825 towards the Emperor and his Ministers? At Genoa I read on the countenance of the Emperor and your own that you did not put entire confidence in the frankness of my explanations of the unfortunate past, nor on the value of my promises for the future. I confess that I was not surprised. I should have marvelled had your impressions been different." Metternich replied that he had kept his word. Carlo Alberto added, "To give you a proof of the faith which I repose in you alone, there is in the world a great conspiracy which seems only directed against the thrones, but is in fact directed against the peace of the social world. I do not suppose I can teach you anything new on this subject; that which I desire to prove to you is that I am not the tool of a faction, like so many others. It is certain that the position of a King of Sardinia is the most difficult of all positions; this difficulty depends on the defects of the Piedmontese character—a character disposed to intrigue, at once bold and timid, complaining and cautious. The position of the head of a country animated by such an unfortunate character is by that very fact rendered extremely difficult. He is never free from foreign pressure and therefore must entertain suspicions against other governments. The Piedmontese feeling is above all things anti-Austrian; it is the influence of France which strengthens this tendency." Then he begged Metternich, in case his conduct did not seem to him clear, to apply to him directly and not trust his letters to the post. Metternich replied that he would rarely profit by this privilege and that the only useful way of dealing with these Piedmontese characters was the way of frankness, open to those who have nothing to hide, either of what they want or of the direction which they follow.

These indications of the character of the King, so

mysterious in his general tendencies, are useful as pointing out certain clues to his conduct. When he considered himself in his relation to Piedmont alone, he was a despot of the despots. The moment he placed himself face to face with Austria he became a liberal, not for the sake of liberalism, but because Austria was despotic and because the only way of combating Austria was through the liberal tendency of the time.

It is impossible to reconcile the conduct of Carlo Alberto in 1833 and 1834 with any just conception of a liberal monarchy or of constitutional rights. Clearly in his mind the people had no rights; they rested with the King alone. And if at any time he was disposed to make concessions in the direction of constitutional liberty, it was because he found every other road blocked by Austria. Most of his contemporaries were more or less infected by constitutionalism. A desire for liberty for himself from the control of Austria and of the Jesuits, made him seem to desire liberty for all.

I have dwelt at greater length, perhaps, than due proportion in the subject justifies, on the details of the conduct of Carlo Alberto, because either with or against his will and tendencies he becomes a starting-point for the development of the history of the kingdom of Italy. In mitigation of so severe a judgment there are certain passages in his life and writings which in justice should be given. We have already seen (p. 24) what he wrote in 1839 in defence of his action in 1821. And in 1840 he writes to Villamarina: "To gain twenty battles is well, but I would be contented, for a cause which I know of, to gain ten and be killed in the tenth; then I should die happy, thanking God." The inconsistencies of this character are irreconcilable. In 1840, when Austria proposed to occupy the line of the Po, in view of the threatened war between France and Germany, the King declared that he would make war on Austria or maintain an armed neutrality. At the same time, according to Bianchi, it is shown by dispatches between Vienna and Turin, that the Piedmontese government had already alienated France

by its support of Don Carlos, and England by denying any concession to the Waldenses, and that it finally yielded to Austria without any hope of compensation. It is useless to attempt to follow farther these inconsistencies in the life of a man whose heart is an insoluble mystery. Tivaroni says of him, "The ideal of Carlo Alberto consisted in a despotism founded on catholicism, but enlightened. All that which did not conflict in his mind with religion, everything that did not lean to liberalism, he promoted generously." Adding to this the inextinguishable and incessant detestation of Austria, to which he never dared give expression and which perhaps for that very reason was more intense, we have an explanation which, if not sufficient for all the sides of the problem, at least relieves him from the worst imputations brought against him. In any case the position of Carlo Alberto in Italian history is too important for light judgments.

Amongst the later studies to which it is worth our while to give particular attention, is that of Baron A. Blanc (*De la Monarchie Représentative en Italie*<sup>1</sup>), who is perhaps one of the best fitted amongst the writers on recent Italian history to throw a fair light on this period of it. Among the conclusions of the work indicated occurs the following passage: "It is easy to conjecture, after what has been revealed as to this strange reign, what were the recommendations with which Carlo Felice had accompanied the legacy of the crown. The old King must have spoken to his successor pretty nearly thus: 'You are not strong enough, you and your old friends, to declare war on Austria and to organize a constitutional régime. Rome opposes liberty as much as Austria does independence, and these two obstacles being united, and a league formed between them, you cannot attack one in front without attacking the other, which would be senseless. Can you some day separate from this question the religious element which your interests and your duties forbid you to touch? That is your affair. For the moment

<sup>1</sup> *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1859.

do not depart from the policy which I have followed, and be you prudent, or you are lost.' In fact it was impossible to enter into a campaign against two adversaries, of whom one, long since *en vedette* but now suddenly intervening as the chief *corps d'armée*, disposed of nearly the entire official nation, of nearly every one of the influences of public employment. The liberal party, feeble, disorganized, divided, distrustful, long excluded from public duties, was not a sufficient auxiliary. The King, faithful in spite of all, sought help from abroad and asked of Louis Philippe if he could count, in giving a constitution, on the assistance of the French army in the case of aggression on the part of Austria should she be discontented. The government of July, which was just then preparing the expedition of Ancona, took no engagements. Carlo Alberto made some efforts to reform abuses; his orders were evaded. He was overwhelmed with remonstrances from all the notables of the preceding reign; he was obliged to submit to these personages, not being able to make a *tabula rasa* of all the functionaries of the kingdom. They invented an incredible implement—the opposition of the bureaux. Every generous idea of the King passed under the censure of the ministerial departments, and came out mutilated or reduced to nothing. In 1834, a minister said publicly that the King was a rascal, a traitor and a brigand, but that happily Austria had no confidence in him and could make Radetzky punish him. M. della Margarita, minister of foreign affairs, to-day (1859) chief of the Right in the Parliament, said and caused to be said, that the King was a Carbonaro; and the Count Broglia, minister at Rome, said freely that between the King and M. della Margarita, he would never hesitate, in case of contradiction, to obey the orders of the latter. All the diplomacy of Piedmont belonged to the Austro-Roman league, and the King in its eyes was only a suspicious personage.

"What we have to say is so contrary to appearances that we should fear to be accused of writing romance if the epoch

in question was not so recent, and if the greater part of the men who have groaned under the shame of these disgraces were not still living and ready to give their evidence. They who know how much acuteness of finesse and ability Italian natures may acquire when the Jesuits take pains to make them supple—those who have studied contemporary Italy, reared in the school of servitude, and certain faces which could be named, and which aid us to understand Machiavelli, Alberoni and Mazarin—they only can form an idea of the network which was thrown over Carlo Alberto, and which he would never have broken through without the generous initiative, or, as some please to call it, the folly, of Pius IX. It would be a singular history to write—that of this unhappy King, of whom they succeeded in making a sort of Henri III, melancholy and bored, or a Charles IX, anxious and savage. The commencement of his reign was marked by the insurrections of the liberals whom the defection of their former chief drove to imprecation and revolt. The court of Carlo Alberto, aware that this defection was only apparent, saw that it was necessary to raise between him and his old friends a barrier of dead bodies, and the Count di Ciniéz pronounced these memorable words: ‘We must make him taste blood, otherwise he will escape us.’ The blood was shed as they desired; thenceforward the King was subject to sudden terrors and inexplicable fears. His remorse, which all his contemporaries knew, threw him into a sombre mysticism, into acts of expiation. He sometimes left his oratory to give himself up to sensual distractions. Those about him profited by this disposition of his mind to encourage the superstitious tendencies of his diseased imagination. He was easily impressed—they terrified him; he raised around himself an army of phantoms, and the fantastic intrigues which abounded in the palace rivalled the wildest inventions of the modern drama<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Persons who lived in the court of Carlo Alberto have collected some strange details of the intrigues of which he was the butt. Here,

"The attitude of the enemy was caressing; he introduced his war machine concealed, and when the blow was struck, it seemed that it was a blow from heaven. Hunted by the calculated ferocity of invisible tormentors, Carlo Alberto, bewildered, had not the energy to defy them openly, because the hallucinations had a character in conformity with the religious impressions which were conveyed to him by the counsels, direct and argumentative, of the Pope. Carlo Alberto was one of those feeble natures which rise to heroism in danger and seek brilliant enterprises, but which lack what may be called domestic energy. The intangible antagonist who lived beside him caused him to lose his courage. Overcome by the internal coalition which besieged him, he had attacks of prostration, dizziness, and fainting fits. Too irresolute to throw off the official persecution by which he was enveloped, he trusted to the hazard of the future. The coins which he then struck bore the legend: '*J'attends mon astre.*' Under this formidable pressure Carlo Alberto remained so far faithful to the principles of his youth that we must admire as well as pity him, and render homage to the purity of a conscience so

amongst others, is an incident which we have from a good source. A man of sense and feeling, then minister of war, was in consultation with the King, when several blows were struck behind a curtain of the hall in which they were. The King turned pale, "It is nothing, Sire," said M. de \*\*\*, "Somebody is working there doubtless." "You are not religious, you," replied the King with a sombre and preoccupied air. The conversation was resumed. At the end of some minutes the sound recurred. The King turned pale again, began to tremble, and, quitting the astonished minister, went to kneel before a crucifix in an adjoining room. People interested in enfeebling his character had persuaded him that Queen Clotilde, wife of Carlo Emanuele IV, who had died at Naples in the odour of sanctity, returned from time to time to the palace. Often indeed a mysterious voice, coming from a corner where no one was to be seen, ordered the King what he must do. The *spirit* scattered in his way morsels of stuffs which the King carried as amulets, and ordered his attendants to carry. Finally it was discovered that this miserable phantasmagory was the work of a valet, a ventriloquist, in conspiracy with a bribed *femme de chambre*.

grievously troubled. Far from accusing him of duplicity, of calculating ambition, as has been done by writers who could not know his interior life, we must give him credit for what he tried to do, and for what he did in his rare moments of liberty. Unquiet, perplexed, living, as he bitterly said to the Duke d'Aumale, 'between the daggers of the Carbonari and the chocolate of the Jesuits,' the unfortunate prince still worked, as much as the insubordination of his functionaries permitted, for the unity of his kingdom : he grouped more compactly the provinces around him by simplifying their administration ; he separated the public treasury from his own revenues and exacted a rigorous economy both in his household and in the public finances."

If we are unable to accept entirely the generous defence of this unfortunate prince, which this loyal critic of his life furnishes us, remembering that not in all cases can the defence of *force majeure*, moral or political, be adduced for the duplicities of the sovereign, at least these facts, for which the name of the author is sufficient guarantee, indicate a weakness of character, exaggerated by a morbid religious education, which must often have left him irresponsible for his conclusions.

Further, this curious and profoundly interesting study of the early history of the Italian kingdom has a side-light import which deserves a word of notice, as it explains a peculiarity in the present condition of public affairs—the recurrence of what the author calls the 'opposition of the bureaux,' displayed in official conspiracies against the most solemn obligations of the Sovereign's word and even the declared will of the nation. It explains also the breaches of that continuity of public policy which is indispensable to constitutional government, especially in its foreign affairs, breaches due to the blind pursuit of personal and partisan advantages—an inheritance from that mediæval statesmanship which survives through the reigns of Carlo Felice and Carlo Alberto to that of Umberto I.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES, 1815-1847.

BEFORE entering on the struggle between Piedmont and Austria—the decisive feature of Italian history during the years of revolution, 1848-49—it will be necessary to relate the chief events which had taken place elsewhere in Italy during the previous generation. The movement for Italian unity began in Piedmont, and it was in that little state that liberal principles of government first took root and shape; but the statesmen of Piedmont could never have succeeded in creating the constitutional kingdom of Italy, had not the ground been prepared by other agencies in other lands. Throughout the peninsula, foreign pressure and domestic tyranny were year by year adding to the fuel of revolution, the flames of which burst forth repeatedly in one region or another. The efforts of reformers and revolutionists were often misled by passion, ignorance, or local prejudice; their methods were crude, and their aims lacked precision; liberalism and national unity sometimes found themselves in disastrous opposition. But the heart of the people was gradually stirred to its depths, and in the fulness of time—though not in the chaotic turmoil of 1848—the leaders appeared, who were capable of uniting and guiding the popular upheaval, and the blood of many martyrs bore fruit at length in a national triumph.

(1) *Naples.*

The restoration of the Neapolitan Bourbons after 1815 was the restoration of the *ancien régime*. Nothing had been learned, and the severity of repression extended even to the circulation of books whose liberalism was of the most moderate kind. In 1816 the public executioner burned in a public place a great quantity of books condemned for their political views. Nevertheless the condition of the "Two Sicilies" remained most apathetic, and until 1820 no movement of any kind took place against the oppressive tyranny which the king had brought back. The Carbonari, who during the rule of Murat, had been more or less encouraged by the king, from his refuge in Sicily, as a means of disturbing the foreign government, now became instruments in the hands of political agitators, who had, however, no intention or conception of acting in favour of a united Italy. It was, also, rather a tendency to rebellion against any authority, and especially against foreign authority, than a movement in favour of constitutional liberty. Slight movements from 1818 to 1820 marked rather local discontent than serious plans of action. Addresses to the King and harmless demonstrations were not wanting, but nothing serious happened.

In 1820 a military movement took place, unique in this respect, in the annals of Italy, but similar to the contemporary movement in Spain. It was isolated, and had no previous or subsequent relations with the movements in upper Italy. Started by two officers in the army, with a priest, and subsequently headed by General Pépe, it was joined by the Carbonari, and other disorderly elements. The aims of the conspirators were divergent, but there was a vague demand for a constitution. The King, bound by an agreement with Austria, at first refused to concede constitutional rights, but after Pépe with a brigade of regular troops had joined the insurrectionary movement, he yielded.

On the 6th of July the following edict was published: "To the people of my kingdom of the two Sicilies: It being manifestly the general desire of the people of the two Sicilies to have a constitutional government, of our own free will we consent, and promise in eight days to publish the bases. Until the proclamation of the constitution the laws now existing will be enforced. Having satisfied the public desire in this way, we order that the troops shall return to their divisions and everybody else to his occupation." On the same day a new ministry took office, composed of the Duke of Campochiaro, Count Ricciardi, General Carrascosa, Marchese Amato and Ferreri, all (except the last) adherents of Murat and reputed liberals. A third decree, issued under the pretext of the king's health, confided the active direction of affairs to his son the Duke of Calabria, as Vicario, the king desiring to escape direct responsibility for the concessions necessary and evidently not being easy in his conscience about the violation of the league with Austria, which bound him to give no constitutional rights diverse from those of the Austrian empire.

It is probable that the king's intention always was ultimately to withdraw concessions that had been due to fear. His withdrawal from responsibility confirmed the suspicion of his insincerity and therefore strengthened the movement. The concession of the constitution stimulated the general effervescence the more as the ignorant population, not understanding the meaning of the movement, exaggerated it in the sense of personal liberty until it was joined by the whole kingdom. The agitation increased, and on the night of the 7th of July the King constituted a council of notables and signed a decree according a constitution, copied, with certain modifications, from that of Spain, generally known as the constitution of 1812. The revolted army, now become the main support of the constitutional movement, arrived at Naples on the 9th of July, commanded by Pépe and the officers who had organized the movement: the column, preceded by masses

of Neapolitan liberals and by thousands of the proprietors of the adjoining provinces amounting in all to about twenty thousand men, entered Naples in great triumph. Pépe, as commander in chief, was received by the King with honour, and in this manner the revolution was completed without bloodshed, although those who remembered the movement of 1799 predicted its failure. In fact the temperament of the people was not well adapted to such a movement. The Neapolitans in general had really no constitutional ideas: undisciplined in politics, undermined by a system of espionage and corrupt government, they displayed no unity of purpose, no desire for honest government, and no perception of common interest in any direction.

On July 13, the King took a formal and solemn oath, in the royal chapel, to observe the constitution. Next day, the new government diminished the price of salt, liberated all political prisoners, and amnestied those condemned for slight punishments: a little later, this clemency was extended to many of those condemned for more serious crimes. The government also called for volunteers to increase the army. The constitution established all the privileges of the Church and of the Crown, and provided for the election of a Cortes similar to that of Spain, but it soon appeared that it was too liberal a form of government to be practicable in Naples, where the nation was unaccustomed to so much liberty.

The first consequence was the hostility of Austria, which decided on measures of repression and on the enforcement of the compact which the King had made with the Emperor. The three allied monarchies were agreed in the attitude to be taken, and Prince Metternich on the 25th of July sent a circular to the German courts to notify them that Austria refused to recognise the revolution in Naples, and that at need she would repress it by force. He also prohibited a movement planned by the Duke of Modena in anticipation of Austrian interference. Austria was disposed to move immediately.

England, although not favouring Austrian intervention, was indisposed to oppose it actively; and France limited herself to persuading the Czar Alexander, who was then under the influence of the liberal minister, Capodistrias, that it would have been convenient to support the constitutional movement at Naples. On the initiative of France, a congress was convoked at Troppau in October, 1820, with the idea of arbitration at Naples to conciliate the King and the constitutionalists. Russia, France and England would have agreed on advising the concession of the constitution, but Metternich applied all his energies successfully to repelling their intervention. The want of unanimity in the views of the powers at the congress paralyzed the general liberal intention of the majority, and the energy of Austria triumphed over the indecision of the other powers.

It was decided finally to call a congress of the European states, and since the allied sovereigns could not negotiate with the revolution at Naples, to invite the King to come to Laibach to confer with them. The King willingly accepted this means of escaping from complicity with the revolution, and, after taking a fresh oath to observe the constitution, and appointing his eldest son to act as regent in his absence, he left Naples (December 14th, 1820). On arriving at Laibach he put himself entirely in the hands of the Austrians, in consequence of which the congress agreed that Austria should occupy the kingdom of Naples and assist the king to recover his legitimate authority: Sardinia, Tuscany, and Modena accepted the principle of intervention. Only the Pope declared that he would take no part in acts calculated to develop hostileities, and offered his mediation for the pacific settlement of the question. On the 9th of February, 1821, the Duke of Gallo arrived at Naples with a letter from the King to his son, the Regent, announcing the decision which he, in agreement with the Congress, had arrived at. He said: "It is beyond my power and beyond all human capacity, to bring about any other result; there is

no uncertainty whatever as to the alternative in which we are placed, nor of the means which alone remain to me of preserving my kingdom from the plague of war." He did not insist on the explicit abolition of the constitution, but said: "They [the powers] consider it as an object of the highest importance for the security and tranquillity of the states bordering on my kingdom, and consequently all Europe, that the means which I shall adopt to give my country the stability of which it has need should not restrict my own liberty in the choice of measures. They desire sincerely that, surrounded by the most honest and the wisest men amongst my subjects, I should consult the true and permanent interests of my people without losing sight of what the maintenance of the general peace demands. They desire that there should result from my care and energy a system of government calculated to guarantee for ever the repose and the prosperity of my kingdom, and to render safe at the same time the other states of Italy, removing all those motives of anxiety which the late events in our country have occasioned."

The parliament in reply to these declarations decided to meet the intervention of Austria with armed resistance, attributing the decision of the King not to his own free will but to the pressure from foreign power, and issued the following proclamation: "The nation of the two Sicilies is the natural ally of all states governed by a constitution similar to its own or by any other. It renounces all right of interference in the government of other nations, direct or indirect, but will never consent that others should restrict its liberty of action within its own limits, and it is disposed to employ every means to cause its proclaimed independence to be respected. The kingdom of the two Sicilies offers an asylum to all exiles for liberal opinions; and finally, the nation will never condescend to make peace with an enemy as long as such shall occupy its territory."

The people were in an ecstasy. The Carbonari hastened

to enroll soldiers and to provide for their families. Amongst those who demanded to serve were the Prince of Salerno, son of the King, the Duke of Ascoli, the Prince of Partanna, and the son of the Prince of Niscemi, who was with the King at Laibach. The Austrian forces, forty-three thousand strong, now set out, while the King, who had arrived at Florence, issued from thence a proclamation declaring that the Austrian army should be regarded as the protector of his subjects, and warning the Neapolitan army and navy that they must consider it as a force acting in the true interest of the kingdom; further, that, so far from having entered it for the purpose of conquest or subjection, the Austrian army was authorized to unite with the Neapolitan army to assure tranquillity and protect the true friends of the country who were faithful subjects of their king. The Austrians crossed the Po on the 4th of February, 1821, and moved slowly through the Abruzzi, directing their march upon Naples. The army of Pépe, amounting to eighteen thousand men with five thousand irregulars, met it at Rieti. In the battle which followed, the Neapolitans, through want of discipline or unity of command, were defeated after a slight resistance, and fell back, intending to renew the defence on the line of the Volturno; but discontent and insubordination in the army rendered the defence ineffectual, and the resistance was put down with no further serious fighting. On March 23 the Austrians entered Naples. The division in the ranks of the Neapolitans, strongly aided by the proclamation of the King from Florence, had already undermined the authority of the parliament, which was suppressed almost without regret. In May, 1821, the King returned. Naples was not yet prepared to understand even what constitutional government meant, and submitted again to the corrupting, disorganizing régime of the Bourbons, with the discontent of only a very small but influential class.

Political trials followed in great abundance; some eight hundred persons (says La Farina) were sentenced to death;

and the prisons were filled with the condemned. Of the nature of these prisons Europe was informed later by the letters of Mr Gladstone, which have become classic<sup>1</sup>. But the indignation of Europe had no other effect than to destroy temporarily the influence of liberal governments over that of Naples. Even the Piedmontese government of 1826, by the hand of Carlo Felice himself, urged the King of Naples to consent to the prolongation of the Austrian occupation, in order to preserve monarchical principles from destruction. The King commuted most of the sentences of death into various terms of imprisonment, but under the pressure of the Austrian government a list of over one hundred thousand suspected subjects was drawn up by the police. The Austrian army was withdrawn in 1827, having cost the kingdom of Naples over three hundred millions of francs.

On Jan. 4, 1825, King Ferdinando died, and was succeeded by his son, Francesco I. His succession brought no change in the tyranny of the government. But for some time there seemed to be no vitality in the popular discontent. A slight movement in 1828 indicated rather local oppression than any general tendency to revolt, but it supplied the government with a pretext for a number of executions, and for the entire extinction of the commune of Bosco, where the rising had taken place. Francesco I. died on Nov. 8, 1830, and his son Ferdinando II succeeded. It was hoped that his antecedents would justify themselves by an enlargement of popular liberty. But accession to his father's throne produced also adhesion to his father's principles. The King was changed but not the system. In 1831 a slight movement, the result of the revolution of 1830 in Paris, took place, but there was no serious result. In 1832 a movement, in which several priests took part, was also suppressed without difficulty. In 1836, on the birth of the heir to the throne, the King conceded an

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<sup>1</sup> Republished in *Gleanings of Past Years*, vol. iv.



amnesty to numbers of political exiles, but his political attitude became more decidedly despotic after the death of his first wife, a princess of the House of Savoy, and his marriage in the following year with an Austrian princess strengthened the Austrian influence on the government. In 1837, another movement, in the Abruzzi, gave occasion for more condemnations and more imprisonments, but led to no further result. Another partial outbreak, which took place in 1841, was followed by 133 arrests and three executions.

In 1843 the Mazzinian conspiracy began to make itself felt in the Neapolitan and central Italian provinces where the influence of Piedmont had not hitherto penetrated. The conception of Piedmontese leadership being less prominent in the plans of the central and southern liberals, Mazzini's propaganda more readily took root, and under the influence of his committees insurrectionary movements began. An organization was established by the London committee in the Romagna and in Naples, the Neapolitan committee being under the direction of Carlo Poerio and Francesco Paolo Bozzelli. The most celebrated of all these insurrectionary movements, more from its romantic and heroic character than from the importance of the movement itself or of its political consequences, was that of the brothers Bandiera. This movement, the early preparations for which had been made by the Mazzinian committees, but whether under the direction of Mazzini himself or not is not clearly established, was in sympathy with the movement in Naples. The Neapolitan branch of the insurrectionary committee was established on the 15th of March, 1843, and was to embrace Sicily and Calabria simultaneously. Poerio writes that great difficulty was found in keeping the more active and enthusiastic of the conspirators within the limits determined by the committee, the more prudent desiring to retard the movement until the preparations were complete; but the impatient spirits broke from the control of the general committee and on the 15th of

March, 1844, precipitated a rising at Cosenza. A brief skirmish with the Neapolitan forces took place, in which a few insurgents were killed and three of the gendarmes wounded, whereupon the insurgents dispersed. The consequence of this failure was the arrest of a number of the directors of the conspiracy at Naples: Poerio, d'Ayala, Bozzelli, de Agostinis, Primicerio, Cosimo and Damiano Assanti, Pierri, Graziosi and de Martini were imprisoned.

Contemporaneously with this movement, the Bandieras organized their expedition at Corfu. The two brothers were the sons of an admiral in the Austrian navy, born in Venice, and at an early period had become infected by the enthusiasm and mysticism of Mazzini. In 1843, after the insurrection in Bologna, Attilio, the elder brother, wrote: "The insurrectionary ferment in Italy will last, if I may believe the current rumours, and, thinking that it may be the dawn of our great day of liberation, it appears to me that every good patriot should cooperate as much as possible. I am studying a way to go to the scene of action, and if I do not succeed it will certainly not be my fault. It will be my preoccupation, once arrived in the locality, to place myself at the head of a political band, to penetrate into the mountains, and there to combat for our cause to the death. The material importance will be, I foresee, very slight, but the moral influence will be much more important, because I shall excite apprehension in the heart of our most powerful oppressor. I will give an eloquent example to every other person who, like me, may be bound by absurd and inadmissible oaths<sup>1</sup>, and I shall thus strengthen the faith of our associates, weak rather from want of confidence in our own means than from an exaggerated idea of the hostile forces or any other reason." In his description of himself, Attilio says, "I am nearly thirty-three years old; of a rather weak constitution; of an ardent heart, but often-times apparently cold; disposed to follow the maxims of stoicism. I

<sup>1</sup> Allusion probably to his oath as officer in the service of Austria.

believe in God and in the future life and in human progress. I am accustomed in my thoughts to consider in their due order, humanity, the country, the family and the individual. I hold firmly that the family is the basis of all right, and therefore I concluded a long time ago that the Italian cause is wrapt up in that of humanity; and rendering homage to this indisputable truth, I comfort myself in the sadness and difficulty of our times by the reflection that to help Italy is to help all humanity. With a temperament equally ardent in reflection and ready in execution, I have convinced myself of the justice of the principles indicated above, and I resolve to dedicate myself entirely to their practical development, which is sure progress. Reflecting on the conditions of our country, I have easily persuaded myself that the most probable way to success in the emancipation of Italy from her present opprobrious position must be that of conspiracy. By what other means, in fact, than that of secrecy can the oppressed prepare themselves for the struggle for liberation? Do not disdain my proposals. You will find in my principles that weapon which is likely to be most efficacious in the fight that is being prepared by those who have the courage to raise the standard of our independence and of order and regeneration." Correspondence with Mazzini increased Attilio's sense of his own importance and of his duty to Italy, and determined him to undertake the dangerous enterprise which, though it resulted in absolute defeat, still served as one of the most powerful stimulants to foreign sympathy. In this sense the apparently insignificant movement of the Bandiera brothers must be considered as one of the highest moral importance, and deserves more notice than failures of far greater scope and gravity.

A letter of Emilio Bandiera to Mazzini, dated the 19th of March, 1844, says: "How will my mother and my wife, delicate beings, and incapable of resistance to great griefs, withstand this ruin? To serve humanity and the fatherland was, and will always be, I hope, my first desire, but I must

confess that it costs me much" On the 28th of March he writes again to Mazzini: "Convinced of the duty imposed upon every Italian, to give himself entirely to the improvement of the destinies of our unfortunate country, we sought every method to take part in that Young Italy which we knew was formed to organize the patriotic insurrection. For three years our efforts were useless. Your writings did not circulate any longer in Italy. The governments said that you were overwhelmed and discouraged by the unfortunate result of the insurrection in Savoy, and, without knowing your principles, we agreed with them. We wished our country united, free and republican. We propose to trust only to the national means, to despise any foreign aid, and to throw down the gauntlet when we believe ourselves sufficiently strong, without waiting for deceitful reports from Europe."

The mother of the Bandiera brothers, hearing that her sons had deserted the Austrian service, followed them to Corfu and piteously besought them to return to Venice and to resume their positions in the Austrian navy, assuring them of pardon and reinstatement. The account which Attilio gives in a letter to Mazzini dated the 22nd of April, 1844, of the interview with his mother, is one of the most striking and pathetic documents in the story of this, the most chivalrous attempt in the annals of Italian insurrection. "In vain I told her that duty commands me to remain here; that my native country is very dear to me; that when I return to it again, it will be not to live an ignominious life, but to die a glorious death: that my safe-conduct to Italy is henceforward the point of my sword: that no affection can tear me from its standard, which I will embrace, and that though one may abandon the standard of a king, he never may that of a country. My mother, agitated and blinded by her feelings, did not hear me: called me impious, unnatural, and an assassin, and her tears racked my heart. Her reproofs, although not merited, pierced me like the points of daggers. But suffering does not take away my

reason; I know that these tears and this contempt are the attendants on tyranny, and if at first I was only animated by love of my country, I am now equally swayed by the hatred which I feel for the despots and usurpers who, through their infamous ambition to reign over others, condemn families to such horrors. Reply to me with a word of comfort. Your applause is worth a thousand insults which I receive from the base, the false, the egotists and the deluded."

The Austrian government summoned the brothers to respond for their desertion, but its summons only called forth this reply from Attilio: "On the 14th of this month, we, the undersigned, received the citation sent to us by order of the supreme command. We boast of what the tribunal threatens to consider high treason. We must either betray our country and humanity, or oppose the foreigner and the oppressor. In this alternative our choice is clear. The laws to which you would still hold us responsible are laws of blood which we, with all the just and humane, repel and abhor. The death to which they would inevitably condemn us is better met by any other method than under their lying and infamous direction. Force is their only law, and we to a little extent at least will endeavour to put the force on our own side in order to give the victory to real justice." These extracts show sufficiently the utterly impracticable and romantic natures of the Bandiera brothers; and the conclusion which practical men would naturally draw from their declarations—that they were rather of the material of the martyr than the conspirator—is confirmed by the issue of the insurrection.

Ricciardi, who was one of their associates, was engaged as a messenger between Paris, Marseilles, Leghorn and Corsica, to arrange for the general insurrection under the direction of Mazzini. It was planned that Ricciardi should land near Civita Vecchia with a thousand Corsicans for an attack on Rome. Nicolo Fabrizzi, starting from Malta with a band of Algerians, was to raise the standard of insurrection in Sicily;

others from **Maha** and from the Ionian Islands were to attempt a landing on the shores of Tuscany and Naples, while others from the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea were to invade Lombardy and Piedmont. The Committee at Paris considered the plan impracticable, and it was therefore abandoned. Meanwhile the Bandieras in the Ionian Islands having been joined by a number of those who were waiting for the general movement, were preparing for their expedition to Calabria. Fabrizio, to whom Bandiera had applied for funds, condemned the undertaking as rash and destined to failure. He added, "Your purpose seems to be the satisfaction of a love of excitement which is entirely personal; and you will sacrifice uselessly all the men who abandon themselves to your guidance." He warned the leader that in Calabria the agitation had ceased, but at the same time offered to assist him in any other direction. The reply of Emilio to this letter shows the nature of the brothers and of their enthusiasm for Italy in a light so clear that it is worth quoting, in order that one may better understand the nature of the excitement developed by the writings and influence of Mazzini. Emilio replied, "In Italy they begin to believe that the exiles, in their impatience for victory, represent everything in rosy colour, hoping that chance may develop some slight incident into a general conflagration, by the success of which they may profit without having made the requisite preparations. We, recently proscribed, are well aware how much you are calumniated—unjustly, it is true—for not having allowed yourself to be killed in heading the first movement and strengthening it with your presence and experience. And, therefore, we wish to respond once for all that misfortune has assimilated our case to yours; we wish to give the millions to understand that, if uncertainty still exists, yet, wherever a movement takes place, the exiles will hasten to participate in the glory and the danger, without waiting until the success of such a movement shall have rendered their assistance superfluous."

Even Mazzini and Ricciardi attempted to persuade the Bandieras to forego this expedition, and they had already turned their attention to another movement in Romagna, when they were joined by Nicolo Ricciotti, another of the enthusiasts of Mazzini's school, who, weak in judgment, abounded in enthusiasm and courage, and, like the Bandieras, had decided if necessary to sacrifice himself in order to stimulate the insurrection. The influence of Ricciotti decided the Bandieras to resume their original plan for a descent on Calabria, and Attilio wrote on the 11th of June, 1844, to Mazzini as follows: "Addio! the time is short. I carry with me the principal articles of a new political constitution for Italy; that is to say those concerning a communal organization, a national guard, and elections....If we succumb, say to our fellow citizens that they should follow our example because life is given to us in order that we may employ it nobly; and the cause for which we have fought and for which we will die is the most pure and most holy that has ever warmed the breasts of men; it is that of liberty, equality, humanity, independence and Italian unity."

The expedition sailed on the 12th of June, 1844; it was composed of nineteen persons, including the two Bandieras and Domenico Moro, a fellow officer in the Austrian navy. The question has been raised and discussed at length, whether the expedition of the Bandiera brothers was betrayed by the British government to that of Naples, and the charge has been affirmed and denied without ever being absolutely proved or disproved. The fact is indisputable that Cardinal Lambruschini, Secretary of State to the Pope, informed the Cardinal Legate of Bologna on the 27th of April of the expedition. It has been alleged that this knowledge, said to have been communicated by the English ministry of the day at a moment when the movement could scarcely have been yet known in Corfu, was derived from a letter of Mazzini intercepted in the English post. The expedition landed on the 16th of June, 1844, at Cotrone. Attilio on landing kissed the earth, exclaiming,

"Thou hast given us life and for thee we will spend it." A proclamation to the Italians had been prepared: it was signed by the two Bandieras and Ricciotti, and headed, "Liberty, equality, independence, unity and the republic! No more kings! Italians, God has created us all equal; we are all made in his image; no other than He has the right to call us his. What have the kings done for us? They have proscribed us and oppressed us, and have filled our country with shame and insult. Let us establish a republic as did our forefathers when they drove out the Tarquins. Let us proclaim ourselves free, masters of ourselves, in this country in which God has placed us." On the 17th the Bandieras were deserted, near San Severino, by their guide, who appears to have betrayed them to the Neapolitan authorities. Their childish ignorance of everything that pertained to military operations and to successful conspiracy now began to appear, in the fact that they knew not where they were going or to whom to address themselves. They wandered for days in a strange country, establishing no communications with any friendly persons, apparently seeking at hazard some chance by which they might execute their plans. Under the guidance of peasants found in the locality, they moved westward and near San Benedetto were attacked at night by the gendarmes. After a slight conflict, in which they repelled the gendarmes with little loss, they arrived at the villa of the family Benincasa, eight miles from San Giovanni in Fiori, where they stopped to rest. Here the people were hostile and, reinforced by a battalion of cacciatori, attacked them. After a short conflict with overwhelming forces, the Bandieras and their principal followers were made prisoners, maltreated, and carried to prison in San Giovanni in Fiori.

The trial by court martial, which followed, showed that the brothers maintained their enthusiasm and courage in disaster as in the attempt that led to it, and completes the picture of the heroic self-sacrifice which we have seen displayed in their letters to Mazzini. "During the trial the serene majesty and



amiability of their looks and speech, and their grace of manner, inspired reverence and pity," remarks an historian of the event. On learning in prison of the execution of the prisoners taken in the attempt at Cosenza a few weeks previously, Attilio wrote to Signor Gioachino Gaudio as follows: "He who writes to you these few words knows that he is inevitably destined to speedy death. Oh! when he burned to follow the dictates of his ideals, it was not in this way that he hoped to finish his life. The desire of his days, the dream of his nights, was to die on the battle-field fighting against those who hinder Italy from becoming like any other country and recovering its national rights. Ah! it will not be German bayonets but Italian bullets which will unite us to God. What a disillusion and what a mission, to be disowned and to be destroyed by those whom we deemed our brothers."

But this tone of defiance was not consistently maintained. While in prison, Attilio wrote a letter to the king, defending his action on the ground that the movement was intended to promote the cause of Italian unity, and declaring that if the king of Naples was willing to become the constitutional sovereign of the peninsula he would devote his life and soul to his majesty. He ended by asking for an audience. In a letter to his advocate, Attilio says: "This king of Italy I cannot find excepting in the king of Naples; he is an Italian, he is a successor of Manfredi; against him there are no precedents such as there are against the king of Savoy and the Duke of Modena; he is not to blame for the deeds of 1821-31; he is not impotent like the Duke of Lucca, nor of the Austrian blood like the Grand-duke of Tuscany. Persuaded that Ferdinand II, in accepting this policy, would become glorious, and that he would have the fortitude qualifying him to regenerate our country, which is also his; knowing that to a great extent the hopes of Italy converge on him, we believed that in this noble struggle he would throw down the royal gauntlet, and we hastened to make the appeal." Prison and the prospect of death

without the glory of battle here seem to have chilled the courage and enthusiasm of the brothers, and in their defence the energy and nobility of their first proposal disappear. The reply to their accusers no longer rests upon the determination to emancipate the country from its royal oppressors and to restore the republican purity of organization, but on a compromise between the despot and personal liberty. But the defence was useless, and the weakness of these last moments may be forgotten in the nobility of purpose and the constancy with which the *Bandieras* pursued their purpose to the end.

The court sentenced seventeen of the eighteen conspirators to be shot, with ignominy, while the treacherous guide was condemned to five years of imprisonment, probably to conceal the fact of his complicity with the authorities. On the declaration of the sentence, Emilio recovering his courage, cried, "*Viva la libertà, viva la patria!*" and sang the chorus, "Who for his country dies has lived long enough." Five of the seventeen had their sentences commuted to imprisonment, but the others were shot according to the sentence. The soldiers who executed the sentence wept. The priests who visited the condemned men discussed with them theological questions, and Nardi maintained that he knew the gospels better than they. Ricciotti told the priest Rosa that they believed that in the mountains of Calabria there were multitudes of people who had attempted to revolt and that their presence would have inspired movements in other localities. On the 23rd of July, the day of their death, the prisoners dressed themselves with the greatest elegance possible in the circumstances and, refusing to be attended by the priests, went to execution, attired according to the sentence, in long black tunics, their heads veiled, and their feet naked—the indications of ignominious punishment. Having been led to the Chapel, where they were detained for some time till the telegraphic confirmation of their sentence arrived, they were marched to the valley of Rovito on the river Crati near Cosenza, where they were shot. The fire was irregular:

Attilio, Lupatelli, and Venerucci survived the first discharge and died with the words: "Viva l'Italia! viva la libertà! viva la patria!"

The absolute recklessness of the Bandieras, seen in the light of history, affords example at once of the folly and the heroism of the Italian insurrectionary movement. Judged by its immediate and practical results, it was folly; judged by its moral influence, none of the futile attempts was more potent for Italian liberation. Mazzini has been charged with responsibility for this unfortunate effort. That he did constantly stimulate to rebellion at any cost and against any risk there can be no doubt: this was a characteristic of the Mazzinian agitation. The Bandiera enterprise was the legitimate fruit of Mazzini's propaganda, and the fact that at the last moment he condemned as rash that particular movement in which the Bandieras perished does not affect the accusation that he urged men recklessly and without any regard to consequences to attempt insurrection, even in the most desperate circumstances. It is impossible, however, to judge or to condemn the general policy except with reference to the general result, and there is no question that the general result of Mazzini's policy was to develop in the most direct and powerful manner the insurrectionary tendency amongst all the youth of Italy. The enthusiasm of men who die for an idea has the effect of martyrdom, whether political or religious, and Mazzini's teaching must be always judged as a religious propaganda and not as practical politics. The names of the Bandieras undoubtedly acted subsequently as powerful incentives, and the faith of the brothers, expressed in their own words, caused "their example to be contagious to forty thousand Italians, lovers of their country and bound by oath to her fortunes." It is necessary that those who are born to martyrdom should throw themselves absolutely into any enterprise, even though it be destined to failure, hoping to induce by their example the inert and the timid and those of little faith to follow them.

(2) *Sicily.*

The condition of Sicily in 1815, when the Bourbons were re-established, was in many respects different from that of the other Italian states. British influence, which had been paramount in the island during the Napoleonic war, had given to the Sicilians, always restless under the government of Naples, a certain experience of constitutional freedom, and the return of the Bourbons and the abolition of the constitution caused an appeal of the warmest nature to be made to the British government for the preservation of the rights which it had guaranteed to them. The appeal was fruitless, for Austrian influence, hostile to all constitutional concessions, soon resumed its control over the royal councils. The separation of Sicily as a kingdom from Naples was maintained for a while, but ceased in 1816. During the absence of the King from Sicily a prince of the royal family, or a distinguished personage chosen by the King, was invested with vice-regal powers. But in order to pave the way for a return to the ancient despotism, a form of constitution was promulgated on June 1st, 1815, which established a parliament, consisting of two chambers, peers and commons; the legislative power depending upon the initiative of the King, by whom all laws were to be presented to the chambers. The executive power was uncontrolled and solely in the hands of the King; the Roman Catholic religion was alone recognised, to the exclusion of any other. Thus with regard to legislation and administrative control, the rights conceded to the Sicilians were purely fictitious. A dummy constitution of this kind, imposed on the island, could not compensate the Sicilians for the loss of independence, and of the rights they had enjoyed under the constitution of 1812. The change in the seat of government from Palermo to Naples left them only the shadow of autonomy, while they were discontented at the loss of those resources which had been

brought to Sicily by the British occupation. The inevitable result was that the Sicilians became steadily and increasingly hostile toward Naples, and the sentiment of distinct nationality, which had been scarcely more than a question of *amour propre* prior to British occupation, grew into strong aversion from any relation with Naples.

The vice-royalty, while keeping up the pretence of autonomy, was a mere shadow of the royal power in Naples. On the 8th of December, 1816, the king published a decree stating that the congress of Vienna had recognised the administrative severance of Sicily from Naples, and the two kingdoms were united under his crown by the name of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The only privileges which the Sicilians retained were the preservation of their separate ecclesiastical system, the archbishopric of Palermo, and the right to supply one fourth of the members of the Council of State. The ministry and the diplomatic service of the united kingdom resided at Naples, and the direction of Sicilian administration was permanently vested in the viceroy. During the four years following this settlement the condition of things was unchanged, except that the discontent of the Sicilians and their antipathy to the Neapolitans constantly increased.

The recall of the crown-prince from Sicily and the substitution of a Sicilian general, Naselli, as vice-regent with three departmental directors, produced a certain amount of local discontent, and still further intensified the hostility to Naples. The consequence of this want of sympathy was that the movement which broke out on the mainland on the 6th of June, 1820, was regarded with indifference by the Sicilian residents in Naples. Naturally, however, the movement produced a certain reflex activity in Sicily and revived the agitation for the constitution of 1812. General Naselli, in order to quiet the agitation, published a royal proclamation, which, while it promised a constitution, did not definitely grant what was demanded by the Sicilians; but this promise

strengthened the agitation in Sicily for constitutional rights, and led the people to hope that the constitution they were to have would be the constitution of Spain. It is probable that there entered very largely into the agitation the question of separation of Sicily from Naples, a topic in regard to which public feeling in Sicily had lately become intense. A public demonstration, headed by the president of the principal tribunal, demanded the constitution of Spain and independence from Naples. The same night a tumult broke out at Cassano between the Neapolitan troops and the people, and led to serious disorders.

At Messina a demonstration took place, and on the 16th of July the people of Palermo rose and took possession of the fort of Castellamare, seizing fourteen thousand muskets. According to Ulloa this movement was favoured by the authorities in order to produce discord between the people and the nobility. Owing to the confusion caused by this partial connivance of the authorities, and the intrigues of the leading agitators to obtain control of the movement, the insurrection rapidly passed beyond the control of either party. A committee was formed, headed by Ruggiero Settimo, the ex-constitutional minister, Gaetani Bonanno, Father Palermo, Marquis Raddusa, Colonel Requesens and Don Mercurio Tortorici, Consul of the guild of fishermen. This committee was charged with the maintenance of order with the aid of the Guilds, and demanded from the royal government an administration separate and independent from that of Naples, with the Spanish constitution then conceded to the Neapolitans. Naselli, being a Sicilian, may be supposed to have sympathized more or less with the aspirations of the people, and for this or for some other reason, to have favoured the Sicilian demands. The movement therefore proceeded without hostilities, the military authorities only opposing the Sicilians from national jealousy. On the 17th two generals, apparently without consultation with Naselli, determined to restore order and

suppress the popular demonstration, and sent strong patrols through the streets with this intention. The Neapolitan garrison, only comprising from three to four thousand men, was insufficient to control the public agitation and, as might have been expected under the circumstances, conflicts broke out, provoked rather by the arbitrary aggression of the troops than by any act of the populace.

La Farina says that Prince Maletto and the Duke of Villa Franca demanded of the governor the withdrawal of the troops, and Naselli gave them a sealed letter for the commandant, affirming that it contained the order for withdrawal, while, on the contrary, it approved his hostility to the demonstration. Maletto, insisting on what he supposed to be the sense of the order, was wounded by a soldier. This was the signal for the outburst. The bells of all the churches rang the call to arms and the fight in the streets between the soldiers and the people became desperate. The people liberated the prisoners and, directed by the priests, drove the troops into the royal palace and attacked the military quarter of San Giacomo and the monastery of S. Elisabetta. Only one regiment of the garrison opposed the troops with any firmness. The generals were taken prisoners, of the people sixty were killed; the loss of the troops was very much greater, but the feebleness of the military defence was incredible. Naselli and other generals, including Church, fled on board the ships, and the populace sacked the town. Even many soldiers who had surrendered were murdered, and the lower classes took control of the city. The Prince of Aci, Colonel Lanza, Colonel Calirara and Prince Cattolica were murdered, under the pretence that they were traitors, having transmitted to the people the assurance of Naselli that the troops would not move. The populace, having become masters of the city, called together the Consuls of the Guilds and the Praetor, and a provisional committee, one-half of which was chosen from the nobility and the better classes, the other from the lower classes, was formed under

the presidency of Cardinal Gravina. This committee, subject to an agreement to accomplish nothing without the consent of the Consuls of the Guilds, seventy-two in number, temporarily directed the government.

This order of things was maintained till the 30th of July, when the regent issued an edict calling on the people of Palermo to lay down their arms, to which the committee replied by sending a deputation to Naples demanding an insular government. On the 24th of July, the Prince of Villa Franca, an ardent constitutionalist, arrived at Palermo, and, being nominated president of the committee in the place of Cardinal Gravina, who had become suspected by the people, aided in a partial restoration of order. But the jealousy between Naples and Sicily made the situation too difficult for pacific arrangement. The regent nominated, as his lieutenant in Sicily, Ruggiero Settimo, who refused, and then the Prince of Scaletta, an appointment which only increased the agitation, as the Prince was unpopular in Palermo. Meanwhile the deputation which had gone to Naples to ask for independence was received with marks of hostility by the populace, and imprisoned by the government, while the King refused the demand for separation. The reply of Palermo was naturally a declaration of independence, and the duplicity of Naselli and the uncertainty prevailing in the counsels at Palermo produced a complication which made a peaceable issue hopeless. The controversy between Naples and Palermo was sustained with slight warmth by the rest of the island, but disturbances naturally occurred in many places. In some, the public archives and the tax offices were burned, and disorders prevailed in the island to such an extent that it seemed rather an outbreak of anarchy than a constitutional movement. Bands were formed in different parts of the island, and a sort of civil war broke out. The quarrel between Naples and Sicily naturally dominated the position, and the constitutionalists of Naples, equally jealous of the unity of the kingdom with the



royal authorities, joined them in their anxiety for the suppression of the insurrection in Sicily.

Toward the end of August Pépe landed at Milazzo with an army of about seven thousand men and easily dispersed the bands which alone represented the insurrectionary movement there, and then, and after a sharp fight between the Sicilian fleet and the Neapolitan, moved against Palermo. He issued the following proclamation on behalf of the Regent: "The government will make no opposition to a representation of Sicily independent from that of Naples on the following conditions: first, that the insurrectionary authorities at Palermo shall surrender all the prisoners, and reestablish order; and, second, that the demands of Palermo shall be accepted by the rest of the island in whatever manner may be arranged." Pépe's orders were to use conciliatory measures with Palermo on the basis indicated by the Regent and the deputies of Sicily, and the presumption was that independence might be agreed to at the discretion of the Regent. The return of the deputation from Naples disposed the committee of Palermo to accept the compromise suggested by the Regent's proclamation, and a petition was signed by over a million people for insular independence under the King of Naples.

On the 17th of September a conference took place at Cefalù between Pépe and the Prince of Villa Franca, in which Pépe gave in his ultimatum—the occupation of Palermo by his troops and the convocation of the Sicilian parliament. The latter was to decide the question of independence, the committee of Palermo remaining in power until the arrival of the King's representatives. Villa Franca accepted the proposition and fixed the 25th for the entry of the troops. The committee, as well as the consuls of the guilds, were disposed to accept the conditions, and the Sicilian fleet pronounced for conciliation, but the people of Palermo rejected the proposition. The troops moved towards Palermo, but the people rose and again

liberating the prisoners attacked the guards in charge of the city. A furious street-fight ensued, lasting two hours and resulting in a victory for the populace. This was the signal for the renewal of all the disorders. The city of Palermo remained in the hands of the mob. No authority existed and the forces there, amounting to three regiments of cavalry, one of infantry and one of artillery, were dispersed. On the 26th of September the Neapolitan troops coming from Milazzo, having dispersed the bands in possession of the vicinity, attacked Palermo: the hostilities were of the most rancorous and murderous character. The Neapolitans sacked and burned all the houses in the suburbs, murdering old men, women and children, while the populace, opposing a vigorous resistance, robbed and killed all suspected of favouring the Neapolitans. The fleet and the fortresses of Castellamare and Garita opened a bombardment of the city which the people sustained with invincible courage. The suburbs were little by little captured by the Neapolitans, who gradually penetrated into the city, capturing several of the squares and driving the people back into the central districts. Several popular sorties were repulsed, but in spite of a continued bombardment by the fleet, the people succeeded, during the night of the 26th and 27th, in maintaining their ground. It is calculated that on the 26th, no less than four thousand of the people were killed, and five hundred of the Neapolitan troops. On the next day the attack was continued and the Neapolitans penetrated as far as the monastery of the Pietà.

The conflict now took a turn so unfavourable for the populace that a conference between their leaders and the Neapolitan commander was held, under the presidency of the Prince of Paternò. After ten days of suspense and discussion a convention was agreed upon, which laid down the following conditions—All the forts and batteries shall be given up; the majority of the votes of the Sicilians legally convoked shall decide the question between united or separate national

representation in the kingdom of the two Sicilies: each commune shall nominate a deputy with the one purpose and no other of declaring the public vote as to the reunion or division of the parliaments of the kingdom; the constitution of 1812, confirmed by His Catholic Majesty in 1820, shall be recognized in Sicily, subject to such modifications as may be adopted by the united parliament or by the separate parliament of Sicily, the arms and statues of the king shall be replaced; all past offences shall be forgotten. The committee presided over by Paternò acted in the meanwhile as a provisional government. It was composed of the military governor of Palermo, Ruggiero Settimo, the Prince of Pandolfina, the Prince of Torabrina, Cavaliere Emmanuele Requesens, the Duke of Cumea, President Alcudi, the Consul of the Guild of Saddle-makers and the advocate Ognibeni, as secretary. On the 6th of October, the forts having been surrendered, the Neapolitans entered into Palermo. Thus ended an outbreak which had cost, according to Palmieri, five thousand lives—a number which Carascosa reduces to three thousand—and which had ruined villas, palaces, works of art, libraries, destroyed hundreds of houses, and caused disaster and damage to the amount of more than a hundred million francs, without gaining anything for the people of the island.

In the compromise which was arrived at, Palermo had been actuated more by its own interests than by those of the island, and dissensions therefore broke out between the different cities. The parliament of Naples moreover passed, on October 15, a resolution in the following terms: "Having seen the reports, the proposals and the documents communicated by his Excellency the Minister of Home Affairs concerning the military conversion concluded between His Excellency, Lieutenant General Floristano Pépe and the Prince of Paternò, the parliament decides that this act is contrary to the principles established in the constitution under Art. 172, because it tends to produce division in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, and that

it is otherwise contrary to the political treaties on which that unity is based; that it is equally contrary to the desire manifested in a great part of Sicily by its deputations and the united national parliament; that, finally, it is contrary to the glory of the united kingdoms, to political conventions and to the honour of the national arms. Therefore, the parliament of the united kingdom of the two Sicilies declares entirely null and void the military convention concluded between General Pépe and the Prince of Paternò on the 5th of October 1820." After this, the Neapolitan Government, always acting in bad faith, revived its restrictions of Sicilian liberties, abolished little by little those emblems of Sicilian independence to which the people adhered, suppressed all the committees, and imposed upon the island a war-contribution of a thousand ounces, besides all the expenses of the maintenance of the army. Finally, in disregard of the amnesty, the government of Naples condemned to death eleven persons at Palermo, three of whom were executed. At Messina sixty people were tried, of whom six were condemned and shot on the second of May, 1823.

Following on the suppression of the movement of 1820 there was a partial Austrian occupation, as if the savagery of the Neapolitan Bourbons were not sufficient to restrain the ambitions of the Sicilian people. The severities were however such as to provoke the introduction of Carbonarism, hitherto of little influence in the island. The first conspiracy was one to poison the wine and bread administered to the Austrians, to seize the authorities and the fortifications, and proclaim the independence of the island—a weakly conceived project, which was never attempted, but which cost the lives of nine persons charged with taking the lead in it, while others were imprisoned and exiled. In 1824 the concentration of all the governmental functions in Naples again quickened discontent, perpetuated by aggravation of the taxes and the detestable administration of Della Favaré, Lieutenant of the King, a man whose morals, if only half as bad as painted by Sicilian historians, were

enough to breed rebellion in a more patient land, and actually had the worst effect on civic conditions. The *Mania*<sup>1</sup> gained greatly in strength, and many members of various societies were prosecuted and condemned, especially towards 1830.

The King died in 1830, and the accession of Ferdinando II, himself a native of Sicily, and disposed, in the early part of his reign, to do what might be done by royal authority to mitigate the miseries of the island, rekindled the loyalty of the Sicilians. The new King, in the voyage through the island, which he made on taking possession of the throne, was received with all the delight of anticipated freedom. He sent his son, the Prince of Syracuse, to administer the government, and pardoned most of the political prisoners. This state of satisfaction was, however, of no longer duration than the liberalism of the King, who, brought up in the traditions of despotism, had other ideas of the relations of King and people than those of the Sicilian liberals. The despotism of a Bourbon might be benevolent but it was not an advance towards constitutional government, and as the illusions of the islanders faded, the insubordination took the old forms. In 1831 already there were hostilities and executions. The severity of the government increased, and the Prince of Syracuse was recalled, as being too friendly with the population.

In 1837 the Cholera visited Sicily and caused ravages which can hardly be understood now. Under the influence of the superstition of the day, which made the epidemic the work of poisoners, the people rose and massacred the sanitary officials. This revolt against the authorities, who were accused of complicity in the poisoning, became a political movement and led to one of the most ferocious repressions of the long series. Imprisonments, tortures and executions surpassed all previous

<sup>1</sup> A loosely organised association for mutual defence against the law, peculiar to Sicily. All who adhered to it were bound to protect and avenge any *Mafiotte* arrested or punished for any offence against the authorities. It had no constitution.

records. The liberal institutions of Sicily which still survived, were mostly suppressed, and the most trivial suspicion of liberalism was enough to cause imprisonment and torture by flogging and privations in the prisons. "In this year," says Tivaroni, "the separation of Sicily from Naples was definitively decided on; after such savagery there could be no more peace nor truce; should either a constitution or liberty come from Naples, it would be refused. Thus the preparation for 1848 was begun." In 1840, for the first time, all the chief cities of Sicily were united in the conspiracy, and the old jealousies, which had in former times brought Messina in arms against Palermo and furnished Sicilian forces to suppress Sicilian liberty, were extinguished. La Farina says that the hatred of the Bourbons extinguished the animosities of hitherto rival populations, which accepted the leadership of Palermo. When, in 1842, the King went to Messina, he found the royal statues with their ears stopped up and their faces defiled. The windows where he passed were closed and the streets deserted. In 1843, for the first time, the insurrectionary committees of Naples and Palermo gave pledges to each other, and the ground began in a certain degree to be prepared for the seed of which the harvest, after many failures and disasters, was gathered in 1860. The Emperor and Empress of Russia, visiting Palermo in 1845 were received with the enthusiasm of men who considered any monarch who was not of Naples, a possible friend and helper, so miserable was the condition of the island.

## CHAPTER V.

### NORTHERN AND CENTRAL ITALY, 1815-1847.

#### (1) *Lombardy and Venetia.*

At the cessation of the great struggle with the forces of conquest and demolition as embodied in the Napoleonic movement, the powers had only one thought, i.e. the reorganisation of the map of Europe and the complete subjection of the revolutionary spirit, which had been the fatal instrument of the Despot. The civilised world was for a time imbued with horror of the principles of popular self-government, and a perfectly excusable dread of the resuscitation of ambitions which had become identified with conquest and pillage, had taken a complete mastery of all the governing classes in Europe. It is necessary to hold this fact in mind, in judging of the actions of the Governments which had spent years and treasures in the suppression of the abuses grown out of revolution, and whose dread of a renewal of them was justifiable though exaggerated.

In Italy there existed no government, holding authority over the whole peninsula, to direct the reorganisation of public rights and conventions ; England, by her geographical position as well as by her constitutional forms, was unable to assume the lead ; Prussia was still in semi chaos, and Russia was only less dangerous than France. It was therefore only natural that on Austria should fall the charge of supervising and carrying

into effect the reorganisation of the peninsula, and though England at every phase of the struggle had shown the desire for a national administration, and was in many points in disaccord with Austria, there was no resource but to allow Austria to do in her own way what had to be done. The misfortune of Europe and of Austria, but especially of the Italians under Austria, was the character of Metternich. As the substantial ruler of Austria, his personal importance in this phase of history is only less than that of Napoleon, and this in an epoch when a strong and unscrupulous personality was a power above control in the most liberally constituted state of the time. Absolutely without principle or scruple, devoted to the idea of an unlimited and irresponsible despotism, cramped by subjection to the supremacy of the Church and the divine rights of dynasties, he possessed, for the realisation of his views, an intellect of very limited range, scarcely more than would have made a good police agent in the administration of which he was the head; but this very limitation and his supreme indifference to human rights and sufferings, as well as to morality, made his government strong and triumphant, so long as the police, and the army, which was only a branch of the police in time of peace, were at his orders.

Had the Austrian government, in 1815, known how to profit by the horror excited in the minds of Italians by the past French government, its conscriptions and forced contributions, its merciless exhaustion of all the resources of the country; had it established a government for Italy, which, while maintaining the supremacy of the Emperor of Austria, should respect the character of the people, it might have prolonged its hold on the peninsula for many years; but the policy of Metternich was one which in time made the tyranny of the French regretted. Italy was wearied of a military régime under which France alone got glory, and of exhaustive taxation which accomplished nothing for the country. If, in these circumstances, Austria had lightened the conscription, or flattered



the new self-consciousness of the Italians, she would have been, for at least that generation, greeted as a benefactor. Italy was prostrate and friendless; a little good will would have quieted all the agitation born of disappointed hopes, and the Austrians, coming in as the enemies of the French, would have seemed friends indeed. No doubt, even so, the sentiment of national independence which had been aroused, and that peculiar and invincible Italian dislike of the foreigner, would in another generation have made the revolt certain in one form or another, and in the end Austria would have been obliged to abandon Italy, possibly retaining its support as a friendly power. But the course followed by the Imperial government was directly the opposite; restriction and oppression in every direction; utter disregard of all national antipathies and differences of temperament, habit and tradition; a determination on the part of the Aulic Council to transform the Lombards and Venetians into good Austrians—this was the programme. Even Metternich, whose limited intelligence enabled him to see the defects of the system but not a remedy, and whose policy seemed to be to suppress all indications of Italian individuality while he lived, and after him to welcome the deluge, wrote in 1819 to his wife, "I do not believe there is anything which less resembles Germany than Italy, but our wise people at Vienna wish at every cost to turn Italy into Germany,—and how wonderfully well they succeed!"

The natural consequences were, of course, conspiracies. Till 1819 Austria, under Metternich, ruled Lombardy absolutely and unopposed, doing its utmost to remodel the country after the German ideal; and the country was slow to apprehend the drift of Austrian policy. It was the cultivated class, impatient of that repression of all intellectual independence which was necessary to the tranquillity of a foreign despotism, that first showed signs of revolt, and the literature of the day prepared the road for the political revival. In 1819 the Carbonari followed, but the first combination which displayed

the hostility of the liberals to the system of Metternich, was that headed by Count Federico Confalonieri. It came into existence concurrently with the attempts in Turin (1821) to extort a constitution from the King and to drive him into a war with Austria. The movement seems, however, at first to have aimed rather at bringing together the sympathisers with liberty than at organising active revolt.

Confalonieri, in whom intelligent Italian patriotism reached its height, had been in the Austrian service and had abandoned it in order to identify himself with the aspirations of Italy, aiming at the union of Lombardy with Piedmont. He had been a member of the deputation sent by Milan to Paris in 1814 to urge the formation of a kingdom of Lombardy with a constitution, but in his writings of that date he showed that the future union of all Italy was the consequence of his policy. On the 13th of May, 1814, he had written to his wife, "The Italians should remain united; should express but one desire; should forget their fatal and mistaken municipal patriotism, to follow only that of the nation...Let them banish all municipal ideas and prejudices; the strongest bond in a state is to be found in compactness and convenient boundaries. The city can not be always a capital, and to be a great city in a great state is better than to be the capital of a little state. If in the process of regaining our rights, the House of Savoy, already the strongest in northern Italy, is to become stronger, it is better to belong to it than to increase the number of states, or to form fractions of Italian duchies." During this time preparation for conspiracy, rather than conspiracy itself, was being made, but in February, 1821, the first grave step was taken in the delegation of Giuseppe Jecchio to treat for common action with the conspirators in Turin. When, however, on the breaking out of the Piedmontese revolution, the delegates Giorgio Pallavicini and Gaetano Castiglia were sent to beg the Prince of Carignano to march into Lombardy, and returned with a real knowledge of the state of affairs in

Piedmont, Confalonieri countermanded all preparations for a rising, and wrote to Count San Marzano not to risk an entry into Lombardy with a feeble force. He was then doubtless more competent to judge of the chances of the movement in Piedmont than those who were in the thick of it.

In 1820, though the Austrian authorities were ignorant of the existence of a genuine conspiracy with a definite scope such as that which Confalonieri had begun to organise, the prosecution of the Carbonari began to turn the elements of discontent into more definite channels, and the first eminent martyrs of Italian liberty began to pay their debt to their native land. Silvio Pellico and Piero Maroncelli headed the roll, and through confessions extorted by torture or by artifice the arrests grew into an immense list. But the connexion of the Carbonari with the Italian movement, incidental as it was, was discovered by the Austrian police through an accident. Gaetano Gastiglia was arrested for using a seal which bore the words "*Leggi e non re, Italia c'è*," a roundabout way of saying that with a constitution and the republic the existence of Italy was established. His associate Pallavicini, who was one of the delegates to Turin, supposing that the arrest was due to this visit, went to the police to take the offence on his own shoulders, as having led his friend into it, and so the fact of the visit became known to the police. Their examination led to an imprudent, if innocent, mention of the name of Confalonieri. He had anticipated arrest and had provided a secure hiding place in his palace, but when the police came it had accidentally been locked and the arrest was made. The carelessness of these conspirators was incredible. Confalonieri had been warned by a friend in the Austrian service to leave the country, but was unwilling to take his wife from her friends without evident necessity, and, when arrested, sent a gendarme with a note to his wife to destroy certain papers in a hiding-place. The note of course led to the seizure of the papers, which betrayed the names of his associates. The clue once

discovered, the arrests were multiplied and the prisons of Lombardy and Venice were filled with victims. The trials were long and were conducted with all the cruelty and cunning of the most barbarous police of the time. Confalonieri, Andryane, Borsieri, Pallavicini, Gactano Castiglia, Torelli and Arese were condemned to death, but their sentences were commuted to close confinement in the Spielberg for terms ranging from life to three years. This commutation was obtained distinctly for Confalonieri, but with great difficulty, and only after the most pathetic and urgent appeals from his parents and friends devoted to Austria. As he was considered the chief criminal, it probably involved the same grace to the less important offenders, but even so it is said that their demands would not have been listened to but for the influence of the Empress, to whom were due the suspension of the execution and a new inquiry at Milan. This gave the opportunity for an immense demonstration on the part of the nobility and a letter from the Archbishop to obtain a pardon. Armed with these, Gabrio Casati, brother of the Countess Confalonieri, obtained the commutation of the sentence to one of imprisonment for life, and the prisoners were sent to the Spielberg.

As the first of the great state trials consequent on the condition of Lombardy under the Austrians, the trial of Confalonieri and his companions is one of the most striking incidents of the struggle for Italian liberty. The prisoners took their places on the scaffold, and the throng of Milanese made no secret of their sympathy. "When they were on the scaffold a great murmur was heard, and then silence. The prisoners were then chained to rings of iron. All the windows were filled with spectators; all gave unmistakeable signs of compassion and interest. A prolonged murmur of satisfaction greeted the announcement of mercy, another, with words of comfort, the designation of the Spielberg; and a long groan followed their departure" (Tivaroni). "The palaces of nearly all the nobility of Milan were closed in sign of mourning, the

boxes of the Scala theatre were left empty with the curtains down" (Andryane).

Confalonieri, arriving ill of asthma at Vienna, became the object of the most powerful temptations to betray his confederates. He was waited on by the Director General of the Police, who announced the visit of a great personage. This proved to be no less than Metternich himself. He explained to Confalonieri the necessity of making an example of him and added, "In this state of affairs, you will easily understand that we attach very little importance to knowing in detail what has taken place in the different states of Italy before or after the revolutions of Naples and Piedmont; if then I wish to be informed by you to-day, it is only from the historical point of view, and in the interest of yourself and your companions. His Majesty will, I doubt not, show himself grateful for any confidential information which you may be disposed to give him." Confalonieri replied, "Your Excellency considers me of too great importance, and to satisfy His Majesty it would be necessary"—"that you make a call on your memory," replied the Prince: to which the prisoner replied, "Alas! I should only find there heart-pains—all the rest is obliterated," and turned the conversation to another subject. The Prince then said, "Perhaps on you it depends to throw off not only your own chains but those of your companions in misfortune. Why keep secret the names of all those who took part in your conspiracy? Perhaps you do not believe in my word—if you wish to put your secrets in possession of the most august personage of the empire, he will come here to find you." To this Confalonieri replied that he could say no more to that august personage than he had said to the Prince; he had nothing to add, nothing to conceal.

The temptation failed, and Confalonieri took his way to the Spielberg, where for thirteen years he atoned for his devotion to Italy, in a dungeon eight paces long and four wide, a narrow barred window his only light—for candles

were not allowed—a mattress for his bed and a single blanket for cover, a wooden bowl to drink from, a wooden spoon to eat with, miserably fed and worse clothed, on his waist eight pounds of iron and a chain from one leg to another, like a galley slave. There was taken from him a leather cushion which his wife had used when she came to Vienna; from his fellow prisoner, Bacchiega, a sparrow he had tamed; from Silvio Pellico and Maroncelli their spectacles, afterwards restored to the former but not to the latter. Thrice a day their cells were searched, and every article in the cells was examined lest some means of escape or relief should be conveyed to them. The Emperor himself prescribed the regimen: it was necessary to apply to him to increase or diminish the ration of beans; for leave to amputate the leg of Maroncelli; for a wig for Villa; for the sequestration of Bacchiega's sparrow, and Confalonieri's cushion. This paternal sovereign permitted letters from Silvio Pellico's father to reach him with only the address and the signature, and only allowed Andryane to inform his parents and family once in six months that he was living. A man came to Brunn with a carriage and passports to enable Confalonieri to escape; he refused in order not to compromise his prison companion, Andryane. In 1830 the Countess Confalonieri died, never having been permitted to see her husband, and that year Silvio Pellico was liberated; Andryane in 1832; Maroncelli in 1833; Castiglia in 1835 and Confalonieri in 1836, to go into exile until 1838. Their years in prison did more for the freedom of Italy than their conspiracies. The indignation of the civilized world at the sufferings of Silvio Pellico, Confalonieri and their companions in torture did more to relax the chains that held Italy down than all the risings which Austria suppressed.

From this time the patriots carried on their work openly, but only by striving to form public opinion. Little by little the tyranny of Austria was modified by the patient persistency with which the Lombards showed their irreconcilable aversion

from its rule; but the road to liberty by this direction was a long one. To oppose a merely negative resistance to the persecutions of the police and the provocations of the Radetzky system, which repressed all manifestations of Italian sentiment, was harder for the impatient and passionate southern blood than the open and acute conflict of conspiracy and Carbonarism. But the horrible severity of Austrian statecraft, with its all-pervading espionage, its prison-tortures, its artifices by which men were induced to betray each other through pretended confessions craftily contrived, compelled acquiescence, and after the trial of Confalonieri and his associates there was a long period of relative tranquillity. Opposition to the government was limited to moral resistance, work in schools and hospitals, and charities—all understood as protests against the Austrian domination, but not open to attack as forms of resistance. Active correspondence with those who, in other parts of Italy, entertained the sentiments of nationality, and associations without a treasonable scope, all worked together to spread the consciousness of Italian citizenship long before the distinct purpose of attaining the unity of Italy was the avowed motive of action. In fact it is most probable that but for the savage repression of all forms of political association in Lombardy, the spread of national sentiment would have been slower, and Lombardy might have been satisfied with something less than the union with Piedmont which it obtained after so many years. The study of constitutional systems, made practical by the movements in Spain and Naples, was more seriously followed, and plans, originally discordant, gradually became harmonious. The republicans of Genoa found common ground with the friends of the monarchy, and the universal detestation of Austria prepared the way for the rule of the House of Savoy. Carbonarism could not be suppressed, though punishable with death; nor could Freemasonry, though the slight revival of activity which took place in 1833 quickened the movements of the police, and

hardened the rigours of repression. Every form of liberalism was met by prohibitive regulations of the severest kind, but no severity could control the growing revolt of the popular spirit. New measures forbade the young men to go abroad for education, and those of the families of the upper classes who were known to entertain the liberal tendencies of the day, were not allowed to go abroad on any pretext; in 1832 the government even declared that all who absented themselves from the territory without authorization of the police were no longer subjects of Austria, and were exposed to confiscation of all their goods. Under these crushing restrictions nothing was possible except to read and think. Reading was therefore restricted, the works of Alfieri were no longer allowed to be reprinted, the Bibles sent from abroad were no longer admitted, and only works which offended neither Church nor state were permitted to circulate.

But with the Italian temperament the forced apathy of such a régime could not long be maintained, and in the place of the verses of Alfieri the tracts issued by "Young Italy" and the exhortations of Mazzini began to find their devious ways through the ranks of the young, the students, the workmen. Apprehensive of the results, the priests and the Austrian police found matter here for another cast of the net, in which numbers of innocent persons, and some actual conspirators, of a milder type and less social importance than those involved in the Confalonieri conspiracy, were caught. The trials consequent on these arrests lasted two years, and on the 27th of February 1835 sentence of death was pronounced on Luigi Tinelli, Cesare Benzoni, Pietro Strada, Giovanni Dansi, and sixteen others, mostly students, with a few workmen of the higher class. Two of the prisoners had gone mad in prison, one had attempted to kill himself in grief at having yielded to the torture so far as to allow admissions to escape him. The survivors were exposed to public view on a scaffold with the sentence placarded over their heads, but the sentences were commuted to imprisonment



for various terms. Another great trial at Mantua in September 1834 ended in the condemnation of the Marquis Odoardo Gonzaga Valenti to three years of prison, Arrivábene and Predieri to exile, while many minor sentences were pronounced, including the expulsion of the historian Cantù from the faculty of instruction. Austria threatened to occupy the Swiss canton of Ticino as the refuge of conspirators, but France protested and Austria was obliged to content herself with a treaty of extradition comprising the offences of treason and rebellion. All institutions, even of charity, which had the appearance of being directed by patriotic intention, or even if set atoot by persons known to have liberal sympathies, were now suppressed; even the Frenchmen Lamennais and Montalembert, travelling to Venice, were kept under police surveillance, with Alexandre Dumas and others.

The death of the imperial jailor and inquisitor, Francis I, on the 2nd of March, 1835, gave some hope of change in the horrible system of political slavery, which owed so much of its rigour to his morbid passion for absolute rule. There was widespread liberation of prisoners, amnesties, and pardons, prisoners having the choice of expatriation or diminished terms of imprisonment. The trials in progress were suspended, and the new Emperor Ferdinand I went to Milan to be crowned—for the pretence of a Lombard kingdom and the fiction of autonomy were preserved. The nobility, wearied of the long term of retirement and abstention from gaiety, welcomed the new sovereign with acclamations and desired to take it for granted that a new era had commenced. Nothing was changed in the régime except that the Emperor gave commissions to artists and donations to the public institutions, but patriotic sentiment in the Milanese was weary, and affairs went more smoothly. Luxury revived in Milan, and from 1835 to 1846 pleasure and extravagance seemed to supersede political activity.

The position of Venice in regard to the Italian revolution

was different from that of all the other provinces. Its long history, and its traditions of republican independence, had set up from time immemorial a habit of considering Venice apart from Italy, which was too strong for the people not to insist on the maintenance of this individuality as the prime condition of civic life. The betrayal of Venice by France in the treaty of Campo Formio (1797) had always been resented as one of the most disgraceful acts in the career of Napoleon, and when the reaction came, after 1815, the traditions of the Austrian government were not old enough to have established any serious hold on the people. Venice had never been part of Italy, but neither was she part of Austria. Still, the repugnance to Austrian government, for some time after 1815, does not seem to have been violent.

A separate government was established for Venetia, and the Archduke John came to Venice to receive the oath of allegiance. At the outset, from sentimental considerations more than political, Austria paid a certain amount of respect to the antecedents and prejudices of the people. The population in general accepted with apathy, rarely interrupted by any outbreak of national sentiment, the government of Austria, and between the years 1815 and 1822 there occurred no serious disturbance of the public peace. The first indication of discontent came from the southern quarter, where the Venetian provinces border on the Romagna, and where the Carbonari had established their lodges. From 1817 to 1822 the slow subterranean operations of the Carbonari were the only motive power in the direction of reform, and in 1821 the trial of a large number of Italians, accused of disaffection, gave evidence that this work was proceeding with some success. The severity of the penalties inflicted on this occasion will give us an idea of the terrible rigour with which the Austrian government defended its possessions against the aggressions of liberalism. The supreme court condemned thirteen citizens to death for high treason on the ground of belonging to secret societies, and

about twenty more were condemned to various terms of imprisonment in the Spielberg and other prisons of the state.

This severity, prudent from the point of view of despotism, had its intended effect, and until 1844 no political movement indicated that there was any political life in Venice. Perquisitions were made from time to time on the most trivial pretexts. The possession of books inculcating liberal sentiments or even of works like the *Siege of Florence* by Guerazzi, which was simply a reminiscence of the republican period in Tuscany, was condemned, while the possession of the Bible translated by Deodati was sufficient to send its owner to the prisons of the state. The sentences in these cases were ordered to be made public without the names of the parties, and no criticism on them was permitted. The concession of the railway between Venice and Milan was made a political question. In 1840 it was noticed that the Venetians discussed public affairs in private instead of in the cafés as hitherto; but it was not until 1844 that the desertion of the brothers Bandiera, and their expedition into Calabria, fell as a bomb into Venetian society. The brothers Bandiera having been enrolled in Mazzini's "Young Italy," this movement led to researches by the authorities, which betrayed a certain amount of activity among the Venetian secret societies. In 1845 Manin appeared. From that time forward he was recognized as the leader of liberal opinion in Venice, and when the agitation in other parts of Italy, especially in Rome under Pius IX, had begun to bear fruit in public action, Manin became the leader of the Venetian revolt.

## (2) *Parma, Modena and Tuscany.*

The restoration of the old order of things at Parma gave the Austrian government an excellent opportunity to pay an imperative obligation while restoring legitimacy its rights. Marie Louise, the wife of the deposed Napoleon, had rendered

services of a most important character during her brief term of sovereignty, not only by her acceptance of so uneasy a throne, but by systematically acting as a spy on her Imperial husband, and revealing all his projects to her father at Vienna<sup>1</sup>. Compensation for this service, and a way of escaping the unpleasant descent from the condition of a Sovereign to that of a subject, were found in the instalment of the Empress as Duchess of Parma, the prior claims of the late Bourbon rulers being compromised by an arrangement which reserved the right of the Infanta Maria Luigia, of the legitimate Spanish Bourbon stock, and late regent of Etruria, to succeed to the duchy on the death of Marie Louise. The Infanta was made *pro tempore* sovereign of Lucca, but, dying before Marie Louise, she transmitted her rights to her son Carlo, who eventually succeeded to the throne of Parma.

Of a mild, and, for one of her race, curiously liberal tendency, the new Duchess of Parma, Archduchess of Austria, seems to have seriously attempted to give prolonged life to the system of internal administration inaugurated by Napoleon, and Parma was distinguished in the general revival of the old régime as the only state that largely preserved French institutions. By a decree of November 20th, 1817, the Duchess established the equality of women in heritage, and named a commission to draw up a civil code, which was sanctioned on the 4th of January, 1820. In the following November a penal code abolished many of the brutalities of the old system of absolute government, and established the publicity of criminal trials and other liberal measures borrowed from the past régime. After a temporary ministerial regency under Count Marescalchi, as a preparation for the assumption of her throne by the Archduchess, the Count Macaulay-Cerati, a native of

<sup>1</sup> Kossuth informed me in 1852 that he, when minister of Austro-Hungary, had seen in the archives of Vienna a series of letters from the Empress to her father in which all the plans of Napoleon were communicated—with what effect some future historian only can show.

Ireland but educated in Parma, was appointed sole minister for another brief period, to be succeeded by Count Neipperg, the latest lover of the Archduchess, and after the death of Napoleon, her morganatic husband. Neipperg was an Austrian marshal but a lenient governor. Dying in 1829, he was succeeded by another Austrian, Baron Werklein, under whose administration the burthens of the state were sensibly increased, and the police and the clergy returned to something of the normal Austrian condition. If universal report does her no injustice, the Sovereign often forgot the duties of her position in the satisfaction of her sensual pleasures, and the government rapidly deteriorated, the maladministration of justice and the usurpations of the clergy operating with the remembrance of the earlier condition of things to produce discontent which broke out into active revolt on the news of the movement in central Italy in 1831. To the demands of the people for liberal concessions the Duchess replied by taking refuge at Piacenza with the Austrians. Werklein resigned, and a provisional government attempted to take the direction of affairs, but the repression of the revolt in Modena and Bologna brought back the Austrians. The treatment of the compromised was lenient, and a decree of amnesty was issued on the 8th of August, 1831. From this time until 1847 the history of Parma is one which hardly calls for notice. Marie Louise died in that year, leaving the reputation of a woman whose private character was not beyond reproach, but whose public conduct made her notable amongst the rulers of Austrian Italy, as mild, just and merciful. The influence of the liberal tendencies of Pius IX had, here as elsewhere in Italy, begun, to work before the Duchess died, and a slight outbreak and repression had taken place on the occasion of the prohibition of a banquet to the Pontiff, with the cost of a few wounds to the demonstrators.

The relative good fortune in the character of its ruler, which made Parma enviable amongst the Italian states under the control of Austria, is sharply contrasted with the hapless fate

of Modena. Among the spawn of petty tyrants bred by the autocracy at Vienna for the misery of the Italian people, the last two Francescos of the Austro-Este house are preeminent for their brutal assertion of the divine right to misgovern at their pleasure the countries consigned to them. Perhaps the infiltration of Italian blood in the Este family gave a more intense mediæval subtlety to their method of government, but in fact they surpassed the doings of the Hapsburgs in Lombardy, impossible as that might have seemed. Francesco IV, son of an archduke of Austria who had been Duke of Modena and Governor of Lombardy and who died in 1806, and of Maria Beatrice of Este, heiress of an income of many millions drawn from large estates in central Italy, as well as of the Duchy of Modena, had two passions dominant over many vices, hatred of France and French ideas, and love of absolute government. What he did in misgovernment was not merely from deference paid to orders from Vienna, as in other cases amongst the petty Italian princes, but also from pure detestation of anything resembling popular rights and the profound conviction that Providence had made the people to be governed and the Princes to govern them. The Queen of Sardinia, the Austrian wife of Vittorio Emmanuele I, arranged a marriage between Francesco and her daughter Maria Beatrice, in the hope, it is said, of inducing the House of Savoy to abolish the Salic law which held there—a change which would have made the wife of Francesco IV of Modena Queen of Sardinia. The ambition of Francesco to become the king of an united northern Italy drew him into intrigues with all classes of Italian politicians; at one time he was liberal with the constitutionalists, at another absolute with the court of Vienna. That he was a man of great ability is undeniable, and a little constancy in his views, with a little political tact, would have made him a dangerous candidate for the position of head of an united Italy. But he was disqualified by his lack of political education and his contempt for popular rights: he was crafty,

dishonest and mendacious; with all this he had at times the courtesy of a man who considers himself master of all around him, and to whom courtesy and condescension cost nothing. Returning to his ancestral state on the 16th of July, 1814, he abolished the laws of the defunct Kingdom of Italy and the judicial system founded on French law, and soon afterwards restored the codes of 1771. During the attempted invasion of Murat in 1815 he withdrew to Mantua, the favourite refuge of the children of Austria when fortune seemed uncertain, remaining however only a few months. The dull routine of repression and irritation continued until the revolutions, which broke out in Naples and Piedmont in 1820, gave rise to agitation in Modena. No violence was attempted in the duchy, but the popular unrest gave Francesco a pretext to put his theories in operation. It was discovered that subversive documents had been circulated, and many arrests were made. The occasion was improved for the establishment of a true inquisitorial régime, with special tribunals for conspiracy. Torture was inflicted by privation of sleep and food and long endurance of extreme physical discomfort: one method of extorting confessions was ingenious if devilish - the administration of drugs which produced delirium in the patient, whose ravings were recorded as testimony against him. Amongst the voluntary exiles who escaped from this tyranny was Panizzi, afterwards chief librarian to the British Museum. Out of these accusations grew the notorious Rubiera trials, in which the Duke showed himself a worse accuser, severer judge and more barbarous executioner than even his servile officials. The details are not edifying, but may be found in Tivaroni, who gives names and particulars of a series of iniquitous condemnations which equalled or surpassed those of the Austrians in Lombardy.

The only serious and continuous effort of Francesco seems to have been that to supplant the male heir of the House of Savoy for the benefit of his wife the female heir of King Vittorio

Emmanuele. But even this did not prosper, and it would seem that his capricious and unbalanced character led even the rulers of Vienna to discourage his plans for creating a kingdom out of the Principalities and part of the States of the Church. Perhaps the advantage of a vigorous and unscrupulous governor in central Italy did not, with the Hapsburgs, outweigh the evident disadvantage of Francesco's growing unpopularity; in any case his intrigues were fruitless. Communications passed between the French republicans and the Duke, and between the latter and the liberals of Modena, through the medium of their well-known leader *Ciro Menotti*. The outcome of the Revolution of July destroyed any hope of aid from that quarter, and the Duke, probably denounced at Vienna as compromised with the liberals, went to the extreme of reaction. The result was the demonstration of January, 1831, which was headed by *Menotti*—a futile and in fact utterly inoffensive conspiracy which had only succeeded in preparing a feeble protest without overt acts. The conspirators, to the number of sixty, having met in the house of *Menotti*, were surrounded by the troops, and after a brief resistance, in which three soldiers were killed, they were all captured. A rising in the capital was thus prevented, and in the trials which subsequently took place implacable severity fell on the prisoners. Only two, however, suffered capital punishment—they were *Menotti* and *Vincenzo Borelli*, the latter not one of those implicated with *Menotti*, but vaguely accused of having participated in the insurrectionary movement of 1820. There is no doubt that the Duke had been deeply engaged in intrigues with the liberal chiefs for the furtherance of his ambitious schemes, and there is evidence enough to make it most probable that the execution of *Menotti* was resolved on in order to silence the only witness of transactions, which, if made known, would have compromised the Duke with Austria without any compensation in the direction of Savoy. It is not improbable that the execution of *Borelli*, whose offence was not such as to distinguish



him from the mass of the conspirators, was ordered simply to obscure the reasons for that of Menotti. The long list of crimes against justice of which the Duke is convicted by authentic history proves that he was capable of such an act. On the other hand, the touching letter which Menotti wrote to his wife before his execution and which the government refused to transmit to her, shows that he was no vulgar conspirator, but a man of high principle, who had entered on the course he took in full understanding with the Duke, and was abandoned by him when he no longer served the ducal purposes. Menotti's letter is one of the most touching documents in the history of the Italian movement, and may be placed alongside that of Attilio Bandiera<sup>1</sup>.

The movement in the city of Modena was summarily checked by the capture of the conspirators, but that in the provinces was more serious, and on the 5th of February, 1831, the Duke considered it prudent to take refuge in Mantua and leave its suppression to the Austrians. The people of Reggio united with those of Modena, and a new government was formed on the 18th of February, but the peasantry were hostile and the succour hoped for from other quarters did not arrive. Francesco soon returned with a strong Austrian escort, and after a trivial resistance the insurgents disbanded. This failure was naturally followed by new severities and a long series of trials and condemnations to imprisonment or the galleys. The despotic tendencies of the Duke, thus intensified, continued during the rest of his life without the stimulus of another rebellion. He died on the 20th of February, 1846. Even the liberal writers on the events of central Italy admit that his private life was without grave reproach, and that he was humane where no political question was involved.

The restoration of 1814 recalled to the throne of Tuscany Ferdinando III, who had been expelled by Napoleon in 1798,

<sup>1</sup> It is to be found in Tivaroni, *L'Italia durante il dominio Austriaco*, i. 634.

and who, by the mildness of his rule, contrasting with the severity of that of the French interregnum, gave his subjects a degree of contentment which no other portion of the peninsula under Austrian control—not excepting Parma in the days of Marie Louise—enjoyed. Even the liberal historians record that he was received with joy. The enterprise of Murat in 1815 disturbed for a moment his tranquillity, and he took refuge in his Ligurian province during the short campaign. While returning to the ancient system, the Grand Duke preserved some of the ameliorations in the code introduced by the French, and perhaps governed as well as could have been expected of one reared in the Viennese school of despotism. This led to the mitigation of all those symptoms of discontent which were so intense in Modena and in the provinces under direct Austrian government. The rule of Ferdinando was that of a benevolent despot in a small state; and such a system was better adapted to the intelligent and pacific Tuscans than to any other part of Italy. The Grand Duke had the means and the energy to suppress open revolt, should it appear, and, feeling sure of his hold on the people, he was really more tolerant than the Austrians found it safe to be. Responsible ministers did not come within his limitations: he had his private secretaries for foreign and domestic affairs, war and finance, but he directed all. The immediate control of affairs was in the hands of a Secretary of State, and to this office the Grand Duke appointed Vittorio Fossombroni. His functions, depending, as they did, entirely on the pleasure of the sovereign, were hardly definable by statute, and practically covered the entire government, so that Tivaroni says of him that he was “the real master of Tuscany in this period.” Born in Arezzo, of a noble family, and early devoted to the study of mathematics, he had given great attention to the problem, so important in Italy, of the irrigation of arid lands. He had accepted under the Empire the charge of supervising the drainage of the Pontine marshes, and made studies for that irrigation

of the Maremme which later was to become one of the chief glories of the dynasty of Lorraine, serving his country tranquilly under Napoleon as he did after the restoration under Ferdinando III. Gino Capponi, no poor judge of men, and a liberal of the most solid type, says of him: "Fossombroni had a mind of the first order in the force and range of its natural qualities, but the rapidity, accuracy and admirable clearness of his views were not supported by a corresponding profundity of reflection or of science....Honest in his administration of public affairs, but indifferent to the peculations of his subordinates, he was in personal affairs of a parsimony sometimes too precise." With this character and an easy-going tolerance of liberal opinions so far as the mere expression of them was concerned, Fossombroni was an ideal governor for an Italian population and left no good reason for measures required by Austrian policy and even demanded by Vienna of the Grand Duke. The Grand Duke displayed a strong *amour propre* in the administration of his state and refused to concede to Austria what it often demanded, even though in accordance with his own tendencies. He was, however benevolent, still a despot and a reactionary, and mingled his resistance to the Roman Curia with concessions to the Church at home, re-establishing ecclesiastical marriage but refusing to permit the Pope to meddle in the affairs of the State.

In 1821 the Grand Duke married, in second nuptials, Maria Ferdinanda, a Bourbon princess; his son and heir, Leopold, had already in 1817 married the Princess Marianna of Saxony. The stability of the dynasty of Lorraine was thus established on what seemed a safe basis, and the Grand Duke clearly entertained no apprehensions that liberalism might render its position insecure. About the year 1820 a mild and Platonic propaganda of progress began to make itself felt in literature, the chief centre being the still well-known scientific and literary reading library of Vieusseux, where advanced liberals used to meet, to read and discuss the events of the day and the

politics of Europe. Around this nucleus gathered the thinkers of Tuscany, and as the genial hospitality of the Grand Duke did not repel the exiles of Naples and Piedmont, the events of 1821 added greatly to the strength of the movement. The foundation of *La Antologia*, a review modelled on the *Edinburgh Review*, vivified the political atmosphere, and was tolerated until 1833. During all these years Tuscany was the Italian Arcadia, where, as nowhere else in the peninsula, a certain freedom of thought and discussion existed undisturbed. The reign of Ferdinando III was one of prosperity and tranquillity for his state, and to this day one may hear old Tuscans repeat the traditions of a golden rule before the idea of Italian unity invaded their Duchy. Tabarrini sums up the condition of Tuscany as that of "a country without passions or ambitions, with mild manners and an inborn sense of the beautiful."

In June 1824 Ferdinando was succeeded by Leopoldo II. Though less princely and more despotic than his father, he was induced by the influence of Fossombroni to repel the attempted intervention of Austria in Tuscan affairs, and no change took place in the administration until the revolution of July set the blood of the most advanced liberals in a ferment. An abortive movement took place in February, 1831, in consequence of which the police arrested about forty of the radical and revolutionary party; but as the vast majority of the Tuscans were content with the government and repugnant to any change, there was no possibility of a serious attempt at revolution, which for the rest the moderates knew would only result in the intervention of Austria. The secret society, "*I veri Italiani*," and the *Giovane Italia* began to work, but with few followers. The Grand Duke kept up the improvement of the country in his mild way and the masses were ready to support the government. In April, 1844, Fossombroni died. He was succeeded by Don Neri Corsini, who soon gave place to Giuseppe Paver, under whom

affairs followed their tranquil course. In 1846 some agitation was caused by the extradition, at the demand of the Pope, of Renzi, a political refugee—an agitation unimportant except as giving the growing liberal party an opportunity for innocuous manifestation. Events had to wait for the initiative of Pius IX.

### (3) *The Papal States.*

The restoration of the Pope after 1815 was hailed with great applause by the Italian population in the states through which he passed on his way to Rome. Pius VII enjoyed the advantage of being looked upon as a victim of the tyranny of Napoleon and came back as the liberator of his people from the French government and the oppressions of Murat. After his return, the civil government of the Papal States was practically carried on at the dictation of the Austrians. But the population, weary of the oppressions and agitations of the preceding years, submitted quietly, desiring only peace. In these circumstances perhaps more progress was made toward constitutional government than would have been possible in a state of political agitation. In 1817 the Pope published a code of civil procedure, and in 1821 the commercial code of the kingdom of Italy, as drawn up under Eugène, was restored. In the penal code capital punishment for heresy and torture were abolished. Taxation was reasonable, just, and imposed according to the law, but the administration was fraudulent and extremely corrupt. From 1815 to 1830 the Pope had only two regiments of infantry and a few companies of grenadiers, dragoons and artillery—sufficient to maintain a tranquillity which, at least in the greater part of his dominions, no political agitation disturbed.

The mountainous portions of the country, in Umbria and the Marches, were, however, always more or less affected by the propaganda of the Carbonari, who on the 24th of June, 1817, ordered a rising. Meeting with no support from the

population, this disturbance was speedily repressed. It was followed by a long list of prosecutions and condemnations to death, or to lifelong slavery in the galleys, and to terms of imprisonment from three to ten years. In 1821 the activity of the conspirators again provoked numerous banishments and imprisonments, and in 1823 further additions were made to the number of poor wretches who were wasting away in the horrible prisons of the Papal States. In spite of these severities, the agitation continued, not extensively indeed, owing to the sluggish and degraded condition of the population, but always to an extent sufficient to disturb the government. The Austrians remained throughout the prime counsellors of the Pope, and enjoyed the advantage without incurring the responsibility of the cruelties to which they urged the Papal government. The death of Pius VII in 1823 and the accession of Leo XII, who had been known in his youth to be of a frank and liberal disposition, excited hopes of change in a liberal direction. But the Pope's character underwent, as in so many other cases, a modification consequent on the grave responsibility of his new position as head of the Church: he grew timid and distrustful of all tendencies to reform, and ended in becoming reactionary and hostile to all liberal movement. In his policy of repression he naturally relied on Austria, whose influence in Central Italy during this period was constantly on the increase.

In the Romagna, where the spirit of the people has always displayed a turbulence scarcely known in other parts of Italy, the agitation was renewed in 1824, and was rigorously suppressed by the papal authorities. In August, 1825, very severe sentences were pronounced against the Freemasons and all other secret societies. In accordance with these, more than two hundred persons of all classes were arrested, and sentenced to terms of punishment varying from death to ten years' imprisonment, while many others were put under police supervision. The capital punishments were commuted to the

galleys for life. This state of things continued until 1829, when Leo XII died. Pius VIII, who succeeded, modified none of the measures taken by his predecessor, and his short reign as pope introduced no change in political conditions. He died in 1830 and was succeeded by Gregory XVI.

On the 4th of February, 1831, under the pressure of the unvarying severity and brutality of the papal administration, an insurrection broke out at Bologna. This insurrection had no connexion with the measures of the new Pope, whose election was not known when it began: it was due to other causes. The discontent in the Romagna had greatly increased since 1824, and the operations of the secret societies had been more active and more successful there than anywhere else in Italy, with the exception of Naples. Taxation was irregular and accompanied by favoritism and corruption, while the measures taken to suppress public opinion were arbitrary and capricious, depending entirely upon the moods and humours of the local administration. The influence of Mazzini began about this time to be felt in Italy. He operated with great energy and success in the Papal States, and was probably the main director of all the liberal movements that took place,—the Freemasons and Carbonari more or less following his lead.

An abortive rising had taken place in Rome on December 10, 1832, two days after the death of Pius VIII, but (as Farini says) it had no settled plan or unity of direction. It was the seizure of Menotti in Parma that gave the signal for the outbreak of February in the Papal States. At Bologna the existing government was at once overthrown, and from this centre the movement rapidly spread throughout the Legations, the Marches, and Umbria. The papal forces in Ancona were overcome with little difficulty, and "within a fortnight four-fifths of the Papal States had fallen away." A second attempt was now made in Rome itself, but, like the first, was suppressed without difficulty, the mass of the population declaring strongly against the revolutionists. The Curia now tried concessions,

lowering the taxes on salt and meal, but at the same time it gathered troops. These measures had no effect on the revolted provinces, which, in a general assembly held at Bologna, on Feb. 25, formally abolished the temporal authority of the Pope and formed themselves into a single state. A provisional constitution was drawn up, and Count Carlo Pepoli took the lead of the movement, along with other men of influence and position. But the more or less conservative tendencies of these persons offended the radicals and the Carbonari, and disunion began to manifest itself in the ranks of the revolutionary party. At this juncture the Austrian government, rightly guessing that the government of Louis Philippe, however it might threaten, would not proceed to active measures, resolved to obey the summons of Gregory XVI and to intervene. Having restored the Duke of Modena, Austrian troops entered Ferrara on March 6, and a fortnight later marched on Bologna. The revolution was easily put down, and the insurgent forces withdrew to Ravenna and Forlì, and afterwards to Ancona, where they capitulated to the Austrians. The whole affair, unsupported as it was elsewhere in Italy, was an ill-considered and misdirected movement, which showed the strength of popular discontent, but developed no distinct aims or national tendencies that might entitle it to consideration as a step in the national development.

These unfortunate events nearly led to international complications. The French government, jealous of Austrian influence, protested against the continued occupation of that portion of the pontifical states where the insurrection had taken place. At the same time it urged the Papacy to introduce reforms, with a view to satisfy public sentiment, but the despotic tendencies of the papal court prevented any hearty adoption of this policy. It is true that the Pope, under the pressure of the liberal governments, made some show of concession. This, however, had no duration, the local authorities following their own pleasure in executing or neglecting their orders, and in the



end things remained as they had been. In 1832 fresh disturbances, this time mainly the work of the students, broke out in the Romagna, and were suppressed by the pontifical forces after somewhat severe fighting at Cesena. The suppression was brutal; at Rimini and Forlì twenty-one people were killed and more than a hundred wounded.

Meanwhile the Austrians had evacuated Ancona and some other places, in the summer of 1831, but they still held their ground in Ferrara. In February 1832 the French, determined not to leave the Papal States entirely under the influence of Austria, occupied Ancona by surprise. Three men-of-war arrived off the port, and landed a body of eighteen hundred men, disregarding the protests of the papal government, which withdrew its own troops in order not to accept any complicity in the French violation of its rights. War between France and Austria appeared to be imminent, but neither party was anxious to fight, and Louis Philippe had no allies. The general state of the pontifical territory remained unaltered, the jealousies of France and Austria disposing the government rather to maintain the *status quo* than to introduce any reforms. In 1837 the French and Austrians simultaneously evacuated the papal territories.

From 1843 to 1845 insurrection in a chronic form infested the Roman states, occasionally breaking out in movements of greater or less importance. The most rigorous measures against the secret societies produced no effect other than that of extending their membership. The punishments inflicted, the persecutions and imprisonments, have rarely been surpassed in severity and brutality in the annals of European government. The result as a whole was bitter animosity on the part of the population, especially that of the more mountainous provinces, toward the Pope and his government. A writer of the period says: "All the population of Ravenna is intensely hostile to the government; the political registers contain only about thirty people who may be said to be well disposed toward

the government of the Holy See. 'The greater part of the population is hostile to the government and might be called liberal.' Cardinal Massimo writes from Imola on the 22nd of August, 1845: "Setting aside the old men and women, the young people of the city and a very small part of the agricultural class not entirely corrupted, the whole of the population from eighteen years of age, with the exception of a few timorous legitimists, is entirely and in principle hostile to the government." The Judge of Ferrara at the same time writes: "The friends of the government have no influence in this province precisely because they are few, and the general sentiment is hostile. The severity of the punishments inflicted for discontent intensifies this feeling." Many liberals went into voluntary exile, and from abroad became the prime movers of sedition in the Papal States.

An insurrection which broke out in Rimini in 1845 still further intensified the persecution, and the extraordinary commissioners who were sent to Rimini and Ravenna committed atrocities scarcely to be described. Some of the political prisoners died of starvation and of the corporal punishments inflicted by the gendarmes in the prisons; and Cardinal Massimo, who ruled at Ravenna, exulted publicly over this severity. The reign of Gregory XVI yielded in no respect to those of his predecessors in systematic and unflinching suppression of all popular rights. The corruption in the papal court, the extravagance and irregularity reached their maximum under Gregory XVI. The finances were in an almost bankrupt condition and a loan of two million scudi produced no permanent relief.\* In 1846 Gregory XVI died, abandoned and detested. The record of his reign is summed up in the following words by one of his contemporaries: "The repose, the life, the reputation and the honour of families disturbed, menaced, and brutally violated by spies, policemen, centurions, curates, bishops, governors, vicars and inquisitors; commerce impoverished, no industries, taxation

and imposts very heavy; the fields desolated and unhealthy; a debt of thirty-eight million scudi; expenditure exceeding income by half a million; no control, no accounts, the administration badly arranged, wasteful and thievish; five hundred civil employes with a total salary of 276,000 scudi; three hundred ecclesiastics with a total salary of 1,100,000 scudi; no codes of law; constant and needless interference with justice; a detestable police; ecclesiastical censure supported by military force; roads, asylums, associations and meetings opposed; the introduction of gas prevented; criminals in abundance; forty thousand persons under police supervision; four thousand exiles. Such was the rule of Gregory XVI." On the death of Gregory XVI, Rome was undisturbed. Its liberal club held its usual conferences without any tendencies to insurrection and the state of the city may be said to have been normal. The conclave for the election of the new Pope acted under the rival pressures of France and Austria, and ended with the election of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti, who took the name of Pius IX. In his early days, when under the influence of the more conservative and moderate of the Italian patriots, Mastai-Ferretti was an ecclesiastic of unusually liberal views. A countryman of Count Pasolini, the leading spirit amongst the rational reformers in the Papal States, he had been greatly influenced by that statesman, and entered upon his sacred functions with a strong disposition in favour of liberal views. Pius IX initiated administrative reforms, and issued an amnesty for all political offences, which was signed on the 16th of July, 1846. This concession was made conditional on the recognition of error and on signature of the following formula: "I, the under-signed, recognize the reception of a singular grace in the generous and spontaneous pardon conceded to me by the indulgence of the most high pontiff Pius IX, my legitimate sovereign, for all the part I have taken, in whatever manner, in attempts which have disturbed public order and attacked the legitimate authority instituted in his temporal dominions.

I promise on my word of honour not to abuse in any manner or at any time the sovereign clemency, and I give my pledge to fulfil faithfully all the duties of a good and loyal subject." The only exceptions from this amnesty were those of employés, officers and ecclesiastics whose offences were complicated with crime, but it comprehended all convicts, exiles and others punished for political reasons by the state.

The appointment of Cardinal Gizzi as Secretary of State (August, 1846) was regarded as an earnest of further liberal progress. This was followed by the nomination of other liberal officials to administrative posts in various parts of the Papal States. Commissions were appointed for considering a scheme of educational reform. Discussion of political problems became active and general, and the supporters of national independence began to speak freely, for instance in the Scientific Congress of Italy, held at Genoa in the autumn of 1846. In March of the following year, the severity of the press-censorship in Rome was modified, and many journals and pamphlets added a powerful stimulus to the movement in favour of independence and reform. In April 1847 an edict was published, instituting a Council of State, to be composed of persons nominated in each province by the authorities of the province, and appointed by the Pope. Laymen were not excluded from this council, which, although it possessed only a deliberative voice, and was entirely subject, in its composition, to the ecclesiastical will, was welcomed as at least a step in the direction of popular representation. The people began to express their joy and their hopes in noisy demonstrations, for instance on the anniversary of the Pope's accession (June, 1847). The government began to feel some anxiety, and shortly afterwards such gatherings were forbidden. The "Sanfedisti" or "Gregoriani"—so-called because they supported the policy of Gregory XVI, the embodiment of ecclesiastical tyranny—began to recover courage, and a reaction, actively supported by Austria, seemed probable. For a time, however,

Pius IX adhered to his policy of reform, consented to the creation of a civic guard in Rome, and substituted Cardinal Ferretti—a strong reformer—for Cardinal Gizzi, as Secretary of State. It appeared as if Metternich's remark, that "a liberal Pope was inconceivable," was about to be falsified by the career of Pio Nono.

Meanwhile, throughout the Romagna, demonstrations occurred in increasing numbers. At Bologna the most advanced Radicals organised a festa in the Borgo San Pietro in commemoration of those who had died or been imprisoned in consequence of the disturbances of 1844: but the Cardinal Legate prevented it. It is clear that Pius IX, on assuming power, had no precise conception of his future course. Of extreme benevolence of disposition, and a devout man, the sufferings of the people and the severity of past governments had no doubt impressed him profoundly, and believing in the goodness and docility of his subjects, he was disposed to do what lay in him to lessen their troubles. But, as always happens in such cases, the liberal cardinal becomes an absolute Pope, and grows despotic after his election. Pius IX held tenaciously to the traditions of the Papal government. His antipathy to constitutional control was evident from the beginning. Ameliorations in the condition of his people he desired, but he intended that they should be conferred as those of a father to his children, and that they should be recognized as free gifts and not made obligatory by any law which should control or seem to control his action. It is needless to describe the demonstrations of devotion and gratitude which marked the first year or two of the Pope's reign. His more conservative advisers foresaw what eventually took place. A people absolutely unused to liberty for centuries, having the door opened which led to self-government, could no more be controlled in their movements than the sea tides. The demagogues and the patriots were confounded together. Ciceruacchio led the one and Mazzini came in

time to lead the other. The right of forming associations and clubs, and all the paraphernalia of popular liberty, came rapidly to the front; the press, for which the utmost freedom was claimed, at first reforming, became satirical and finally subversive; and all the rest of the abuses growing out of liberty presented themselves in rapid succession. Pius IX desired, as a rational and healthy step, to restore the Roman municipality, the recollections of which were amongst the soundest traditions of the Roman state. But it should be a municipality which should answer to his own will; that it should be independent of him he never dreamed. The municipal council was to relieve him of care, not to assume responsibility. The Pope conceded willingly all that did not limit his absolute power, only to find that he had prepared the approaches of attack; and when the time came in which he saw his mistake and was obliged to check the excesses of popular feeling, the blame was laid not on him but on his advisers, whose unpopularity increased in exact proportion to the popularity of the Pope. Fraternizing banquets and the organization of the civic guard went with demonstrations of loyalty to the Pope and detestation of the cardinals.

This drift in affairs was toward the precipice. Austria on one side, Naples on the other, and France across the sea were watching with apprehension the tendency to liberal institutions which might lead to the reformation and reconstitution of Italy. The preparations of Austria, crafty and determined, showed that Metternich at least had a distinct conception of what was going on. England, as usual, with her predilection for free institutions everywhere, opposed her influence, but fruitlessly, to check Austrian intervention. So early as the 27th of July, 1847, Austria, making a pretext of local disturbances, sent troops to occupy Ferrara, pretending the precedent of the disturbances of 1831. The Papal government resented this aggressive action. Cardinal Ferretti protested against it, and described it as a "provocation," not only to Rome, but to

**Italy in general.** England protested, but in vain. The hold of Austria on the northern border of the papal province strengthened day by day. The policy of the Pope was enigmatical. While diplomatically opposing the pretensions of Austria, he encouraged the sentiment of the people which demanded war with that empire, but at the same time refused to make any preparations by which the popular will could be made effective. He consented to the formation of a camp at Forlì where seven thousand men commanded by a Monsignore was established as a protest against the Austrian invasion, which, however, the Pope had no idea of repelling by force. From this conflict grew the idea of a defensive league amongst the Italian states—an idea which the Pope finally accepted and sought to develop. The notion that a defensive league, unprepared to take the offensive, was a negation of defence, never occurred to the Pope, who was accustomed to deal with ideas and not with facts. Meanwhile legal measures which might be considered humanitarian rather than political were applied in his dominions. The Jews were emancipated, and the gates of the Ghetto, which had for centuries been closed at night and opened in the morning, were broken down. Finally, the first step toward constitutional government was actually taken by the organization of the municipal council of Rome, which was solemnly installed on the 24th of November, 1847. The councillors received the Pope's blessing before entering on their duties. On the 30th of December an edict was issued, establishing a ministry, formed on western models. It was to consist of nine heads of departments, but all were to be ecclesiastics. This was an unfortunate decision, which enraged the radicals, while it alienated the moderates, who might otherwise have aided the Papal government in stemming the revolutionary tide which was soon to sweep over Rome.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE LITERARY FORERUNNERS OF THE ITALIAN REVIVAL: GIOBERTI, CESARE BALBO AND MASSIMO D'AZEGLIO.

THE perusal of the literature which is now considered to have stimulated the movement of 1848 almost makes one question if the Italy, which we know, be the same that was moved to a certain vitality by the works of Gioberti. Yet the consentient opinion of Italian writers on this phase of Italian history in dealing with his "*Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani*," is that this sober, philosophic and profoundly religious study, retrospective and speculative, of the conditions and possibilities of Italian life was the signal of its awakening from the sleep of centuries. Minghetti, who, by the part he took in all the phases of the reawakening in central Italy, shows himself to be a competent exponent of the views of the better Italian minds of that epoch, says of it; "The book seemed to some an extravagance, to others a revelation. The truth is, that while many of its ideas were peculiar to the author, and partook of his character, his studies and his profession, the substance of it responded to a sentiment still undefined, but which had been slowly developing in the minds of Italians. The idea of nationality had, in the previous years, spread far and wide through many channels, open and secret, and the desire of a great and free country had taken possession



of the majority of the younger men ; but the method hitherto employed had proved so inefficient that weariness and disgust had followed. Experience had proved that conspiracies, secret societies and partial insurrections were of no utility-- that they made the governments more severe, retarded civil progress, arrested the increase of public prosperity, plunged many families into misery, and did not even win the approbation of civilized nations.

"The rumours of wars and of European insurrections which were circulated every spring time, the mystic declamations of Mazzini in the name of God and the people, his inciting of others to insurrection and murder, while he remained in security in London far from danger,--all these things showed that the time had come to try another method, more serious, more practical and surer.. Gioberti, a Piedmontese exile for the sake of liberty, had taken part in the earliest phases of the *Giurine Italia* or had been in relation with its chiefs, but had wearied of that pompous and impotent society. His intellect had anticipated that change which had been imperceptibly operating and now began to appear widely....but obscurely in the consciousness of many men. This opportuneness and coincidence of the ideas of the author with the spirit of the day gave his book a special importance....The purpose of the book was to prove that Italy, although it had lost all political value for the outside world, contained all the conditions of moral and political revival, and that to effect this change there was no need of revolutions, invasions or imitations of the foreigner, since political revival is limited to three heads--unity, independence and liberty--the first two of which might be attained by a confederation of the various states under the presidency of the Pope, and the last by means of internal reforms in each state, effected by their respective Princes without danger or diminution of their real power."

The notion that the forces which were, and long had been, destroying the Italian nationality, could unite for its restoration,

betrays the fundamental defect of Gioberti's scheme, and we may well be surprised that so idyllic a vision should have been accepted by thoughtful Italians as offering material for a propaganda. Issued from the press of Brussels in 1842, the *Primato* was prohibited in all the Italian states except Piedmont—an earnest of the willingness of the Princes to accept the scheme it offered—and it was on that account widely circulated and read. Had it been allowed by the Grand-Duke, the Bourbon and the Pope, the shrewd Italians would have seen in it a snare for their scanty liberties; and it is probable that, but for its proscription, it would have passed almost unobserved.

Reading it now, we find it difficult to account for the influence it exerted. It is not that the author was insensible to the political degradation to which the masses of Italians had sunk, or the political and social vices produced by the system of government under which they had grown up; in certain passages of his writings he had denounced, with the religious zeal of a Savonarola, both vices and humiliations. "If they are not abolished, even if God came on earth again to give us laws, we should remain the scum and disgrace of humanity." He aimed at what he believed possible—the awakening of the virtues of the race by appealing to its past glories and the position of supremacy which Italy had once held in the civilized world. He appealed to Caesar, to ancient conquest and empire, to the Papacy, to the revival of letters and of art, and to the glories of the petty republics whose triumphs were indeed the germs of the final division and paralysis of Italy, in order to awaken the pride of Italians and stimulate a new political life. He succeeded, not in renovating, but in galvanising that part of the nation which was still subject to literary influence and ethnological dreams; but that small portion which was gifted with political sense understood that to expect from the little despots of Italy, and above all from the Pope, any relaxation of their arbitrary power was

absurd. Gioberti's faith in the Pontiff, evidence rather of his devotion as a churchman than of his perspicacity as a statesman, misled him into the belief that the head of the church, who always pretended to a superhuman wisdom, could submit to constitutional control. This dreamer of dreams saw the Papacy, the head of Christianity, also at the head of social and political reform, and of the restoration of justice and liberty—a restoration which, to practical men, meant voluntary abandonment of all restraints on heresy and apostasy, dangers in the eyes of the churchman greater than any others.

But what gave Gioberti that measure of success which he attained, was the singular and unique accident of the advent of a Pope who had been affected by the same enthusiasms, and had dreamed the same dreams—of a society reformed by the Church, and restoring the government of the world to the Church. The point of view of the two reformers was, no doubt, widely different—the Pope seeing that the humanization of ecclesiastical government would strengthen the power of the Church and heighten the devotion of the nations, while Gioberti hoped for reform as a concession by arbitrary power to the rights of the people. Both were mistaken, as events showed, but the coincidence of a reforming Pope and an eloquent advocate of popular emancipation led to the delusion that they were at one in their view of the science of government—a delusion which no doubt helped forward the work of reform. Hopes were awakened which never died out, and the reaction which affected Pius IX did not carry away with it the hopes of the liberals.

The central idea of Gioberti—and this was no mere artificial attempt to excite the national vanity of the Italians—was that history showed that by its geographical position and the virtue of the antique stock, in which he made the Pelasgi the ruling element, Italy had always been, and must be even in modern times, the controlling member of the confraternity of European nations.

"I intend (he says) to show...that Italy alone has the qualities required to become the chief of nations, and that though to-day she has almost completely lost that chiefship, it is in her power to recover it, and I will state the most important condition of that renovation....As infant civilization was born between two rivers, so renewed and adult civilization arose between two seas; the former in fertile Mesopotamia, whence it easily spread over Asia, Africa and the west; the latter in Italy, which divides the Tyrrhene and Adriatic seas, thus forming the central promontory of Europe and placed in a position to dominate the rest of the hemisphere....In the Church there is neither Greek nor Barbarian, and all nations form a cosmopolitan society, as all the tribes of Israel a single nation. But as, in the Jewish nation, genealogy determined the tenure of the hierarchy, and the sons of Levi received the custody of the Law and the service of the Temple, so in the Christian commonwealth the division of the nations is in a manner involved in the order of the Catholic Church. And, the Church having a supreme head, we must recognise a moral pre-eminence where Heaven has established its seat, and where nearer, quicker, more immediate and more uninterrupted are the inbreathings of its voice. This pre-eminence certainly does not transgress the natural order of divine intentions, real and efficient in their working and in the obligations they impose. So that the Italians, humanly speaking, are the Levites of Christianity, having been chosen by Providence to keep the Christian Pontificate, and to protect with love, with veneration and if necessary by arms, the ark of the new covenant.....Let the nations, then, turn their eyes to Italy, their ancient and loving mother, who holds the seeds of their regeneration. Italy is the organ of the supreme reason and the royal and ideal Word; the fountain, rule and guardian of every other reason and eloquence; for there resides the Head that rules, the Arm that moves,\*the Tongue that commands and the Heart that animates Christianity at large.....As Rome is the seat of

Christian wisdom, Piedmont is to-day the principal home of Italian military strength. Seated on the slopes of the Alps, as a wedge between Austria and France, and as a guard to the peninsula, of which it is the vestibule and peristyle, it is destined to watch from its mountains, and crush in its ravines, every foreign aggressor, compelling its powerful neighbours to respect the common independence of Italy."

Further citations are hardly necessary to show that of all the idle dreams of Italian independence, those of Gioberti were the most unsubstantial. That they should have so deeply stirred the intellect of Italy shows that there was the gravest need of an awakening. Gioberti's writings were rather appeals to the mercy and benevolence of the Pope and the despots, than a call to the consciences of Italian aspirants after political emancipation.

Following closely on the *Primato* of Gioberti came the "*Speranze d'Italia*," of Cesare Balbo, a work of a different temper, and impressed with a recognition of historical precedent which gave it a certain practical value as a theory of Italian independence. Beginning with a review of the aspirations and ambitions towards a "Kingdom of Italy" the author gives a lucid demonstration of the necessary antagonisms in those aspirations and ambitions, according to the mind which entertained them, whether that of Prince, Pope or patriot. The conclusion he sums up as follows:

"That the Kingdom of Italy was a dream is proved by the fact that it was never made. Let us look at the reason, clear enough now. Princes, the governing classes, the people, conspirators and other classes of subjects, desired the Kingdom, each after his own manner. The conspirators and the people desired not so much the Kingdom as the social order dreamed of in the dreamed-of Kingdom, one dream on another, liberty added to independence. The Princes desired independence but not liberty; the grandees, the nobles, the rich and notables of all sorts desired aristocracies; those in no way distinguished,

democracies. And, as usual, Naples made a move and, contrary to their habits, Palermo waited and Turin moved, with a want of harmony in their movements which was a prophecy of discord when they should show their intentions. And Austria stood behind to profit by the discord, while France did nothing to prevent it, and England and the others were indifferent. Sensible people had foreseen this; some generous natures were sacrificed, many ambitious ones were defeated. Out of it came some lessons, not new but profitably retaught—that we must not confound undertakings for the sake of liberty with those for independence; that the latter must have precedence of the former, and above all, that the Kingdom of Italy is impossible with this variety of opinions, of intentions and of states.”

To the student of Italian history, especially to him who has had the opportunity of seeing how morbid and chaotic is the present condition of Italian politics, and how little interest the great majority of Italians take in their own government, it is surprising that Balbo, with his sober and common-sense views, his clear prevision of difficulties, and his insight into the defects of his countrymen, should have had serious influence on the Italy of his day. This can only have been due to a condition which does not now obtain—that the direction of public opinion was in the hands of thoughtful and prudent patriots, who kept in view the higher interests of Italy. The arguments and warnings of Balbo would exercise no influence on the politics of to-day, and the fact that they were a powerful influence in the stirring times in which they were printed shows that the men who laid the foundations of the Kingdom of Italy and who produced an effect on foreign opinion which still holds sway, had little in common with the classes who now rule the unfortunate state.

Balbo clearly foresaw the difficulties springing from the position of the Pope, the presence of Austria, the rivalries of the different rulers of Italy, the party-divisions with their

fruitless and ruinous animosities, and the weakness of the democracy; he perceived the helplessness of Italy without assistance from abroad, as well as the dangers and difficulties of foreign support; and he set forth these things with a logical precision which is unique in the annals of Italy. "The more I observe and study, the more clearly I see that there are only two great and important parties in Italy (as there are only two main points of view, two great interests in its politics, two distinctions in its territory, i.e. dependent or independent provinces), two great parties, I repeat, the foreign and the national; that which despairs of independence and adapts itself to dependence, and that which hopes and prepares for independence. And according to their nature and to etymology, I call all those liberal, who in any way work for liberation. In the different modes of action amongst those who agree on the great principle I only see family differences, and my book is only the discussion of the differences so arising. As to all the rest. '*Odi profanum vulgus et arceo.*'"

Starting from the Giobertian theory of a confederation, he shows that so long as there is a foreign power embraced in it, no independence is possible, and that the position of the Pope, as its President, would be less rather than more independent than it then was. Excluding the foreign power, there remained four ways of attaining the confederation, viz. by a spontaneous movement of the Italian princes; by a spontaneous national uprising; by the help of foreign powers other than Austria (which power is studiously left undesignated) or, finally, by taking advantage of some favourable occasion more profitably employed than those of past times. In the examination of these alternatives Balbo proceeds with a cold rigour of logic and precedent to prophesy the discords of the Italian princes, the great dangers arising from the secret societies and their effects on public morality, the animosities which would result from partial risings and the impossibility of an universal insurrection, and the greater danger of calling in a new foreign

arbiter (France) to correct the ill done by the old one (Austria). His conclusion is that the only contingency which would justify Italians in expecting the reconstitution of Italy as a confederation—for he rejects the Kingdom of Italy as impossible—is the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which would compensate Austria in the east for what she would surrender in Italy. The analysis shows a tranquil and elevated judgment as well as a sound knowledge of his countrymen which are, for that heated time, very remarkable. The most important point in Balbo's conclusions, and one in which he agrees with Gioberti, is the indication of a confederation of the Italian states as the only practicable solution. And looking, with eyes freed from all illusions, at the present state of the Kingdom of Italy, I am compelled to say that the results justify to a certain extent the diffidence of the two Italian critics; for nothing is more evident than that, while a confederation under favourable conditions might have ultimately prepared Italy for a complete and satisfactory unity, the premature and forced conformity of so many and so various populations, under a system for which the larger part were unfit, has introduced into the body politic diseases which neither the Kingdom can now cure, nor the return to a confederation remedy.

Of the work of the third person in this triumvirate of the revival, Massimo d'Azeglio, Minghetti, the best qualified of all our authorities, expresses the opinion that it was potent not only with the Italian public but also with the Pope. In fact, one of the occasional letters of Pasolini mentions that he had given the book "*Casi di Romagna*" to Cardinal Mastai, afterward Pius IX, and Minghetti says that it had a part in the formation of the liberal opinions which actuated the Pontiff in the early reforms of his reign. And the exalted opinion always entertained by d'Azeglio of that Pontiff may well have led the latter to his first liberal step—the appointment of the ministry which included Pasolini and Minghetti, friends of the eulogist and advocates of the same reforms.



*"I casi di Romagna,"* says Minghetti, "was the first practical exposition of the programme then first adopted—the substitution of public, peaceful, serious and courageous discussion of our affairs, for secret societies and plots. The book was written with evident desire for impartiality, with a feeling of just consideration for others and with frank sincerity and loyalty towards friend and foe. It condemned the insurrection of Rimini as imprudent, ineffective and disastrous, but at the same time it showed clearly the evil character of ecclesiastical government..... The effect was greater than we had anticipated; the book was printed in Tuscany, was everywhere circulated and read, and was the general subject of conversation. This was what we desired, and it showed the ground to be ready for sowing the seed. All the Italian governments felt it, even the Tuscan, which notwithstanding its usual liberality, resented its publication and expelled d'Azeglio—by the orders of Austria, it was said."

This persecution of the work of d'Azeglio was of course the one thing to make his popularity complete. At this period (1845), to be marked as the enemy of Austria was to become the champion of all Italian pretensions. Both Gioberti and d'Azeglio, devoted to the Pope, unwilling to tolerate the least abatement of his dignity or sovereignty, and unable to conceive the unity of Italy as possible without his cooperation and leading, belong to the extreme conservative party of the later period when unity began to appear a practical question. The influence of the *"Casi di Romagna"* was greater than the historian of the events discussed in it dreamed or hoped for. To hate Austria, and to consider the martyrdoms of Lombardy and Venice as a part of the career of an Italian liberal, belonged to Italian education; but to regard the Pope as necessarily one of the tyrants of Italy never occurred to the leaders of the movement at this time. But this dispassionate record of the misdeeds of papal agents, written with scrupulous accuracy and an historical impartiality until then unknown in Italy, by a

writer of distinction and graphic power, devoted to the Pope and even tenacious of his privileges, not only must have had a wide-spread influence on the general Italian question, but must also have convinced many sober thinkers that the liberation of Italy involved the suppression of the Papal sovereignty—a result which neither of the leaders of the movement at that time anticipated. And to-day, in the growing demoralization of the too-hastily created kingdom, we can estimate at its true value the caution and conservatism of the early Italian liberals and their aversion to the system of conspiracies and insurrections. The healthy progress made by Italian liberalism in spite of repression in the period between 1830 and 1846, and the disastrous failures of the succeeding period in which the Mazzinian agitations began to dominate, justify the policy of the Italian conservatives and their distrust of the republican propaganda.

The literature of the subsequent years, especially the proclamations of Mazzini and the incitements to violence which emanated from the secret societies, not only drove from the direction of the general movement the prudent and responsible reformers with their moderating influence, but brought to the front an element which has been ever since, and is especially to-day, the most dangerous in the Italian State—that form of radicalism which is inspired by intolerance of the restraints of government, be it that of the oppressor Austria or that of the once oppressed Italy. We have seen Mazzini, its chief, embarking on a new revolution in 1870, when what was most essential to Italy was to retain the confidence of Europe and to prepare a place for it amongst the solid states which might be counted on as an element of security in international politics. This impatience of discipline in the lower elements of the “party of action,” and the efforts of the higher to force reforms upon the country, in the teeth of the conservative element in the state, did certainly stir the blood of the nation; but such policy led to no useful results,

while it gave an undue and disastrous influence to the classes whose *raison d'être* is agitation for agitation's sake. When the State was made, there remained for this school of professional agitators only agitation for further changes, and so even Mazzini found himself compelled, by the necessity of retaining his influence, to conspire against the Kingdom in favour of the Republic.

## CHAPTER VII.

NORTHERN ITALY, 1847-1848.

### (1) *Piedmont and Austria.*

A GREAT step was taken toward the re-awakening of Italy's political life in the journey of Massimo D'Azeglio through central Italy to study the spirit of the people. Austria was recognized as an enemy. The great question was how to paralyse the influence of Austria over the Pope, over the King and over the principalities. On his return at the end of 1845, D'Azeglio went to Turin and demanded an audience with the King. He expressed to him the views he had formed and the information he had gathered during this journey, the hopes and aspirations of liberal Italy which centred on him as the head of the coming movement; and the King replied, "Let these gentlemen know that they must keep quiet at present, there is nothing to be done; but tell them that when the time comes, my life, the life of my children, my army, my treasury, my all, will be spent in the Italian cause." This was the first time that the King had spoken distinctly, without equivocation, and from this time forward he was regarded as the leader of the great Italian movement. It is probable that the election of Pius IX in 1846 was the immediate cause of the King's resolutions becoming active. That election enabled him to reconcile the two dominant

motives of his life—fidelity to his religion and hostility to Austria. On the 25th of July he writes, "In spite of the little, even very little (*sic*) Austrian party, I am firmly resolved not to halt in the way of progress toward all that aims at the safety of the people and the strengthening of our national spirit." And again; "For the rest, if it were desired to drive out of our country everybody hostile to the Austrians, I should be obliged to begin by driving out myself."

As the plans of the Pope became more clear, those of Carlo Alberto defined themselves as more liberal. He detested revolutionists, and it is probable that the idea of parliamentary government was accepted only as an inevitable means to the end of developing national character. While he wrote of Italian independence and progress and rejoiced over the attitude of Pius IX, for whom he entertained the highest reverence and whom he was ready to defend if he should be attacked—even offering to send his fleet to the coast of the Romagna and to receive him in case Austria should occupy his territory—he at the same time sent contributions to the revolutionary league of the Swiss Catholic cantons forming the *Sonderbund*, while he favoured the Waldensian Catholics and sent them arms. In the midst of perpetual contradictions between the old tendencies and the new aspirations, face to face with the liberalizing tendencies of the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King still hesitated as to the question of the constitution.

Balbo said that Carlo Alberto did not fear liberty for its own sake but regarded it as an obstacle to national independence. On this point we have two letters of the King: one to Villamarina dated Aug. 28, 1847, which says: "I have just written an official letter to the Holy Father to ask him to be the sponsor [of his plan of reform], and I take the opportunity to inform him of all my conclusions, i.e. that to please God one must profit by every step of progress and all discoveries which He permits in science and art, to further the greatest good of the

people, and the advantage of society. I also believe that a government ought to maintain a large army to be able to defend its nationality, to enforce the laws, and protect the good against the evil-disposed. But on the other hand it ought to give the population all the advantages in its reach, and put itself at the head of progress by making the proprietary class participant in the administration of their provinces. To sum up, I believe that a wise monarchy must be progressive in good and must give the people complete liberty, except to do evil." And again, "I intend to make a form of government in which my people shall have all the liberty that is compatible with the preservation of the basis of the monarchy. I believe that in this way one may establish a wise government in which liberty and personal rights will be greater than those which one finds in certain constitutional governments, where liberty is a fiction and the administration of the state is founded on corruption. To attain this end I have for many years occupied myself with a series of laws to be published progressively. One of the most important of these for the monarchy is the communal law which is about to be published. It is founded on the interests of the rural population, and in virtue of the same the citizens may rise by a series of elections from the municipal administration up to the Council of the state." This is probably the last concession in the direction of a constitution which he was prepared voluntarily to accord. The constitution was still in his mind distinct from reform and was probably considered impracticable.

The concession of Carlo Alberto's reforms<sup>1</sup>, though they fell far short of the constitution, still excited great enthusiasm in Piedmont. The King, according to custom, was to visit Genoa on the 5th of November, 1847, and great festivities were prepared for the occasion; triumphal processions were formed, and all Turin was on the road by which the King was to leave. He evidently entertained inexplicable apprehensions of evil,

<sup>1</sup> *Vide supra*, p. 48.

and only after long hesitation decided to confront the crowd. On horseback, with his children and his suite, pursued with flowers and blessings, he was received by an ovation than which he had never one warmer or more sincere evidence that the people had forgiven and forgotten everything. He passed under a vault of two thousand flags, pale as a corpse, cold, absent-minded; but when he came to his travelling carriage outside the city, overcome by the unaccustomed experience and by the tumult of opposing emotions, he, who ordinarily had seemed to despise popular demonstrations, in dismounting from his horse seemed about to faint.

His reception at Genoa was equally enthusiastic. Banquets, demonstrations and festivities celebrated the conversion of the King to liberal sentiments. The popular demonstration against the Jesuits, and the development of the constitutional tendency, to the point of demanding a constitution—the first step towards which was taken by Cavour, whose name is now for the first time mentioned in Piedmontese history—met with no favour from the King. The agitation in Lombardy which resulted in the insurrection of Milan increased public excitement. Demonstrations of loyalty to the King, and offers of support in case of declaration of war against Austria, were multiplied. The concession of the constitution in Naples added to the strength of the constitutional movement, and both Turin and Genoa were enthusiastic. The influence of England was at this moment exerted in favour of the constitution, and on the 5th of February, 1848, after the insurrection of Palermo and the granting of the constitution at Naples, the King appeared to have decided to grant the demands of the city of Genoa.

A consultation with his ministers and principal state-officials ended in their almost unanimous advice to grant the constitution. The popular agitation was menacing, and although the King appears to have entertained conscientious scruples about his promise of 1824—never to change the institutions of

the state without the consent of the Knights of the Annunziata and the bishops of the kingdom—he was obliged finally to yield to the pressure. He had hoped that the partial reforms already accorded in 1847 would have sufficed. But the popular current once turned in that direction was irresistible, and on the 7th of February the King called a second council of the principal men of the kingdom, presidents of the council of state and ministers, and requested them to study the concessions which could be made, insisting only on the maintenance of the Catholic religion. Poggi says that the King had written on a piece of paper the first article of the constitution: “The Catholic religion apostolic and Roman is the only religion of the state; all other religions are tolerated according to law.” The rest of the sheet was blank, as if to show that so long as the religious question was settled according to his view he was indifferent to the rest. He took part in the discussion on the articles, and on the afternoon of the 8th of February an edict appeared with a formal promise of the constitution. A petition, signed by a thousand people of authority, was responded to by a proclamation admitting the Waldensians to the enjoyment of civil rights. A colossal festa on the 27th of February expressed the popular satisfaction, and representatives of all the communes of the state were invited to participate in it. Fifty thousand persons assembled. A placard which bore inscribed upon it “1821—1831—1833” led the procession of the returned exiles; a second banner in mourning was followed by the Lombards; the procession was three hours passing before the sovereign.

On the 28th the Jesuits were banished by popular demonstration from Genoa as well as from other places in the kingdom. On the 4th of March the constitution as it is now in vigour in united Italy was published. It was based on the French constitution of 1830, establishing the Roman Catholic religion as the religion of the state, and the King as protector of the Church. It constituted two chambers,



one of which should be nominated by the King and the other by direct popular suffrage, the senate being composed of the higher functionaries, bishops, the wealthy and those who were recognized as having rendered eminent services to the country. It appeared as if, now that the opposition to a constitution in the abstract had been broken down, Carlo Alberto was determined to form one that should be of substantial value. But parliamentary institutions begin work with difficulty. Political parties not existing, the constitution of a ministry was a difficult task. The first ministry was finally composed of Balbo, president of the council, without portfolio; Pareto, foreign affairs; Ricci, home office; Sclopis, minister of justice; Franzini, war and navy; Boncompagni, public instruction; Count Desambrois, public works; Count Revel, finance—a ministry characterized by Tivaroni as “without harmony, without fusion, mostly conservatives and comprising only two liberals.”

“So after a long and terrible evolution, terrible for him and for the country, the constitutional Regent of 1821 became the constitutional King of 1848. Had he a right to public confidence? Could he pretend that because he had been prudent in 1821 or because in 1831 he had initiated some slight reforms, therefore the liberals of all parts of Italy should gather round him and Piedmont, certain of having found the necessary chief who should reconstruct Italy as a nation? No; the events of 1821 and 1831 threw on his name and his intentions, not only in the minds of the republicans but in all those who were not courtiers, a doubt and a distrust so intense, so legitimate, that the entire Italian movement was corrupted by it. At Novara Carlo Alberto atoned for his sins towards Italy, but he could not obliterate the memory of them. This was enough to debar the Italian movement from obtaining that sure leadership, that crowned Garibaldi who was necessary in order to unite all in one single effort; and without this union the force necessary to overcome

the numerous obstacles which stood in the way did not exist. Failure was therefore inevitable." (Tivaroni, p. 192, v. 1.)

When in September 1847 the custom-house league between Piedmont, Tuscany and the Papal States was established, the moment had arrived to initiate negotiations for a political league between the greater Italian states for mutual defence. If Carlo Alberto desired the other states to aid him he could not have been unaware that this assistance must be paid for; Tuscany, Rome and Naples would not without compensation have contributed their means and their soldiers at the risk of creating a powerful state in northern Italy, the existence of which they did not desire. The simple aspiration to independence, although this now existed in every Italian state, could not induce the sovereigns, jealous of the aggrandizement of Piedmont, to undergo the grave sacrifices necessary, simply to substitute a Piedmontese dominion for an Austrian. A sentiment of Italian unity was not yet born, and a poor substitute for it was the ambition of Carlo Alberto to create a magnified Piedmont in its place. The league of the Italian states was therefore partial and without sufficient motive. The Pope and the King of Naples, jealous of the ambitions of Carlo Alberto, lent themselves with little good will to the confederation. The war on Austria which was to have been the object of the league was an enterprise which demanded preparations and resources far beyond those of this ill-organized alliance. It became necessary in fact for Piedmont to accept the risks of the undertaking. But in 1848 nothing was ready. The hesitations and uncertainty of the King, the unintelligent enthusiasm of the people, did not stimulate that forethought which should provide against the contingencies of a great war. Owing to the feebleness of the King neither of the liberal states was able to repose confidence in him, and neither England nor France, which had now become a republic, took the King seriously. Austria was supported by Russia, while the preparations of the King for a war, which was to expel Austria from Italy, proceeded slowly and with

such vacillations that the insurrection of Milan, known as the Five Days' Revolution, was necessary to move him to action.

The facts regarding the final movements of Piedmont indicate that the King had never seriously contemplated the conditions of war. He had only dreamed about it, as he had dreamed about a great many other things. Even if it was true, as his advocates claim, that his apparently despotic tendencies were only intended to deceive Austria, he might at least have prepared for the war which he proposed to undertake; but, in fact, no preparations were made. In January and February 1848 the government had called under arms three classes of the army, but nothing had been done to make them efficient. The army was provided with nothing that was necessary for immediate entry into the field, and when the King crossed the Ticino on the 29th of March, 1848, it was only with twenty-five thousand men. In the field of diplomacy nothing had been done to obtain the moral or military support of the friendly powers. Neither France nor England had been taken into the confidence of the government. Even the relations with the Lombards, who were preparing for insurrection, were incomplete. The proclamation of the republic in France probably induced the King to refuse all co-operation with that country, the dread of the republican propaganda overcoming all the necessities of the situation.

It was the revolution in Vienna (March 13) and the insurrection in Milan (March 18) which put an end to the King's hesitation. The Piedmontese population, especially the students and the young men, could no longer be restrained, and nothing but direction on the part of the King was required to develop a far greater force than that with which he took the field. The volunteers for Milan were not furnished with arms, and many days were lost in overcoming the reluctance of the King and the ministry to furnish this aid to the insurrection. Up to the 22nd, assurances of neutrality and friendship were given

to Austria, but on the 23rd of March an article by Cavour in the *Risorgimento* gave the signal for a final decision. War was commenced on the 23rd; that is to say after the complete victory of the insurrection at Milan. Had the King moved earlier and had his army been able to attack the Austrians while the struggle was still going on in Milan, the disaster to the imperialists must have been enormous. But Radetzky was allowed to retire and collect his forces anew without any molestation from the Piedmontese army. It is useless to discuss the pretended motives which the ministers, on behalf of the King, put forward to explain a measure which had been decided upon provisionally a long time before. So far as the King was capable of deciding anything, he had decided to declare war on Austria. The excuses put forward for the step, such as the danger of the republican movement extending to Piedmont if public opinion were not yielded to, the influence of France and that of Switzerland,—the immediate neighbours of Piedmont,—and other similar motives, were distinctly afterthoughts. The King would and would not, after his usual manner; every thought had an afterthought; he could decide nothing and obeyed events without ever succeeding in controlling them.

With the declaration of war came the necessary throwing off of disguises, and a despatch of Abercrombie to Lord Palmerston on the 27th of March says: "This morning the Marquis Pareto, the minister of foreign affairs, affirmed that the declaration against Austria had a double object: first to drive the Austrians out of Italy, and second to assist the provisional government of Milan." And yet on the 27th of March Pareto writes to the British minister, whose government had strongly advised against the declaration of war—that the Sardinian navy had orders not to commit any act of hostility against the Austrian navy unless provoked. The proclamation issued on the 24th of March says: "People of Lombardy and of Venice, the destinies of Italy are ripening;

a happier future smiles on the intrepid defenders of indefensible rights. Through love of race, through understanding of our times, and through unity of desire, we first give expression to the unanimous admiration which Italy offers you. People of Lombardy and of Venice, our army, which was already concentrated upon our frontier when you precipitated the liberation of glorious Milan, now comes to give you that supreme proof of assistance which brother expects from brother and friend from friend. We will support your just ambitions, trusting in the aid of that God whose marvellous help has put Italy in a condition to work out her own salvation. And for the better demonstration of our sentiments as to Italian unity, we will that our troops entering the territory of Lombardy and Venice shall carry the shield of Savoy added to the Italian tri-colour flag." On the same day the King issued a decree of amnesty for all political prisoners condemned before the publication of the constitution.

The two elements which force themselves on our attention at the opening of this eventful war,—the condition of the Piedmontese army and the enthusiasm of the population—compel a comparison not at all to the credit of the King and his advisers. According to contemporary evidence (Brofferio, *Storia del Piemonte*) in March, 1848, the Piedmontese army was absolutely incompetent to take the field. Arms, ammunition, baggage, horses, travelling-wagons, artillery-trains, camping-material—all were lacking. Pinelli in his *Storia del Piemonte* says that when the preparations for war commenced, the arsenals were empty, the arms insufficient in number and inferior in quality, the fortresses all dismantled, horses few and poor, and the castles incomplete and uncertain. The regiments of cavalry had hardly the strength of a peace establishment. The change from the old flint-lock to the percussion-lock musket recently made had left many of the recruits ignorant of the use of the new arm, and there was no organization of

hospital service. The general staff had no strategical knowledge or education: it was ignorant of the districts in which the war was to be made, and no maps were provided. Of this army, thus ill-prepared, the King, even less prepared, proposed to take command; the blind leading the blind into the inevitable disaster which followed<sup>1</sup>.

(2) *The Five Days in Milan.*

The war between Piedmont and Austria is so intimately connected, both in its inception and its course, with the insurrection of Lombardy and Venice, that before discussing the events of that war we must trace the history of the movements in the Austrian provinces, to which it was so largely due. For a good many years, no open movement had broken the apparent repose of the territories subjected to Austria in northern Italy. It may be that even during the long period of catalepsy, which supervened in the provinces of Lombardy and Venice, conspiracies existed, though better concealed than before, taught by the bitter experiences of the past. But this time it was not Piedmont, nor a constitutional sovereign that woke Italy from her sleep, but the Pope.

<sup>1</sup> While these pages were being written the disaster of Adowa occurred. Public criticism on that terrible waste of splendid courage and opportunity has attributed it to causes very similar to those indicated in the text. Nor was it otherwise at Lissa and at Custoza in 1866. It is impossible not to note in crises like that of 1848 and later times, the traditional tendency of the Piedmontese court to sacrifice the interests of the army to the necessity of consulting the influences, either external or internal, which it fears. Hence the choice of commanders notoriously incompetent, a military organisation abandoned to the interests of clients of the Court or, in the end, to the grouping of factions in parliament. Hence the ability of enemies at home or abroad either to hinder—as in 1866—any strenuous co-operation with an ally, or—as in 1896—to push the army into a disastrous action, without the knowledge or responsibility of the ministers themselves.

There can be no doubt that the signal for the liberation of Italy was in effect given by Pius IX. And the slow vengeance of public opinion in other lands had begun to tell on the Austrian government, which, as it had been enabled to hold its possession in Italy only by the connivance of the other European powers, England included, found that the growing conviction of its unfitness to govern was weakening the support in which its security had consisted. The initiative of the Pope for the first time reconciled religious sentiment with Italian aspirations after liberty. The clergy, with its immense ascendancy over the rural population, always the last to be brought into any political movement, in great part took the path of political reform, and carried with it, not only the rural classes, but that part of the nobility which still remained devoted to the Church. What was of still greater importance, it gave the real liberals, who only wanted an authoritative name to lead them, a justification for renewing an agitation which Austria, devoted to the Church, could no longer resent as she had resented the initiative of her lay subjects. Pius IX became the symbol of Italian liberty, and demonstrations, nominally religious, became synonymous with protests against the Austrian government. Busts of the Pope carried through the streets of Milan excited enthusiastic demonstrations, but in spite of all the vigilance of the police no open act justified repressive measures.

The measure which finally provoked the outbreak was the prohibition by the liberal committees of the use of tobacco, the monopoly of which, held by the Austrian government, was one of its principal sources of income. All the youth of the liberal party bound themselves under no circumstances to smoke, and to prevent, if possible, others from smoking in public. On the 3rd of January, 1848, the Viceroy wrote to Governor Spaur: "As to the prohibition to smoke tobacco—in order to catch in the act those agitators who abuse or maltreat people who smoke, the best expedient would be to

order some policemen in civil costume, or gendarmes, to walk the streets with cigars in their mouths, and to have them followed at a little distance by other guards also in civil costume with orders to arrest those who disturb the smokers." On the same day the people attempted to snatch the cigars from the mouths of the officers, and a conflict ensued in which five citizens were killed and fifty-nine wounded. This was the signal for the bursting of the storm. Preparations were made on both sides for the conflict, and on the 18th, the news of the révolution at Vienna, which began on March 13, quickened the ardour of the insurgents into action. Slight concessions on the part of the government only stimulated still more the determination to obtain reforms. Proclamations were secretly posted throughout Milan demanding reforms under the menace of immediate revolt. On the same day, a popular demonstration moved towards the Governor's palace. The masses, scarcely knowing with what purpose the demonstration had been organized, joined the demonstrators, and the soldiers on guard, apprehending hostile movements, fired on the people. The crowd dispersed but immediately started the cry "to arms." Barricades were thrown up, arms were gathered, and the conflict began, in which, during five days, all classes of the inhabitants, men, women and children, engaged in perhaps the most brilliant feat of unorganized courage which the history of Europe can record. In every quarter of the city barricades blocked the movements of the troops,—by the 20th they amounted to 1700; cannon were made of wood with bands of iron, powder was manufactured, and a long, desperate and singular struggle was carried on through the streets of Milan, with horrible brutality on the part of the troops and incredible audacity on that of the population.

No plans had been formed which could be betrayed, but the accumulated indignation of the entire people and the momentary weakness of the government, unprepared for so



sudden and spontaneous a movement, urged discontent to action. Isolated collisions in the streets had led to an attack on the Broletto, where in the head-quarters of the municipality a few hundred people, of whom sixty only were armed, had gathered in council. They were attacked by 2000 Croats and Bohemian troops, and were dispersed after a conflict of two hours partly carried on with tiles from the roofs.

Radetzky supposed all to be over, and made known to the municipality his determination to crush all signs of discontent, even by the bombardment, if necessary, of the city. That night it rained and the troops occupied themselves in destroying the barricades which were springing up, but the morning of the 19th was fine, and masses of the citizens thronged the streets, plotting mischief, but without organisation. It was the explosion of a long repressed fury which was indifferent to all dangers. Here and there, as if by inspiration, centres of organisation appeared; churches, shops, and houses were closed, the bells rang the call to arms, and the barricades sprang up again everywhere; arms were seized wherever they could be found—arms of all epochs and every description—the furniture of the houses was carried out to form or heighten the barricades, and the energetic and long-suffering population poured out of their dwellings in a state of frenzy, which made no account of obstacles. Wherever the troops ventured into the streets to attack the barricades, tiles, furniture, stones, beams, boiling oil, were poured on them; even the women took part in the fight. The chiefs, Luciano Manara, Enrico Dandolo, Luigi della Porta, Augusto Anfossi and others, passed from street to street, from house to house, to encourage the combatants, without sleeping or resting. A fever of combat spread its fiery contagion through the entire population, and overpowered discipline and armaments.

On this day, the 19th, Anfossi, at the head of a resolute band, attacked and carried the Porta Nuova, a strong position

which swept two of the principal streets, and gave a solid centre for concentration. The troops seemed stupefied, the perpetual clamour of the bells, the ever present attacks; the very ragamuffins of the streets taken with the frenzy of battle and utterly indifferent to danger, mocking, jeering and deceiving the troops, the rain of projectiles from the roofs, the audacity of the assailants, all these things affected even the Marshal and paralysed his resolution. The municipal authorities, with the mayor at their head, made feeble efforts by half-hearted measures to reconcile populace and government, but finally yielded to the drift of insurrection and practically withdrew. A council of war was formed, composed of Carlo Cattaneo, the real head of the movement, Giulio Terzaghi, and Giorgio Clerici, nobles, and Enrico Cernuschi, plebeian and republican. This self-nominated committee of public safety was recognized by the insurgents as in control of the insurrection, and unity of action was thus secured. The Austrians were in possession of the Cathedral—from the roof of which the Tyrolese riflemen fired on the people—the Royal palace, the Palace of Justice, the head-quarters of the police, the municipal palace, the barracks and the Castle. During the night of the 19th and 20th the Marshal had occupied the bastions at the right and the left of the gates to secure the way for reinforcements from the outside, and threatened the bombardment of the city.

All through the 20th it rained in torrents, but the struggle continued fiercely. General Clam held his own at the Porta Ticinese, but elsewhere the Austrian resistance began to give way. The Tyrolese, harassed by the fire of the insurgents, abandoned the pinnacles of the cathedral whence they had fired on the streets below. General Rath abandoned the royal palace, and the people captured the police office and the Courts, where they liberated all the political prisoners, retaining in prison only those accused of common crimes. The spirit of the people was as humane as courageous. Bolza, one of the principal persecutors, was found hidden in a hayloft and was

about to be put to death by the people, when Carlo Cattaneo exclaimed: "If you kill him, you do justice; if you spare him you will be acting nobly"; and he was spared. At the Tribunale the people destroyed all the documents, carried away all the arms, and liberated all the women, but spared all the police officers who had hidden in the cellars, and carried the wounded to the hospital. Count Thurn, who had ordered the arrest of Bogazzi, in consequence of a quarrel in the streets, was released. A proclamation put forth by the Council of War, and headed by the words: "*Italia libera*," ran as follows: "Brave citizens, let us keep our city pure; let us not condescend to revenge ourselves by the blood of these miserable satellites whom the fugitive government leaves in our hands. It is enough now to watch them and notify them. It is true that for thirty years they have been the scourge of our families and the abomination of the country, but you will be generous as you have been brave. Punish them with contempt and make an offer of them to Pius IX." The brutality of the troops was in strong contrast with the conduct of the insurgents. The soldiers broke open the doors of a tavern near St Mark's and murdered the cook and three other persons, after having tortured them in various ways; they then roasted alive two children and repeatedly bayoneted a pregnant woman, after which they set fire to the house and withdrew<sup>1</sup>.

On the 20th, at midday, the commander of the Croats, Baron Ettinghausen, presented himself to the Council of War, saying that he came not as an envoy from the Marshal but on his own account to intervene, being moved by a sentiment of humanity. He proposed a truce of fifteen days. During this time the Marshal should keep all the troops shut up in eight different localities; the civic guard should be regularly organised, and all the positions occupied by the citizens should be put in

<sup>1</sup> *Archivio Triennale*, on the authority of 250 witnesses.

a state of permanent efficiency. The municipality, which deluded itself with the idea of continuing in this state of semi-legality from which it had not yet emerged, entertained the idea of the truce: at the worst, it would have been able to maintain its communications with the surrounding country. But at a joint-meeting held by the municipality and the Council of War, the proposition of the truce was rejected by a large majority, it being seen that in these fifteen days Radetzky could collect troops from without, sufficient to crush Milan. The reply to Ettinghausen was, "Say to the Marshal that if he insists on continuing to fight, the nobles in Milan will know how to bury themselves under the ruins of their palaces." The Council of War, combative and republican, was in conflict with the royalist municipality, which desired to maintain a prudent attitude. The Mayor, timid and undecided, did not enjoy the confidence of the Council of War and was kept under guard, but after the conference with Ettinghausen the municipality issued a proclamation claiming the entire direction of affairs, and formed itself into a committee of public security for the supervision of subsistence and finance.

During the 21st, the struggle went on. A certain number of combatants from outside made their way in and strengthened the forces of the insurgents, and the employés of the railways united in bands under their inspector Borgazzi, who was killed on the fourth day of the struggle in the attack on Porta Tosa. The network of barricades, held strongly by reckless masses of the people, made all movements of the troops in the streets impossible. Radetzky wrote to Fiquelmont: "The nature of these people, it seems to me, has been transformed; fanaticism has invaded all ages, all classes and both sexes." On the same day, the Council of War demanded the assistance of all who had any military experience, and numbers of those who had served in the army of Napoleon offered their services. The centre of the city was now entirely abandoned by the

Austrians, and the combatants who had held the barricades in that quarter, now no longer assailable, were ordered to man the external barricades. During the night the people had worked with feverish energy on movable breastworks which they had planted under the walls. The Council of War ordered an attack on the headquarters, on the barracks of the engineers and the staff, and the barracks of San Francisco. Pasquale Sottocorno, an old and crippled man of the people, carried straw and hay, which he piled before the gate of the engineers' barrack and set fire to the door. In the capture of the engineers' quarters one hundred and sixty soldiers were taken prisoners.

The foreign consuls having on the 20th of March protested against the bombardment of the city, Radetzky replied that he would postpone it for another day on condition that all hostilities on the part of the Milanese should cease, and this proposition was supported by the consuls at the municipality. The council of war, however, refused any such concession and declined the truce. The Austrian troops, as Radetzky's dispatches testify, were exhausted and had need of a rest in order to enable them to continue the struggle. On the other hand, it was urged that the city had only provisions enough for twenty-four hours more, but Cattaneo replied, "Twenty-four hours of food and twenty-four hours of fasting give us more than time enough to conquer, and at the end it is better to die of hunger than on the gallows." On the discussion in the Municipal Council, the proposition of a three days' truce was rejected by twelve votes against three, and the municipality replied that the citizens who were charged with the defence of the city did not accept the proposition. They added that, as Field-Marshal Count Radetzky had been notified, even if the truce were consented to, the ardour of the combatants was such that they could not ensure its observance.

Meanwhile the question of cooperation with Piedmont had arisen. A messenger had been sent to Turin on a confidential

mission to the King, who replied that he wished two things: that a body of insurgents or deserters should draw the enemy into a violation of the Sardinian territory, and that there should be sent to him an address signed by the nobles. Enrico Martini, who had brought this message, also proposed that they should immediately constitute a provisional government with authority to confer on Carlo Alberto the sovereignty of Lombardy. Cattaneo, whom circumstances placed at the head of the movement, advised that the decision of such questions should be left to the country, and that this was not the moment to consult it. "Is it then," he said, "so grievous to be once in our lives our own masters? The royal houses belong to no nation: they have their own interests apart from ours, and are always ready to come to an understanding with the foreigner against their people. I am firmly convinced that it is necessary to appeal to all Italy and to make the war a national one. If Carlo Alberto is the only one who offers to intervene between us and Austria, then the admiration and gratitude of the people will be the prize of his generosity, and no one can deny the right of the country to put itself under his authority." Cattaneo remembered that it was not possible to trust Carlo Alberto, who had been a traitor in 1821, and that the Lombard nobility had offered themselves to Austria in 1814. He declared that, on account of the weakness of the means of which it disposed, he would not have favoured the insurrection, but that, now that it existed, the assistance of all Italy was necessary, and this would not be obtained if Lombardy gave herself to Piedmont. This opposition of Cattaneo to the union with Piedmont and the unquestionably republican tendency of his opinions were never forgiven him by the Lombard nobility.

On the 21st, the Council of War invited all the communes of Lombardy to constitute local councils, which should occupy themselves with the question of carrying on the war. This invitation said: "We ask from every city, from every section

of Italy, a little detachment of bayonets, which, guided by some good captain, should come and hold a general assembly at the foot of the Alps to arrive at a final and conclusive accord against the barbarians." Late that night the municipality, timid and vacillating, finally decided to form itself into a provisional government. The formation of this government encountered opposition from the Council of War and serious discord was threatened, but finally, on the advice of Correnti, the Council of War was fused with the Committee appointed by the municipality and the two were united in a provisional government. This government issued a manifesto as follows: "The armistice offered by the enemy has been refused by us according to the will of the people, which wishes to fight. We fight then with the same courage which has made us victorious in these four days and we will still conquer. Citizens, we receive unflinchingly this last assault of the oppressors with the confidence which is born of the certainty of victory. Let the rejoicing bells respond to the sound of the cannons and the bombs, and let the enemy see that we know how to fight cheerfully and to die cheerfully. The country adopts as its children the orphans of those who die in battle, and assures to the wounded its gratitude and assistance."

Henceforward there was no way to turn back. Either Milan would conquer or she would be buried in ruins. On the morning of the 22nd, it being foggy and rainy, while one portion of the citizens strengthened the barricades by means of movable barriers consisting of masses of faggots, another attacked Porta Tosa, which was defended by one thousand Austrians with six pieces of artillery, and at night-fall took it by assault. The city was thus opened to the outer world; the people, from the different sections entered freely, and the communications of the Austrians from bastion to bastion were broken. The Austrians abandoned several of the gates, and the civic forces, reassured by the prospect of being able to renew their supplies, redoubled their aggressive activity.

Alarmed by the progress which the Milanese made in every direction and by the rumours that the Piedmontese army had passed the frontier, thus threatening his supplies of ammunition and food, the Marshal determined to evacuate Milan, preferring the humiliation of retreat to the risk of exposing his troops to surrender or starvation. He left behind him the treasury, with two millions of florins, and on the night of the 22nd, at eleven o'clock, covering his retreat with the thunder of his guns, he withdrew from the line of fortifications.

His retreat being unobserved was unmolested, and following the line of the Austrian fortresses in the direction of Lodi, he arrived during the night at Melegnano, where a slight resistance which was offered to his passage was easily overcome. He rested at Lodi from the night of the 24th to the morning of the 26th, whence he retired slowly through Crema to Verona, where he arrived between the 5th and 6th, without having been molested in any one of the many ways by which the citizens might have harassed his retreat. Milan was exhausted by the heroic efforts of the five days, and the satisfaction of seeing the Austrians depart was so great that no one dreamed of imposing obstacles to the retreat; Milan in fact, on the morning of the 23rd of March, was surprised to find itself free. Cattaneo estimates the loss of the Austrians at four thousand men; the Austrian account estimates it at four hundred killed and wounded—a disparity which suggests exaggeration on both sides; but certainly so small a sacrifice as the Austrians admit hardly justifies their evacuation of the city. The dead on the Milanese side were three hundred and fifty, and there were six hundred wounded.

In this conflict, which is the most memorable among all the struggles for Italian liberation, all classes of society had taken part; many young men of the highest circles mingled in the movement with workmen, artisans and populace, and paid their portion of losses. The greater part of the clergy had helped in the revolution; the Archbishop of Milan had



blessed it; the parish priests of the city and of the country round about had rung their bells and spread the alarm, and some had even preached in its support. The parish priest of Paderno had led the people in an attack on the Austrians; a priest was wounded at Porta Tosa, and even the women, so great was the excitement, took part in the combat. One Louisa Battistotti, in the uniform of a fusilier, never abandoned her weapons for five days. All the contemporary writers testify to the indescribable cruelty of the Austrians. Bodies of many children were found, and women and men were murdered and burned. The list of their names is given by Tivaroni, and in it are those of thirty women. It is greatly to the credit of Milan, that the wounded and sick and the families of the Austrian soldiers and functionaries remaining in Milan were unmolested. The Austrians were doubtless rendered less averse to the evacuation of Milan by the reflection that the arrival of their reinforcements and the want of military organisation among the Milanese would facilitate the recapture of the city. The tenacity with which Radetzky clung to his position had more of military *amour propre* than strategical importance. If the country districts had risen, to be shut up in Milan would have been destruction; if the country surrendered, Milan was easy to capture; and while the heroism of Milan remains undiminished in its lustre, the lengthened resistance of the garrison was superfluous from the military point of view.

In the country round about, the movement in sympathy with the insurrection in Milan varied greatly. Some sections caught the inspiration of combat, others remained absolutely lethargic. Had the rising been general, the position of the Austrians would have been serious, and the retreat of the garrison of Milan might have been easily turned into a surrender. At Mantua a movement was attempted, but through want of union the Austrian garrison was able to maintain its position. At Pizzighettone the little garrison

surrendered the fortifications, but Brescia was the only important fortress which followed the example of Milan.

At Brescia the insurrectionary organization had always been combined with the plan of cooperating with the Piedmontese whenever that should be possible. On the 21st of March the insurrection broke out. The city, after a short struggle, fell into the hands of the people, and the defence was organized by exiles who had returned from Turin. On the 22nd, the soldiers of an Italian regiment in the Austrian garrison of Brescia joined the people and summoned Schwarzenburg to surrender. Having captured the arsenal and two barracks with a loss of ten killed and thirty-five wounded, they permitted the Austrians to retire to the Oglio with four thousand men, where they protected the retreat of Radetzky, while another party of the insurgents captured a convoy of ammunition coming from Verona. The rising of Brescia was followed by similar movements in Monza, Como and other Lombard cities.

### (3) *Venice.*

Simultaneously with these movements in Lombardy, a rising in Venice led to the retirement of the Austrians from that city. In June 1847 a banquet had been given to Cobden at which the Austrian government forbade Manin to speak. In January 1848 Tomasseo publicly advocated the formation of legal political parties, acting openly and agitating for constitutional reform. The Austrian government decided to take energetic measures against this propaganda, and Manin and Tomasseo were arrested and thrown into prison. Public opinion was so far advanced, that this excessive severity aroused a general hostility to the government, and from this time forward a serious fermentation went on. On the 7th of February disorders broke out in Padua on account of the prohibition of the use of tobacco by the patriots. On the 8th, two officers

having been ordered to throw away their cigars, a collision took place, in which a student was killed and several students and citizens wounded. One officer was killed in the disturbance. Arrests naturally followed, and the greatest rigour was employed towards all demonstrations, even the most apparently innocent. The police at Venice forbade the making, use, or sale of felt hats with broad brims, known as "Calabrian hats," considering them as symptoms of liberalism. On the 10th of February disorders broke out at Treviso in consequence of a *Te Deum* sung by a liberal priest, and many imprisonments took place. All demonstrations in the theatre or in public were forbidden, wherever any possible connection with politics might be suspected.

From February until the 10th of March these repressive measures seemed to suffice, but the news of the revolution at Vienna (March 13) produced the same effect in Venice that it had produced in Milan. The people rose en masse and demanded the liberation of Manin and Tommaso. The Austrian government, embarrassed by the insurrection at home and the general discontent in various parts of the empire, and unprovided with sufficient forces in Venice to resist a general movement, should one take place, yielded and liberated the prisoners. Thereupon the people demanded the formation of a civic guard for the maintenance of order in the city. This also was yielded, and step by step the power of the people advanced. The arsenal was taken and the civic guard increased from two hundred to two thousand, while the forces of the Austrian army proved insufficient to hold both forts and city. The Italian troops in the Austrian service deserted to the insurgents. Thus the Venetian forces gradually developed so strong a preponderance, that without serious collision or shedding of blood the Austrian army was obliged to evacuate Venice and all their possessions round about. Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and other towns immediately threw off the yoke.

It was, however, a delusive victory, which, by making the citizens of Venice unduly confident in their own abilities, probably led ultimately to much greater difficulties than would have occurred had the Austrians been in a condition to resist from the beginning. The city being free from foreign control, the people determined on the restoration of the republic. On March 24th the republic was proclaimed, and Manin was elected president. This step called forth great enthusiasm, and for a time united the population in a determined resistance. Nevertheless in its effect upon the north-Italian movement as a whole, the proclamation of the republic by Manin was a grave mistake. It developed distrust between Venice and Piedmont, and destroyed the cooperation which might have given a different colour, at least in the diplomatic world, to the entire movement. The prejudice against republican institutions at that moment was strong in all parts of Europe, excepting France, and the proclamation of the republic of St Mark inclined other governments to allow Austria a free hand in her action against Venice. The question of fusion with the other minor states, which occupied the minds of Manin and his confederates, was purely academic. Such a step could not possibly exert any influence on the military position, and the doubts developed by the discussion destroyed any chance of harmonious action with the other provinces in revolt. Heartly cooperation between Piedmont and Venice became impossible, and the armistice which concluded the first campaign between Piedmont and Austria made no mention of Venice.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA, 1848—1849.

#### (1) *Goito, Santa Lucia, and Curtatone.*

THE King of Sardinia entered upon the war with Austria with the same vacillation and uncertainty with which he had inaugurated the reforms; first deciding, then postponing, and then coming to a new and different decision, so that a campaign, begun with great chances of success, ended in a complication of disasters. The army received orders to cross the frontier on the 24th of March, 1848. The King left Turin on the night of the 26th and entered Pavia on the 29th. Radetzky had abandoned Milan six days before, had had time to reorganize his army and recover from the demoralization of his defeat, and was already on his way to his base of supplies. But his troops were fatigued and discouraged, and if attacked by a strong body of fresh men during their retreat must certainly have yielded almost without resistance. The King, in his "Memoirs of the War of Italian Independence," pretended that he had delayed in order to obtain the adhesion of the cabinets of London and Paris, although the opposition of these cabinets had been outspoken and nothing but the actual outbreak of hostilities could have induced a reconsideration. The fact is that the King, in his studies on the dispositions to be made, had paid no attention to the important

consideration of the material for carrying on the war. Everything was in confusion; resources which existed were not at hand; deficiencies were not supplied; he entered the campaign with a flourish of trumpets but with his army in a most inefficient condition. Instead of following Radetzky in his retreat from Milan and seeking an opportunity to engage him, he zigzagged across Lombardy without aim or plan of campaign, and in eleven days arrived at Cremona with the apparent intention of attacking the Quadrilateral. Meanwhile, Radetzky had time to give his army repose, to receive reinforcements and to put himself in the most favourable position for receiving an attack.

Military critics who have written since 1848 are agreed that the only feasible plan of campaign was to pass the Adige and concentrate at Vicenza, thus cutting off all reinforcements from the Quadrilateral. Radetzky in this way would have been paralyzed; the fortresses were not prepared for a siege, and the best military opinion is that Carlo Alberto would have taken them as the result of a successful campaign. Instead of which, apparently unwilling to encounter the risk of any decisive action, he marched and counter-marched, concentrated his forces slowly on the Mincio, and remained there four months in practical inactivity, more anxious apparently to oppose the republicans of Milan and Venice than the Austrians under Radetzky. The King finally decided to march directly on Mantua, leaving a detachment on the right bank of the Po, and, avoiding the plains of Montechiaro and of Ghedi, to attack the enemy at Goito, at Mozambano or at Borghetto; further to send his right wing to take Mantua with the assistance of the inhabitants, and then to attack Radetzky before Verona. On the 7th of April, leaving a force in front of Valleggio, he moved on Goito, crossing one of the three bridges over the Mincio between Mantua and Peschiera. At Goito a sharp engagement took place at the bridge, which was defended by a small force of Austrian riflemen. After four

hours' fighting the Austrians retired with a loss of three officers killed, three wounded, seventeen soldiers killed and thirty-five wounded; the Piedmontese lost forty men killed and wounded, but they took four guns. General Broglia, with a detachment, crossed the bridge at Mozambano, skirmishing there and at Borghetto. This gave the King command of both banks of the Mincio. The Austrians now abandoned Valleggio, and the King took up his position at Volta, where he received reinforcements. His army at this juncture numbered sixty thousand men. Radetzky remained on the defensive at Verona, holding the line of the Adige, and sending to Villafranca eighteen to twenty thousand men, who were not disturbed.

Instead of advancing and attacking or menacing the communications of the enemy, the King sat still to observe. Some brigades were sent forward, more to occupy territory than with any strategical intention. The chief critics of this period, Costa de Beauregard and Willisen, consider the military plans of the King to have been as uncertain as his political schemes had been. "All the defects of his character, so entirely speculative, here come out. On the slightest strategical movement the King became engaged in a labyrinth of speculations as to the result and arrived finally at no decision. One may say in the final analysis that the real military talent of Carlo Alberto consisted in seeing the defects of all combinations, even those of his own. He passed his nights in prayer. His gaunt face, like that of a man sick almost to death, and yet so full of fire; his sadness which seemed even to repel the resemblance of a smile, had a magnetic effect on the troops." (Minghetti to Pasolini.)

On the 11th of April a slight skirmish took place at Castelnovo, and three brigades under Bava made a reconnaissance on Mantua, which the Austrians met by flooding the country. The king then sat down to besiege Peschiera without artillery, which he only received in May. On the 20th of April a division of Tuscans, five thousand men with two hundred

cavalry and eight guns, arrived under the command of General Ferrari, an old officer of Napoleon. Amongst these were fifteen hundred volunteers from Florence, Sienna and Pisa, mostly students and professors, and two hundred and fifty Neapolitans armed at the expense of Rafaello Scala. They were ordered to concentrate at Governolo before Mantua. On the 25th Durando with the Pontifical contingent arrived—seven thousand men with twelve guns: one regiment of Swiss, one of Romans, one of Grenadiers, and one of Chasseurs à cheval. Of these four thousand four hundred were excellent soldiers.

These troops, forming the extreme right of the Piedmontese line, had orders to manœuvre between the Po and the Adige, supported by eleven hundred Parmesans with as many Modenese and four guns. The total force amounted to sixty-six thousand men with one hundred and twenty-three guns. The Venetian volunteers and the Neapolitans had not yet arrived. The King now decided not to oppose the march of General Nugent, who was coming tranquilly from the east through the Venetian provinces, but to lay regular siege to Peschiera, occupy the right bank of the Adige, and drive the Austrians from the passes of the Tyrol.

On the 30th of April, it was intended to attack the positions of Piovezzano and Pastrengo, situated at the opening of the valley, but it was Sunday, and the Piedmontese troops could not move until they had been to mass, so that hours were lost and the movement only began at eleven o'clock. After a slight action in which greatly superior Piedmontese forces occupied the hills commanding Peschiera, and in which the superior quality of the Piedmontese artillery was demonstrated, the right bank of the Adige was evacuated by the Austrians, with a loss of eight to nine hundred, including prisoners; of the Piedmontese, fourteen were killed and seventeen wounded. But the King took no advantage of these successes, and remained without a conception of the consequences of his victory. Desultory preparations for the siege of Verona,



and the continuation of the siege of Peschiera, divided the Piedmontese forces, and all the operations were pursued without energy and without definite plan. An attempt, on the 6th of May, to occupy the heights above Verona, with over thirteen thousand men and seventy pieces of artillery, resulted, through the want of organization and unity of action, in a check and a compulsory retreat. This affair, known as the battle of Santa Lucia, was not in itself serious, but it gave fresh evidence of the incapacity of the King and the lack of harmony among the Italian commanders. It therefore discouraged Carlo Alberto, while it emboldened the Austrians to take the offensive. In the meanwhile General Nugent, slowly approaching from the east, concentrated his forces at Gorizia and, traversing the Venetian provinces, moved to join Radetzky. Udine attempted to resist, but surrendered after a few days' bombardment. The King still paid no attention to the grave danger involved in the union of the two Austrian armies, and sent no forces to aid the Venetians in their resistance.

Nugent, at Cittadella on the Brenta, held a council on the 16th of May to decide if he should join Radetzky or first subdue the insurrection in the Venetian provinces; it was decided to effect the junction. Accordingly, leaving behind him sufficient forces to protect his communications, he pushed forward to join Radetzky at Visnadello. Durando, who commanded the army which should have opposed Nugent, whether through the want of orders from the King or afraid to offend the Pope, did nothing to hinder the junction of the Austrian commanders, and, remaining on the defensive, took refuge in Vicenza. This place had already been attacked, in April, by the Austrians under Nugent, but the assailants had been forced to retreat. As it menaced the communications of Radetzky with Austria, it was determined to make another attempt. On the 23rd of May, General von Thurn commenced an attack on the city with nineteen thousand men and forty pieces of artillery: the Italians composing the garrison, numbering

about three thousand, were mostly volunteers. The attack was repelled with a loss of about eight hundred killed and wounded on the part of the Austrians, and thirty killed and one hundred and thirty wounded of the Italians. The volunteers, who in other places, for want of proper direction and organization, had made a poor display, here acquitted themselves with the greatest credit, and the defence of Vicenza was considered one of the most brilliant feats of arms performed during the war.

The junction of Nugent and Radetzky gave the latter a force disposable for active operations of about fifty thousand men. He now resolved to take the offensive, and, leaving Verona on May 27, marched towards Mantua, which was invested by the Tuscan troops. The Piedmontese, nearly sixty thousand in number, were stretched along a line of operations from Curtatone, on the right wing, to Peschiera. The Austrian commander decided to attack Curtatone, which was held mainly by a body of Tuscan students and volunteers. The King, paying no attention to Austrian manœuvres, concentrated his troops nearer to his own head-quarters, thus leaving the position of Curtatone isolated. Orders were sent to abandon the position, but, as they were not conveyed with proper formality or through the proper officer, the commander of the Tuscans declined to obey them, tearing, as he himself subsequently stated, to be accused of treason. On the morning of the 29th, the Austrians attacked Curtatone and Montenaro with a force numbering about fifteen thousand men and twenty-three pieces of artillery. The Tuscans, numbering about seven thousand men, with nine guns and two mortars, made a gallant resistance; three times Curtatone was assaulted, being carried on the third attempt. Montenaro was also assaulted three times. The fight lasted six hours, and ended in the disastrous defeat of the little Italian army, nearly all the artillery men being killed at their guns, while the killed, wounded and prisoners of the Tuscans amounted to nearly half their force.

Radetzky, immediately after the victory of Curtatone, concentrated his forces for an attack on Goito. General Bava, who acted as Italian commander in chief, without having the control necessary for the post, profited by the delay in the Austrian movements, caused by the defence of Curtatone, to gather about twenty thousand men at Goito. On May 30, a desultory combat ensued in which success was divided, the right wing of the Piedmontese being driven back, while the centre and left remained firm; and the artillery again decided the fortune of the day. The Austrians eventually retreated, with a loss differently estimated at from five hundred to three thousand, and fell back upon Mantua. The loss of the Italians, killed and wounded, was less than three hundred. In consequence of this victory, the important fortress of Peschiera fell into the hands of the Piedmontese, but beyond this the second battle of Goito had no results. The Piedmontese remained inactive after the conflict, and the Austrians were allowed to retire without further molestation.

Fresh risings in Vienna, and the Emperor's flight to Innsbruck, occurring at this time, undoubtedly paralyzed the Austrian operations to some extent, but it is worth notice that Kossuth, who was at the moment of his greatest power, as Austrian Minister in Hungary, refused to favour, in Italy, the struggle for liberty which he himself was preparing for Hungary, and decided that the forces of Radetzky should not be withdrawn. The Marshal therefore renewed operations against Vicenza, where Durando still commanded. Either trusting to the King to follow up his success at Goito by the relief of Vicenza, or incapable of any movement, he neither evacuated the city nor strengthened its defences. After a vigorous attack carried out by forces enormously superior to the Italian, the heights were carried, and the city, assaulted on three sides, capitulated on the 10th of June. Thanks to the volunteers composing the greater part of the garrison, the defence had been so gallant that the Austrians released the prisoners,

imposing only the condition that they should not serve against their victors for three months. A rapid movement on Padua, garrisoned by three thousand Roman volunteers, resulted in an immediate surrender; and Treviso, with a garrison of Sicilian volunteers, was given up by the orders of the municipality, in opposition to La Masa, commanding the Sicilians. Soon afterwards Mestre and all the minor places in the direction of Venice fell into the hands of the Austrians.

Thereupon, the King, feeling the danger of Radetzky's increasing strength, made up his mind to act with vigour against Mantua and Verona. But the same defects which had made all the other operations fruitless—the slowness of movement and want of organization, and the ignorance of the situation of the enemy—also paralyzed this. “Carlo Alberto,” says Lamarmora, “had not the practical common sense necessary for the disposition of the troops, not even for understanding the nature of the ground. He hardly knew how to keep the direction of his movements and was averse to making observations. So it would have been impossible for him to have gained a victory, even had Radetzky followed the usual dilatory methods of the warfare of that day.”

## (2) *Diplomacy.*

At this epoch the threatened intervention of France, nominally in favour of Piedmont, but really for her own advantage, showed the difficulty which Italy had before her, in diplomacy as well as on the battle-field. From time immemorial, the policy of France aimed at preventing Italy from becoming strong. Richelieu wrote to a French General in his time, “More than anything else it is necessary for France that Italy should remain divided and weak, because it is necessary for us not to have at our side any strong and great nation.” In

1821 the French Minister at Florence wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "The independence of Italy (i.e. its independence of Austria—real Italian independence having always been opposed by France) and, above all, its subdivision into little states, ought to be the desire and the aim of every French agent devoted to his country." When the revolution of 1848 broke out in Italy, the French would have come, if called, to assist in the foundation of a kingdom of Upper Italy; but on the condition that they should have Savoy and Nice, at least—with the hope of substituting their own influence for that of Austria over a state of secondary rank. If Carlo Alberto had offered Savoy to France, the independence of Italy from Austria might have been accomplished in 1848, and the kingdom of Upper Italy, with the Duchies, would have constituted the basis of a nation, the centre of attraction for the other provinces. The internal complications would have been greater than they were in 1859, for the republicans were stronger in 1848, while the governments of Tuscany, Rome and Naples were more popular and more difficult to deal with; but, even so, this union of the upper Italian provinces would have formed eventually the basis of the Kingdom of Italy under conditions very similar to those which obtained in 1859. Nevertheless it seems to me that Carlo Alberto acted on a sound intuition in refusing French aid at the French price, and I believe that the cause of Italian liberty and unity, and of good government, would have ultimately profited had Cavour followed the same policy. The aid of France cost more than it brought in.

Carlo Alberto obstinately refused any cession of territory in compensation for the assistance of France, and the successive French ministers who had to deal with the question refused without this to assist Italy. Partly from a right instinct but partly also from ignorance and vain glory, the King refused all assistance, and declared that Italy was in a condition to accomplish her own destiny. The dispositions of the French were shown by the fact that, when Carlo Alberto entered

Lombardy, a French column<sup>1</sup> organized at Lyons moved on Chambéry. The incident had, however, no consequence except to increase the distrust towards France. The Piedmontese Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to the British Ambassador, "We have written to the Marquis of Brignola, Minister at Paris, that he should urge the Provisional Government to keep these assemblages of troops away from our frontier, in order that the people may not suppose that France wishes to occupy herself with us. We mean that it shall be known absolutely that Italy decides to manage her own affairs."

Lamartine says frankly, in his work, "The Present, Past, and Future of the Republic," "If the King of Piedmont should drive Austria from Upper Italy and take possession of Milan, Venice, Parma, Modena, Genoa and Tuscany, France could not permit at her very doors the transformation of a secondary power to one of first rank. The frontiers of this new kingdom are at the gates of Lyons; a new alliance with Austria would enable this Italian kingdom to change entirely the defensive position of France. The Alps would be doubly formidable. France in this case must secure herself by the possession of Savoy and Nice. If the King of Piedmont should be defeated, France would intervene to obtain for Lombardy and Venice political and constitutional, semi-national existence." These

<sup>1</sup> An eye-witness has described to me this movement. It was organised by a Lyons radical club called "Les Voraces": it had no support from the French army. A column of a thousand men, without uniforms, armed with fowling-pieces, pikes, sabres, &c., marched from Lyons into lower Savoy. The authorities, civil and military, withdrew. The population, finding itself abandoned by the government, made no question that it was given over to the French Republic; but the next day, when the "Voraces" had entered Chambéry, and began to display evident anarchical tendencies, the citizens of that place, aided by the peasantry of the neighbourhood armed with scythes and pitch-forks, attacked them. The guard-houses and the Hôtel de Ville were recaptured, and the Lyonnese were made prisoners and confined in the churches. There were some killed and wounded on both sides. The Piedmontese authorities, who took no part in the conflict, afterwards returned to Chambéry.

plans were destroyed by the insurrection of the 23rd of June in Paris, but it may be said that France, whether monarchical or republican, whether in the epoch of Louis XIV, or of Napoleon, or of the republic of 1848, looked with unfavourable eyes on the aggrandizement of Italy. The Minister Bastide, successor to Lamartine, wrote to Bois-le Comte at Turin: "We desire sincerely the liberation of Italy from the foreigner, but at the same time we cannot admit that for the benefit of an Italian power there should be established a dominion perhaps more inconvenient to us than the Austrian. In other words, we shall never remain indifferent and passive spectators before the ambitious projects for the increase of his dominions which the King of Sardinia seems to entertain. The formation at the foot of the Alps of a monarchy of ten or twelve million inhabitants, bordered by the two seas, which would become in every respect a formidable power, without considering the possibility of its absorbing the rest of Italy, would be for France and for the peninsula a very grave fact. We could admit the unity of Italy, on the principle and under the form of a federation of states—independent, sovereign and counterbalancing each other as much as possible—but never a unity which should put Italy under the dominion of one alone of these States."

Garnier-Pagés, Minister of Finance in the French Republic, in his history of the Revolution of 1848, says that the sitting of the Chamber on the 23rd of May, in which Lamartine made his declaration concerning Italy, had been preceded by a discussion in the Council of Ministers on the 12th of May, in which Ledru Rollin had declared that they ought to aid Italy but not the King of Piedmont. Marie Arago declared against any intervention; Garnier-Pagés had, on the contrary, supported it, as had Lamartine. According to the analysis of that sitting, communicated to Henri Martin by Pagés, the Council of Ministers had decided to declare to the Assembly that it was the wish of the government to pass the Alps on the first appeal.

Lamartine considered that they might leave Venice to Austria as a semi-independent state, but he would have Savoy. But on the 22nd of May the Piedmontese Minister, Pareto, declared to the Chamber of Turin that "the French army would not come unless called by us, and as we shall not call it, it will not come." The Lombard envoy wrote on the same day to Lamartine: "I pray you to declare, what is the truth, that I, as well as the representative of Venice, am opposed through national sentiment to any French intervention." Giuseppe Massari had written in April, "In order that Italy should exist, it is indispensable that she should, in everything and for everything, now and in future, always, always, always, act alone and for herself." Gioberti had said that he feared Austrian dominion less than French assistance. Poerio and Prati wrote poems against that assistance. Mamiani declared it the greatest misfortune for his nation, and Minghetti said, "I cannot think of it without blushing and without profound indignation." In Italy they still believed in May, 1848, that they could conquer alone, and any cooperation which would have taken from Italy the honour of victory, was repugnant even to those least confident in final success.

Soon after the outbreak of war, diplomacy began its attempts, honest or dishonest, at conciliation. In 1848, Austria must have considered French intervention in Italy as very probable and certainly disadvantageous, and therefore the imperial Commissary at Gorizia had promised to the Lombards and the Venetians, that if they would abandon their insurrectionary policy, they should have an administration to be controlled by themselves, liberty of the press, lightening of taxation for the poorer classes, and all the political and national advantages to which they aspired. Abercrombie, the British Minister, advised the Piedmontese government to be contented with the cession of Lombardy; to which the council of Ministers of Piedmont replied that it was not possible to negotiate until the liberation of Italy from the Austrians was complete, while



the Lombard provisional government on its side refused to entertain the proposition. On the 12th of May, Viscount Ponsonby, British Ambassador at Vienna, who had already informed Lord Palmerston of other projects for the neutralization of Italy which had been discussed and abandoned by the Ministerial council at Vienna, announced the departure for London of Baron Hummelauer with various proposals. Hummelauer wrote to Lord Palmerston on the 23rd of May, "If to-morrow the French should pass the Alps and come into Lombardy we should not go to meet them, we should take position at once at Verona and on the Adige, and if the French should come through and attack us, we should retreat toward our Alps and the Isonzo, but we should not accept battle. We should not oppose the entrance or the advance of the French in Italy. Those who called them would only have to experience again their domination. No one will come to find us behind our Alps and we shall rest spectators of the struggles of which Italy will be the theatre."

On the 24th of May, Hummelauer presented a memorandum to Lord Palmerston which made the following propositions: "Lombardy will be abandoned by Austria and will be free to remain independent or to unite with any other Italian state according to its own will. The state of Venice will remain under the sovereignty of the Emperor; it will have a separate administration, completely national, formed by the representatives of the country without the intervention of the Imperial government, and represented in the central government of the monarchy by a Minister whom it will maintain there, and who will direct the relations between the local administration and the Imperial government. The Venetian administration will be presided over by an Arch-duke as Viceroy, who will reside in Venice as Lieutenant of the Emperor."

Lamartine confirms these propositions in his History of the Revolution of 1848 and declares that France would have accepted them with the before-mentioned rectification of the

frontier in its favour. England, however, while not believing that the Italian question would be so readily settled, advised Austria to withdraw entirely from Italy. We need not ask whether it is probable that Hummelauer's proposals would have been repeated after hostilities had ceased, or that Radetzky would have given his consent (which in the light of subsequent events is doubtful). They were unconditionally rejected by the Piedmontese Ministry, without even submitting them to the approval of the King; and in May, Pareto declared to the Chamber that it had never entered into the projects of the King or his Ministry to negotiate, so long as an Austrian remained in Italy; rather than condescend to this, the Ministry would resign.

In May the mediation of England was offered to the King on the basis of a guarantee of the integrity of his dominions and the possession of the Duchies of Modena and Parma, if he would make peace. The King replied that he would not negotiate so long as an Austrian remained in Italy. Finally, on the 17th of June, the Counsellor Schnitzer-Meerau arrived at Milan to treat directly with the provisional government of Lombardy; he was the bearer of a letter, dated the 13th of June, from Baron Wessenburg to Count Casati, president of the provisional government of Lombardy. This letter declared that Wessenburg was authorized to negotiate with the provisional government, on the basis of the separation and independence of Lombardy, on the following conditions—the assumption of a proportional part of the debt of the empire, certain advantages to Austrian commerce, and compensation for their losses to the members of the imperial family, and of the civil and military employés. The King seems to have been inclined to accept this proposal, but weakly, hesitatingly, as was his custom in all matters. He replied to Abercrombie on the 10th of July that he would accept a proposition to make the *Adige* the frontier of the state, with the annexation of Lombardy and the Duchies of Parma and Modena to

Piedmont; and he declared that if the Austrian government was disposed to make proposals of peace on the basis of such modifications of the frontier, or if such proposals should be made by the English Ministry in the quality of mediators, or if they were made in the name of the Queen, he would not hesitate to accept them. He desired this opinion, however, to be considered confidential, and observed that it would be easy to convince the Parliament and the nation of the wisdom of these pacific measures. It is probable that on this basis, in spite of the national exultation and the question of Venice, matters might have been arranged pacifically, though not without ulterior complications: France would probably have insisted on the cession of Savoy. But all chance of a favourable result was lost through the hesitations and procrastinations of the King.

### (3) *Custoza.*

Towards the end of July, the King, having failed to make any impression on Verona, concentrated his forces with the object of investing the great fortress of Mantua, at the south-western angle of the Quadrilateral. His culpable neglect of ordinary military precautions and his frequent strategical blunders had allowed the Austrians to recover from their previous reverses, to receive reinforcements, and to concentrate for new operations. Meanwhile the King wasted time in besieging fortresses which were impregnable to an army so imperfectly supplied as his, and gave himself up to fasting and prayer, until the war took a decided turn against him.

Costa de Beauregard asserts that the King was in correspondence with a visionary nun of Savoy, called Maria Teresa, in obedience to whose counsels he even changed his plans and refused to follow those which had been agreed upon. "The King ruled even to the last details the action of his generals, and though he showed himself courageous and

indifferent to death, always the first on horseback and the last in retreat, he acted with so little energy and decision, and his manœuvres were so slow and irregular, as to excite despair." The reinforcements promised from Lombardy arrived at the end of June. They consisted of twelve thousand men: a promiscuous crowd, badly armed, badly clothed, and without instruction. Nine battalions from Piedmont were required to fill the vacancies in the ranks, making a total of sixty-five thousand men (of whom sixteen thousand were already ill with fevers contracted in the marshy country about Mantua), with one hundred and twenty-eight pieces of artillery. Against this force the Austrians mustered one hundred and thirty-two thousand infantry and eight to nine thousand cavalry.

It is at this point that a name destined to become one of the most famous in the annals of Italy, first appears upon the scene. Born at Nice in 1807, Giuseppe Garibaldi in his youth took to the sea, and at the age of twenty-one undertook a voyage to Constantinople and the Black Sea. At one of the seaports in the East he is said to have fallen in with a follower of Mazzini, who speedily enrolled him in the ranks of "Young Italy." Soon after his return to Italy, he took part in a rising in Genoa (1834) in connexion with Mazzini's unfortunate expedition from Savoy. Proscribed by the government, he made his escape to Marseilles and thence to South America, where for some ten years he lived the life of a partisan, entering the service of Rio Grande, then in revolt against Brazil, and subsequently that of Montevideo in its war with Buenos Ayres. In a series of fights, both by sea and land, he gained considerable reputation and valuable experience in guerilla warfare. In Montevideo he raised a corps of 800 Italians, who followed him to the death. It was the news of the war in Lombardy which now brought him back to Italy. He speedily raised a body of volunteers, and early in July, 1848, offered his services to the King. Carlo Alberto, who had no taste for

revolutionaries, gave him a cold reception, but not wishing to alienate any support at such a juncture, advised him to go to Venice and take part in the defence of that city. \*

The position of the two armies facing each other at this moment was such as to leave Piedmont no hope of victory. The Piedmontese forces, already less than half the strength of the Austrian, extended their lines to compensate for their numerical inferiority, until from the extreme right to the extreme left was a distance of over eighty miles. The left rested on Rivoli, thirty-four miles from Mantua, and the right was at Governolo on the Mincio. This dispersion of forces enabled Radetzky, marching out of Mantua with sixty thousand men, to attack first the left wing, then the centre, and then the right wing, crushing them one after the other. Partial successes proved the military valour of the Piedmontese troops, but were immediately buried in collective defeats. On the 23rd of July a vigorous attack on the centre drove the Italians from the heights of Custoza and other positions, after which Radetzky rapidly marched on the Mincio, bridged it and occupied both banks of the river. In these circumstances, the King, instead of concentrating all his forces, left a portion of the army before Mantua and without sending advice of his movements to Sonnaz, who commanded on the left, made an attack on the Austrian positions. This attack, on the 24th, was successful, and the Austrians were driven from Custoza. But Radetzky, on the 25th, changed his front, rapidly concentrated fifty thousand men, and met the Italian advance at Berettara. After a brilliant struggle, in which the division of the Duke of Genoa repelled three attacks of the Austrians, nightfall found the entire force engaged and no reserves available. The Italians were obliged to retreat from the heights of Custoza, and finally retired to Villafranca with the loss of twenty-five thousand men. On the 26th they evacuated Villafranca and fell back towards Piedmont. The Austrians pressed on with vigour, and allowed the retreating

army no moment of repose. The King's sons, the Dukes of Savoy and Genoa, did their best to stop the Austrian pursuit, but their efforts were in vain.

It is useless to relate the details of a struggle conducted without intelligence and without unity, with splendid courage on the part of the troops and ignominious ignorance on the part of the commanders. At Volta and Goito the brave Piedmontese army showed its proverbial courage, but all the advantages of offensive action and previous success were on the Austrian side. On the 27th, the King decided to demand an armistice. The Austrian terms were better than the Italians had a right to expect, considering the condition of the campaign; nevertheless, the King refused Radetzky's propositions and decided to retreat on Milan. The campaign was lost, and nothing remained but the obligation of the King's word to support the Milanese movement, which now, with the destruction of the Piedmontese army, was absolutely hopeless. On the 3rd of August the King arrived at Milan with twenty-five thousand men, followed by the Austrians forty-five thousand strong. Slight skirmishes took place in which the Piedmontese troops maintained their reputation, but which could not avert the reconquest of the city by Radetzky. On the night of the 4th the King convoked a council of the generals in which the Milanese had no voice, and in which it was decided to demand of Radetzky an armistice with the sole condition that the city should be protected. Radetzky, knowing that at that moment diplomatic negotiations were going on, and that England and France contemplated intervention, agreed to the King's proposals, but stipulated for the evacuation of Lombardy, the Duchies and Venetia. To this the King consented, and next day (August 6) he retired to his own dominions, leaving Milan to the tender mercies of the Austrian commander.

The armistice of Vigevano terminated a campaign undertaken with little forethought and preparation, with incompetent chiefs and inadequate forces, though with courage and resolution

on the part of the people. The apprehension of foreign intervention alone saved Piedmont from occupation by the Austrian troops. The disaster was evidently due in the main to the incompetence of the King<sup>1</sup>. The *procès-verbal* drawn up by the ministry on their resignation states fairly the facts of the case: "The general opinion and judgement of the intelligent and experienced deplores greatly the fatality which had surrounded the throne with men known to be mutually antagonistic,—courtiers, not soldiers, incapable of directing military affairs...As a matter of fact, the movements and the condition of the enemy were always unknown, and their attacks unforeseen. Our troops, even when numerically superior, were always inferior at the point attacked. The storehouses were full, but the distribution irregular; the soldiers were oftener exhausted by privation than disabled by combat; and a general confusion of ideas prevailed amongst the chiefs. We will say nothing of the ineptitude of the strategical movements,

<sup>1</sup> The Memoirs of Gen. Della Rocca, which appeared while this work was in the last stages of preparation, show very clearly where the fault lay, and to whom the disasters of the Piedmontese army were due. The General was chief of the staff, and as such charged with the preparations for the movements of head-quarters, and the details of his diary bring to light the absolute disregard which the King showed for the advice of his experienced officers. In the last stage, i.e. during the retreat on the Piedmontese frontier, Bava, the commander in chief, advised that the army should pass the Po and take up a position menacing the flank of the Austrians in a march on Milan, and at the same time defending, so far as possible, the Piedmontese territory, in order to prolong the campaign with a chance of retrieving the blunders made by the King during the late movements. With this object the army was ordered to retreat on Borgoforte. This order was countermanded by the King, who from motives of loyalty towards the Milanese, as sincere as they were unintelligent, directed the retreat on Milan, thus drawing the Austrians after him, and involving the city in the defeat inevitable on that line of defence. The result which Bava predicted followed. The city had made no preparations to receive the army, or to support it, never having anticipated a defence; and the ineffectual resistance under the walls led, as was foreseen by Bava, to the final and complete catastrophe, both for Milan and Piedmont.

but the want of foresight, and the errors which constantly recurred, betray an incompetence which almost justifies the want of discipline and resolution visible throughout the army. We are unwilling to suppose treason, actual or intended, but owing to evident indifference to the cause, declared aversion from all constitutional principles, absolute ignorance of the science of war, the results were very different from what the valour of the soldiers had a right to expect." The one bright spot in the picture is the splendid spirit with which volunteers from Italy offered themselves in support of the first champion of Italian emancipation. The immediate political effects of this disastrous campaign were, as might have been expected, reactionary, and the liberalism which had insisted on the war was cowed by its failure. But the advocates of war to the bitter end were not yet silenced. This was but an armistice, and there was a hope that another campaign might retrieve the now evident blunders of the first. In spite of the reaction amongst the ruling classes, popular agitation was continued, with that stubbornness which is a marked trait of the Italian character, at least in the north.

#### (4) *The armistice.*

On the 4th of March, 1848, the Piedmontese constitution had been proclaimed. It established two Chambers, one named for life by the King, and one elective; it conferred a veto on the King in all cases, without limit or conditions, as well as the prerogative of making war or peace; it gave the Chambers the right to control expenditure; it granted freedom of the press with provision against abuses, freedom of meeting, a national guard, the right of petition to every citizen aged 21, and inviolability of domicile. It was in short a frank and full surrender of all that had been so long refused.

In February, 1848, a commission, of which Cavour was a member, was named for the drawing up of the electoral law. The



elections took place on the 27th of April, without interference on the part of the government. The Chamber resulting was largely liberal, but it included none of the republicans of 1831, only a few of those of later date, and fewer from the aristocratic class or clergy, while Cavour was only returned in the secondary elections. The speech from the throne was made by the Prince of Carignano, and was colourless, while the debates on the reply were long and tedious, as might have been expected from an assembly in which there were one hundred and forty lawyers, who had never before been allowed to ventilate their political hobbies without censure.

The matters to which the Parliament had first to give its serious attention were the consequences of the campaign, the concluding disaster of which showed that the civic discipline of the little state was very incomplete. The debates proved that the conceptions of the situation entertained by the representatives of the people were rather those of a public meeting than of a serious deliberative body. "The Piedmontese deputies soon gave Charles Albert anxiety enough. Freedom of speech was to them, who had lived hitherto with a gag in their mouths, what his first jack-knife is to a boy; they hacked and cut at everything, to assure themselves and the world that they really had a weapon to use. They proposed bills to abolish antiquated abuses, and to reform ancient institutions. A worthy purpose no doubt, but ill-timed, when matters of immediate and vital importance had to be dispatched by raw legislators, and when every matter beat up opinionated disputants. But the notification to the Chamber of the vote of Lombardy for fusion drove these disputants to the verge of civil war, and the majority of the ministers and their supporters wished to have the annexation of the new provinces ratified as soon as possible in order that the royal authority might be substituted for their flaccid provisional administration. But some of the radical deputies protested against any act of union until the end of the war, and most of the Piedmontese

members were in a frenzy lest Milan should be the capital of the new kingdom." (Thayer's *Dawn of Italian Independence*.)

A new Ministry was formed on the 28th of July, after the Chamber had passed several measures of repression against the ecclesiastical orders, and of consolidation in civil affairs. It was composed of Casati, a Lombard, President of the Council; Ricci, finance; Rattazzi, agriculture; Gioia from Parma and Durini from Lombardy, without portfolios; Plezza, home office; Lisisio, minister "near the King"<sup>1</sup>; Collegno, minister of war. These were all installed in their functions in the midst of the agitations caused by the recent defeats of the army. The armistice had left the people discontented and impatient. Fresh outbreaks in Vienna and disorders throughout the empire paralysed Austria and left a long interval of comparative inactivity. This interval, which might have been employed in reorganizing the Piedmontese forces, was lost through dissensions between the King and the democratic majority of the Chamber. Military organization did not undergo the needed reforms, the depôts of material were not replenished, and paralysis and confusion reigned where forethought and concentration should have been found. The ministry, paralysed by dissensions, was impotent to impose the reforms necessary, even had it conceived them, while the failure of the Piedmontese military operations had shaken the faith of the other provinces in Piedmont itself. The other sections of Italy were still unprepared for union, unprepared even for separate action, while the enemy was concentrated and confident, knowing that time and force were with him. Wild schemes of military operations were in the air, and occupied the popular mind. Garibaldi was invited to join with the troops which held Rome; France prepared for intervention both in Rome and in Piedmont.

When, in August 1848, the news of the defeat of Custozza

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<sup>1</sup> i.e. accompanying the king on campaign.

arrived in Paris, a conference was held between Cavaignac, Bastide and Lord Normanby, at which France and England agreed to offer their mediation to the combatants. The memorandum of Hummelauer was accepted as a basis of this mediation. The foundation of the agreement was the formal renunciation on the part of Austria of all rights over Lombardy, but the preservation of sovereignty over Venice, which was to be constituted like Hungary, with a government and administration of its own. If the Piedmontese had been able to hold out till the end of August, something might have been effected in this sense. But the proposal of mediation came after the armistice and when Lombardy was already evacuated, and it was too late. Austria had conquered, and believed that neither England nor France would make war for the sake of Italy. Still, the resources of Piedmont were not seriously impaired, and had the King been willing to sacrifice Savoy and Nice, France might have intervened and Austria still have had to contemplate the possibility of defeat. On the 3rd of September, therefore, the Emperor decided to accept mediation in principle, while not binding himself to make concessions to Italy, in order to avert the danger of immediate French intervention. A note of the 17th of September from the minister at Vienna defined the Austrian conditions: the establishment of Lombardy and Venice as a kingdom under Austria, with a constitutional government, including an elective chamber and a national army. France suspended her military preparations, but Palmerston, more sagacious than his colleagues, and foreseeing that French intervention in Italy was sooner or later inevitable, advised that, in the interest of Austria, and in view of possible complications, Lombardy should be ceded to Piedmont. Vienna, however, hesitated and Piedmont still refused to recognize the extent of its helplessness.

In October the government of Carlo Alberto, taking advantage of the embarrassments of Austria in connexion

with Hungary, began to contemplate a renewal of the war. At the end of that month the capture of Vienna and the suppression of the revolution by Windischgraetz diminished still further the disposition of Austria to offer concessions to Piedmont, and on the 17th of January the proposal of Hummelauer was withdrawn, under the pretext that it had not emanated from the government of Vienna. In February, 1849, Swartzenburg refused to make any concessions. Louis Napoleon—then President of the French Republic—had expressed an intention of effecting the confederation of Italy under the patronage of France; to which Austria replied in the same month, that she would be represented at the conference which it was proposed to hold at Brussels, only on the condition that the King of Sardinia would withdraw all his pretensions and that the condition of affairs prior to 1815 should be substantially maintained. The conference did not meet and the government of Piedmont decided to renew the war.

The organization for the new campaign was, if possible, worse than that of the past. New levies of men, undisciplined and reluctant, raised the army to one hundred and thirty-five thousand men (including ten thousand volunteers from Lombardy and other parts of Italy), of which the hospitals and garrisons retained above thirty thousand. The army was put under the command of a Polish general—Chrzanowsky. Bava, the former commander-in-chief, was deposed, owing to the public outcry, which made him responsible for defeats that, in fact, were really due to the King. Chrzanowsky came from Breslau as a simple general and was promoted first to major-general and then commander-in-chief. He is described as being of small stature, pale, beardless, wrinkled, with a turned-up nose, projecting jaw, dull eyes, a shy and awkward bearing; he resembled a priest rather than a soldier; he was of a cold character, and he was entirely ignorant of Italian. He was never seen, and in the silence of his cabinet gave

himself up to details of organization which diverted him from his real functions as commander-in-chief. The King regarded him with reverence and wrote to Costa: "He seems to me absolutely inspired; he believes that his own operations are aided by the divine will made manifest."

(5) *Novara.*

The armistice came to an end on the 12th of March, 1849, and in the midst of the most unfortunate and discouraging circumstances the Piedmontese army was put in motion. It was divided into two corps d'armée; the first was in three divisions, commanded by Durando, Bes, and Ramorino, the leader of Mazzini's disastrous insurrection in Savoy; the second corps d'armée, in two divisions, was commanded by Perrone. The whole army was scattered along a line reaching from Lake Maggiore by Novara and the Ticino to the Po, and thence eastward to Parma. The Austrian army was divided into five corps with two divisions each, the corps being commanded respectively by Wratislaw, D'Aspre, D'Appel, and Count Thurn, and the reserve by Marshal De Wocher. It had one hundred and eighty guns; it was well disciplined, well equipped, and was under a competent staff. The Austrians concentrated at Lodi, so disposed as to induce the belief that they intended to retreat on the Adda. It is useless to recount the strategical and tactical blunders by which the ill-organized Piedmontese army, with its incompetent commander, drew on itself new disasters for Italy. The general's staff knew nothing of the ground between the two armies; orders were confused and slow, and the confidence of the army in Chrzanowsky was at a minimum.

The commander-in-chief had to select one of three plans—to throw himself on the right flank of the enemy, while the two divisions at Mortara menaced him in front; to enter

Lombardy and operate on the rear of the Austrians; or to give battle on ground selected and known. He chose the third and took up his position at Novara. On the 22nd of March, Radetzky moved against the Piedmontese army, having by his procrastination permitted it to concentrate, while if he had marched rapidly on Novara he would have found it unprepared and would have shortened the struggle considerably. The strength of his six corps d'armée in the movement on Novara was fifty-seven thousand men with one hundred and eleven guns. Twenty thousand men with forty guns remained useless beyond the Po, while unimportant combats at Sforzesa and Mortara, with the marches and counter-marches for three days, cost him seven or eight thousand men—of whom the greater part were deserters. Since the Austrians did not concentrate their forces for the attack on Novara, Rattazzi could say that “at Novara fifty thousand Piedmontese were beaten by less than twenty-five thousand Austrians.” On the 23rd of March no defensive works of *any* importance had been undertaken by the Piedmontese, although the Austrians had lost the day before in useless attempts to find their enemy, who was supposed to be at Vercelli. The defeat which followed is partially explained in General Chrzanowsky's official bulletin. After describing the disposition of the Italian troops, and the Austrian attack on the Italian left at Bicocca, which was defended by the contingents from Savona and Savoy, he continues,—“The Savona regiment, which was in the first line, fell back, whereupon the Savoyard brigade came into action. In a short time these troops retook their lost positions and moved forward to the cascina Lavinchi on the left of Cittadella. Meanwhile the fire of the Austrians on our left slackened, and their efforts seemed now to be directed against our centre at Cittadella, which was taken and retaken several times. At this juncture the Austrians renewed and strengthened their attack ~~on~~ our left. The Savoy and Savona brigades gave ground and commenced to retreat toward Bicocca. In a short

time this position was lost and the fate of the day was decided. The Duke of Genoa was sent to recover the position with the reserve, but after a desperate fight, in which the Duke had several horses killed under him, he was obliged to retreat. Then the Austrians threw their whole strength on our centre, and our battalions, falling back one on the other, were obliged at night-fall to retreat."

The real reason of the defeat, which the bulletin conceals, is to be found in the incapacity of the Italian General. After Cittadella had been taken, lost, and retaken by the twenty-third regiment of the line, the Austrian attack seemed repulsed, and a retreat along the whole line appeared probable. If at this moment a general attack had been made by the Piedmontese, the battle might have been saved; but the commander-in-chief lacked either decision or perception, and gave the order to retreat. D'Aspré in his report says: "If the Piedmontese had shown greater energy we should have been put, at this point, in great difficulty." La Marmora, in his *Episodio del Risorgimento Italiano*, says, "If the repulse of D'Aspré's corps had been followed up...the fortunes of the day might have changed. The divisions of the reserve were then almost untouched." The Austrians however returned to the attack. Late in the afternoon Radetzky threw four divisions, supported by a brigade of grenadiers, on Bicocca and carried the position. An attempt to retake it by the Duke of Genoa with three battalions, failed, and a heavy rain coming on decided the day. The Piedmontese lost two thousand and eighty-three dead and wounded, two thousand prisoners and twelve guns: the Austrians two thousand four hundred and ninety-four killed and wounded and one thousand prisoners.

The King, who had worn over his uniform a cloak trimmed with black fur and silver embroidery, had continually traversed the battlefield on his black horse. At night-fall he said to Chrzanowsky: "All is lost; even honour"; and when Durando tried to keep him out of the fire, he replied, "It is useless;

let me die ; this is my last day." The Piedmontese army, cut off from Turin, had no longer any basis of operations. It remained forty thousand strong, but the commander had lost all faith in the possibility of success. The King sent Generals Cadorna and Cossato to Radetzky to demand an armistice. The Marshal replied that the King must disband the Lombards; surrender to the Austrians, until the conclusion of peace, the territory between the Sesia and the Ticino, and the citadel of Alessandria, without waiting for the authorization of parliament; and give up the Duke of Savoy as hostage for the observance of the stipulations. The King called together the Generals and the Princes at nine o'clock and said: "Gentlemen, I have sacrificed myself to the cause of Italian independence; for it I have exposed my life, that of my sons, and my crown; I cannot maintain the struggle. I understand that my person may be an obstacle to the conclusion of a peace now become indispensable; I cannot sign it. Since I have not been able to find death on the battle-field I will make the last sacrifice to my country. I lay down my crown and abdicate in favour of my son."

The King immediately left Piedmont, going to Nice, whence he went into exile at Oporto and there passed the short remainder of his life. He died on the 28th of July, 1849. On the day following the abdication a conference took place between Vittorio Emanuele and Radetzky, and an armistice was concluded. The new King agreed to disband immediately the Lombard, Hungarian and Polish battalions, and accepted, during the armistice, the occupation by an Austrian force of all the territory comprised between the Po, the Sesia and the Ticino, and half of the fortress of Alessandria, at the expense of the Piedmontese government. He engaged to evacuate Piacenza and all the territory occupied in the principalities of Modena and Tuscany; to withdraw the fleet from the Adriatic within fifteen days; and to reduce the army to a peace footing. On the 26th of March he signed the treaty of peace.



Piedmont had in this war incurred very serious sacrifices in men and money. The expense of the two campaigns was 145,560,000 francs, besides the war indemnity to Austria and the expenses of the Austrian occupation amounting to about 66,000,000, a total expense of over 200,000,000 francs, which, for a state whose ordinary budget did not extend beyond 84,000,000 was a heavy charge. Nevertheless the advocates of Italian unity considered that, even disastrous as it was, the war had distinctly advanced the cause of national unity and independence. For the first time an Italian army had fought, under the Italian flag, with the distinct purpose of establishing Italian unity, and, failure though it was in the military sense of the word, the war produced a great moral result. Though at this moment no other portion of Italy was willing to sacrifice its provincial independence and its peculiar institutions, Piedmont had proved that in her, at least, Italy possessed a coherent national organization, capable of effort and of sacrifice for the common cause.

(6) *Lombardy and Venice.*

The affairs of Lombardy during the period immediately following the insurrection of Milan are closely intermingled with those of the war between Piedmont and Austria. It was not till the 28th of July, 1848, that the Lombard provinces organized their respective resources. They levied a forced loan of eight millions on the capital, and six millions on the various provinces, and on the 1st of August called to arms the entire population from eighteen to forty years of age. The disaster of Custoza left Lombardy and its insurrection to its own resources, but the blunders of the Piedmontese government had already made the Lombard cause hopeless. The news of the capitulation of August 5 produced in Milan a painful sensation, in which indignation against the King and hostility

against the Austrians struggled for supremacy. The municipality protested against the capitulation and the most violent demonstrations were made against the King, who, being accused of treason and publicly insulted, despondently offered to cancel the capitulation and resume the combat. But the hopelessness of any further struggle in the face of the superior forces of Austria and the discouragement which supervened in the liberal ranks determined the acceptance of the armistice.

An immense number of citizens abandoned the city, which was reoccupied by the Austrian army on the 6th. The Austrian government, desirous of conciliating the public opinion of France and England, adopted a policy less rigorous than that which had provoked the disturbance. The following manifesto was issued in the name of the Emperor Ferdinand on the 20th of September: "It is our sovereign will that the inhabitants of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom should have a constitution responding not less to their nationality and the needs of the country than to their union with the Austrian empire. With this object, as soon as its tranquillity shall have been restored, we shall convoke, in a place to be agreed upon, the representatives of the nation, to be elected freely by all the provinces of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom." When the crown was assumed by Francis Joseph (Dec. 1848) he also declared that he freely recognized the high importance of liberal institutions in agreement with the times, and he called Nazzari to Vienna, to consult on the constitution to be granted to the reoccupied provinces. Three months later the Emperor proclaimed the constitutional statute of the empire of Austria one and indivisible, known as the Unitary Edict, which, in article 76, promised an organic law for the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. In spite of all these provisions the state of siege was maintained and the disarmament of the country proceeded with unrelenting rigour.

With Milan the rest of Lombardy naturally passed again into the power of Austria. But in some parts of the country

the resistance was still maintained. It was not till after the battle of Novara that the Austrians recovered the town of Brescia, after a memorable defence. A few days after that battle, a column of twenty-two thousand men with two guns from Mantua attacked San Euphemia, a suburb of Brescia, but after three hours' combat they retreated. On the 27th, the Austrian forces again attacked the city and bombarded the castle. Brescia resisted heroically and the inhabitants made a successful sortie. On the 28th, another sortie was less successful, the Brescians losing in killed, wounded and prisoners about one hundred men. General Nugent, commanding the Austrians, was mortally wounded. On the 29th, the Austrians succeeded in occupying the suburbs and General Haynau, arriving from Padua with reinforcements of three thousand men, laid close siege, summoning the city to surrender under menace of sack and destruction. The summons was disregarded and the bombardment commenced. On the 1st of April the bombardment had succeeded in crushing the general defence. The combat was continued in the barricades and streets through the nights of the 1st and 2nd, with the greatest obstinacy, and Haynau in his report to Radetzky says, "I would not have believed that so bad a cause could be defended with so much perseverance," adding, "I opened immediately a terrible bombardment of the city and recommenced the attack. In view of the grave losses which we had already suffered, and the obstinacy and fury of the enemy, we were obliged to proceed to the most rigorous measures. I ordered, therefore, that no prisoners should be taken, that everybody found with arms in his hands should be immediately killed, and that the houses from which shots were fired should be set on fire. So it happened that the fire, already begun partly by the troops and partly by the bombardment, spread to several quarters."

A letter of G. Maifer written on the 8th of April says "that the soldiers sacked the houses, set fire to them and killed whomsoever they met. Men were murdered before their wives

and children, and their dismembered bodies thrown out from the windows and against the barricades as one throws to the dogs the remains of a dinner." The horrors accompanying the suppression of the movement in Brescia probably surpassed all that took place during the Lombard insurrection. One would be glad to believe that the details given by the Italian authorities were exaggerated by political animosity. The names, however, of the hundreds slain, with the admissions of Haynau and other Austrian authorities, justify to a large extent the accusations of the Italians. The brutalities of Haynau, who commanded the attack, have made him notorious among military monsters. Nugent, on the other hand, who was mortally wounded in the assault, bequeathed all that he possessed to the municipality of Brescia as a testimony to the heroism of the city, which won in this defence the title of "The Lioness."

We must now return to Venice. The fall of Vicenza in June, 1848, followed by the recapture of other places in Venetia, had practically isolated Venice and cut her off from any hope of assistance from Lombardy or Piedmont. Nevertheless the people, inspired by Manin, determined to hold out. The republican government still hoped for assistance from other parts of Italy, but military conditions, added to the reactionary policy of the Pope and the King of Naples, rendered this increasingly difficult. On the 3rd of July, the Venetian assembly, after a hot debate, in which the influence of Manin at length prevailed, resolved that, in view of the supreme necessities of Italy, a fusion with Piedmont was desirable. A similar vote had, shortly before, been passed by the Lombard assembly at Milan. But it was too late. The Piedmontese army, defeated at Custozza, retired from the field, and left Venice to its fate. Manin, who had temporarily withdrawn from the government, now again took the helm, and the Venetians resolved to continue a defence which was already well-nigh desperate. They even submitted to ask aid from abroad

—a step which, in the previous June, both the fusionists and the republicans had condemned. On the 11th of August Manin wrote to France begging the assistance of the sister republic. The wisdom of this appeal is doubtful. France replied sentimentally, ordering the embarkation of three thousand soldiers as a menace to compel Austria to accept her mediation, but the only result of the French threat was that Austria accepted the offer of mediation without suspending operations. Until October nothing occurred to break the monotony of the siege, which had now become close, excluding Venice from all communication with the mainland. The Austrian batteries were established on the borders of the lagoons, Mestre was occupied, and the only possible communication from outside was by sea. An intelligent examination of the political situation of Europe at large would have determined men, subject to other influences than those of sentiment and historical association, to abandon an enterprise which, humanly speaking, was absolutely hopeless. But resistance at all costs was decided upon by the excited patriotism of the people, and large contributions were made by the citizens toward the cost of the war.

The chief difficulty of the position lay in the character of Manin, who was governed more by sentiment than by sound political considerations, and whose great power over the people was due rather to the force of his eloquence than to the prudence of his counsels. The Austrians actively carried on their operations, and while England frankly advised the Venetian government to yield, the French made some sympathetic demonstrations and imposed on Austria the cessation of the blockade by sea. The only reply which the Austrians made to this was to press the siege by land with increased vigour. The Venetian forces, such as they were, a medley of volunteers from Naples, Rome and Lombardy, with the Venetian civic guard and the Italian deserters from the Austrian army, amounted to about eighteen thousand men; ill-organized, divided by quarrels and national jealousies, and with the

exception of small bodies of enthusiastic volunteers, unfit for military operations. To revive the spirit of the people, distressed by the long siege and the hardships naturally arising from the blockade, sorties were made, and the raw Italian forces distinguished themselves in two attacks on the Austrian positions. In October, the town of Mestre was retaken, and the Austrians lost heavily in men and guns. Meanwhile the domestic difficulties in which the government of Vienna was involved, through the disorders in Bohemia, Hungary, and elsewhere, inspired fresh hopes in Venice. But no help came from abroad, and the powers, who were conducting the negotiations for mediation, now imposed on the Venetians the cessation of offensive operations. The negotiations lasted until the middle of the following March, during which time no further collision took place. Meanwhile the Austrians continued to strengthen their positions, though, so long as the issue of the struggle with Piedmont was undecided, they could not press the siege. But the battle of Novara enabled them at length to throw all their strength upon the city. By the end of April, 1849, they had concentrated before Venice thirty thousand men, with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. The siege was pushed in the most vigorous manner on the side of Mestre, and the city was now blockaded by land and sea.

On the 4th of May the batteries opened with forty-seven guns on Marghera. The fortress was defended by two thousand four hundred soldiers, more than could find shelter within its walls. The bombardment on the one side and the other continued without intermission, but the end could not be long delayed. The French and British governments, to which Manin had again applied in April, declined to interfere. At last the abandonment of Marghera was decided on. Ulloa, the commander of the fortress, prepared for evacuation by stratagem; leaving the guns all charged with fuses of different lengths, which were lighted at the moment of retirement.

Thus explosions kept up the appearance of the presence of the garrison until the last man had left the fortifications, and when the firing ceased the Austrians assaulted an empty place. The loss of Marghera brought the Austrian artillery within range of the city, and the lines of the siege being drawn closer, the hardships increased. Defeat was now inevitable, but so long as hardships alone were to be apprehended the resistance continued. The Austrian bombardment met with but a feeble reply, and in July it became evident to the Venetian that the issue could be but of one kind. During the early days of August an agitation for surrender began, and on the 11th of August Manin resumed negotiations at Mestre. The capitulation was signed on the 24th by Antonini, Cavadallis, Calluci, Count Medin and Priuli, Manin having resigned. The Austrians agreed that, beyond forty persons indicated by name, nobody should be molested in consequence of the insurrection.

Manin escaped, and soon afterwards retired to Paris, where he lived during the rest of his life. He remained ever faithful to his old principles, and a few years later, founded, in conjunction with Pallavicini, the "National Society" of Italy, an association which, less extreme in its views than that of Mazzini, contributed largely to educate public opinion in support of union and liberty. Manin himself, one of the noblest names in the long list of Italian patriots, while a republican on principle, was by no means a fanatic, and eventually recognised the Piedmontese monarchy as the one efficient means of salvation for his country. "I accept the monarchy of Savoy (he said to Cavour in 1856), provided that it works loyally and efficiently for the making of Italy.... It should remain the centre of Italian unity." In September, 1857, he died.

## CHAPTER IX.

### CENTRAL ITALY, 1847-1849.

#### (1) *Tuscany.*

THE condition of Tuscany, at the opening of the agitation for the liberation of Italy, was much less favourable to extreme measures than that of other parts of the peninsula. But here too the impulse given by the reforms of Pius IX made itself strongly felt, and long before the outbreak of war in northern Italy, the forward party in Florence and other cities of the duchy had shown signs of dangerous activity.

This liberal movement naturally excited the indignation of Austria, which threatened an occupation of the Tuscan states if constitutional reforms were adopted. England informed the Grand-Duke that she did not recognize in Austria any right to arrest or hinder any changes that took place regularly in the independent states of the peninsula, and that the entry of the first Austrian soldier into the Grand Duchy or the States of the Church would be regarded by her as a violation of international rights, which would oblige her to take action by sea. The attitude of France was favourable to independence within constitutional limits, and, thus supported, the Grand-Duke had continued to favour the movement for reform. The agitation was carried off within just limits and went no further than the Grand-Duke seemed willing to follow. Sympathy for the



movement in Piedmont was expressed by the public and the municipality of Florence. Bettino Ricasoli, gonfaloniere of the city, proposed an address to Carlo Alberto, and called on the city to demonstrate its satisfaction at the concession of the Piedmontese constitution.

On the 11th of February, 1848, a great demonstration took place at Pisa in favour of the constitution; on this occasion the Grand-Duke issued a proclamation, declaring that he was willing to give such reforms as should be matured and which the people might merit by the prudence of their conduct. When it was known that the constitution was being drawn up, the municipality went to the Grand-Duke to ask that it might be assimilated to those of Naples and Piedmont so far as to assure the formation of two legislative chambers. On the 17th, the constitution was published, proclaiming liberty of the press, liberty of commerce and the inviolability of property, with equality before the law. Advices from Rome urged the disabling of non-catholics, but the constitution established the legal equality of all religions. Public opinion was utterly indifferent to the questions raised by the agitators, and Mazzini had scarcely any followers. Tuscany, through its government and through its people, followed the movement in Piedmont and contributed its forces in proportional measure to the army of Carlo Alberto. Early in April a Tuscan contingent set out for the seat of war. The Grand-Duke presented the flags to the troops and pronounced a discourse in which he spoke of Italian independence and confederation. At Curtatone and Montenara the Tuscan volunteers distinguished themselves, and in June the minister, Ridolfi, ordered several companies of regulars to be sent as an additional contingent, with six hundred more volunteers and six guns. But at the same time public opinion ran strongly against fusion with Piedmont. In fact throughout the entire movement, until the final reforms of 1860, Tuscany maintained an obstinate attitude of local independence.

The Tuscan parliament was inaugurated on the 26th of June, 1848, and was opened by a discourse by the Grand-Duke in favour of independence and Italian liberty, in which he thanked God for having chosen him to give to his people a liberal government. The actions of the government and the deliberations of the assembly were, however, trivial and led to no considerable result. Many speeches were made but few decisions were taken. The antagonism between the majority who were autonomists and the minority who were fusionists seemed to swamp all other questions. The ministry was disposed to call in French intervention but this was negatived owing to the opposition of the Grand-Duke and the autonomist majority. The ministry fell in August, after two months of power, and was succeeded by a moderate, or perhaps conservative, cabinet under Gino Capponi. In Leghorn the people, more accessible to the agitation of the Mazzinists and extremists, demanded democratic institutions and favoured the republican propaganda. The ministry closed all the clubs and arrested the leaders of the agitation; but the people rose, attacked the arsenals, occupied the palace of the governor, whom they imprisoned, and took possession of the armoury. From August until the middle of October anarchy reigned in Leghorn and Lucca, and it was only with the greatest efforts, accompanied by concessions, that the movement was prevented from spreading to the rest of the principality. The conclusion of the armistice between Austria and Piedmont resulted in the sharpening of political antipathies, and on the 12th of October, Capponi resigned. A radical ministry, under Montanelli—a Tuscan volunteer—and Guerrazzi, followed. Their object was to bring together a national assembly, representing all the states of the peninsula, to discuss Italian affairs. This was naturally opposed by Austria and by the conservatives, but supported by the Tuscan parliament, which met early in January, 1849. Soon afterwards, the Grand-Duke, alarmed by the progress of radical opinions, left Florence (on January 30,

1849) for Siena, where riots had already broken out in favour of restoration of the former régime. The people of Siena, driving out the liberal agitators, demanded the abolition of the constituent assembly and the return of the Grand-Duke. That prince had, however, other plans in view. On the 7th of February he suddenly left Siena for Orbetello, having addressed the following letter to his ministers :

"Siena, 7th February, 1849. I have accepted, it is true, a ministry that had already resolved on calling a constituent assembly, and I made allusion to it in my discourse at the opening of the legislative assembly; but now, as it becomes a question of exposing me and my country to the greatest misfortunes, that is to say of bringing on me and on so many good Tuscans the thunders and the censure of the church, I must refuse to adhere to the law, and I do so with all tranquillity of conscience." From Orbetello he communicated with the Pope, and soon afterwards joined Pius IX at Gaeta, in the kingdom of Naples.

The records show that the King's action was due to the pressure of Austria and the Pope. His abandonment of all progressive tendencies paralyzed the moderate constitutionals, and threw power into the hands of the extremists and republicans. On the 8th of February, Mazzini arrived at Leghorn. The agitation passed into an extreme phase and the anarchy which prevailed throughout the principality resulted in the active intervention of Austria and the restoration of the Grand-Duke. This restoration was in fact demanded by all the moderates, who were alarmed by the excesses of the republican element at Leghorn, and the Mazzinists and fusionists became generally execrated by the population.

Here, again, the battle of Novara proved decisive of the situation. The reactionary element at once assumed the upper hand. On the first of May the Grand-Duke nominated Serristori commissioner with full powers. He dissolved all the commissions in Florence and in all the other communes of

Tuscany, and abolished every concession made previous to the 11th of April, 1848. On the 10th of May the Austrian forces presented themselves before Leghorn. The people offered a resistance which lasted until the next day, when the Austrians carried the defences and took possession of the city, with the usual accompaniment of executions and imprisonments. The Grand-Duke re-entered his capital under the protection of Austria on the 28th of July, and Tuscany, after its saturnalia of constitutional liberty and democracy, returned to a condition infinitely worse than that which preceded the agitation. The Grand-Duke, ruling with Austrian support, governed on Austrian principles. The constitution was overthrown, and liberalism breathed no more in Tuscany, until the great movement following the declaration of war between France and Austria in 1859 broke the ice throughout Italy.

(2) *Parma and Modena.*

Marie Louise, the Austrian Duchess of Parma, was succeeded, on her death in 1847, by Carlo II, hitherto ruler of the petty principality of Lucca, and son of that Maria Luigia, the Spanish Bourbon, whose claims to the succession of Parma had been recognised in 1814 (see above, p. 99). The weak and hesitating character of the Duke not giving that assurance of a firm policy which was required by Austria, his accession was made the pretext for strengthening the Austrian garrison in Parma. However, what Carlo II lacked in masterfulness was supplied by his son, who was appointed to command the army. Soon after his accession, Carlo II sold Ghistalla to the Duke of Modena, and Lucca to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany; and he signed a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Austria, recognising the right of the Austrian troops to enter his states, and placing the Modenese army under the orders of the Austrian general. The insurrection of Milan disturbed these combinations, and in March, 1848, an

insurrection broke out in Parma. The Duke drifted with the Italian current into constitutional concessions, and issued a manifesto in which he remitted the fortunes of his principality to the arbitration of Pius IX, Carlo Alberto, and Leopoldo, Grand-Duke of Tuscany, promising to grant a constitution and to cooperate with the other Italian states in giving succour to Lombardy. But as the Piedmontese statesmen were disposed rather to annexation than confederation, his advances were received with coolness, and in the confusion which followed, the Duke withdrew. The fate of Parma was determined by that of Piedmont, and after Novara the duchy received an Austrian garrison and was placed under military government. On the 20th of May, 1849, Carlo II, by a formal act, abdicated in favour of his son, Carlo III, who in May, 1849, took possession of the government, in which he renewed the traditions of his House by an arbitrary and dissolute régime, comparatively free from repressive cruelty, but practically under the control of Austria in all political affairs. He renewed the treaties with Austria, providing for her military occupation of the principality. His prime minister was one Thomas Ward, a British subject, formerly his jockey. The record of his reign is one of the most degrading of all those which the House of Bourbon has inscribed on the page of history, but has otherwise little political value. Carlo III was assassinated on the 26th of March, 1854, by a person whose identity was never well established, but who was supposed to be one of his own household, the murder being attributed to a personal feud.

During the minority of the heir apparent, Marie Louise of Bourbon, sister of the Count de Chambord, widow of the late Duke, acted as Regent. She was a well meaning and amiable princess, who began with the best intentions towards her subjects, and with economy in the administration. But in July, 1854, a seditious movement, ascribed by Tivaroni to Mazzini, paralysed all the good intentions of the Regent and

brought on an Austrian intervention, followed in turn by new attempts, which were severely suppressed. The period of gentle reforms, carried out or intended by the Regent, gave place to one of cruel repression and absolutist rigour, which lasted until 1857. Perhaps the recognition of the futility of those movements which it was the policy of Mazzini to provoke on all occasions, even the most hopeless, weakened the insurrectionary tendency; at all events the years preceding the war of 1859 were without incident in Parma. The declaration of war developed a flurry of demonstration, followed by immediate repression, but a week later the Austrians, retreating before the allied troops, carried with them the last traces of the Bourbon government of Parma.

Francesco V, who succeeded his father as Duke of Modena in 1846, possessed neither the greater nor the smaller abilities of his predecessor: he exceeded the father only in his repression of liberalism, and his unmeasured severity towards disaffection. The movement of 1848 drove him and his family to Mantua, under the protection of Austria, and the forms of constitutional government were maintained for the brief space of the war between Piedmont and Austria, when Modena sent its small contingent to the army of Carlo Alberto. But with the blood-letting of 1848-9, the repressive measures of the government, and the immense number of exiles, the liberal fervour in Modena so abated, that until the dawn of the great movement which accompanied the war of 1859, there is nothing to record of Modena except a long series of political trials and other tyrannical actions, in which Francesco gave play to his violent and bigoted character.

### (3) *Rome.*

The first of the liberal demands to which Pius IX found it necessary to oppose an obstinate resistance, was that for the expulsion of the Jesuits, in favour of which a demonstration took place on the occasion of the Swiss civil war known as

that of the Sonderbund. The popular movement began to take a turbulent complexion. The pressure of democratic opinion had become too strong not to alarm the Pope, and on the 1st of January, 1848, a demonstration nominally of gratitude for concessions made, but probably intended to extort more, found him indisposed to accept the homage. The Quirinal was guarded by troops and the Pope refused to show himself. The dissatisfaction manifested induced him on the following day to go out, and he was received with the usual demonstrations of enthusiasm but also with cries of "down with the government, the police, the cardinals," and "death to the Jesuits and conservatives." Cicernacchio followed the Pope's carriage in another holding up a placard on which was written "Holy Father, justice! The people are with you." The emotion which this demonstration produced in Pius IX is said to have caused a fainting fit, the impression of which upon the masses was irritating, and the incident seems to have been the turning point from which, on one side, the Pope tended toward reaction and on the other the people toward rebellion. Incessant demands for a constitution and a responsible ministry and all the apparatus of a popular government were made. On the 12th of January, 1848, the revolution broke out at Palermo and a constitution was shortly afterwards given at Naples. The liberal movement and that for the unity of Italy received fresh force, and the Pope was compelled to yield more or less to the pressure. He still refused the constitution, but, on the 11th of February, yielded so far as to admit laymen to the ministry. Pasolini and Sturbinetti accepted office. On the 24th of February the revolution of Paris broke out, and in March the Piedmontese constitution added to the strength of the liberal current. There was no going back from this point after the events in Naples, Paris and Turin: the Pope was forced to grant a constitution or abandon the state to a revolution. Austria alone presented a doubtful protection, and the Pope yielded.

On the 10th of March the first ministry which precluded the constitution was formed, nominally under Recchi, but really under the crafty and reactionary Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, who assumed the presidency of the council. The ministry was composed of Antonelli, Recchi, Sturbinetti, Morachini, Minghetti, Aldobrandini, Mezzofanti, Pasolini, Galetti, Bedini, Cavaliere and Farini—a mixture of reactionary conservatives and advanced liberals. Following the ministry came the constitution (March 14): a constitution of such strong ecclesiastical colour, however, that it in reality meant little more than the definition of ecclesiastical privileges and the regularization of the rights of the church. The control of the College of Cardinals and the veto of the Pope on all legislation reduced the legislative powers of the chambers, established under the constitution, to a shadow. The Pope still resisted the movement for a really liberal constitution, and this speedily destroyed his influence. Shortly afterwards, the revolutions in Vienna and Milan annihilated the last hopes which the reactionists, rather than the Pope, still entertained, while the outbreak of the war between Piedmont and Austria contributed to strengthen the movement in Rome. Popular opinion demanded the formation of an army and active measures for the assistance of Piedmont and Lombardy. A force was raised, and placed under the command of General Durando. Incomplete in discipline but increasing in numbers, this army when once formed marched toward the Po, employing about a month to traverse four hundred miles. The military enthusiasm of the liberals and of the emancipated population carried the Pope against his will toward the final catastrophe.

On the 29th of April, Pius IX issued his allocution, an encyclical, in which he declared with sufficient distinctness that he did not recognize the policy of war with Austria. He followed up this step by a well-meant but futile attempt to mediate between the combatants. From this moment the



antagonism between him and his subjects began. What the ministry and the popular voice demanded, the Pope refused, and the logical consequence was, in the end, the proclamation of the Roman republic. The first result of the allocution was the resignation of the ministry. It was followed by another, almost equally incongruous, under Cardinal Soglia and Count Mamiani. Mamiani accepted the office with the implied understanding that the war against Austria was to be actively prosecuted, but the resistance of the Pope, though passive, was seconded too well by all the conservative influences to permit the ministry to carry out its intentions. Weak and vacillating, it yielded one day to the Pope, another day to the people, and finally on the 3rd of August gave way to a ministry under Fabbri, who had been pro-legate at Urbino and Pesaro, and had been known as one of the moderates whose ideal was a liberal government under the Pope. Mamiani succeeded only in increasing the antagonism between the papacy and the people. He introduced the telegraph, the decimal system, books for the lower classes, and re-organized on a wider basis the council of state, but he passed no important measures in regard to the administration.

Meanwhile the Austrian forces, without any declaration of war, attacked Bologna. The insurrection in Milan and the failure of Piedmont had implicated the papal contingent, which was sufficient pretext for Austria to commence hostilities against the Pope, and the battle of Custoza made such a measure safe. On the 8th of August the Austrian general entered Bologna by treaty with the civic authorities, but a popular uprising produced a conflict, the result of which was the expulsion of the Austrians with a loss of five hundred men. The brutalities committed by the troops in their retreat exasperated popular feeling to a high degree, while the success of the Bolognese encouraged the radicals in Rome. Unable to cope with these difficulties and with the hesitations of the Pope, the ministry of Fabbri gave way, and was succeeded by that

of Pellegrino Rossi. This remarkable man was a native of Carrara, and had had a wide experience. He had taught the science of law in Geneva, and had subsequently resided for some time in France, where he had served the Guizot ministry in diplomatic positions. He had imbibed Guizot's constitutional principles, but, like him, had a strong tendency to be absolutist in practice, and while personally respected, had no gift for making himself popular.

The new ministry, less liberal than the people desired, entered upon its difficult task in September, 1848. A number of minor reforms—financial, judicial and administrative—were carried out, insufficient to pacify the extremists, but sufficient to cause violent antipathy among the reactionaries. Before, however, anything serious could be accomplished, the ministry came to an end. On the 15th of November, Rossi was assassinated as he went to the chamber to open its sittings. The deed met with a disgraceful degree of approval from the Democratic party. The actual murderer was not identified at the time, but recent historical research has proved beyond doubt that it was the elder son of Ciceruacchio. Whether his father was cognisant of the crime before its commission is uncertain. The result of the assassination was to throw Pius IX entirely into the hands of the most bigoted circle of his advisers. The French government on one side, the Austrians and Neapolitans on the other, taking the pretext of this crisis in Roman affairs as a justification for their interference, invited the Pope to take refuge with them respectively. He yielded to the Neapolitan invitation and escaped to Gaeta (November 24).

The democratic ministry under Galletti, extorted by the popular outcry from the Pope on the 16th of November, was composed of people of slight influence or authority. It was therefore weak, and in fact Rome may be said, after the Pope's departure, to have been governed by the mob. On the 10th

of December a project was presented for a constituent assembly, and the rest of the year was passed in discussing plans. But Piedmont had been defeated, and the prospects of united Italy were dispersed to the winds. Schemes and counter-schemes, plots and counter-plots followed on each other until, on the 29th of December, the council was dissolved and a decree issued for the convocation of the assembly of the Roman state with unlimited power. The constituent assembly met on the 5th of February, 1849, and went to the Aracoeli to hear mass. In the assembly Armellini, Garibaldi, Saffi, Mamiani and other radicals took part, and the Pope was declared to be deposed from the temporal government. The Roman republic was proclaimed, but its relations with the rest of Italy were left for future consideration. Envoys were sent to Paris to greet the French republic and to invite the cooperation and sympathy of the French government. On the 18th of February, seven thousand Austrian troops re-entered Ferrara and threatened a general occupation of the Roman state. Meanwhile, France was also contemplating intervention. So far back as November, 1848, General Cavaignac had sent orders to Toulon to prepare an expedition which was to be sent to Rome. On the 5th of January, Lord Palmerston had protested at Paris against any armed intervention at Rome, but the Pope demanded it and England was indisposed to make a *casus belli* of the question. France was determined not to permit Austria to obtain that dominant position in Italy, which would have been given by the occupation of Rome, and the rivalry of the two powers accelerated the inevitable intervention.

The Roman assembly prepared as best it might for hostilities, the result of which must have been foreseen by all at the blindest. The news of the expiration of the armistice (March 12) and the renewal of the war between Austria and Piedmont excited the patriotism of the assembly to the point of a declaration of war against Austria. Great enthusiasm was manifested in the preparations, and great sacrifices were

undertaken to get the army into a condition to march. But while the national guard and the regular troops, amounting to about ten thousand men, were marching to take part in the war, the battle of Novara determined the fate of the republic. On the arrival of the news of that disaster on the 29th of March, the assembly thought a vigorous government necessary in view of the great danger to which Rome was exposed, and therefore nominated a triumvirate with unlimited powers for war or peace, in order to save the republic. Mazzini, Armellini and Saffi were elected on the 30th of March, and Mazzini pronounced a discourse advocating resistance to the last and the maintenance of Roman prestige for the sake of Italy. Decrees and measures for the prosecution of the war followed each other in rapid succession, and Rome prepared to defend herself on one side against Austria, on another against Naples, and on the third against France. The proposals for union with the other Italian states failed, and Rome, left alone, could only offer a futile resistance.

Common sense and the least practical insight would at this moment have counselled surrender and have thus avoided bloodshed and the destruction of many invaluable historical monuments. The rivalry between France and Austria made it inevitable that one or both should risk all in the determination to restore the Pope. No power in Europe offered more than words of counsel, and in December 1848 the constituent assembly in Paris had approved the sending of Cavaignac with a brigade to defend the person of the Pope. France had its reasons for intervention in Italy: they were the same which had conduced in 1832 to the occupation of Ancona. It was impossible to allow Austria to dominate the whole peninsula, or northern influence to supersede that of the west, and, whatever might have been the sympathy of the French republic for the Roman, self-interest got the upper hand. Had the Roman politicians understood this, they could have made no question of the ultimate result of the struggle. It

was simply a race between Austria and France as to which should restore the Pope; between the two Rome might perish; that was unimportant. Other reasons there were, doubtless, to stimulate action on the part of the new president of the French Republic, but these were enough.

In April, 1849, the French squadron left Marseilles and on the 24th appeared before Civita Vecchia, carrying three brigades of infantry, three battalions, and two squadrons of Chasseurs: in all, according to different authorities, seven to ten thousand men. The expedition landed at Civita Vecchia without any resistance. The commander protested that they came as friends of Rome. Besides, the Roman government had prepared no means of defence and an attempt to prevent disembarkation would not only have failed but would have exaggerated all the difficulties of the position. The French authorities published a proclamation declaring that the forces of France only intervened to prevent disorder and greater misfortune to the country. "France does not intend to claim the right to decide as to your interests, which are those of all Europe and of all the catholic world, but she feels called upon to facilitate the establishment of a régime here which shall be as far from the present anarchy as from the ancient abuses already destroyed by the generosity of Pius IX." In vain the municipality of Civita Vecchia said "Order reigns here and not anarchy"; Oudinot caused the proclamation of the municipality to be torn down, and in view of his assertion of friendly intentions the people tranquilly accepted French occupation.

Negotiations between Mazzini and the French commandant were carried on from the 24th of April until the 28th, when the French troops began their march on Rome. Garibaldi had entered the city, and volunteers from Genoa, Piedmont, Florence and other parts of Italy, insufficiently armed but resolute and ready for any emergency, gathered there to the total number of about eight thousand five hundred men. The attack began on the 29th. On the first day the French, deceived

as to the quality of the resistance, came on rashly, and approaching the walls without precautions, were themselves attacked and defeated, with the loss of six hundred killed and wounded, and two hundred prisoners; the Italian loss amounted to from three to four hundred in all. The French forces withdrew, and encamping between Civita Vecchia and Rome, prepared for more regular siege operations. The Roman authorities, anxious to conciliate rather than exasperate, released all the French prisoners unconditionally. Preparations were made for a vigorous defence, but without any knowledge of siege operations; otherwise the French attack might have been far more disastrous to their troops. An armistice was declared, of which the French took advantage to receive reinforcements and to fortify their position, while the Romans prepared to meet the Neapolitan army coming from the south. The triumvirate appointed Roselli, an old soldier of the Neapolitan campaigns, commander-in-chief, although the friends of Garibaldi urged very strongly his appointment to the supreme command; but local patriotism prevailed over large considerations, and Roselli, being a Roman, was appointed. Garibaldi marched at the head of a detachment of three thousand men to meet the Neapolitan army of twelve thousand, which had already reached Velletri and occupied that city. A difference of opinion between Garibaldi and Roselli wasted time and divided forces, and the result was a comparatively insignificant skirmish before Velletri, in consequence of which, however, the Neapolitan army retreated. Meanwhile, the Austrians, their hands freed by the victory of Novara, and anxious to be level with the French, again advanced into Papal territory. On the 8th of May, Bologna was assaulted by the Austrian army, and after suffering a bombardment of eight days, capitulated.

It now becoming evident that the defence of Rome was impossible, the government deliberated as to which of three plans to adopt; to defend the city to the last; to surrender

to the French; or to march out and fight a way through to Upper Italy. The decision was in favour of the defence. Garibaldi proposed following up and attacking the Neapolitans and carrying the revolution into Naples, but he was overruled, and it was decided to fortify and hold the city. From the beginning of May until the 28th the time was passed in negotiations between the triumvirate and M. de Lesseps, the envoy of the French government, which resulted in an agreement precluding the French from occupying the city. But the reaction in France strengthened the hands of the President, and Lesseps was recalled, orders being at the same time sent to Oudinot to press the siege.

On the night of the 28th--29th, in spite of the truce, the French had seized by surprise Monte Mario, a dominant position but too far off for effective bombardment. On the 1st of June, Oudinot wrote to the triumvirs to notify them that he refused to accept the result of the negotiations, and demanded the surrender of the city. To prove how incapable were the Roman triumvirate of conducting the defence of the city, it suffices to quote the evidence of Garibaldi, who declares in his memoirs, that from April to June no defensive work, even temporary, had been planned or established in such important positions as the Villa Pamphili and the Villa Corsini, from which Rome was commanded. The commissioner of war had thought such preparations useless, and, while the French were receiving reinforcements, so that in June they had from twenty to thirty thousand men with thirty-six guns ready for the attack, the Romans had received but slight reinforcements of volunteers from without. Their entire force, including the civic guard, amounted to a little over eighteen thousand men with one hundred pieces of artillery, of which only fifty were serviceable.

The French attack began on June 3rd. It was made from the west side of Rome, the French troops moving from Monte Mario towards the heights of the Janiculum. At the outset

Oudinot surprised in their sleep the garrison of the Villa Pamphili, which was the key of the defence. When day broke, Garibaldi, discovering the occupation, attacked with all his force, but in a disordered and frenzied manner; he allowed his troops to be defeated in detail, and at nightfall the French were established in the position which they had taken. The fight was distinguished rather by individual courage on the part of the Italians than by any military capacity on the part of the commanders. The defence of the city wall was more obstinate. The Roman forces were concentrated between Porta Cavallegieri and the grounds of the Villa Pamphili. Trenches were opened and batteries set up by the French, who, in spite of occasional bursts of patriotic valour on the part of the Italians, made steady progress. The efforts of the Italian troops were fruitless, in the face of the strong positions held by the French and the increase in their forces, which by this time amounted to from thirty to forty thousand men with sixty-eight pieces of artillery. At length the resistance collapsed, and the entry of the French took place on the 3rd of July. The struggle testified to the courage of disorganized and ill-armed Italians quite as much as to the organization of the French. The day before, Garibaldi, gathering such forces as still adhered to him, left the city and began his wonderful march, memorable in the records of military operations, toward Venice. He passed through the ranks of Austrians, Neapolitans and French, and finally reached the Adriatic at the beginning of August. But almost all of what still remained of his force was captured by the Austrians at sea on the way to Venice, and he himself escaped with difficulty. Papal authority was at once restored, but it was not till April, 1850, that Pius IX returned to Rome, where a French contingent long remained, to keep out the Austrians and to signalise the orthodoxy of France.



## CHAPTER X.

### SOUTHERN ITALY. 1847-1849.

#### (1) *Naples.*

THE attempt of the Bandiera brothers was followed by two years of repose, but the ferment which prevailed throughout Italy in 1847 naturally caused a recrudescence of insurrection in the Neapolitan states. On the night of the first of September, 1847, an outbreak took place in Messina and Reggio, on each side of the straits. For three days the people held their own, but with the aid of the fleet, and in default of any cooperation on the part of the interior, the movement was suppressed. Fourteen of the insurgents were condemned to death, and four were executed, the sentences of the others being commuted to the galleys for life. In spite however of all these reverses and executions, the movement, crude and aimless as it was, persisted, without chiefs or organisation, through the very despair of individuals, thrown together by the intolerable character of the lives they led. Nothing is more powerfully demonstrative of the inflexible brutality of the Bourbon rule than this persistence, in face of such terrible lessons, of the pleasure-loving people of the southern provinces, in their efforts to escape from their chains. There was a quickening of political life, and it was clear that the intelligence of liberty was spreading, at least amongst the better classes—for under the

Bourbon system it was a rule to conciliate the lowest strata of society by the most corrupting indulgences. The secret societies made their way because people could no longer live in that manner, and the risk of death was perhaps to many only an excitement the more. The Bandieras had set a fashion for martyrdom.

It was at this point that the reforming tendencies of Pius IX began to move the waters. But the reforming Pope fell under the excommunication of the despotism, and all persons on whom his colours and portrait were found were imprisoned; the royal family even instituted a *novena* to pray for light to be given to this benighted head of the Church. Tumults began in Naples itself, in sympathy with the influence from Rome, and these were aided by slight insurrectionary movements in the interior. Though never individually important, their persistence compelled the King, early in 1848, to make some concessions in order to keep the peace. At the same time many leading men, both of Naples and of other Italian provinces, brought their influence to bear on the King to induce him to follow the example of Piedmont. Losing constancy in the face of the contagion provoked by the Pope's example, and finally of the Sicilian insurrection which began at Palermo on the 12th of January, 1848, the King yielded, and on the 18th of January he formed a *Consulta* with the object of examining certain projects of constitutional reform. On the 23rd of January an amnesty was granted to the political convicts, with a few exceptions. A good understanding was thus temporarily restored between King and people, while the insurrection in Sicily accentuated still more the hostility which from time immemorial had existed in a latent form between Naples and Sicily, and Naples refused to the island the autonomy which it demanded.

But the King's first concessions had the effect of stimulating popular demands, and on the 27th the King yielded so far as to form a ministry favourable to a constitution. Bozzelli, a

number of insurgents,—estimated at 8000 in Calabria—was sufficient to have given the government serious trouble, had they been united and properly directed. Divided and uncertain in their action, and unsupported by the other provinces of the kingdom, these movements were finally suppressed in July, those of the insurgents who could, escaping to Corfu and to the Roman states. In March, 1849, it was dissolved, and the Bourbon tyranny resumed its full sway.

Meanwhile the Neapolitan parliament met (July). The liberal deputies, led by Carlo Poerio, vigorously attacked the government, exposed its cruelties, and demanded the prosecution of the war with Austria. But the defeat of Piedmont at Custozza made all these efforts nugatory. The reaction now became supreme. The ministers paid no attention to liberal speeches in parliament, which indeed no longer met with any real support in the country. In September parliament was prorogued. It did not meet again till the following February, when the revolutionary movement throughout the kingdom was practically extinct. The despotism wreaked an unbridled vengeance on those who had for a time dethroned it<sup>1</sup>, and the night of political lethargy shrouded southern Italy for eleven years.

## (2) *Sicily.*

During the years immediately preceding 1848 the tyranny of the Neapolitan authorities became blinder and more cruel, and the hostility of the Sicilians to the Neapolitan government grew more and more intense. On the night of the 26th of November, 1847, some hundred workmen, assembled in the Piazza del Duomo at Palermo, inaugurated a movement toward that union of classes which had been recognized as indispensable for the success of any liberal efforts. This movement was regarded by the authorities as insurrectionary, and an attempt

<sup>1</sup> For Carlo Poerio, in particular, see Gladstone's *Letters* (Gleanings, vol. IV.).

was made to suppress it by force, in which one of the workmen was killed. On the following day a more turbulent and formidable demonstration took place. Manifestations of Italian sentiment for the first time appeared, along with indications of a liberal propaganda. A programme was agreed on by the liberal committees at Naples and Palermo, the two parts of the kingdom for the first time recognizing the necessity of a thorough understanding if the yoke was to be thrown off. The intermediary between the two sections of the organization was Francesco Crispi, then a young advocate from Palermo, for several years noted as one of the foremost agitators for constitutional reforms, who had recently taken up his residence in Naples for the transaction of the legal affairs of his fellow islanders in the Courts of Naples, to which all appeals were of necessity referred. When the preparations of the joint committee were matured, and it was considered prudent for the rising to take place in the island, the final consultation was held at Naples, and Crispi sailed at the end of December with the order that the rising should begin on the 12th of January.

The impatience of the Sicilians, amongst whom the organization was not widely extended, nor the intentions of the committee generally known, threatened to bring on the movement prematurely. On the 5th of January a violent demonstration took place at Messina, the people breaking the windows of the royal palace. Many arrests were made in various parts of the island, but the royal functionaries seem to have acted with great timidity, as if apprehending the overthrow of the existing state of things, and unwilling to increase the hostility of those who might become their masters at no distant day. Arrests were also made of members of the committee in Naples, and Crispi, who had shortly before returned to Naples, only escaped through a warning given him by the printer of his legal documents, who had learned through the mistress of one of the functionaries, that a perquisition was to be made at his lodgings.

This gave Crispi the opportunity of destroying all the compromising documents and preparing for the search which followed, and the result cleared him from suspicion. He sailed again in the early days of January, to take his place in the movement; but the weather being unfavourable, the little sailing-boat on which he had embarked was delayed, and he only reached the island when the fighting had been going on for two days.

One of Crispi's colleagues, La Masa, had left for Florence and Rome to obtain counsel and assistance, and risings were prepared in the Abruzzi under the command of Durando, a liberal and Roman General. At Messina, where Gamba Costa headed the movement, the arrest by General Vial of several working men produced outbreaks which led to the release of the prisoners. Similar disturbances took place at Catania and other localities in the east of the island. On the 10th of January a proclamation was secretly circulated by the committee in Palermo, and pasted on the walls of various other cities, calling on the Sicilians for a general rising. It ran as follows: "Sicilians, the time of petition has passed; protests, supplications and pacific demonstrations are useless. Ferdinand has despised them all, and we, a free people, are reduced to chains and to misery. Shall we defer the attempt to reconquer our legitimate rights? The force of an united population is irrepressible. Union of the people and downfall of the King! The 12th of January, 1848, will commence the glorious epoch of regeneration. Palermo will receive with transport as many armed Sicilians as shall present themselves for the support of the common cause, to establish reforms and institutions in harmony with the progress of the century and the demands of Europe, Italy, and Pius IX. Union, order and obedience to our chiefs, respect to property; let all theft be declared treason to the country and punished as such. Whoever has no means shall be provided for. Heaven will help our just enterprise. Sicilians! to arms!" This open appeal to insurrection is good

evidence that no wide-spread organization existed. The knowledge of what was to be done was limited to a small and well-organized committee, which trusted to the general discontent to carry its decisions into immediate action.

La Farina, in his history of Sicily, goes so far as to affirm that there were neither chiefs nor the means of carrying on the revolution. There were indeed, four secret societies, mainly directed by members of the Sicilian aristocracy, but there was no general committee for the island, and it is evident that there was no comprehensive plan. The insurrection sprang up spontaneously, as in Milan, from a general sense of the intolerable oppression which weighed on all classes alike, and from a general determination to embrace the first opportunity to throw it off. Any incident in such a condition of society might produce the explosion. The incident in this case was the arrest of eleven of the most prominent promoters of the pacific demonstrations in favour of reform. Amongst these were several of the leading nobility, eminent literary men, ecclesiastics, and others, none of whom had ever advocated extreme measures. The city of Palermo was menaced with a state of siege, against which the consuls protested. The younger agitators, aware of the general condition of public feeling, and impatient for some action, were eager to precipitate it, and only the influence of the elder and more sober portion of the malcontents induced them to postpone the movement until the appointed day. This was the 12th of January, the King's birthday, a traditional occasion for demonstrations in Sicily. There were no arms, but the absolute deficiency of military preparation, while it left the insurrection comparatively impotent, also lulled the apprehensions of the authorities, who on their part made no preparations for defence.

The 11th of January was quiet, but at dawn on the 12th manuscript placards written by La Masa and signed "The Committee," and bearing the heading "Order and Union," gave

directions for the revolt. In the course of the morning of the 12th many people from the country flocked into the city. The troops occupied the squares in front of the police head quarters in the royal palace, where Di Majo, the King's lieutenant, and General Vial, the commander of the place, were stationed. The population moved about in the streets as if in expectation of some novelty, but nobody commenced an attack, and the movement seemed likely to become abortive. About 8 o'clock a young man named Amedeo, finding himself the only armed person visible, seemed to be taken by panic and fired his gun, which he had hitherto concealed, at random, shouting "To arms!" At this signal one Pasquale Meloro appeared, also armed, while two priests, Ragona and Luigi Venuti, entered the Piazza Vigliena, with crucifixes in their hands, and exhorted the people to rise. A young man, Paolo Paternostro, began a speech in the old market-place, a glove maker, Santa Astorina, distributed cockades, and La Masa, the recognized chief of the movement, gave the signal for action with a flag made of two handkerchiefs, one white and one red, tied with a green ribbon to a stick. La Masa's following included Rosalino Pilo, one of the future chiefs of the final struggle for Sicilian liberty, that of 1860.

Thereupon the crowd dispersed, the shops were closed, and the bells began to ring the alarm. The principal difficulty was to find arms. The troops scattered through the city were attacked separately, and blood began to flow freely. Pietro Amedeo, who had given the first signal, was amongst the first killed. Groups of rural partisans began to come into the city. The troops, disconcerted and not knowing well which way to turn, attacked and dispersed the groups of youths wherever they found them. About 4 o'clock the people began to throw up barricades. There were at this moment only about fifty armed insurgents, while the garrison, variously estimated at from three or four thousand to seven thousand men, timidly avoided the populous quarters. No general demonstration took

place, only the young men persisted in reuniting after being dispersed, and an obstinate if desultory resistance continued during the night. A more ineffective beginning of a serious struggle has perhaps never been recorded in Italian annals. Like that of Milan, its spontaneity was its only element of success, and, unlike that of Milan, absolutely no preparations had been made.

At dawn on the 13th new reinforcements came, and the rendezvous in the Piazza Ferravecchia saw three hundred men armed with guns and another three hundred with many sorts of weapons. If the authorities had had any energy or strength of purpose, the movement could have been crushed at this moment without difficulty. The insurrection was limited to a single quarter, which, surrounded and attacked with artillery, must have immediately yielded. The movement gained no strength during the 12th, and the little nucleus of resistance on the 13th was hardly sufficient to create the enthusiasm necessary for the successful continuance of the revolt. But the troops were even more inactive than the populace. The authorities believed that the insurrection had been prepared by the English, would be aided by them, and would probably succeed: they therefore determined to await the development of the attack. They concentrated their forces in the stronger buildings, the royal palace, the castle, and the barracks, and abandoned the rest of the city to the operations of the populace. As the troops retired from the streets, they were followed by the people, who began to throw up barricades, upon which the cannons of the castle and the royal palace fired with grape. The younger insurgents soon gathered courage from the weakness of the military defence, and attacked the police wherever they found them, while the mountaineers at the sound of the firing began to flock into the city.

During these first two days, however, the want of organization and concentration on the part of the insurgents would have made their suppression easy, had the royal authorities



properly understood it and adopted any intelligent plan. The generality of the upper classes, surprised by an actual rising in the initiation of which they had had no part, and which seemed therefore to have been directed from abroad, at first held aloof. When, however, the leading personages in the preparatory conspiracy decided to assume the direction of the movement, and issued from their immobility with the proclamation of a constitution and Sicilian independence, the better classes began to take part. The populace fell into the background, and the nobles and proprietors, with the better class of employes, finding arms and means, gave the movement consistency.

On the morning of the 14th, La Masa and his fellow-agitators called together a committee of twenty six citizens, presided over by the Prince of Grammonte, who summoned a municipal council, and it was agreed to constitute four committees to direct the different phases of the movement. The first committee was presided over by the Praetor of Palermo, the second by the Prince of Pantelleria, a leader in the movements of 1812 and 1820, the third by the Marquis di Rudini (father of the present Marquis and Prime Minister), and the fourth by Ruggero Settimo. The orders issued by these committees bore the signatures of all the principal citizens of Palermo; at last the movement had become serious. But during this day, the 14th, there were only slight skirmishes in the streets, the Neapolitans awaiting reinforcements from outside, while the people contented themselves with checking all movements of the military. Early on the 15th combined operations began. The Palace of the Finances was attacked and that of the Prefecture taken, with great slaughter of the police.

On the morning of the 16th, reinforcements arrived from Naples, and the immense display of force on the part of the authorities began to produce discouragement amongst the insurgents. Many members of the committee escaped. At

the meeting which took place on the 16th, there were only nine of the numerous demonstrators of the day before; these were Ruggero Settimo, the Prince of Pantelleria, Casimiro Pisani, Vincenzo Errante, Marchese Pilo-Scaletta, Francesco Crispi, Ignazio Calzone, Pasquale Calvi and Mariano Stabile; all the rest had fled. La Masa, with an Italian flag and a drum and with the cry of "Viva la constitutione," went through the streets to revive the agitation. He directed a new attack on the Palace of the Finances, but the garrison of the building had been reinforced and repelled the attack. A hot engagement took place at Porta Maqueda, where the Neapolitan reinforcements attempted to enter the city. Here, after three hours' fighting, the insurgents were victorious, capturing another gun and a number of prisoners. Stabile, a member of the committee, replied to the consuls, who now offered their mediation to procure peace, that Ferdinand II was the perjured and the rebel, not the people, and that Sicily intended to recover her ancient liberties.

On this position the night fell. The soldiers now began to exercise their usual brutalities. They captured the monastery of the White Benedictines near the royal palace, murdered two priests, four lay-brothers, the Baron Tortorici and ten other citizens who had taken refuge in the convent, and sacked both the convent and the church. These outrages produced a savage excitement among the people, who in their turn attacked the troops in the church and massacred all found there. Encouraged by this success, they then renewed the attack upon the Noviciato and the Palace of the Finances. The agitation spreading, money and arms began to come in, and the committee began to spread publications encouraging the insurrection. The King's Lieutenant called on the Praetor of Palermo to exert his influence for pacification, but the Praetor refused to take any action unless the parliament of Sicily were ~~first~~ convoked.

Longo and Orsini, who had escaped from prison, now

joined the insurgents with two guns which they had obtained from the English, and attacked the royal battery at Porta di Castro, cutting off the water supply from the royal palace and the quarter of the Quattro Venti, setting fire to the stores of forage and straw, and preventing all passage of provisions to the troops. Desultory fighting went on until the 19th, when the consuls sent in a new protest against the bombardment. General di Majò again invited the Praetor to the royal palace in order that some means might be provided for pacification. The Praetor replied: "The city has been bombarded for two days, and set on fire in localities inhabited especially by the poorer classes; I myself have been fired at by the soldiers while with the Austrian consul and carrying a white flag; the foreign consuls have been received with shots, when, preceded by two white flags, they attempted to approach the royal palace; unarmed monks have been assassinated in their convents by the soldiers, while the people respect and treat as brothers all the soldiers taken prisoners, such is the actual state of the city. A general committee of public defence and security exists. Your Excellency, if he wishes, may direct to them his propositions."

From the 19th onward the assistance received from the country proved very efficient. The military organization was also improved, and a committee of ladies, including the Princess of Butera and Mrs Marston, the wife of the consul of the United States, was organized to care for the wounded. On the 21st the Lieutenant sent to the Praetor of Palermo a royal decree, dated the 18th of January, by which the King, in spite of the anger which he had felt at the news of the insurrection, conceded the reciprocal judicial independence of the two parts of the kingdom, the separation of the administration of Sicily from that of Naples, and the limitation of administrative offices in Sicily to Sicilians. At the same time he granted a general amnesty, and appointed his brother, the Count of Aquila, viceroy, with instructions to nominate

Sicilians to important positions in the administration. The fighting was now suspended for communication between the two parties, but the royal troops having fired on the delegates of the consuls who went to negotiate, the British admiral threatened to fire on the Neapolitan ships, and the Praetor declared that in order to suspend hostilities parliament must be convoked under the constitution of 1812, modified according to circumstances.

The negotiations having thus failed, the fighting was continued, and on the 23rd the insurgents carried several positions held by the Neapolitan troops. The attack on the royal palace and the archbishopric was pressed with irresistible vigour, and was at length successful. The royal troops, running short of provisions and ammunition, evacuated the city on the 25th of January, and took up a strong position on Monte Pellegrino. Their retreat was harassed by the populace; the royal palace was sacked; the gendarmes massacred, and grave injury done to the monuments. The forts of the Molo and of Castellamare and other places outside the city still held out for some days. But on the 27th the Molo was evacuated, and on the 4th of February the fort of Castellamare fell. The insurgents were now completely masters of the city. Meanwhile the royal troops, under the command of Di Sauget, fell back to Guadania, leaving on their retreat their guns and many arms, their dead and wounded, but murdering and ravaging as they went, violating women, murdering children and burning the houses. At Guadania they embarked on the ships, and on the 1st of February evacuated the island.

The Neapolitan army, with its men of war and its artillery, had shown its inability to suppress in a fifteen days' fight an insurrection of the people of Palermo, begun without arms, without organization and without military experience, but continued with a tenacity probably unequalled in Italian history. The entire island rose after the example of Palermo, the union being temporarily complete, and city after city

expelled its Neapolitan garrison. Girgenti rose on the 22nd of January, and the garrison surrendered after nine days' fight; Catania rose on the 24th, and on the 27th constituted a general committee, which after a fight of three days expelled the garrison with heavy loss. On the 29th, Caltanissetta, and on the 30th, Trapani rose, and after two days' fight the royal garrison surrendered. On the 29th, Messina followed, and on the 1st the royal troops retired to the monastery of Santa Chiara, where the resistance was finally suppressed.

Lord Minto, the British envoy, had throughout these transactions exercised a constant pressure toward conciliation with concessions in the sense demanded by the Sicilians. The Sicilians themselves had no other conception of a larger scheme of revolt than that which was necessary to secure insular independence. Ruggero Settimo, president of the Committee, was a man of limited political conceptions, a sincere Catholic, with no ideas beyond the independence of the island, and out of sympathy with the conception of Italian unity. The general committee created by the revolution prepared the way for the convocation of a parliament, but hardly anyone in Sicily perceived that the island, excluded from a large national movement, would inevitably succumb to the Bourbon reaction. Mazzini wrote to the Sicilians on the 20th of February, and besought them to think of the nation and not limit themselves to their own autonomy and the old constitution of 1812, but rather to aim at the republic as a means toward the attainment of national union. "Do you consider yourselves (he wrote) strong enough to resume alone the political life which one day will be that of Italy? Are you mature enough to reach at one leap the ideal to which you aspire and to constitute at once a government better than those which exist to day, as a nucleus and living example for the nation? Only in that case should I, should we, cease to urge on you the union with the states of the mainland."

In the circumstances the Sicilians could not be considered

egotistic in declining to consider propositions extending beyond their own security. Moreover, the tendencies of the island were too autonomist for any terms of unity with Naples, and without Naples no union with the upper provinces seemed conceivable. When on the 3rd of February the envoy came from Naples to Palermo, bringing the decree of the King granting an amnesty and promising a constitution, the people replied by shouts of war, and the committee refused to negotiate, saying, "We can only add that it is still the universal desire to effect a union with the kingdom of Naples only by special ties, which the Sicilian parliament can sanction, in order to form in this way two distinct members of the Italian confederation." Thus far, this was the most advanced position recognized by the Sicilian leaders in the direction of Italian unity. The reply necessitated a struggle to the death between the Bourbons and Sicily. It was not to be supposed that the King would acquiesce peaceably in the loss of half his dominions, and in preparing for war he appealed simultaneously to England and France for their moral support. The Sicilian committee, on the other hand, asked for the intervention of the British representative, "in order to recover the constitution [of 1812] which by right has never ceased to exist." This demand was clearly not satisfied by the constitution granted by Ferdinand on the 10th of February (see above, p. 210), which provided only for a single parliament for the whole kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The idea of Naples was that of a united kingdom. Sicily demanded two kingdoms, two constitutions, two armies, and only recognized the union in the person of the King. While these negotiations were going on, the Neapolitan government gave it to be understood that, if Palermo persisted in its rebellion, the King would make Messina the capital of the island. To this threat the people of Messina replied with great enthusiasm, declaring their accord with Palermo. On the 23rd of February military delegates from Palermo arrived

at Messina, and under their influence the insurgents attacked the fortifications still occupied by the royal troops. The citadel bombarded the city<sup>1</sup>, causing great damage, the people meanwhile fortifying the hills around with batteries mounting twenty-five guns. Reinforcements arriving from Palermo, Catania, Trapani and other parts of the island, the insurgent forces were divided into three bodies, and on the 6th of March a vigorous attack was made. The castle replied with a bombardment of the city until its ammunition was exhausted, after which under the influence of Lord Minto a truce was agreed upon.

Meanwhile, at Palermo, the general committee formed a commission for regulating the convocation of parliament, and on the 24th of February issued a proclamation appointing the 15th of May for the elections, and the 25th for the commencement of the session. The decree maintained the two chambers of 1812, but, as the peerages which had become extinct since 1812 amounted to half the chamber, it was provided that they should be replaced by peers proposed by the Commons, and, in case of disagreement, by a joint committee of the two chambers. In the negotiations with Naples, Lord Napier and Lord Minto demanded for Sicily a constitution based on that of 1812, but with considerable modification, not approving the new constitution which the King had conceded and the Sicilians refused. The Anglo-French mediation was accepted by the committee of Palermo on the basis of such a constitution with a separate parliament. By an agreement with Bozzelli, the King declared in a dispatch, communicated to his own government by Lord Minto, that "we have graciously decided to continue to our Sicilian subjects those parliamentary institutions which the changes of time and the particular conditions of our dominions beyond the Faro make desirable." But this concession was subsequently withdrawn, and on the

<sup>1</sup> From this bombardment the King received the nickname of Bomba, by which he was thenceforward known.

5th of March, in a joint sitting of the council of Neapolitan ministers with some Sicilians, Lord Minto proposed that the King should legalize the convocation of the Sicilian parliament for the 25th at Palermo, by himself convoking it for that date. After a discussion which lasted from six in the evening till two in the morning, Lord Minto obtained the acceptance of his proposition. By a decree dated 6th of March the King convoked the parliament at Palermo, authorizing it to adapt the constitution of 1812 to the exigencies of the time and to provide for the needs of Sicily, though safeguarding the personal union. He also nominated Ruggero Settimo lieutenant-general and established under him three ministers for Sicily—Pasquale Calvi, the Marquis of Torrearesa, and Mariano Stabile, all of whom had been leaders in the insurrection. The decree created a minister for Sicily at Naples, and provided that for all common interests the two parliaments should decide by agreement. Lord Minto carried the decrees to Palermo in person.

The most important difference between the King's concessions and the demands of Palermo lay in the question of the withdrawal of all Neapolitan troops from Sicily, a condition which the Palermitan committee regarded as essential. If in Sicily at this time the conception of Italian unity and independence—against which the whole influence of Austria was thrown into the scale—had had any weight, the Sicilians would probably have been willing to sacrifice many of their insular pretensions in order to reconcile the two kingdoms. But, although English influence was exercised to the utmost in the direction of conciliation and unity of action, it was hardly possible for Lord Minto, even under the threat of abandoning the Sicilian cause, to obtain consideration of the conditions of union. The ultimatum of the committee, sent on the 18th of March, was "That the King should have the title of King of the Two Sicilies; that his representative in Sicily, with the title of Viceroy, should be a member of the royal



family or a Sicilian, and that the office of Viceroy should be supplemented by an *alter ego* with all the faculties and all the restrictions that the constitution of 1812 gave to the executive power; that all the acts or engagements made, or given, by the general committee or by the local committees of the island should be respected so long as their authority existed; that the act of convocation of parliament published by the general committee should form an integral part of the constitution; that the diplomatic, civil and military functions and the ecclesiastical dignities should be conferred only upon Sicilians, and by the executive power residing in the island, that the national guard should be preserved, with such reforms as the parliament might see fit to make, that within eight days the royal troops should evacuate the two fortresses which they still held in Sicily, and that those parts of the fortresses which, in the judgment of the committee or in that of the municipal legislators, menaced the city, should be demolished; that Sicily should coin money according to a system which the parliament should determine, that the existing cockade and tricoloured flag should be preserved; that Sicily should receive a fourth part of the existing arms, fleet and war-material, or the equivalent of the same in money; that there should be no demand from one side or the other for the expenses of the war, but that all damage done to the free port of Messina or to the merchandise deposited in it should be defrayed by the Neapolitan treasury and not that of Sicily; that the ministers of war and the navy and of foreign affairs, and all those in charge of the affairs of Sicily, should remain with the Viceroy, and should be responsible according to the terms of the constitution; that Sicily should not recognize any minister for the island at Naples; that the free port of Messina should be restored to the state in which it was prior to the law of 1826; that all affairs of common interest should be determined by agreement between the two parliaments; that in the case of the formation of an Italian commercial or political

league, which was desired by the Sicilians, Sicily should be represented by her own delegates, equally with all other states there represented; that those delegates should be nominated by the Sicilian government; and that the postal and other steamers, bought with the funds of Sicily and for insular uses, should be sent back."

This ultimatum clearly contemplated the organization of Naples and Sicily as two distinct states, with the tie only of personal union through the sovereign, with local ambitions and needs widely differing and leading probably to further separation. These were conditions which Naples was not prepared to accept, and in the rejection of which the King was certain to be supported by Neapolitan public opinion, so far as such could be said to exist, but at all events by the chauvinism of Naples. They were such terms as a defeated nation may be obliged to accept, but no other, and Bourbon pride was not prepared to accept them. Lord Minto, however, did urge their acceptance, but the King refused. In a despatch to Lord Napier he declared that he could not accept the Sicilian conditions without the consent of the Neapolitan parliament; while to Palermo he replied by a protest against the legality of all acts which might be done in Sicily without his authority, accusing the Sicilians of opposing the resurrection of Italy and the future of their common country. It is possible that, as La Farina believes, the news of the revolution in Vienna, received a few days later, might have induced the King to yield on these points, had the debate been prolonged. As it was, the unreasonable insistence of the Sicilians on exaggerated conditions, only to be imposed on a people recognizing itself inferior, prolonged the discord and ultimately cost Sicily all her gains. The consequences on the impending struggle for the independence of Italy seemed grave, as withdrawing, from what should have been a national effort, the entire forces of Southern Italy. But, looking over the long struggle from our later point of view, we may doubt if

the result would in the end have been different had accord been obtained. What was necessary was to eliminate Austria from Italian struggles, and this neither England nor Europe dared to attempt.

In spite of the resistance from Naples, the leaders of the movement in Sicily proceeded with their attempt to establish parliamentary government. The elections took place as arranged. A few candidates of the extreme republican party were elected, and no partisans of the King. La Farina says that, on account of the pride of the Sicilians, no one offered himself as a candidate, and that there were no electoral committees: that out of the twenty thousand voters in Palermo only three thousand cast their votes, and that the government exercised no influence even for the correction and prevention of abuses. The Chamber of Peers was mainly composed of the old feudal nobility, and the new peers chosen by the Chamber of Commons were without importance and generally without social position. It is clear that Sicily was far from being educated up to the compromises and concessions necessary for constitutional government and an united Italy. War and prolonged sacrifices were needed to complete the political education of the people.

On the 25th of March, 1848, Ruggero Settimo inaugurated the parliament in the church of San Domenico, concluding his discourse with the following words: "The Bourbons have ceased to reign in Sicily since 1815. May God bless and inspire the votes of the parliament and regard Sicily with favour and permit her to unite her defences with those of the great Italian nation, free, independent and united." On the 22nd of March, Milan and Venice had expelled the Austrians, but Sicily by a more unequivocal declaration had already anticipated all the other sections of Italy in the declaration of her aspirations for Italian unity. Parliament decided that executive power should be vested in the President of the kingdom of Sicily, who should exercise it by a council of six

ministers according to the principles of the constitution of 1812, preserving to him the prerogative of dissolving, adjourning and proroguing the chambers, the declaration of war and conclusion of peace, and the right to pardon all crimes that were not against the state. Ruggero Settimo was unanimously elected president of the government. He appointed as ministers those who had hitherto been the presidents of the various committees of the insurrection. The soul of this ministry was Stabile, minister of foreign affairs.

On the first of April, parliament decided to communicate to the other states of Italy the desire of Sicily, free and independent, to make part of an Italian confederation. In a meeting of the most prominent deputies on the morning of the 8th, the minister of foreign affairs read a letter from Lord Minto, dated on the 6th of April from Naples, informing him that it was not probable that the King of Naples would yield the crown to one of his sons, as he had proposed on the 22nd of March, and that he absolutely refused to acknowledge the independence of Sicily. To remain united to Naples on the conditions offered by the King was impossible. Stabile declared that it was better to die fighting than to submit to new royal frauds. Some deputies declared themselves in favour of Sicilian independence with a King of the royal family, others against any Bourbon. Public opinion in general was decided against any political relations with the royal family, while, on the other hand, the republicans were too few and the republican programme too uncertain to unite the suffrages of the deputies. The formal declaration of the deposition of the Bourbons was at first opposed as imprudent, but after discussion was finally (April 13) voted unanimously in the following words: "The throne of Sicily is vacant. Ferdinando Bourbon and his dynasty are for ever deposed from the throne of Sicily. Sicily will be governed as a constitutional monarchy, and, so soon as it shall have reformed its constitution, will call an Italian prince to the throne."

This declaration was signed by all classes—archbishops, princes, abbots, and deputies—and was received by Palermo and by the island at large with enthusiasm.

Lord Palmerston, at this juncture, while advising the King to take no part in the war which was being undertaken by the northern Italian states against Austria, recommended him to come to an agreement with Sicily, assuring him that neither Prussia nor England would give him any countenance in reconquering it. The conditions of government in Palermo were, however, extremely difficult. The taste of liberty given to the lower classes excited an insatiable appetite. The galley-slaves who had been liberated during the insurrection resumed their career of brigands; the municipal and national guard, recruited at random, were filled with characters of questionable honesty. disorders occurred in many parts and spread over the island, and dissensions broke out in the ministry owing to personal jealousies and ignorance of the art of government. The national guard assumed the position of the old pretorian guard in Rome, and dominated the government to such an extent that it was necessary to conciliate it by concessions. The government decided to send delegates to the other Italian states; Father Giacinto Ventura to the Pope; Carlo Gemelli to Tuscany; and Amari, Pisani and La Farina to negotiate for the assistance of the Italian league. La Farina and La Masa desired Sicily to take part in the war in Lombardy, and proposed that she should send detachments to Tuscany, to Rome, to Milan and to Turin as earnest of her participation in the liberation of Italy. The Marquis of Torrearsa, President of the chamber, objected that this proposition was equivalent to a declaration of war against Austria, while Sicily was only at war with Naples. The parliament accordingly rejected the proposition of La Masa and La Farina, but resolved to send a hundred men to Lombardy to show her approbation of the war for the liberation of Italy. But the condition of the island demanded

the entire attention of the government. The war with Naples was sufficient to occupy all its energies, and the disorders within the island went far to paralyze military action.

On the 8th of May parliament published a statement of the charges against the Neapolitan government, including the violation of the promises of 1815 and of the constitution sworn to in 1812, the withdrawal of all the rights and franchises of Sicily in 1816, and the abolition of an independent magistracy in 1837; and it continued: "Syracusa and Catania have been saddened by the massacres committed by Caretto; our population has been exposed to confiscation, to robbery and to murder, by that butcher crowned with honours and rewards; the decree of administrative uniformity has been contrived to depress the spirit of the people of the two kingdoms under the deceitful appearance of improvement; the most important offices in Sicily are given to foreigners indisposed to recognize the rights and dignity of the Sicilians." Further, it denounced the vast network of police agents, as contemptuous of all laws, civil and penal, violating personal security and the sanctity of home; and it censured the police as at once stupid and arbitrary in the suppression of all freedom of thought, insidious in its espionage and false in its accusations, inflicting imprisonment and exile without warrant or judicial proceedings, and torture in the barracks of the gendarmes and in the obscure prisons of the commissioners. The bishoprics (it declared) were occupied by foreigners, and the sanctity of the priesthood profaned by a system of espionage; more than half of the public revenue was diverted from the island, in great part fraudulently employed to supplement the finances of Naples or the privy purse of the crown; the administration made a machinery of oppression and robbery; the public works a pretence; insupportable oppressions and dilapidations of every kind. "In throwing off the Bourbon yoke"—so this document concludes—"Sicily has fulfilled a duty, even towards the foundation of Italian nationality upon the basis of

a powerful coalition of states, individually autonomous but federally united, and connected by their economical and political relations. To this federal union, which is the supreme necessity of Italy, the parliament sees no greater obstacle than the usurpation of lordship over Sicily by a family which, by its secular traditions, has shown itself to be the servant and instrument of the foreigner, a family which has striven to divide and set at enmity two nations naturally fraternal and harmonious, making one only the scourge of the other."

If at this time Sicily had been favoured by an united and resolute government, the Neapolitan risings of May and June would have afforded an opportunity for an effective and beneficent union between the two kingdoms. The Sicilian chambers did indeed decree three days of national mourning for the insurgents who had perished in the risings, but more practical assistance was required. An army, even a small one, landed in Calabria, would have gathered together all the liberal elements, and, attacking the royal forces in the rear, would have speedily reduced them to impotence, strengthening the position of the Neapolitan revolutionists against Austria. But Sicily was still unconscious of her own requirements and of her obligations toward Italy. As in 1812 and 1820, so now she showed herself prepared neither for autonomy nor for parliamentary government. The ministers could agree on no measures, the chambers were in incessant dissension, and ministerial propositions met with indifferent support or none at all from the deputies, who were divided into groups without any idea of common action. It was impossible to impose taxes, and equally impossible to organize war without funds. The conscription was intolerable, and voluntary recruitment only rallied to the army the worst and most disorderly elements of the population. On the expulsion of the Bourbon authorities, the government had found in the treasury two millions of ducats, and the grist tax had been reduced to conciliate the populace. This being the only tax which could be collected

without the reorganization of the tax department, the government was left with very insufficient means for carrying on its operations. A foreign loan was out of the question. An internal loan at 7 % was offered but failed. One million, two hundred thousand ounces<sup>1</sup> were obtained by the sale of public bonds and other resources, but this was utterly insufficient for the creation of an army, and without an army independence was unattainable. Arms were ordered from England but did not arrive. The troops which had been organized broke out into disorder and committed every kind of excess. Dissensions of all kinds developed in the island, and republicans, Bourbonists and other parties raised their heads in continuous and increasing antagonism. Three months and a half passed without the government having adopted a single measure for the organization of an army. These defects rendered all military initiative impossible, while the continued inaction increased the discontent and discord. An expedition of five hundred men, ill-armed and ill-provided, was ordered against Naples, but its members took refuge in flight to Corfu. They were stopped at sea by a royal steamer, and thrown into prison. The leaders were condemned to death, but by intervention of the British Admiral the sentences were commuted to imprisonment for life.

The question of the selection of a king for Sicily now came to the front. The candidates were the Archduke Charles II, son of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany; Prince Napoleon Bonaparte, favoured by France; a son of the King of Naples; and the Duke of Genoa, second son of the King of Sardinia, who was preferred by England. On the 10th of June, 1848, the chambers declared themselves a permanent body for completing the work of constitutional reform. The national sovereignty was proclaimed; the crown was deprived of the faculty of dissolving or proroguing the chambers, and of

<sup>1</sup> The ounce was equivalent to 10s. in English money.



dismissing or suspending the national guard; Sicily was declared for ever an independent state; all citizens at the age of twenty-one, knowing how to read and write, were to be electors where they had resided for two years. Ministers or presidents of the ministry could not be deputies or senators. A deputy was to have an income of at least eighteen ounces a year, and a senator one of five hundred. The communes were permitted to give salaries to their representatives. The parliament had the right to choose a new dynasty if the King died without successors. The King was not allowed either to marry or to leave Sicily without the consent of parliament on pain of deposition. His title was to be "King of the Sicilians." Thus the constitution of 1848 modified in a democratic direction that of 1812, largely diminishing the powers of the King.

On the night of the 11th of July the Duke of Genoa was unanimously elected King under the name of Alberto Amedeo I. The deputation charged with presenting to the Duke the decree of the parliament which elected him, arrived in Piedmont during the last days of the war with Austria, and was obliged to await the conclusion of hostilities in order to receive his reply. Carlo Alberto, desiring not to alienate the King of Naples, declined the offer for his son; England under the circumstances was unwilling to persist. The Duke accordingly replied to the Sicilians that he preferred his sword to any sceptre in the world; that Italy had more need of soldiers than of anything else, and that he was a soldier and desired to fight for the cause of Italy. This refusal entailed the fall of Mariano Stabile, who had held the leading influence in Sicilian affairs up to this time. Having met with two failures in his policy—that of the expedition to Calabria, and the refusal of the crown by the Duke of Genoa—he sent in his resignation, and was succeeded on the 13th of August by the Marquis of Torrearsa.

The Austrians being triumphant in Lombardy and the Neapolitans having withdrawn from the Po, the King of

Naples decided to carry on the war with Sicily. The citadel of Messina still remained in the power of the royal forces, although the fighting had been continuous during the months of May and June, excepting the armistice. The King, therefore, at the end of August, 1848, sent a strong expedition under General Filangeri, comprising about twenty thousand men, who using Messina as their base, began serious operations against the forces of the parliament. From Palermo reinforcements were sent to Messina, but they were ill-organized and undisciplined, and badly supplied with money. On the 6th of September a body of royal troops, amounting (according to La Farina) to twenty-four thousand men, landed and attacked the city from the land side, while the citadel began a bombardment. The Sicilian volunteers, composed in great part of men released from the galleys, formed very inefficient troops, and their resistance proved weak and fitful. Severe fighting continued for two days, but the Neapolitan troops carried the positions held by the insurgents, one by one, and gradually reconquered the city. The struggle was carried on in the suburbs, but all resistance being gradually overcome, the population, so far as possible, fled to the mountains, many who sought refuge in the churches being massacred, while those who were captured in the roads and in the country round about were killed where they were found.

The sack of Messina commenced on the 7th, and continued until the 8th, with great cruelty, violation and murder of women, and enormous destruction of property. The losses on both sides had been very grave. The capture of the city was followed by the proclamation of a general amnesty and the establishment of a free port. La Masa, the commander of the Palermitan reinforcements, fell back on Milazzo, but such was the want of discipline and the insubordination of the troops that he abandoned that stronghold without any resistance, and retired on Palermo. The French and British Admirals, Baudin and Parker, after the capture of Messina,

imposed on the Neapolitans, by threatening to use force, a truce in order to arrange a pacification. From January to September the government at Palermo had done little but debate and issue proclamations. The struggles of hostile personalities, the divisions and jealousies amongst the different leaders, had paralyzed the government. Without the power of collecting taxes, and wanting ammunition, arms and material, it was impossible to carry on the war effectually, while the greed and ambition of the nobles excited the most acrid contests amongst the ruling classes. Neither the ministry nor the parliament realized the necessity of providing for the organization of the army, of supplying arms and ammunition, or of finding sure means of filling the treasury. Thus the reopening of hostilities at Messina found the government unprovided with any adequate resources to maintain the struggle. The cities refused to pay the contributions levied on them, and the rural districts had nothing to give. The churches and convents were stripped of their valuables for sale or pledge, and paper money was issued to the amount of fifteen million francs. A loan was tried at Paris, but failed, and a forced loan of twelve and one half millions of francs was found impossible to collect. In these circumstances it was no wonder that the insurrection lost all vitality.

During the armistice imposed by the English and French authorities, the King had offered the re-establishment of the constitution of the 29th of January with a separate administration and parliament, retaining at Naples the ministers of foreign affairs and of war. But the insurrectionary government refused the concession, although a portion of the clergy, the aristocracy and the citizens in large part were favourable to the compromise.

The fall of Messina left the Sicilian government in command of less than five thousand regular forces, with disorganized masses of volunteers. The chamber then voted the mobilization of a part of the national guard, and called under arms

the classes of 1834 and the following years; it sanctioned the employment of officers of artillery and engineers from abroad, the seizure of horses and mules belonging to private individuals, the formation of a battalion of the employés of the custom house, and the construction of a church at Palermo to our Lady of Victory! The military disorganization went rapidly from bad to worse, in spite of all the energy displayed by a few members of the insurrectionary committee, of which Crispi was the chief. Garibaldi was invited to undertake the command of the forces and accepted, but subsequently withdrew his acceptance. The command of the provinces of Palermo, Trapani, Girgenti, and Caltanissetta was finally given to the French Traubland, and the general direction of the war to a Polish officer named Mieroslawsky.

Meanwhile the paper money which had been issued depreciated rapidly in value. The divisions and jealousies in the government increased, and Cordova, minister of the treasury, having proposed the arrest of the chiefs of the opposition, violent dissensions arose, with the result that government was completely paralyzed. On the 23rd of February, 1849, the Tuscan envoy in Sicily wrote to his government that "all aspirations after Italian unity, as well as republican doctrines, though regarded by the government of Sicily, and by almost all the members of parliament, as theoretically excellent and perhaps capable of immediate realization in central Italy, are held to be inopportune and therefore injurious here and now... The masses are strong and full of generous sentiments and heroic devotion to the cause of insular independence, but they are so ignorant of politics and so subject to the influence and the prestige of certain individuals that they are entirely incapable of democratic government." On the 15th of March he writes: "In fifteen months of independence and liberty and with ten millions of scudi spent, nothing serious has been done to prepare the country for a strong and effective defence. There are very few who understand Sicilian affairs and their

relation to those of Italy or the revolution. Most of them talk about Sicilian independence and Sicilian autonomy but nothing more. Except a few men of the popular classes, all oppose at heart the idea of democratic unity."

France and England having now exhausted their influence with the King of Naples to obtain conditions acceptable to the Sicilians, the moment approached for a final solution, since none of the powers were disposed to take a more active part in the defence of the island. The King, by a proclamation issued in March through the French and British Admirals, offered, as an ultimatum to Sicily, the constitution drawn up at Gaeta on the 28th of February 1849 (Tivaroni), according to which Sicily would return to its allegiance, and would be governed by a viceroy assisted by a council of ministers and a national parliament, with a national administration and a revision of the constitution of 1812 according to the needs of the time; the principal points of the island to be occupied by Neapolitan troops; the insurgents to have full amnesty, subject to the temporary exile of the most prominent leaders. The King refused to concede freedom of the press or a national guard, but the forces by land and sea were to be entirely Sicilian. The King was to be represented in Sicily by a viceroy with such attributes and powers as he should determine; he was to dispose of the forces by land and sea, and to have the supreme direction of foreign affairs. A minister for Sicily was to be always in attendance on the King. The peers were to be nominated for life by the King, who reserved the right to convoke and dissolve parliament at his pleasure. It is clear that these proposals left hardly a shadow of public liberty to Sicily.

On the 17th of March, the Sicilian ministry having refused to present the royal ultimatum to parliament, the deputy Raeli presented a counter-proposal by which all Sicilians between the ages of eighteen and thirty were to be included in the army. With general enthusiasm the population began

to throw up fortifications around Palermo, and, the ministry being still divided, a part resigned in order to leave the government in the hands of those who were resolved to carry on the war. The British and French negotiators not having succeeded in obtaining any guarantees from their respective governments that the King's promises should be duly carried out, and the Sicilians on their side refusing to accept any settlement without such guarantee, Mieroslawsky, at the head of the newly reorganized army, with six guns, moved toward Catania. The French Major Poulet, with a part of the national guard, went to Termini, and the university legion with the deputies Crispi, Papa, Natoli and Paternostro, under the command of La Farina, republican ex-minister, moved on to Misilmeri. Mieroslawsky disposed of seven thousand seven hundred men out of the nominal forces of nineteen thousand which the government had called into existence, fifteen thousand being organized and the rest in bands of volunteers, against sixteen thousand regular Neapolitan troops, supported by six hundred and fifty-three cavalry and forty guns, and aided by the ships of war along the coast. The Sicilians had no ships. Their forces consisted mainly of recruits unaccustomed to military discipline and badly armed and equipped; more than half the cavalry had no horses; the artillery was unhorsed; the officers were mostly ignorant of all the duties of active warfare, and two of the generals were foreign; ammunition was scarce; there were no commissariat supplies and no ambulances. The three months of armistice had been utterly wasted so far as practical military preparations were concerned.

Hostilities recommenced on the 30th of March, 1849, and Mieroslawsky contemplated an attack on Messina, but the vanguard was defeated and dispersed at Taormina and Mieroslawsky was unable to rally them. On the 4th of April he moved on Catania with seven thousand men, to attack the garrison which consisted of twelve thousand men, holding

fortified positions, with thirty two pieces of artillery. He occupied the heights of Aci which dominate the city, but his vanguard was repulsed, and on the 5th the Sicilians were entirely defeated and dispersed, losing three hundred and fifty killed and two hundred and fifteen prisoners. Microslawsky was wounded and his flags and guns were captured. Murder and sack for five days followed this defeat. At Syracuse the Sicilian forces dispersed before they were attacked; Caltanissetta received the royal troops with enthusiastic demonstrations, and at Mezzagno, only twelve miles from Palermo, the last body of Sicilian troops disbanded.

On the 14th of April, the chambers accepted the offer of French mediation, the lower house by fifty-five votes against thirty-three, the chamber of peers unanimously. The ministry, again modified, opened negotiations through the British and French representatives with the King, who now offered a constitution, with a viceroy and a national guard for Palermo, an amnesty, and recognition of the public debt. On the 17th of April the parliament adjourned *sine die*. The president, Ruggero Settimo, thereupon convoked a meeting of the nobles, ministers, peers, and deputies, with the foreign officers, to advise as to the course to be followed. Opinions were divided, the principal members of the aristocracy maintaining the necessity of peace, while the more radical deputies and officers insisted upon resistance. The meeting broke up in tumult. La Farina proposed Settimo as dictator, advocating the dissolution of the national guard and the arrest of the leading advocates of peace. But resistance had evidently become impossible, and Palermo, discouraged by the royalist successes, felt no longer competent to carry on the struggle. Settimo therefore left Palermo, surrendering his power into the hands of the municipality; the other leading insurgent authorities escaped abroad. On the 26th of April the Neapolitan squadron appeared before Palermo and summoned it to surrender.

The municipality undertook to negotiate with the royal forces, but on the 29th of April, with a last volcanic eruption, the people rose and expelled the municipal authorities, created a new municipal council, and organized a chaotic resistance. On the 3rd of May, the royal troops advanced to attack the city. On the 7th they came into collision with the insurgent bands, supported by the French volunteer battalion and a squadron of cavalry. The combat continued during the 8th and 9th in the villages round Palermo, which were carried by the troops with the usual massacres of all classes and both sexes. The chiefs of the squadrons and irregulars, who had been bought over by the royal authorities, now imposed a cessation of hostilities, and on the 11th, Filangeri accepted the surrender, granting an amnesty for all excepting forty-three of the chiefs. On the 15th the Neapolitans occupied the outer portion of the city; the foreign legion and the Neapolitan deserters marched out in silence, and a general disarmament was ordered within forty-eight hours under penalty of death to all found in possession of arms. It is hardly necessary to add that when the victory was gained, all the King's promises were forgotten. On the 20th September, 1849, the Neapolitan minister replied to the British government, when they reminded him of the ancient incontestable rights of the Sicilians, that "Sicily enjoys perfect tranquillity, and the inhabitants are happy to have returned to the protection of their legitimate sovereign."

From this date, for a period of eleven years, no further movements took place in Sicily. Settimo, La Farina. Crispi and all the prominent insurgents went into exile until the expedition of Garibaldi to Marsala in the year 1860.



## CHAPTER XI.

NORTHERN ITALY, 1849-1858.

### (1) *Vittorio Emanuele.*

FEW monarchs have ever mounted the throne in the midst of greater difficulties than those which encircled Piedmont on the accession of Vittorio Emanuele. It was a dark day of shattered hopes and national disaster. Parliamentary institutions were new and untried: the prestige of the monarchy was shaken: the enemy was at the gates: the army was demoralised, and the public funds exhausted. But the courage and firmness of the young King, tried in so fiery a furnace, proved themselves adequate to the task. On the 27th of March, 1849, Vittorio Emanuele published his first proclamation. It was written by himself and slightly modified by Carlo Cadorna. It contained in the following words the pledge to continue the work so disastrously begun by Carlo Alberto. "Now our endeavour must be to maintain our honour untarnished, to heal the wounds of public fortune, and to consolidate our constitution. In this endeavour, I beg the help of my people. I am prepared to give my solemn oath, and in response I expect from the nation assistance, affection and confidence." But this was not enough; the public faith was too rudely shaken by the incompetence and hesitations of the monarchy to be able to give ready credence to the word of the King. At a review of the National Guard

of Turin held shortly after the issuing of this proclamation, the King was made to feel the distrust of the nation by the icy coldness of his reception. Returning to the palace he complained, with tears in his eyes, that he was unkindly judged. The reception by the Chamber of Deputies that night was still worse. When Pinelli read the conditions of the armistice, amidst loud interruptions, aimed especially at the articles relating to the occupation of Alessandria and the abandonment of Venice, there were cries of "No, no"; "Never"; "It would be vile"; "Piedmont would be disgraced"; "Rather war to the death"; and so forth.

The ministers calmly stated that they were waiting for the report of Chrzanowsky on the condition of the army, and ineffectually protested against the violence of the chamber. On the proposal of Giovanni Lanza, the chamber voted that "the armistice is unconstitutional and the ministry cannot put it into execution without violating the Constitution." On the proposal of Justi the assembly declared itself permanent, appointed a commission to announce to the King that the chamber demanded news of the progress of the war, and voted as follows; "The chamber not being able to sacrifice the nation, invites the government to concentrate its forces at Alessandria, and, having declared the country in danger, to convoke at Genoa all the men fit to carry arms." Another resolution declared that "If the ministry shall permit the entry of the Austrian forces into Alessandria, or shall recall the squadron from the Adriatic before the armistice is approved, it shall be declared guilty of the crime of high treason." And finally, in reference to the retirement of Carlo Alberto, it called, on the proposal of Ceppi, for the immediate presentation of the act of abdication. These resolutions were passed with great disorder, amid expressions of contempt directed against the ministry by the public present at the discussions. The manner in which the reading of the armistice was received by the chamber caused the King to weep bitterly.

In this confusion of purposes and collision of interests, the King, depressed by the hostility of the radical party and the lukewarmness of the Conservatives, with Genoa in insurrection and the Austrians holding the keys of Piedmont, exercised that resolution which was his dominant trait. Perceiving that in the disposition of the Parliament nothing deliberate and useful could be hoped for from it, he made up his mind to dissolve the chamber, and to appeal afresh to the nation. In Italy, then as now, in moments of vital decision, the elective body has generally proved an embarrassment to prudent government, and the perception of this fact was the first proof not alone of the King's political acumen but of his civic courage. On this occasion the country at large recognized the wisdom and prudence of the King, and, with no more excitement than was natural on the election of a new chamber, accepted his decision.

Good authorities state that Radetzky offered better conditions to the King if he would revoke the constitution. In fact the government of Vienna was more anxious to check the progress of liberalism than to defeat Piedmont, and the importance of the crisis lay in the question whether this concession to constitutional liberty should be preserved or sacrificed. To support this pretension of Austria there were some amongst those about Vittorio Emanuele who were inclined to anticipate danger in the extension of liberty. But the King, as we can see clearly by his subsequent political conduct, understood the full importance of maintaining this beginning of liberty, especially as justifying the claim of Piedmont to the headship of a future Italy. Everywhere else in the peninsula absolutism had triumphed. The Bourbon restoration in Naples and Sicily; the return of the Papal domination in Rome; the principalities restored to their rulers under Austrian protection; despotic tendencies strengthened even in Tuscany, the most liberal of all the Italian states; and Lombardy and Venice subjected anew to the full rigour of

Austrian rule—all this left the future of constitutionalism in Italy depending solely on its preservation in Piedmont. "Vittorio Emanuele understood that his interest and honour were combined in the maintenance of the constitution. Liberty had disappeared from the rest of Italy, but such eclipses are only temporary. Was it not evident that on the day on which the peninsula should awaken from its degradation, she would turn toward the only Italian people among whom was to be found a liberal constitution under the tricolour of independence?" (Sorin.)

On the 30th of March, 1849, the King took the oath to the constitution before the parliament at Turin. The oath ran as follows: "In the presence of God I swear loyally to observe the constitution; to exercise the royal authority only in virtue of the law and in accordance with the law; to render justice to everyone according to his full and entire right, and to act in all things on behalf of the interests, prosperity and honour of the nation." To this he added the words:—"In taking the reins of government in the present circumstances, of which, more than anybody else, I feel the immense gravity and the bitterness, I have given the nation to understand what are the tendencies of my mind. The establishment of our national institutions, the safety and the honour of our common country, will be the continual object of my thoughts, and with the constant aid of Providence and with your help I hope to be able to accomplish this purpose. It is only through being profoundly penetrated with the gravity of my duties that I have been supported in the solemn act of taking before you the oath which must guide my life."

In Genoa, on the other hand, the democracy did not limit its protests to legal measures, but broke out in an armed rebellion, not excited by differences as to questions of the form of government but by a national *amour propre*, ignorant and belated, if sound in its origin. Immediately after Novara, Genoa had sent a deputation to Turin, offering to receive the

Parliament there, and urging the continuation of the war, and a fresh appeal to the people. The reception of this deputation by Pinelli, instead of by the King, produced a very unfavourable impression. At Genoa the clubs controlled everything. On the night of the 27th of March, Genoa was excited by the rumour that the Austrians were at Ponte Decimo and intended to enter the city. The municipality distributed arms to the people; the clergy and the syndic invited the citizens to bury themselves under the ruins of the city rather than to yield. The population collected in the Piazza San Domenico, and called for arms. A committee of defence was formed, together with another for public security, composed of Constantino Reta, David Morchio and Avezzana.

In this popular uprising the ancient character of the independent people of Genoa came to the front. There was in it neither republicanism—as some writers have supposed—nor separatism, the ambition for the restoration of the old State of Genoa. The feeling which pervaded all classes, and united the Genoese republican and the Mazzinian with the partizans of the Piedmontese monarchy, was common detestation of Austria and common desire for independence. It was probably the greater activity of the republicans, rather than their representative quality, which led to their incidental prominence in these disorders. Morchio and Avezzana were well-known republicans.

All those who knew Morchio rendered justice to the honesty of his character, and during his rule he neither executed nor imprisoned anyone except the General-intendant Faruto, whom he held as a hostage. Avezzana, chief of the staff of the National Guard, placed himself at the head of the agitation with a battalion of the artillery of the Guard, and on his own responsibility, unrecognized by any authority, even municipal, but aided by some of the most energetic of the young Genoese, he armed six hundred porters whom they had organized. On the 1st of April this force attacked the arsenal,

and, with the aid of the National Guard, captured it. In it there were found fifteen to twenty thousand muskets. At the same time General de Asarta, a Genoese veteran, commanding the division of Genoa, gave up to the insurgents the forts of Sperone and Bigatto, and on the 2nd of April consented to evacuate all the fortifications held by his force of twelve battalions of artillery and carabineers. The capitulation contained this agreement: "Genoa shall rest unalterably united to Piedmont." The people murdered the policeman Penco and the major of the carabineers, Count Seppi di Bierolo, who had gone out in civil dress, and dragged his body through the streets. The agitation, arising mainly from the febrile and irrational excitement which occasionally overpowers masses of undisciplined men, in this case embittered by the offended dignity of an ancient state and by animosity towards Austria, rapidly became a sort of insanity. In order to prepare for war against Austria, the insurgents demanded the expulsion of the Piedmontese soldiers and the calling in of the Lombard volunteers who were quartered at Tortona, Valenza and Voghera, and who showed a disposition to join the Genoese movement.

The hope of any favourable result from this campaign of desperate patriotic *amour propre* was too slight to weigh with practical minds, but the danger of a renewal of the conflict with Austria was such as to make the suppression of the Genoese movement, in spite of its patriotism, imperative upon the Piedmontese government. The revolutionary elements from other parts of Italy rallied at Genoa. Nino Bixio and Mameli came from Rome, and Montanelli from Tuscany, with volunteers to strengthen the movement. Under the urgent pressure of this danger, General La Marmora acted energetically. Marching with his division rapidly on Genoa, on the 3rd of April he surprised the forts on the side of the Polcevera, took by a *soup de main* the redoubt of Belvedere, and with little resistance occupied one section after another of the fortifications. On the 5th of April, after a short bombardment,

he assaulted the city in three columns. On the 6th, an armistice was signed, and Genoa submitted, with a loss on the part of the Piedmontese of fifty dead and two hundred wounded—a slight loss considering the magnitude of the operations. A notable feature of this affair was the participation of a British man-of-war, which threatened to fire on the Genoese batteries if the project of releasing and arming the galley prisoners was carried out. Finally the crew aided in the restoration of order by taking possession of the battery on the Old Mole. The capture of the city was followed by abuses and excesses which must have heightened the animosity of the Genoese toward Piedmont, for these La Marmora must be held responsible.

The trial of General Canastota, who, at the battle of Novara, had disobeyed his orders and permitted the Austrians to gain an advantage which possibly decided the fate of the day, supplied a vent for the national indignation, which made him a scapegoat for the disastrous termination of the war. He was found guilty, and on the 22nd of May was shot, not as a traitor, but for having disobeyed orders.

Meanwhile the chamber had been dissolved, and a new ministry formed, under Massimo d'Azeglio, whose influence with the late King had been so great two years before. The elections to the new chamber took place in July, in the midst of general tranquillity. The chamber discussed the definite treaty of peace, which had been signed on the 6th of August. This treaty, after long negotiations, during which the British government had applied strong moral pressure on Austria in favour of Piedmont, had been concluded on terms more favourable to the latter than could have been expected. A considerable pecuniary indemnity was exacted from the defeated state, but Piedmont was not forced to cede any territory. Adjourning until the 15th of November, the chamber then resumed its sittings and discussed the report of the committee on the treaty of peace. The report violently censured the

treaty. The debate was conducted with great acerbity, and an order of the day, declining to discuss the treaty until provision should be made for conferring on Lombard immigrants the right of citizenship, was offered by Carlo Cadorna and passed by a small majority. This order of the day was accepted by seventy-two votes against sixty, and its adoption was substantially equivalent to the rejection of the treaty of peace. The chamber was dissolved, and the elections to a new one were appointed for the 9th of December.

In preparation for the opening of the newly-elected Chamber of Deputies, the King issued a proclamation at Moncalieri, which ran as follows: "I have concluded a treaty with Austria, honourable and not ruinous; the welfare of the state demanded it; the honour of the country and the obligation of my oath demanded that at the same time it should be faithfully executed without any hypocrisy and without cavilling. My ministers demanded the consent of the chamber, which in reply imposed a condition that I cannot accept, because it destroys the reciprocal independence of the three powers and so violates the constitution. By the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies the liberties of the country encountered no risk. They are safeguarded by the venerable memory of King Carlo Alberto, my father; they are entrusted to the honour of the House of Savoy; they are protected by the sacredness of my oath; and who should dare to entertain a fear of their suppression?" The proclamation concluded: "I have sworn to maintain justice and liberty according to the rights of every man; I have promised to save the nation from the tyranny of parties, whatever their name, their purpose, or the rank of the men who compose them. In fulfilment of these promises and out of respect for these oaths, I dissolved a chamber which had become impracticable, and I again fulfilled them by convoking another immediately; but if the country and the electors deny me their assistance, the responsibility of the future will not fall upon me, and in the disorders which may arise they will not



have to complain of me, but of themselves. If I believe it my duty on this occasion to speak with severity, I trust that the public sense of justice will recognize that I was moved by a profound love for my people and for their real good, and that they will see I am actuated by a firm determination to maintain their liberty and to defend them from foreign as well as domestic enemies. Never hitherto has the House of Savoy appealed in vain to the loyalty, the good sense and the love of its people; it has, then, the right to confide in them on the present occasion, and to feel assured that they will combine to save the constitution and the country from the dangers which menace it."

The last sentences of this proclamation seemed, in the days of undefined political rights, rather a threat of absolutism than a constitutional decision, and they were for a long time employed by the extreme Liberals as a reproach against the King, and the ministry which supported him. But in later times the proclamation of Moncalieri has been regarded as a proper assertion of the legitimate rights of the head of the state against the disorganizing and dissolving tendency of factional politics. It had the eventual result of establishing the authority of the King on an unexceptionable basis. This assertion of the prerogative of the Crown has in some of the later crises in Italy been invoked as an example to be followed by Vittorio Emmanuele's successor, in whose hands the party of order consider the royal authority to be dangerously weak.

The elections of December, 1849, resulted in strengthening the groups of the Right and the Right Centre and in the reduction of the Left to about thirty votes. We may safely recognize in this the effect of the Moncalieri proclamation, and of the acknowledged necessity that the agitations against a peaceful conclusion with Austria should be put an end to at any cost. The King was received at the opening of parliament with acclamation. The government candidates for offices in the chambers were elected, and on the 9th of January, 1850, the

One of the earliest declarations of the new government led to a conflict with Rome. The Pope had returned to the Vatican under the influence of the most despotic reaction, and in his relations with the other Italian states he claimed to retain all the mediæval privileges to which he had ever pretended. The "Foro Ecclesiastico," or ecclesiastical tribunal, possessed sole jurisdiction over the clergy, besides extensive control over laymen. The Church still maintained the right of sanctuary: the Jesuits ruled education, and no house was free from their inquisitional search. In February, 1850, Count Siccardi, on behalf of the government, brought in a Bill to put an end to these obsolete claims, and in the debates on this Bill was heard, for the first time, the authoritative declaration of the Italian policy towards the Church in Cavour's famous dictum, "A free Church in a free State." The law passed in spite of clerical opposition. The Archbishop of Turin incited the ecclesiastical authorities to rebellion against it. He was condemned by the tribunal to two months' imprisonment and escaped to France. A few days later the Minister of Commerce, Santarosa, fell ill with a mortal malady, and on his manifesting a desire to receive the sacrament in his last moments, the clergy refused to accord the sacrament unless he confessed his repentance for the part he had taken in carrying the law. This Santarosa refused to do, and died without absolution. The people of Turin manifested their admiration for his moral and civic courage by giving him a splendid funeral.

(2) *Cavour.*

The death of Santarosa had one very important result: it gave an opportunity for the admission of Camillo Cavour into the ministry. Cavour, who from this time forward till his death was the leading figure in Italian politics, was born in 1810 at Turin. He belonged to an old and noble Piedmontese family, had been educated in the military academy at Turin, and served in the household of Carlo Alberto while he was still Prince of Carignano. At twenty-two, being then a sub-lieutenant in the Engineers, he was guilty of a manifestation of liberal principles which brought him under military discipline, whereupon he resigned, leaving the army and retiring to his estate near Vercelli, where he devoted himself to agriculture and the study of the practical and severe elements of statecraft. He paid especial attention to English politics, made more than one visit to England, and conceived a great admiration for the Free trade policy of Sir Robert Peel. Shortly before the outbreak of 1848 he founded, in conjunction with Balbo, D'Azeglio and other reformers, a journal named the *Risorgimento*, which had great influence on public opinion in the crisis that followed. In the Parliament summoned in accordance with the "statuto" or constitution (1848), he sat as member for Turin, and vigorously supported the government of D'Azeglio, both in its liberal measures and in its maintenance of the royal authority.

He entered the Ministry with the condition that the minister Cristoforo Mameli, a timid, narrow-minded man who was opposed to the liberalization of the constitution, should be dismissed, and in fact, a month later, Mameli gave up his post to Pietro Gioia of Piacenza. The first act of Cavour, as minister of agriculture, was to issue a circular to the Syndics abolishing the official regulation of the price of bread in the communes, — an indication of his opinions on free-trade. On the 19th of April, 1851, Cavour took the portfolio of finance.

In May 1851 he arranged the new convention with France, and he concluded a new treaty of commerce in February 1852. With great foresight he at the same time commenced the reorganization of the State even in departments with which he had directly nothing to do. Loans were negotiated, taxes were increased, and railways were pushed forward in spite of opposition which would have daunted a man of more timid constitution. In order to strengthen the hold of Piedmont on the adjoining provinces of Italy, Cavour arranged to introduce into the ministry Luigi Carlo Farini, one of the exiles from central Italy—a nomination of characteristic boldness, inasmuch as Farini was not a Piedmontese even by adoption, and did not possess the rights of a citizen. In 1852 the taxes were raised on the proposition of Cavour, the increase being from four to twelve per cent. on the previous taxes on furniture, servants and horses; the customs duties were also increased.

The reforming tendencies of the new government were not favourably regarded by the reactionary party in France, and were condemned in a more outspoken way by the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. Napoleon, who by the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, had made himself master of France, gave the Piedmontese government to understand that he desired in his neighbours a corresponding tendency. There were, among the contemporaries of Cavour, some who sympathized with the absolutist views of Napoleon; and even reformers like D'Azeglio, Bersezio, and Menabrea responded by an attempt to carry laws for the restriction of public liberty, and for regulating the press and the elections in a sense according with the views of Louis Napoleon. The King, on the contrary, determined to be master in his own house, and in a confidential dispatch to the ministers in London and Paris, dated the 10th of December, 1851, declared himself resolutely opposed to the suggestions\* from Vienna and Berlin, viz., that he should modify the constitution of Piedmont so as to bring it into

accordance with those of the states which adjoined him in Italy. The dispatch said: "The sovereigns of Austria and Prussia have indirectly, though respectfully, given the King our august sovereign to understand that they advise him to adopt, in the direction of his government, a tone in harmony with that which is followed in the other Italian states, intimating under the form of an apparent menace, that otherwise he might have to repent of his persistence in following his present political system." The dispatch continued: "His Majesty has not been able to avoid replying with the observation that the political condition of the states ruled by the two sovereigns who have given him this intimation, seems to him to indicate much more the need of advice, than their right to offer it to others"; and it concluded that as the King did not meddle with anything that other sovereigns saw fit to do, he desired on his part the same freedom of action. This circular, appearing immediately after the Napoleonic *coup d'état*, displayed in their best light the courage and independence of him who was to become the first King of Italy.

Shortly after these incidents Cavour arranged to make an open declaration in parliament of his determination to abandon the old Conservative party to which he had belonged on his entry into politics, for the more liberal system in which the rest of his life was passed. The "Connubio," as this combination between Cavour and the Liberals was called, was finally and formally arranged between Cavour, Rattazzi and Buffa, and their programme was formulated in the following words: "Monarchy, the Constitution, independence, civil and political progress." In this combination the men of the Left bound themselves to abandon the extremes of their party, and those who had belonged to the clerical party agreed, on their part, to approach the Liberals, and by their fusion to found a distinct political organization. An occasion for the declaration of this policy in Parliament was found in the discussion of the law on the press.

The question has been raised whether Cavour, at that time minister of the finances in the ministry of D'Azeglio,—in some respects a Conservative,—could loyally conspire, while remaining in the ministry, with men who professed opinions contrary to those of his colleagues. Should he not have resigned office before adopting a policy which involved their fall? The question is a somewhat academical one: Cavour's action was at all events courageous, and led eventually to the formation of a ministry on liberal principles.

The occasion for the rupture was not long in coming. On the 15th of April, 1852, Pinelli, President of the Chamber, died, and the election of the new president developed the differences between D'Azeglio, President of the Council, and Cavour. The latter supported Rattazzi, and the former Boncompagni. Rattazzi was elected by seventy-four against fifty. A rupture between D'Azeglio and Cavour speedily followed. At a dinner at the house of D'Azeglio, Cavour jokingly introduced the subject of the antipathy of D'Azeglio for Rattazzi, on which the President of the Council exclaimed with energy, "I do not want to know anything about Rattazzi." Cavour made no reply but turned red with rage, sprang from his seat, raised his plate and threw it down savagely on the ground, breaking it into a thousand pieces; then, with his hands in his hair, fled from the room shouting like a madman to *Ia Marmora*, who followed without being able to overtake him, "He is a beast, he is a beast!" On another occasion, after the election of Rattazzi, D'Azeglio having in the council of ministers requested his colleagues henceforward to behave openly and loyally, Cavour replied that he would have done better to moderate the anger of Galvagno towards the "*Con-nubio*." D'Azeglio replied that he had no faith in the political capacity of Rattazzi. Cavour, beside himself with indignation, declared that he was tired of being suspected by his colleagues, offered his resignation and immediately quitted the room without saluting any of his colleagues. Thereupon the

ministry resigned, and D'Azeglio, in a letter to the King, declined to form another. The King, however insisted, and the ministry was formed with the exclusion of Cavour and Farini. Thus began the antagonism between Cavour and the Conservatives, which became the chronic condition of Piedmontese politics.

Cavour for a time retired from politics and went abroad, visiting France and England, as much to study foreign political conditions, perhaps, as to withdraw himself from all contact with the present conduct of government. The difficulties of the time were too much for the timid and exhausted D'Azeglio, and the King was ultimately compelled, even against his own desire, to accept a new ministry. Cavour replied to the first overtures by a refusal: the conduct of the government toward the Pope had been too obsequious to satisfy his progressive principles, and on the question of concessions to the pretensions of the Vatican the discord was complete. The King, with all his independence, was influenced by his mother and his wife—two women who, with all their virtues, were notoriously subject to clerical pressure. But in the end, there being no combination to satisfy the royal tendencies, Cavour was called in to form a government without the stipulation of any conditions. On the 4th of November, 1852, this ministry, since known as the "Great Ministry," was definitely formed; Cavour being Minister of Finance and President of the Council, and Rattazzi being Minister of the Interior.

Cavour's leadership of the government gave a great impulse to reform, especially in a financial and economical direction. The finances were in disorder, the interest on the national debt had increased six-fold since 1847, trade was small, and communication very defective. But the country possessed considerable natural resources, and Cavour set to work to develop them. He concluded advantageous commercial treaties with Great Britain, France and other countries: he

reformed the tariff in a free-trade direction: he promoted railways, and initiated the great project of a tunnel under the Mont Cenis. At the same time, the ecclesiastical legislation of Siccardi was pushed further: civil marriage was legalised, and the clergy were made fully amenable to the tribunals of the State: the mendicant orders were suppressed, and lay education encouraged. Under the guidance of La Marmora, the organization of the army was reformed. Meanwhile, the constitution of 1848 was strictly observed, in letter and in spirit, for one of Cavour's greatest distinctions, and one in which he contrasts favourably with his great contemporary, Prince Bismarck, is his loyal adhesion to the best principles of parliamentary government. The conviction of this loyalty grew upon his countrymen, and enabled him, in the general election of 1853, to carry the day against the extreme members of both the reactionary and the democratic parties. With his hands thus strengthened, Cavour could now proceed to claim for Piedmont a place in the councils of Europe—a place which, he foresaw, would furnish him with a favourable basis for pushing forward the work of his heart, the reunion of Italy.

The year 1854 brought the opportunity of Piedmont, so long desired, to assume its place as an independent member of the European system. The alliance of Piedmont with France and England for the Crimean War was led up to by various overtures of Napoleon in different senses, especially by declarations of friendly intentions with regard to the liberation of Italy; but the negotiations for this Triple Alliance were complicated by numerous antagonistic interests:—the conflict between Piedmont and Austria was still only suspended, and Cavour, apprehending that Austria, if she entered into the alliance against Russia, would demand concessions which might seriously compromise the interests of Piedmont, imposed conditions which protected those interests. The vacillating attitude of Austria increased the difficulties of the situation, particularly for Piedmont. England and France, in wishing



that Piedmont should enter into the alliance, were actuated by entirely different motives. In the opinion of Cavour, England desired simply to substitute Italian soldiers for English; France, on the other hand, desired to encourage Austria to take a hand in the war against Russia by assuring her of the friendly attitude of Piedmont on the frontier of Lombardy.

The Piedmontese government saw with pleasure a European struggle which might permit Piedmont to take the position in Europe which it desired, though at the same time it might interfere with the acquisition of the Italian provinces of Austria. The King and Cavour had always entertained strong views in favour of participation, but the conditions proposed by Cavour's colleagues hindered the King from accepting the proposals of the allied Powers. The *Moniteur*, on the 22nd of February, 1854, published a declaration that, if and when Austria should associate herself with the treaty of London (November 1853) against Russia, France and England would guarantee her Italian provinces and defend them against all external attack. This is easy to understand. It was important for France and England to have the aid of Austria, and if they negotiated with Piedmont, it was not for the sake of the strength to be derived from its cooperation, but only to prevent Austria from declining their alliance on the pretext of danger from Italy. But Austria, embarrassed, on the one hand, by her connexion with Russia, which had saved her in 1849, and on the other, by her own interests, which led her to desire the security of the Ottoman Empire, combined with some territorial concessions, actually used this pretext, and, in order to secure herself against Piedmont, demanded as a condition the consent of France and England to the occupation of Alessandria. The negotiations for such concession failed, owing to the definite refusal of Piedmont. It was impossible that the King should make any concession allowing Austria, even temporarily, to set foot upon his territory.

The negotiations accordingly dragged on, and Austria by

her indecision postponed the definite accession of *Piedmont* for some months. Cavour, however, was keenly alive to the danger that the western powers, in order to gain the assistance of Austria, would give pledges of a nature prejudicial to the further progress of *Piedmont*. The vague engagements entered into by the Cabinet of Vienna in December 1854, quickened his anxiety and made him resolve to anticipate Austria by joining the league without any conditions at all. On the 8th of January, 1855, the King declared to Grammont his firm decision to participate in the Crimean War without any condition at all. The final decision involved a modification of the ministry. On the 10th of January the minister of Foreign Affairs, Dabormida, resigned, and Cavour took his place. On the same day, he signed the protocol adhering to the military convention, the only condition being a guarantee of the integrity of the states of the kingdom of Sardinia, which France and England obliged themselves to defend from all attacks during the war.

### (3) *The Crimean War.*

The conclusion of the treaty between Italy, France and England, for combined action in the war against Russia, strained both the popularity of Count Cavour and the authority of the King. Combated by the Left and the revolutionary party, still under the influence of the exiles, the war was denounced as anti-liberal and opposed to Italian precedents, which were more in accordance with hostility against Turkey, if participation there must be. The influence of the great minister over the more Conservative elements, aided by the sound common-sense of the King, at length prevailed, and the treaty was confirmed in the Chamber of Deputies on the 10th of February, 1855, by a vote of one hundred and one ayes to sixty-neges. The majority was, however, only ninety-five to sixty-four in secret ballot, a difference which indicates that

the opposition was stronger than it dared to show itself, and that considerable pressure had been applied to the deputies to induce them to follow the government. The vote in the Senate was fifty-two in favour and twenty-seven against; a majority rather due to respect for the King and the government than to the perception of any advantage to be derived by Piedmont from the alliance. It was to the wise prevision of Cavour, subsequently recognised by the public, and to the association of the kingdom in the action of the two leading European governments that the admission of Piedmont to the position of an European power was due.

In April, 1855, the Piedmontese army, 17,767 men, with 4,464 horses and 36 guns, sailed for the Crimea. The original intention had been to place it under the command of the King's brother, the Duke of Genoa, but his death having occurred during the negotiations, the Minister of War, Alfonso La Marmora, took the command. The experience of 1848-9 and the practical sense of the King and of Cavour had taught the necessity of organisation; and the little army proved, by its admirable discipline and by the efficient part it took in several actions, especially in that of the *Tchernaya*, that Piedmont could be counted on as a military power, thus effacing the disastrous impressions of the war against Austria. The sacrifices which the kingdom was called upon to make were compensated by the position which Piedmont assumed in Europe, while they gave it a right to a place in the councils of the powers, which had long been the hope of Cavour.

Prior even to the commencement of the negotiations for the treaty of peace, Cavour had arranged the programme of a visit to be made by the King to the western powers. Accompanied by Cavour and Massimo d'Azeglio, Vittorio Emanuele visited Paris and London in December, 1855, preparing the ground for the later diplomatic action which should secure the recognition of Piedmont. When, a little later, the war had ended, and the Congress of Paris assembled,

early in 1856, the new power was admitted as a full member of the European concert. The obstinate resistance of Austria to the admission of Piedmont to a seat and a vote in the Congress, on the ground that her importance did not justify her presence in the councils of the great powers, was a proof at once of the value of this admission and of the wisdom of Cavour. The opposition was overruled, having been anticipated and provided for in the negotiations which preceded the Congress, during the visit of the King to the western powers.

In the discussions on the treaty of peace Cavour took a dignified and decided part, without attempting to exert an undue influence, and he succeeded in winning the esteem of Russia, as well as that of the western powers. His opportunity came later, when the French plenipotentiary, Count Walewski, acting under the directions of the Emperor, opened a discussion on various subjects of general interest, among which the condition of Italy was far the most important. Cavour had carefully prepared the way for this discussion, by establishing a good understanding on the subject with France and Great Britain. He was thus enabled to call attention, in the most efficient way, before the representatives of united Europe, to what he justly called the utterly abnormal state of Italy, to the oppression of Lombardy and Venice, to the occupation by Austria of the Legations, to the horrible misgovernment of Naples and Sicily. Lord Clarendon, the British representative, energetically supported Cavour's appeal, and no single power, except Austria, ventured to defend the existing state of things. No definite resolution was come to, nor is it to be supposed that Cavour expected one. He had succeeded in his object: he had shown Europe that there *was* an Italian question; he had isolated Austria in public opinion; and he had put Piedmont forward as the champion of Italian liberty and Italian nationality. Nothing in the career of the statesman who was to be the chief maker of Italy shows his

prophetic vision more clearly than his participation—so bitterly opposed by the mass of his patriotic contemporaries—in the Crimean War.

(4) *Lombardy and Venice.*

Meanwhile, in the Austrian provinces of Northern Italy, foreign tyranny was rapidly destroying, by its own excesses, any support which it might have received from the public opinion of Europe. In those parts of Southern and Central Italy where repeated failures discouraged in a less energetic population any farther hopes of progress, the re-established despotism had no cause for alarm. But in Venice and in Lombardy the momentary gleams of liberty, acting on a more resolute nature, intensified the conflict, and consequently made the Austrian rule more rigorous and uncompromising than before. The government at Vienna was not accustomed to be conciliatory, nor had it in its multifarious dominion ever found its way to the heart of any people whom it had governed. The pervading presence of the military element, by which alone Austria succeeded in keeping down the Italian spirit, and the constant collisions provoked by its arrogance, made life unendurable. Persecutions, military courts, imprisonments and executions only served to intensify the brutality of the soldiers and the animosity of the Italians. Piedmont was always on the border, holding the Italian flag in view and always renewing the hope of union with a kindred people. The Austrians understood finally that conciliation was impossible, and after 1849 the "record of repression was something which, as a system, had never been equalled in any part of Europe except in the little known and obscure legends of Russian Poland. The Austrian government remained simply an army encamped in the midst of a hostile people.

Radetzky writes to his daughter on the 4th of November,

1849: "These Italians have never loved nor will they love the Germans; but, persuaded that they cannot liberate themselves by force, they have surrendered, and we are avenged; and that suffices." Don Enrico Tazzili, in a memorial written in prison to explain why the Italians were discontented, sums up their grievances as follows: "The difficulty of communication between the different provinces and the necessity of travelling always with passport in hand, which obstructs commerce and thus impoverishes the country; the poverty of the journalists, harassed by a prying and ignorant censorship, worse even than that of Vienna; wretched journals; a system of universal espionage; the immoral arts of the police, who condescend to denounce as spies those whom they cannot purchase—as was done by the director of the Lombard police with Cesare Cantù; the want of information about public affairs; the obstacles placed in the way of all transactions connected with property in the provinces and communes; delays in the proceedings for the liquidation of state debts; bad conscription laws; monopolies in favour of a few wealthy people; the enormous price of salt; criminal convictions without legal defence or any other guarantees; the appointment by intrigue of numerous German functionaries; a pedantic system of instruction and the use of foreign books; no assurance for the recovery of property, and the hindrance of any petitions to the sovereign." Sforza Benvenuti says in his work on *Crema and its territory*, "The Austrians having in 1849 increased taxation, especially on the wealthy, those persons who had considerable incomes and even those of moderate fortunes threw off that indifference with which before 1848 they quietly paid their tribute to Caesar without demanding by what right and from what city they were governed." On the 11th of November, 1848, a decree dated the 3rd of October was published, in which the Lombards were accused of "being indifferent to the mercy of his Majesty, as proved by the never-failing clemency which he condescended to show to his rebellious

subjects," and therefore were subjected to extraordinary taxation. A special tax was laid on all the members of the past provisional governments and of the committees, as well as on all who had played a leading part in the revolution or had given it their active or moral support.

Francis Joseph, shortly after his accession to power, issued a proclamation dated the 9th of March, 1849, by which he promised a constitutional régime for Austria, but he retained in Lombardy and Venice only military administration. This administration weighed on the people with a severity such as had never before been known in Italy. On the 7th of August, 1848, on his entry into Milan, Prince Schwartzenberg warned all the inhabitants to surrender all their arms and ammunition under penalty of death. On the 19th of August two Mantuans were shot outside the gates for having been found in possession of arms, and on the 1st of September another for having been discovered to have kept a gun in his house. In Monza, in September, 1848, the Colonel in command ordered the land agent of a proprietor and his son to be shot for the possession of a gun. In Milan in September a butcher was shot for the possession of a knife, and a crazy man who was going through the exercises of military drill with a gun in the public street was also shot. In every city of Lombardy and Venetia executions were frequent. Whoever was accused of fomenting dissatisfaction in the army, and whoever was found in possession of arms or ammunition of any sort, was tried by a merciless court-martial. The prince of Lichtenstein at Cremona, Wohlgemuth at Como, and the local commanders in various cities and provinces, condemned and executed whoever was found guilty of any of these offences, and although the population was terrorized into quiet, the inevitable and natural consequence was the aggravation of the hostility between the civic and military elements. Of course in view of the failure of previous movements, and in the presence of the enormous military force of Austria, all hope

of liberation by armed revolt had to be given up, while, at the same time, more friendly relations between conquerors and conquered were rendered impossible by the memory of the thousands who had perished in the struggle. Thus the only possible relation between Austria and Lombardy and Venetia was that of jailor and captive. The detestation of Austrian rule was manifested in every direction, even to the extent of recklessly provoking persecution. No demonstrations of confidence or devotion to Austria were made, or, if a few of the sycophants of power attempted to conciliate their masters by manifesting such feelings, popular vengeance settled the account. At Cremona on the 28th of April, 1852, an Austrian flag having been displayed in the public place, all the windows opening on the square were closed and the theatre that night was empty.

Austria seemed to have abandoned all idea of pacification. The most fantastic and absurd punishments were inflicted not only on individuals but on provinces. The fines imposed by Radetzky in Milan in November, 1848, amounted to over 20,000,000 francs. Mantua was obliged to pay in a few days 400,000 francs. Brescia, under the orders of Haynau, paid 90,000 francs for the province, 12,600 for the expenses of trials and executions and because there had been found in the communal palace some old military effects left there by the Piedmontese at the cessation of hostilities. In January, 1849, a decree was issued that each provincial deputation should elect a representative to meet at Vienna. Not an individual went. At Pavia the military authorities ordered the theatre to be opened, and notified the public that, "if anybody by criminal political obstinacy should persist in not frequenting the theatre, such conduct should be regarded as the silent demonstration of a criminal disposition which merited to be sought out and punished." Haynau at Brescia notified the workmen that if they did not attend the theatres they would be considered as taking part in revolutionary demonstrations.



The list of military condemnations and executions in the year 1849 is interminable. Scarcely a city of Lombardy escaped. To insult the troops, or even to fail in outward respect towards them, was considered a capital crime. In Monza, on the 4th of April, a tavern-keeper named Angelo Previtali was shot for his insulting and threatening demeanour towards the royal troops during a combat; and the meanest Austrian commander was justified in summarily executing anyone infringing one of the military decrees.

An incident which took place at Milan on the 18th of August, 1849, is worth recounting as an example of the height at which this military repression had arrived. A glove-maker, who had decorated her windows on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday with her apron ornamented with the Austrian eagle, was hissed and howled at by a crowd which was dispersed by the soldiers, while the glove-maker was uproariously applauded by the officers in the café opposite. On the 23rd of August punishment was meted out to those who had taken part in this incident. On the ground of "scandalous political demonstrations, insults to the imperial flag, injury and insult to the soldiery, and offences against the forces employed in preserving order, and for revolutionary cries," fifteen men from different provinces were punished with from thirty to fifty blows on the bare back, while Ernesta Galli of Cremona, a woman twenty years old, was sentenced to forty blows, and Maria Conti of Florence, seventeen years old, to thirty blows "for having laughed during the transaction." The expenses of these punishments were charged to the commune of Milan. On the 9th of September, 1849, the provincial council of Milan was dissolved for having delayed in making an address of submission to his Majesty the Emperor, and the imperial commissioner for the direction of civil affairs in Lombardy, on the 20th of September, increased the land taxes in Lombardy by fifty per cent.

On the 16th of October, 1849, the authorities at Vienna

established a system of government in the Italian provinces, dividing them into two distinct kingdoms, each one presided over by a Lieutenant. In Lombardy this was the Prince Charles Schwartzenburg, a man of liberal and humane character, honest, of good intentions, "the least a soldier and the most a gentleman of all the lieutenants," but ignorant of the language and therefore obliged to leave the administration in the hands of the corrupt and arbitrary council. In Venetia the Lieutenant appointed was Antor Puchner, whose merit was that he had procured the support of Russia for the Austrian operations in Transylvania during the Hungarian revolution. At the end of this year Marshal Radetzky fixed the term of one month for the return of all exiles who had not been indicated as accomplices of the revolution, they being liable (on refusal to return) to confiscation of all their goods and chattels. At the same time Montecuccoli, the head of the civil administration, issued a decree, levying an additional tax of six millions a month on the communes of Lombardy and Venetia for the maintenance of the army. The contributions and requisitions for the years 1848 and 1849 were later capitalized in the sum of ninety-two millions, or, according to Di Castro, one hundred and twenty millions, and charged to the Monti di Pietà of Lombardy and Venetia. Montecuccoli also imposed a forced loan of a million and a half of francs on one hundred and fifty bankers, merchants, and shopmen of Milan for the last three months of 1848. At Cremona, Araldi Arizzo was taxed 300,000 francs, Carlo Albertini 80,000; and in Mantua in 1851 the lawyers Rossetti and Predevalli 14,000 francs each. The income-tax, which in 1815 was fifteen centimes on every scudo of value, in 1851 had risen to twenty-four centimes.

Throughout Lombardy in 1851 the population adopted the tactics of abandoning all public entertainments, theatres and spectacles, and avoiding all contact with the governing classes, especially with the soldiers; and this system of passive resistance, which before 1848 was exceptional, now became universal.

Taxes of different kinds and forced loans followed, with paper money of forced circulation, and the pressure in 1851 had reached such a point that from all these various reasons the Milanese population recommenced the agitation for revolt. In Venice there was less pressure and less indignation, but the general result differed but little. The secret committees spread, and the influence of Mazzini increased. A committee was formed, with Mantua as the centre, which, under the pretext of establishing a journal, founded an organization whose actual object was to prepare the means for another insurrection. Its programme, drawn up by Don Enrico Tazzoli, was as follows:—"A monarchical constitution however liberal, though under a good prince it might provide for the well-being of a state, does not give the requisite guarantees for the future, since the executive power has the faculty of dissolving the National Guard, closing the Chamber, or of forgetting, after the manner of the Austrians, to reopen it, or of governing by royal decrees. It is necessary, therefore, to make a *coup d'état* difficult. The representation of the nation ought not to be interrupted, and it is necessary to have a force by which any duplicity of the executive power may be met, otherwise the people will always be exposed to the disagreeable necessity of a revolution. The example of certain countries prospering under constitutional monarchy proves nothing in favour of this manner of government. It would not be difficult to show in this manner that the most absolute government is the best, because some wise and good prince made his absolute power the means of doing good to his subjects. It is not necessary here to repeat the other arguments in favour of the republic as the only practical means of obtaining that triple boon, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, of giving encouragement to the hopes of all, and supplying the stimulus which comes from universal activity and morality. The committee then is in favour of the republic, but in order not to offend the feelings of many good people it

feels bound to study public opinion, proposing to do whatever may be practicable to spread the love of the republic, under the direction of the high-priest of liberty, Giuseppe Mazzini." As a practical measure they proposed to surprise the fortresses.

The organization of the committee was practically the same as that of the Hungarian revolutionists, the central committee of fifteen being divided into three sections; only the head of each section corresponded with those of the other sections, and every member had in relation with him five initiated members, each one of whom had five more, all being known only by numbers, indicating their functions and their position in the organization. In this manner an arrest could only extend to the affiliated members immediately below and above. This committee in Mantua proposed to set up sub-committees in every district of the province of Lombardy, each of which should be another centre of operations; but in most of the districts this was not put into practice. Mazzini directed the operations from London. But in September, 1851, as the conspiracy began to take a more definite form, many persons were arrested. Amongst these was one Pizzi, of Mantua, who under torture disclosed the name of the person from whom he had received instructions—Professor Bozio—and he in turn betrayed Tazzoli. The latter had drawn up a register of the committee, written in cryptograph, the key of which was a canto from Dante and certain numbers. A letter of Tazzoli betrayed Teresa Marchi, who was the custodian of the register, and on her arrest this was discovered. Castellazzo, one of those who possessed the key of the cipher, under torture gave it to the Austrian authorities, and Tazzoli, having from some inconceivable motive registered all the officials of the secret societies with indications of the names of many affiliated, and of the principal chiefs of the committees of Lombardy and Venice, with which the central committee in Mantua was in relation, the entire conspiracy fell into the hands of the Austrians. Arrests in great number followed, including soldiers

and especially Hungarians, over whom the influence of Kossuth, due to their mutual relations during the unsuccessful revolution in Hungary, was very great. Military trials, arrests and the usual consequences of conspiracy under Austrian rule followed. On the 7th of December, 1852, five of the condemned conspirators were hanged. Thus the Mantuan insurrection was nipped in the bud, with no profit to the liberties of Italy but an increase of hostility between the population and the Austrian Government.

At Milan, however, a more ambitious conspiracy was being carried on, under the direction of Mazzini, which, not being discovered by the police, led to an attempt at insurrection on the 6th of February, 1853. The plan, as laid down by Mazzini, was comprehensive. Bands were to enter into the Lombard territory at Pavia, at Poschiavo, by the Valtelline and Lugano; and Mazzini was to be at Chiasso on the 5th of February, awaiting the signal from Milan. It was arranged that Emilia, Carrara, and Tuscany should follow. All depended upon Milan, where Mazzini hoped for a successful movement, in which case all Lombardy would have risen; afterwards Sicily, and then Piedmont was expected to join. It was believed that the Austrian troops would be compelled to evacuate the cities of Central Italy and concentrate themselves on the Po, or by remaining divided would have been easily overcome by the popular rising.

The 6th of February fell in carnival, and the movement was planned with Mazzini's theoretical precision to begin at five in the afternoon. The castle, with its garrison of twelve thousand, was to be surprised; eighteen of the bravest men commanded by the chief of the conspiracy in Milan were to attack with dagger in hand the guard of eighteen men stationed in the tower, after which three hundred of the people, from the neighbourhood, commanded by chiefs of their own class, should break in, and two hundred others in twos and threes should attack by surprise the officers and soldiers in the streets.

The head-quarters in the palace were guarded by twenty-five men, and at five o'clock the generals and officers of the staff were to meet at dinner with the governor. A hundred of the conspirators were to attack them under the direction of one Fanfulla, an officer of Garibaldi's lancers. The grand-guard was in the custody of one hundred and twenty men with three officers and two howitzers, and these were to be attacked by the insurgents of a large section of the city. The royal palace and the barracks of San Francesco were to be attacked by another detachment. Eighty labourers were to be ready with pickaxes and iron bars and piles to raise barricades, and the gas was to be cut off to put the city in darkness. Some non-commissioned officers of the Hungarian regiments had promised to join Klapka, one of the generals of the Hungarian insurrection of 1849, who was to take part. The students of Pavia were to enter Milan on receiving the signal. On the night of the 5th of February a meeting of the chiefs of the conspiracy decided on the rising for the next day. This elaborate plan, as was the case with most of Mazzini's schemes, was theoretically excellent but practically of an extreme absurdity. To suppose that a few hundreds of the populace, without organization and without weapons, could surprise and overpower a garrison of twelve thousand men, implied the entire efficiency and readiness of all the conspirators; it was essential that nobody should betray to the authorities any step in the movement, and that every step should be successfully taken.

The proclamation which Mazzini prepared for the occasion shows the character of the man and the strength of his illusions. It ran thus: "The mission of the national committee is finished; yours begins. The last word which to-day your brothers send to you is *insurrection*. The moment, prepared during three long years, has arrived, and it is necessary to profit by it. Do not look at appearances, and do not let yourselves be defeated by the cowardly sophisms of the timid. The surface

of Europe from Spain to Italy, from Greece to sacred Poland, is a volcanic crust under which is a lava that will open its way in torrents at the shock of the Italian rising. To the Sicilian insurrection succeeded four revolutions; twenty will follow ours. All have bound themselves by one oath in this fraternal organization. We have friends in the ranks of the army which oppresses us, who will respond to our bells when they ring the alarm. The national democracy forms an organized camp, the vanguard of the great popular army; therefore fear not isolation. The initiative of Italy is the initiative of Europe. Insurrection, sacred as the fatherland which will bless it, is the attainment of justice, of improvement for all; and the fraternal life of Italy which it proposes will rise in its might and change martyrdom to victory. Thousands of victims fallen in the holy name of Italy have deserved this from you. Let the movement be as tremendous as the tempests of our seas, and as tenacious and immovable as the Alps which encircle us. Between the Alps and the Sicilian seas are twenty-five millions of our countrymen and one hundred thousand foreigners. The struggle is only momentary if you wish it.

“Insurrection! From city to city, from town to town, from village to village vibrates, like an electric current, the immense word, arousing, raising and exciting to the fever of a crusade all who have Italian hearts and Italian arms. Recall to the people the unmerited massacres, the rights denied, the ancient power, and the vast future of liberty, of prosperity, of education which may be conquered at a blow. Recall to the mothers, the sisters, the friends, plunged in inconsolable grief, their dear ones exiled or in prison, or butchered because they had not, and would have, a country. Recall to the intelligence of youth the freedom of thought forbidden and suppressed; the great Italian tradition which they can only renew by action; the nullity in which they are, heirs of the men who have twice civilized Europe. Recall to the soldiers of Italy

the dishonour of their servile condition, despised by the stranger, the bones of our fathers scattered on all the fields of Europe for the honour of Italy; recall the glory which crowns the soldier, the right of justice and of the nation. Soldiers, women, young intellects and nations, have one heart, one thought, one pulse, one prayer in the soul and one cry on the lips: we wish our country, one Italy,—and the Italian fatherland shall be.

“Attack! break at all points the long and weak line of our enemies! obstruct it! suppress and extinguish the soldiery! ruin bridges and roads and prevent their rallying by aiming at their chiefs! Follow them, arrest the fugitives and make war to the knife! Make arms of the tiles of your roofs, and the stones of your pavements, of the wood of your implements, and the iron of your crosses! Alarm them with fires lighted everywhere on your hills! From one extreme to the other of Italy let the bell of the people sound the death-knell of the enemy! Conquer everywhere! move rapidly to the aid of the place nearest to you and let the insurrection become an avalanche everywhere. Should fortune be against us, let us hasten to the bases of operation provided by the mountains, and to the fortresses which nature has given you. Wherever the combat shall break out you will find brothers; and strong by the victories gained elsewhere you will return the day after. Let there be but one flag—the national—write upon it the pledge of fraternal union, the words ‘Dio e il popolo,’ alone powerful in victory, the only class that does not betray. It was the republican banner that saved the honour of Italy in 1848 and 1849, it was the banner of old Venice, the banner of eternal Rome, the temple of Italy and the world. Purify yourselves fighting under this flag. Let the Italian people be worthy of the God who guides it. Let women be sacred, sacred the old men and the children, and sacred property. Punish theft as an enemy: reserve for the insurrection, the arms, the ammunition and the material taken from the foreign



soldier. To arms, to arms ! This, your last word, is the signal of battle. The men whom you choose to guide you will be to-morrow to all Europe the messengers of the first victory."

The insurrection of Milan in 1853 was the *reductio ad absurdum* of Mazzinian notions. Eloquent proclamations, passionate stimulation of patriotic sentiments, and the provocation of youth to fruitless sacrifice and heroic failure, were the chief elements of Mazzini's operations<sup>1</sup>. On the 6th of February, instead of the expected thousands, there were only one hundred and fifty people in the streets, whose operations began in the murdering of any stray soldiers and officers they found. Of the three hundred who ought to have attacked the castle less than one hundred presented themselves. Seven or eight attacked the guns in the Cathedral Square and the rest dispersed. Fanfulla fled and only stopped upon reaching Piedmont ; the rest of the chiefs disappeared. Of the three thousand conspirators enrolled, only five hundred showed themselves, of whom about one hundred took an active part in the demonstration. At the royal palace, out of the hundred who were to have attacked, twenty showed themselves, of whom one was wounded. Barricades were erected in two localities and the bells were rung to call the people to rise. At Porta Tosa a more serious conflict took place. There, in the narrow street, the benches of a wine shop and an omnibus

<sup>1</sup> The following note from Mazzini to a friend and companion, reads, in the light of the present state of Italy, like a bit of irony, but it only expresses briefly Mazzini's delusions.

November, 1863.

"To N. Degola :—

Italy is a divine infant called by God to be the Moses of the peoples of Europe.

"Each of us is called to be the educator, each of us may be so, on condition that his soul becomes a temple of virtue, symbol of unity between thought and action.

"Do you too fulfil this holy mission and hold me as your brother.

"Giuseppe Mazzini."

were thrown together as a barricade, and here with the guns which they had been able to seize, the few assailants who had been repulsed from the royal palace made a last stand. The casualties, as announced by Radetzky in a proclamation of the 9th of February, amounted to ten Austrians killed and wounded. The populace made no reply to the calls of Mazzini. The doors and windows of the houses were closed and the streets were deserted. All the authorities, including the archbishop, opposed the rebels. It was in fact a complete *fiasco*.

The chiefs of the insurrection escaped, so far as possible, into Piedmont. Of the people arrested seven were hanged on the 7th, nine on the 12th, and two on the 13th. For the same affair, on the 18th of July, 1853, numerous citizens were condemned to punishments ranging from death to imprisonment for terms of years. Tivaroni says that Kossuth disavowed a proclamation to the Hungarian soldiers of the garrison, alleging that it was given to Mazzini two years before for another occasion, but that Mazzini had employed it for this. This is a mistake. I was myself employed by Kossuth in the autumn of 1852 in his secret service, and he had selected me to carry his proclamation to the Hungarian troops in Milan in anticipation of this movement, ordering them not to fire on the populace when the insurrection took place. Another contingency more urgent demanded my services elsewhere and I was sent into Hungary, and the service in Milan was performed by another agent; but that it was actually performed according to the understanding between Kossuth and Mazzini (with the result that the Hungarian regiments were decimated and sent into Croatia), I was subsequently assured by Kossuth himself. But it is necessary to say that Kossuth, in the consultations with Mazzini with reference to this rising, advised strongly against it as certain to lead to no results. Hungary was not ready for the movement, and Kossuth assured Mazzini that, even should the insurrection in Milan be successful, he could not call on the Hungarians to rise. To use his own words, "One must

not play with the blood of the people." Mazzini, however, persisted, alleging that even if the movement failed it was necessary to do something or he would lose his control over the popular feeling. It is said that Colonel François, Director of the Police, had been warned of the insurrection and that the general in command very naturally refused to believe it, knowing that no serious preparations had been made for the rising.

Radetzky declared the city in a state of siege pending further punishments and exactions, and ordered the expulsion of all suspected strangers, closing the roads from Ticino into Lombardy, as the Swiss canton had given shelter to the refugees. He imposed on the city of Milan the obligation of supporting during the rest of their lives all the wounded and the families of the killed, and an extraordinary contribution for the extra pay given to the garrison on account of the insurrection. On the 13th of February, the Emperor issued a proclamation confiscating all the goods and real estate of all the political exiles of the Lombardo Venetian Kingdom. Twice before, the government at Vienna had vetoed this measure. Now Vienna changed its system and the severities of Radetzky were adopted by the Imperial government.

The failure of this movement was fatal to all liberal progress in the Italian dominions of Austria, and at the same time destroyed the influence and prestige of Mazzini over the population. In this respect, perhaps, it was productive of more good than evil, causing the Italian liberals to turn from the fantasies of republicanism to the possible union under the monarchy of Piedmont. At all events republicanism declined in the whole of Italy. A remnant of insurrection still remained in the mountains of Italian Tyrol, where the local chiefs, in combination with Mazzini, had arranged to rise and cut off the communication between Vienna and Lombardy. Pietro Fortunato Calvi, an ex-officer of the Austrian army, took up a position at the Three Bridges in

the valley of Cadore and successfully resisted for a few days the march of the Austrian troops. Overpowered, arrested and escorted to Innsbruck, he was thence sent to Mantua and put under trial before the military tribunal. The examination lasted twenty-one months. On the 10th of November Calvi wrote to a friend as follows; "There is no torture which has been spared your poor Pietro; in the first months of my imprisonment I was subjected to the severest trials and to treatment which makes a soldier's hair rise on end when he thinks of it. I was compelled to say anything that my butchers desired, but you, my good friend, do not condemn me too severely. I beg of you to pity your unfortunate friend and have compassion on him if the treatment was too strong for him. I was ready to face death without yielding, but the brutal treatment which I was compelled to undergo, oh! to understand it one must have experienced it, for it was worse than a hundred deaths!" Condemned to death on the 1st of July, 1855, and asked if he wished to crave pardon, he replied that he wanted nothing of the Austrians. "I hate, and will always hate the Austrians until the end of my life, for all the ill they have done to Italy."

He then delivered to the judges the following declaration, published after his death: "I served Austria in my youth, and for a long time was one of the Austrian army, acting loyally for the time that I wore their uniform; when, in 1848, in consequence of the bad government and the torture which Austria inflicted on my poor country, the population of Italy rose, I rejoiced at the event and recognised the justice of their cause. Abandoning Austria and resigning all my functions, I proclaimed the sacred right of Italy to be independent, and loyally fought in the midst of the people to sustain her invaded rights. But in my relations with others, whether while belonging to the Austrian army, or when having given my resignation I accompanied my brothers, I acted always with loyalty and with the honesty of an honourable officer. Therefore, I protest

against the illegalities employed against me by the military commission,...the torture inflicted on my unfortunate companions, the deceitful questions intended to obtain false depositions for the purpose of dishonouring us, the espionage exercised by the special civil court of justice, always for the same purpose ; and I declare that, rather than deny the sacred principles on which the cause of Italian liberty and independence repose, rather than adhere to the rapacious policy of Austria, rather than sanction its claims by any act which might seem to concede them, or by any submission to its authority, I, Pietro Fortunato Calvi, once officer of the Austrian army, and late Colonel of the Italian army during the war of independence, now condemned to death for the crime of high treason, go joyfully to this death, declaring from the scaffold that what I have done I have done knowingly and that I would be ready to do it again in order to drive the Austrians out of the states which they have infamously usurped. I demand that this declaration made by me, with a sound mind, and written and signed with my own hand, shall be, by the special court of justice, united to the record of my trial, in order that everybody may know that Pietro Fortunato Calvi, rather than betray his country, offered it his body. Dated from the Castle of San Giorgio in Mantua, 1st July, 1855.

PIETRO FORTUNATO CALVI."

To the President of the Court, to whom he offered a cigar and who hesitated to accept it, he said : "Do you refuse to give this pleasure to a dying man? This offer is a proof that I do not feel for you any hostility or rancour and that I desire to die in peace with everybody."

This attempt of Calvi was the last menace to Austrian tranquillity, for the people had finally come to understand that the isolated and undisciplined acts of a populace, however justly indignant, were powerless against the organization and well-established forces of a despotic power. With the cessation of all attempts at violent revolt the Austrian administration

finally adopted a policy of half-conciliation and, recognizing the failure of violence, attempted to win over the hearts of the people by measures which were only regarded as weak, not as friendly. During the visit of the imperial couple in 1858, attempts were made to smooth the way for reconciliation, but the people remained sullen. The Emperor drove through streets where no head was uncovered, and where people cried "Viva" to the syndic who followed, while they were silent before the Emperor who preceded. Some few were won over by the courtesies of the imperial court, but no serious breach was made in the sullen resistance of the masses. The Archduke Maximilian, an amiable and intelligent Prince, conceived the idea of going on a conciliatory mission to the Italian people. He visited Milan and Venice, and attempted to win over the chiefs of the opposition, but his offers were only responded to by members of the public service: the people at large turned their backs on all his propositions. The military authorities at the same time opposed his policy. In 1858 he returned to Vienna to obtain further concessions, but, in spite of all efforts and all concessions, public opinion throughout the Lombardo-Venetian dominions was resolutely though silently hostile. When the students of the university had a mass said in the church of San Antonio at Padua for the soul of Orsini, decapitated for the attempt on the life of Napoleon the Third, the whole city attended. The students and the common people fraternized and the walls were covered with the popular inscription "Viva Verdi," which was the cipher adopted as a combination for "Viva Vittorio Emanuele Re D'Italia." On every occasion which permitted a manifestation of discontent against Austria, demonstrations of a pacific but most enthusiastic character took place.

On the 20th of February, 1859, the death of Emilio Dandolo, one of the leading combatants in the five days of Milan, who had also fought at Rome under Garibaldi and in 1855 volunteered for the Crimean War, took place at Milan.

Dandolo always maintained the most resolute attitude of hostility to Austria and was one of the chiefs of the Piedmontese party. At his funeral fifty thousand people followed the coffin and the entire city of Milan demonstrated its grief and respect. The demonstrations provoked arrest and several of the leading demonstrators went into exile. At the Scala theatre when the chorus of *Norma*, "*Guerra, guerra*," was sung, the audience applauded. At Venice in March, 1858, a great crowd gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the 22nd of March, 1848, and the Piazza was filled with people; ladies were dressed in such a manner as to display by some combination of stuffs the Italian tricolour. When the Archduke Maximilian with the Archduchess appeared, the Piazza was immediately abandoned by the entire population. Until the beginning of the Franco-Austrian war, the attitude of the Italian people in the cities as well as in the country remained absolutely indifferent either to the menaces or to the caresses of the Austrian authorities, and the war put an end to a situation from which neither party reaped any profit.

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE WAR OF 1859 AND ITS RESULTS.

#### (1) *Magenta and Solferino.*

THE position of Cavour after the Congress of Paris was very strong, but it was that of a strictly constitutional minister. It was said in Turin—"We have a ministry, a parliament, a constitution: all *that* spells Cavour." This was perfectly true, but Cavour was in no sense a dictator; it was in and through parliamentary institutions that he worked and preferred to work. "Believe me (he said): the worst of chambers is preferable to the most brilliant of ante-chambers." He governed by persuasion, by his clear and cogent reason, by his immense industry and his intimate knowledge of all departments of state, by his care for every interest—political, economical, educational—of his country, by the confidence he placed in the parliament and by the confidence he received from its members in return. Revolution and insurrection he persistently discouraged, not only in Piedmont, but elsewhere in Italy, little caring that he earned thereby the hatred of Mazzini and the republicans. A futile outbreak, stirred up by Mazzinians at Genoa in 1857, showed at once the embitterment and the weakness of the party. As an antidote to this revolutionary poison, Cavour pushed forward his schemes for economical and financial progress. Taxation was necessarily



heavy, but commercial treaties, railways and useful public works gradually enriched the nation and lightened its burdens. Of these works the greatest was perhaps the tunnel under the Mont Cenis, begun in 1857. At the same time, the military and naval defences were improved. La Marmora continued to reorganise the army: a naval arsenal was created at Spezzia: the fortifications of Alessandria—for which liberals throughout Italy subscribed to buy one hundred cannon—were strengthened. All this could not be done without cost, and Cavour's popularity for a moment seemed on the wane. The general election of 1857 reduced his parliamentary majority in an alarming degree. Still he held on undaunted, confident in the principles which he had deliberately adopted, and before another election came, his policy had been rewarded by its first great triumph.

In all the struggles of this new liberal government from the beginning, its chief opponent and the warmest friend of Austria was the Papacy, which, since the fall of the Roman Republic and the return of the Pope from Gaeta, had become the implacable enemy of any movement towards constitutional reforms. Strong as was this alliance, Cavour was able, in spite of it, to maintain successfully the cause of religious and civil liberty, and it is hardly to be doubted that the adoption by the Pope of the cause of Austria assisted more than it retarded the emancipation of Italy. The Emperor Napoleon, animated, on the one hand, by a certain natural deference for the Pope, and supported by the clerical party in France, could not, on the other, neglect the liberal element which, though temporarily crushed, was still strong among his subjects. Thus, while he was bound to maintain the position of the Pope, it was impossible for him to permit papal influence to go beyond its legitimate rights. But Napoleon himself adhered to the hereditary policy of France, and was in heart opposed to the union and complete emancipation of Italy. He could not, therefore, loose his hold on an influence so likely to weigh

in the future of Italy as was the influence of the Pope; and Cavour, in struggling against these adverse tendencies, required all his tact and all the moral influence of England, which at that time was exercised entirely in his favour, to enable him to obtain the success with which he came out of the Congress of Paris.

Material advantages he did not aim at. His object was to establish the prospective position of Italy, and the immediate position of Piedmont in Europe as the legal and diplomatic representative of the Italy to come. The great conflict which lay in the future between Piedmont, on behalf of Italy, and Austria, must be deferred to a more fitting occasion, when Europe should have recovered from the effects of the late conflict. At the dissolution of the Congress of Paris, Cavour gave to the representatives of the different powers a memorandum in which he said: "Disturbed within by revolutionary activity, troubled abroad by a régime of violent repressions and foreign occupations, menaced by an increase of the influence of Austria, Piedmont may, at a given moment, be obliged to adopt extreme measures of which it is impossible to foresee the consequences." This prophecy and promise of a future period of activity was supported by preparations for the coming struggle. But the policy of Cavour was more diplomatic than military. The failure of Carlo Alberto in his attempt to obtain, by the military forces of Italy alone, the development of Italian liberty, persuaded him that without alliances Italy could not expect to achieve what she hoped for. With the recognised position which he had won for Piedmont as a base, Cavour depended on the friendship of England and of France, not on revolution and conspiracy, to prepare his future attack on Austria. Nor did he neglect other countries: he always kept an eye on the public opinion of Europe at large. Both during the Congress and subsequently he sought to win the good-will of Russia, and he succeeded. With Prussia he was less successful, but he at least obtained

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neutrality from that power, whose policy at that time was one of hesitation.

In depending so largely on diplomacy, Cavour was forced to take steps which perhaps retarded the completion of Italy more than he suspected. The alliance of France could not, like the moral influence of England, be gained without compensation, and he sacrificed so much to that alliance, that his policy might seem too hasty rather than too cautious. But we must remember that England, while lavish of good wishes and moral support—except for a brief interval in 1857—was obstinately disinclined to translate benevolence into active measures. We must remember too that Cavour had the revolutionists and republicans to think of, and he dreaded them as likely rather to alienate than to conciliate the governments of Europe. He was himself, in temperament and conviction, averse from democratic forms of government being carried beyond a certain limit; and the attempts at assassination—which were the morbid outgrowth of the republican agitation—gave his determination a sharper point.

The Orsini conspiracy and the attempted assassination of Napoleon III (Jan. 1858), being of Italian origin, had a very curious effect. At first a terrible embarrassment to the Italian government, tending to alienate the sympathies of Europe, and especially of France, this event led to a closer union between Napoleon and Cavour. It roused bitter feeling between England and France, and thus tended at first to throw England into the arms of Austria. But while Italy thus temporarily lost the support of England—at least the support of the Tories, who now came into power for a short time—she gained the more strenuous support of France. The crime made Cavour and the Italian government more rigorous in their action against republican combinations, but it also rendered the Emperor to a certain degree apprehensive of the possible consequences of persisting in a policy which outraged individual Italians and degraded Italy collectively.

The Emperor in his indignation attempted to force upon the Italian authorities measures of prevention which would have been oppressive to personal liberty, but Cavour and Vittorio Emanuele, while passing a law to punish incentives to political assassination, refused to submit to his extreme demands. The probability is that this attitude of Piedmont compelled the Emperor as an alternative to adopt measures to conciliate the hostility of Italian revolutionary circles, which had come to consider him as, equally with Austria, the jailor of Italy.

However this may be, the Emperor, who had long been brooding over the Italian question, and who in December, 1855, had said to Cavour, "What can one do for Italy?" at length made up his mind. In May, 1858, he made overtures in his subtle, indirect way, for an alliance with Piedmont, overtures which led to the famous meeting at Plombières in July. At this little village in the Vosges, Napoleon and Cavour met in secret, and there in a single day's conversation, the league was hatched which was to revolutionise Italy. No formal treaty was made or signed, but a mutual understanding was entered into. There was to be joint war with Austria: Italy was to be free "from the Alps to the Adriatic," and, as the price of French assistance, Savoy and Nice were to be "reunited" to France. It was a heavy price to pay, but it bought eventually much more than Napoleon ever intended to give. It bought the union of Italy.

Cavour returned by way of Germany from his journey in the west. From Prussia he received only vague indications of hostility to his plans of opposition to Austria, and on his return to Turin he devoted himself to far-seeing preparations for war and for such negotiations with France as might secure the active cooperation of the Emperor. The marriage of Jerome Bonaparte, cousin of Napoleon the Third, with Princess Clotilda, the daughter of Vittorio Emanuele, was negotiated. France assumed an attitude of hostility to Austria,

which was manifested at the New Year's reception at the Tuileries, by the characteristic expression of the Emperor to the Austrian Ambassador, ostentatiously made before the representatives of Europe,—“I regret that our relations with your government are not as good as they have been; I beg you to say to the Emperor that my personal sentiments towards him have not changed.” And at the following opening of the Parliament of Piedmont (Jan. 10), the King, in his address from the throne, said, after announcing the marriage contract: “The horizon on which the New Year opens is not quite clear... Our country, small as it is, has become influential in the councils of Europe, because of the greatness of the ideas which she represents, and of the sympathies which she inspires. The situation is not exempt from danger, for, while respecting treaties, we cannot disregard the cry of grief (*grido di dolore*) which rises to us from so many parts of Italy. Strong in union, confident in our right, we await with prudence and resolution the decrees of Providence.” The speech was enthusiastically applauded in the assembly: it echoed throughout Europe. War was evidently in view. The preparations of Piedmont as well as those of France were made openly, and Austria responded vigorously. On the 7th of February, 1859, Cavour obtained from Parliament a vote of fifty millions of francs to put the kingdom in a state of defence.

Still during four anxious months the war was deferred. In spite of the fact that a formal treaty was made (January 18, 1859), by which France bound itself to support Piedmont if attacked by Austria, Napoleon's characteristic hesitation caused Cavour endless perturbation. A famous pamphlet, “*Napoleon III et l'Italie*,” supposed to have been inspired by Napoleon, appeared to commit the Emperor to a forward policy: still he hesitated, anxious till the last moment to find a way out of the difficulty without war. Austria appealed to the German states for their support. The diplomacy of Europe, disturbed by the prospect of a conflict between two

first-class powers, attempted to intervene. England offered her mediation on the basis of liberal reforms in Lombardy and Venice, and the renunciation of all interference in Central Italy. In March, the proposition of a Congress was made by Russia, and was adopted in London and in Paris. But the proposal was no sooner made than endless difficulties arose. Was Piedmont to be admitted to the Congress? and if Piedmont, why not all the other Italian states? Then England proposed a general disarmament, and this was strongly supported by Napoleon. Cavour, in despair, assented, of course on the assumption that Austria would also disarm. But Austria, tired of delay, herself cut the knot. On the 23rd of April, the government of Vienna, having massed its troops on the line of the Ticino, sent an ultimatum to the Piedmontese government requiring it to disarm within three days under the penalty of a declaration of war. What Cavour was willing to do on the friendly advice of England, he could not do under threats from Austria. He therefore rejected the Austrian demand—which had put that country in the wrong—and on the 27th of April, war was declared. Vittorio Emanuele issued two proclamations—one to the army and one to the nation. The former announced his assumption of the command of the army, and the appointment of his cousin, Prince Eugenio Savoia-Carignano, to civil control during the King's absence: the other accorded a complete amnesty for all political offences.

The Piedmontese forces at the opening of the campaign amounted to one hundred thousand men liable to military service, of whom fifty thousand were then under arms. The Austrian government had in the meanwhile concentrated its troops in the heart of Lombardy between the Adda and the Ticino, the immediate object of the campaign being the invasion of Piedmont and the seizure of Turin. Had the Austrians been energetic, they might have overpowered the Piedmontese army before its allies could appear. But Radetzky



was dead : his successor, Count Gyulay, was a poor substitute. The Austrians were slow ; movements were of the old kind—a few leagues a day,—and the delay gave the French army time to arrive to the support of Piedmont. The first French divisions landing at Genoa supported the Piedmontese from the south, while a division under Canrobert, crossing the Alps, menaced the Austrian army from the north. The Austrians, renouncing at once their invasion of Piedmont, began to fortify the line of the Ticino. The first conflict took place at Montebello, where the French and Piedmontese troops, to the number of eight thousand, found themselves in contact with the Austrian division under Field-marshal Stadion, twenty-five thousand strong. The tactics of the allied army caused the Austrian commander to overestimate its strength and take his dispositions accordingly. Supposing the number of the Franco-Piedmontese army to be very much larger than it was, he remained on the defensive. The attack of the allies was successful and, with the comparatively heavy loss of seven hundred men, the village of Montebello was carried at the point of the bayonet.

Following up the success at Montebello, the allied army marched on Valenza, Casale, Vercelli and Novara, moving along the right bank of the Sesia in order to turn the right wing of the Austrian army, in the hope of outflanking it, and crossing the Ticino before Gyulay could prepare for the defence. The Sesia was crossed on the 30th of May, and the army debouched on the plain of Palestro, on which the Austrian brigade under the command of General Weigl was entrenched. The Piedmontese army was charged with the capture of the village, the King being in chief command. Cialdini with a division of Bersaglieri stormed the heights, on which he placed a battery of four pieces of artillery, and then carried the village of Palestro at the point of the bayonet. This movement disclosed the plan of the allies, and the Austrian Commander fell back beyond the Ticino and massed his army at Magent.

for the defence of Milan. On the 2nd of June the French imperial guard under the orders of General Camou bridged the Ticino at Porto de Turbigo near Novara. The first division of the second corps d'armée, under the orders of Mac Mahon, was enabled to cross on the 3rd and occupied the village of Robichetto, where it received and repelled an attack of the Austrians. The Austrian general, Clam Gallas, who defended another point of the Ticino—the bridge of San Martino—fell back, and the two divisions of the French army which had passed the river united in preparation for the battle of Magenta. The order of battle was as follows: Napoleon III had his head-quarters at San-Martino; on the right bank of the Ticino the division of St Jean d'Angely; on the left of the Ticino between the bridge of Buffalora and Magenta, and behind the Emperor, distributed over a space of three or four leagues toward Novara, the divisions of Niel, Vinoy, Canrobert, Trochu and Renault; while finally, the corps of Mac Mahon, which had passed the Ticino to the north, was approaching from that direction.

The battle began between the troops of St Jean d'Angely and the advanced guard of the Austrians, but feebly on account of the weakness of the French advance; and a vigorous attack of the Austrians on this point would have compromised the position of the French army, but Mac Mahon, hearing the firing, fortunately made haste to relieve the Emperor. This preliminary combat, which had for its object the capture of the railway embankments and the village of Buffalora, continued until four in the afternoon, at which time the Austrians still held firm and the position of the French had become critical. At half-past five the army of Mac Mahon made its appearance, while the divisions of Espinasse, Lamotterouge, and Camou converged on the same point from their earlier positions. The Austrians fell back on the village of Magenta, which was the key of the position, and at seven o'clock an attack in force established the French victory by the

possession of Magenta. The Austrians evacuated Milan and fell back on Melegnano, where they were followed and again attacked by a French division under Baraguay d'Hilliers.

This victory, so seriously contested, barely decided in favour of the Emperor by the ready comprehension of Mac Mahon, seemed to have paralysed the Emperor with the apprehension of his narrow escape from a great defeat, and it was only on the 23rd of June, two weeks later, that the French army resumed its movements. The Austrians in the meantime had fallen back on the Mincio and occupied the position of Solferino, where they were again attacked by the allies. The Franco-Piedmontese line of battle extended from Castiglione and Cavriana on the extreme right, to San-Martino, near the Lake of Garda. The battle began about six in the morning, Canrobert holding the right, Marshal Niel at his left, then Mac Mahon, Napoleon III with the guard under St Jean d'Angely, Baraguay d'Hilliers in the centre before Solferino, which was the centre of the Austrian position; the Piedmontese army with the King forming the left. A desperate combined attack carried the heights crowned by the tower known as the "Spy of Italy," from which a view of the entire field could be had. This was taken by d'Hilliers at one o'clock. The Austrians, massing on the heights of Cavriana opposite, engaged the French in the plain beneath, while Benedek on the Austrian right kept the Piedmontese in check. The battle was not yet lost to the Austrians. On the contrary, the new position was one the capture of which would demand hard fighting and the victory seemed rather inclined to the Austrians than to the French. But the fortunate foresight of Napoleon, who had then introduced into military operations rifled artillery, decided the day. His batteries of rifled guns established on the heights of Solferino under his own eyes reached the Austrian reserves and commanded the entire field of operations. The astonishment and demoralization produced by this new element, and the

necessity of finding new positions protected from this unexpected fire, decided a withdrawal which became a retreat. At night Napoleon III occupied the rooms which the Emperor of Austria had occupied the day before. On the left the Piedmontese army attacked the position of Pozzolengo. After an obstinate fight of several hours they were repulsed toward the Lake of Garda ; but at 4.30 renewing the attack, they carried the heights of San Martino and the Austrian army fell back along the whole line. The loss of the Austrians, in this obstinate battle of Solferino and San Martino combined, was over twenty-two thousand men ; the French and Piedmontese lost over seventeen thousand. In the night the Austrians passed the Mincio and took refuge in the Quadrilateral. The French were now joined by the fifth corps d'armée which had been occupied in supporting the revolt of Tuscany, and at the same time the allied fleet appeared before Venice.

## (2) *Villafranca.*

At this point diplomacy began its paralyzing operations, and Napoleon III, who had by treaty engaged to deliver Lombardy and Venice, or, as he had expressed it, "to liberate Italy from the Alps to the sea," halted and began to temporize. There is no doubt that the narrowness of the advantages he had gained in the two battles just fought, and the danger of defeat, which at one moment was unmistakable, had greatly diminished his confidence in the events of the campaign. At the same time other German powers began to threaten intervention. The Emperor is reported to have been profoundly affected by the unaccustomed spectacle of war, and to have been intimidated by the menaces of Prussia, which had begun to mobilize her forces. This consideration was certainly a weighty one, but even had Prussia acted, he had, probably, already gained advantages in his Italian campaign sufficient

to enable him, by utilizing the forces of Central Italy and extending the sphere of action, to meet the Prussian attack. But the consideration which did most to bring on a pacific change in the temper of the Emperor was the rapid spread of the revolutionary movement in Central Italy, which threatened to upset his plans for its organization, and menaced the position of the Pope. The latter contingency, pressing powerfully on the Catholic party in France, undermined Napoleon's power just where it was strongest, and though the fabled personal influence of the Empress was only a mask for the vacillations of the fickle monarch, the opposition of Catholic France was an element in French politics which he was not strong enough to face. He might have risked the combinations from without, but this menaced him from within. Moreover it must not be forgotten that he was not, and could hardly be, a frank and full-hearted friend of Italian emancipation.

"Napoleon III heard the menace of Germany; he was not certain that he would not have in a few days a struggle on the Rhine, and at the same time one in Venetia: he was besides physically prostrated by the fatigue of the campaign under the burning Italian sun; the view of the battle-field covered with dead and wounded had profoundly moved him; and finally he felt that he might be compelled to accomplish the unity of Italy and to sacrifice the temporal power of the Pope when he had only intended to make a kingdom of Northern Italy. Thus at the moment when France and Europe expected new battles they heard that Napoleon III had had an interview with the Emperor of Austria and that a peace had been concluded between the two at Villafranca." (Sorin.)

The above extract from a French author, who, though not entirely in sympathy with Napoleon III, has given a thoroughly French colour to his history of these events, may be taken as the version most favourable to French honour and consistency which could be given of the conclusion of the war. It leaves the Emperor convicted doubly of bad faith; first in respect of

his promises with reference to the conduct of the war, which were unfulfilled, and secondly towards Vittorio Emanuele who, as his ally, had a right to participate in any negotiations for peace. The object of the war having been the emancipation of Lombardy and Venice, at the price of the cession of Savoy and Nice, he fulfilled only half of his engagement, and yet, later on, insisted on Italy paying the full price,—the cession of Savoy and Nice<sup>1</sup>. It is not possible, with all the mitigations adduced, to acquit Napoleon III of bad faith; but at the same time we must admit that for a weak man who never showed himself a far-sighted or bold statesman, or a man of principle, he did as much as could *a priori* have been expected of him. A bold man or a competent one would have probably followed up his successes. Napoleon was neither.

The treaty of peace, signed at Villafranca on the 11th of July, ran as follows: "The two sovereigns will favour the creation of an Italian confederation; this confederation will be placed under the honorary presidency of the Pope; the Emperor of Austria will cede to the Emperor of the French his rights over Lombardy, except the strong places of Peschiera and Mantua; Venice will form a part of the Italian confederation, remaining under the crown of the Emperor of Austria; the Grand-Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena will return to their states, granting a general amnesty; the two Emperors will demand from the Pope the introduction in his states of indispensable reforms; full and entire amnesty shall be accorded to all persons compromised in the recent events in the wars of the two belligerents."

"This peace, concluded on so vague a basis, satisfied nobody, because, after it as before, Italy was incomplete. Napoleon III had delivered Lombardy, but he had abandoned that completion of Italian nationality which he had pretended

<sup>1</sup> The demand for Savoy and Nice was dropped at Villafranca, but subsequently revived.

to accomplish. He had opened before him an inextricable labyrinth of difficulties from which his diplomacy could not extricate itself and which had a distinct influence, fatal and decisive, when eleven years later he made an appeal to his ancient allies." (Sorin.)

Napoleon III, for reasons based on his personal policy, having signed the treaty of Villafranca, the King of Piedmont was compelled to submit to the decision of his ally as to which he had not been consulted. Cavour was in despair. He hurried to the scene of negotiations, and in a violent outburst of temper, upbraided the King for giving way. Returning to Turin, he immediately resigned his office and left the country. The whole of Italy rose in a tremor of indignation and recalled to the Emperor in innumerable publications and denunciations his famous promises:—"Italy shall be free from the Alps to the Adriatic." The Peace of Villafranca was a terribly painful disillusion for all the friends of Italy, and a ruinous impeachment of Napoleon III, whose timid and inconsistent policy showed that he was incapable of foreseeing the consequences of his own acts. The French army left Italy, cursed and insulted by the people who had received them a few months before with such enthusiasm and friendship. A letter of Massimo D'Azeglio quoted by Sorin draws a just picture of the state of Italy at this moment: "If they had proposed two months ago the following problem: to go to Italy with two hundred thousand men, spend half a milliard, win four battles, restore to the Italians one of their most beautiful provinces, and return cursed by them, one would have said the problem was insoluble. Well! Facts have proved that it was not. In Central Italy the people, excited by so many promises, will not accept the Peace of Villafranca. What will happen? The unknown!... Beyond that, I abstain from all judgement on the conduct of the Emperor. After all he has been under fire for us against the Austrians; and as to those admirable soldiers of France, I would embrace their

knees; but all that does not prevent the situation made for our poor Italy from being terrible."

In communicating the treaty of Villafranca to Vittorio Emanuele, Napoleon had said, "We shall now see what the Italians can do by themselves," an enigmatical expression alluding to the policy of Carlo Alberto—"Italia farà da se"—which Cavour had abandoned, and hinting that the Emperor would do nothing more for Italy. But the Italians had determined, with the tenacity which is characteristic of their race, not to let the work stand still where Napoleon had left it, but to go as far as patriotism permitted against the obstacles which still remained. Lombardy acted as a shield for the southern provinces, behind which Italy could carry on her operations, and the exhaustion of the war and the public opinion of Europe prevented the Austrian Emperor from interfering in what might be done beyond the sphere of his legitimate possessions.

The Congress of Zürich, which met in August, 1859, had invited Napoleon to answer for his work before united Europe, and the programme which he proposed to this congress is contained in a letter addressed on the 20th of October, 1859, to Vittorio Emanuele. "It is not a question," said the French Emperor, "of knowing if I have acted ill or well in concluding the Peace of Villafranca; it is a question of obtaining from that treaty the most favourable consequences for the pacification of Italy and the repose of Europe. At the moment of peace, it was necessary to make a treaty which should assure so far as possible the independence of Italy, which should satisfy Piedmont and the aspirations of the people, but which should not wound the Catholics nor the sovereigns in whom Europe interests herself. I believe, then, that if the Emperor of Austria would come to a frank understanding with me, in order to arrive at this important result, causes of antagonism would disappear, and the regeneration of Italy would be accomplished by a common agreement



without any more bloodshed. These are, according to my ideas, the essential conditions of its regeneration. Italy should be composed of several independent states united by a federal organization, each of these states being free to adopt its own constitution and salutary reforms; the confederation would thus consecrate the principle of Italian nationality; it would have only one flag, one system of custom-houses, and one coinage. The central governing body should be at Rome; it should be formed of representatives appointed by the sovereign of each state on the proposal of the chambers. By according the Honorary Presidency to the Holy Father, we should satisfy the religious sentiment of Catholic Europe; we should augment the moral power of the Pope, and we should enable him to make concessions according to the legitimate desires of the population.'

" This plan, which I had formed at the conclusion of peace, may still be realized if your Majesty will employ your influence to bring it about. Great advances have already been made in this direction. The cession of Lombardy with a limited debt is already accomplished. Austria has renounced her right to garrison the fortresses of Piacenza, Ferrara and Comacchio. Finally, Venetia is about to become a purely Italian province. We shall demand that Parma and Piacenza be reunited to Piedmont, because this territory is strategically indispensable to it. We shall demand that the Duchess of Parma be appointed to rule in Modena; that Tuscany, with the addition of some territory, be restored to the Grand-Duke Ferdinand; that a system of wise liberty be adopted by all the states of Italy; that Austria consent to complete the nationality of Venice not only by creating a representation and an administrative district, but also an Italian army. We shall demand that the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua be recognized as federal fortresses; and finally, that the confederation based on the real necessities and the traditions of the peninsula and on the exclusion of all foreign influence shall assure the work of

Italian independence. Will your Majesty be convinced of this? My sentiments do not vary as long as the interests of France do not oppose; I shall always be happy to serve the cause for which we have fought together."

The conclusion was this,—Piedmont had gained one province, and Italy seemed to be farther from unity than before; but the fire had been kindled, and henceforward there was no power which could resist the advance of Italian independence. The tenacious patriotism which had survived the suppressive measures of the old régime in Piedmont, and the brutality and massacres of Austria in Lombardy and Venice, could not be checked by the barriers of straw which the system proposed by the Emperor of the French would have erected around it. The fire kindled in Piedmont had already reached the principalities and Tuscany: it was soon to blaze up in Naples. Napoleon had left Italy to itself: it took him at his word, and while the Congress at Zurich was discussing the Italian question, the Italians were accomplishing facts which rendered the Peace of Villafranca a dead letter and the Congress an absurdity.

### (3) *The annexation of Central Italy.*

The outbreak of war in the north naturally led to revolutions in Central Italy—in Tuscany, in the duchies of Parma and Modena, and in the Romagna. War was declared between Austria and Piedmont on the 27th of April, and on the same day the Tuscan dynasty fell. The rulers of Parma and Modena fled from their capitals, and when, soon afterwards, the Austrian troops were withdrawn from Bologna to aid their countrymen in Lombardy, the Papal Legate retired to Rome. Provisional governments were at once established in these states, and envoys were sent to Vittorio Emanuele to offer their allegiance to the prince who was already recognized

as the future King of Italy. The King received these deputations and appointed commissioners to represent his authority and interests in Florence, Modena, and Parma. As to these three states there was little hesitation, but the establishment of Piedmontese authority in the Romagna meant a collision with the Pope, and it was not till the eve of the armistice that Massimo d'Azeglio was sent to Bologna to represent the King.

Meanwhile the question of the future of these provinces engaged the attention of all in Central Italy. It was fortunate that in Tuscany, the most important state, the supreme power came into the hands of a man whose energy and courage were only equalled by the statesmanlike insight with which he clung to the policy of union. This man, the Baron Bettino Ricasoli, was the descendant of a noble and ancient family. At the moment when the revolution broke out he was on his way to Turin in order to come to a complete understanding with the King and Cavour. In his absence a triumvirate was formed by Peruzzi, Malenchini and Dancini. Subsequently a more regular government was established, in which Ricasoli became minister of the interior. He soon however asserted his supremacy, and became the virtual dictator of Tuscany. The smaller provinces formed themselves into a new state, which took the name of Emilia. Here Farini, a Romagnol by origin, took the lead, and soon acquired in Emilia the same authority as Ricasoli wielded in Florence. To these two men it was principally due that Central Italy was guided through a crisis of the greatest difficulty to a secure union with Piedmont and Lombardy in the new Italian Kingdom.

In Tuscany Ricasoli had to struggle not only against the partisans of the late dynasty, but against the supporters of Tuscan autonomy, and against the scheme for a confederation or a kingdom of Central Italy, which was put forward by Napoleon and adopted in the Peace of Villafranca. This scheme was at one time pressed upon Ricasoli by Farini and other representatives

of the Duchies and the Romagna, but it was weakened, from the outset, by Napoleon's desire that the central confederation should be headed by a prince of his own family. Few Italians could have wished to substitute French for Austrian domination, and Farini very soon withdrew his support. More could be said for Tuscan autonomy, but to this plan, as well as to the other, Ricasoli opposed a strenuous resistance. At the head of the unitarian party, he insisted, with a tenacity remarkable amongst Italian statesmen, on the absolute and unqualified unity of all the provinces under King Vittorio Emanuele. But the ground was not prepared. The leading Tuscans and the chiefs of Central Italy reconciled themselves with difficulty to the absorption of their country in the little kingdom of Sardinia. The autonomy of Tuscany seemed to them essential to the preservation of the character of Tuscany and its political life, and, in opposition to Mazzini, who had laboured to impress the vital importance of absolute unity, men like Capponi, whose patriotism was unquestioned, maintained the idea of the autonomy of the separate portions of the peninsula. A society called the National Italian Society (p. 190), organized by the exiles at Turin, had been for some years labouring for a federative system, in which each province, adhering to its old limits and so far as possible to its individuality, should become part of a united Italian confederation. The advocates of the union of Tuscany with Piedmont were few, but at their head was the motive power of all—Ricasoli. France urged, and England was not openly hostile to, a kingdom of Central Italy; Prussia alone, with that wise foresight which characterised her statesmen through all the difficulties of that epoch, urged the union of the principalities with Piedmont. The moment and the movement were critical. The acceptance of the project of a Central Italy, once effected, would have become almost an insuperable obstacle to future unity, which could only have been attained by a new revolutionary and probably republican agitation.

Ricasoli threw his whole soul into this struggle, determined to yield to no pressure and to admit no obstacle. He never hesitated an instant in his choice of means or the object to be gained. He combated the supporters of a republic with the same energy as those of Napoleon or the House of Lorraine. But while he refused on the one hand to concede anything to the spirit of separatism he insisted on the fullest expression of the popular will, resisted obstinately an enforced unification, and declared that he would not accept the absorption of Tuscany in Piedmont, but only in Italy under the King Vittorio Emanuele. His persistency marred all the plans of the French Emperor. The premature peace left Ricasoli master of the situation, unless the Emperor chose to impose his decisions by force; and it cannot be doubted that to his constancy and inflexibility was due in great measure the success of the unitary movement, so fruitful in its ulterior consequences. Ricasoli wrote to his brother after the battle of Solferino: "We must no longer speak of Piedmont, nor of Florence, nor of Tuscany; we must speak neither of fusion nor annexation, but of the union of the Italian people under the constitutional government of Vittorio Emanuele. It is to Italian unity and strength that we must aspire."

The Peace of Villafranca threw Florence into a condition of intense agitation. The official bulletins posted on the walls were torn down by the people. The advocates of a restoration of the House of Lorraine excited only the most intense hostility on the part of the Tuscans. The provisional government in Florence prepared for hostilities. A league was formed between Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Romagna, and a joint army was formed, consisting of twenty-four regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, twelve battalions of Bersaglieri and other arms in proportion. The peace, which stipulated for restoration and confederation, obliged Vittorio Emanuele to recall his representatives from the revolted provinces. Early in August, 1859, Boncompagni left Florence. Gicrolimo Ulloa,

a Neapolitan general who had commanded the Tuscan army, was replaced by Garibaldi. Central Italy was organizing itself as a state in readiness for an active union. An assembly was elected which met in the ancient hall of the Five Hundred in the old town-hall in Florence. It voted the deposition of the dynasty of Lorraine and annexation to the kingdom of Sardinia, at the same time offering Ricasoli dictatorial powers. Things were in this state when Mazzini's arrival threw a new difficulty in the way of establishing a solid authority in Tuscany, for his agitation for the republic exposed Italy to a new danger. Ricasoli combated the projects of Mazzini on the one side as he did those of the Emperor on the other, and succeeded in maintaining the moral forces of Tuscany intact. On the 29th of September, a council was held at Scaricalasino, between Ricasoli, Farini and Cipriani, who had been appointed Governor-General of the revolted provinces of Romagna, and it was arranged to send Minghetti to Turin to obtain the consent of the government and of the King to the election of the Prince of Carignano as regent—the election to be made separately by the assemblies of the four provinces. The negotiations ended in a compromise: the Sardinian government hesitated to take a step so compromising for the dynasty, and Boncompagni was appointed Governor-General of the united provinces of Central Italy.

At this juncture the Congress of Zürich, which was called to ratify and give the sanction of all the powers to the Italian settlement, came together. It met on the 6th of August, and sat till the 10th of November, 1859. Never was a harder task given to a diplomatic body to perform than that laid before this assembly; it had been called to approve and countersign the settlement of Villafranca, while this settlement was being rendered futile by events which were its inevitable consequence, and by the irrepressible action of the Italian people. At this moment France had a lively apprehension of the consequences, on the one hand, of renewing the war, and on the other, of

putting excessive pressure on the Italians ; Prussia was ready to intervene to prevent any further prostration of Austria, though indisposed to support the illegitimate influence of that power in Southern and Central Italy ; Great Britain was well disposed towards Italy, but suspicious of France. The hopes that France had entertained, of being able to assume a mastery over the future of Italy by keeping her divided and a field for intrigues such as had been so potent in the past, were frustrated by the audacity of the Italian liberals, no longer paralysed by contrariety of aims and ambitions, or by the incompetence of their leaders. After long discussion, the treaty known as the Peace of Zürich was finally concluded on the 10th of November, 1859. The following are the principal articles :—The prisoners of war shall be surrendered on both sides ; the Austrian frontiers shall be those recognized by the preliminary negotiations at Villafranca ; Lombards who wish to leave the new possessions of Piedmont, or to leave those of Austria to abide in those of Piedmont, will be allowed one year to transport all their effects without duty ; Lombards born in the territory ceded to Piedmont, and enrolled in the Austrian army shall be free. It was further stipulated that the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria should use all their influence to constitute an Italian confederation under the presidency of the Pope. Venetia was to be comprised in this confederation. It was agreed that the consent of the powers should be necessary for any change in the frontiers of the different states of Italy. The rights of the sovereigns of Tuscany, Modena and Parma were formally recognized. The Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria undertook to use their influence with the sovereign Pontiff to secure reforms in his states. A formal clause secured that no person compromised by the late political events should be prosecuted or disturbed by either of the contracting parties.

The decisions of the Congress of Zürich were as futile as those of the treaty of Villafranca. The French Emperor was

obliged to accept the consequences of his previous action. The presidency of the Pope, the confederation of the Italian states, and all other details of the famous scheme vanished into thin air. No force had been provided to compel the Italian people to relinquish what they had won, and they understood that the jealousies of Europe would permit none of the powers to interfere.

The general assembly of the central provinces was convoked for the 6th and 7th of November, 1859, and on the 7th, Ricasoli proposed, and the Tuscán assembly approved, the regency of Prince Eugenio of Savoy and the promulgation of the constitution of Carlo Alberto. The example was followed by the other assemblies in spite of French opposition, and in this juncture the influence of England, now again under the Whig government of Lord Palmerston, was exercised in favour of the union of Italy.

The difficulties were not slight: the timidities of Turin aided the promoters of division, and, but for the firmness of Farini and Ricasoli, the union of Italy was in danger even at this last moment. The Congress of Zürich was still sitting, and Napoleon in response to the votes of the assemblies, notified the King on the 9th of November that he must repudiate the regency of Prince Eugenio under penalty of nullification of his action by the Congress. The attitude of the Emperor excited the indignation of Ricasoli, who wrote to Salvagnoli: "My anger at this new expedient of the Emperor has renewed my strength. I swear that I will not fail in my undertaking, and I hope to accomplish it; in any case I will sooner permit myself to be crushed than yield." In face of this imperial veto, the Piedmontese ministry, in council with the principal political men of Piedmont, contrived the expedient that Prince Eugenio should declare that, though motives of public convenience compelled him to decline the regency, he would, in virtue of the power given him by the vote of the assembly, depute Boncompagni to exercise his authority.



Thereupon Castelli, one of Cavour's confidants, was sent to Florence, with instructions to prevent the sending of the deputation which should carry to Turin the vote in favour of the regency. On the 13th Castelli telegraphed to Rattazzi that he found Ricasoli obstinate, and on the same day he wrote that if the King did not adopt a decided policy, he was convinced that he would lose himself and Italy. "Woe to the King, if he is not inspired by a real Italian will and does not proclaim it loudly. His chariot is the people who elected him King, and if he does not do his duty, that is, if he does not maintain himself and show himself to be thoroughly Italian, he will ruin himself and us. Distrust France and do not trust England too implicitly. We count on the King." Ricasoli resisted all compromises and the pressure of the Sardinian government, and when Boncompagni notified him of his immediate departure for Florence to assume the regency, he openly expressed his discontent and replied that he would not accept anyone as regent but the Prince, in accordance with the interests of the King and of Italy, and with the vote of the assembly. Peruzzi in this juncture assumed a responsibility which did not belong to him, and declared his acceptance of the proposition of a vice regency, whereupon Ricasoli at last yielded to the pressure of all his friends, amongst whom was Cavour, and consented to accept Boncompagni, but with the distinct proviso that he should be recognized as vice-regent in the place of Eugenio of Carignano.

Fortunately for Italy, the French Emperor began, in the winter of 1859-60, to relax his opposition. This was partly due to his growing conviction that the people of Central Italy desired union—and it must be remembered that he always put forward the popular suffrage as the basis of his own throne; partly to the fact that he could not carry out his plans without force, and to apply force for such an end would have been to stultify all the pretensions with which he had entered Lombardy; but partly also—and this was probably

his most powerful motive—to his perception that the annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont would give him a pretext for reviving the claim upon Savoy and Nice, which he had dropt when he failed to go to Venice. The change in his policy was indicated by another pamphlet, "*Le Pape et le Congrès*," and by a change in his ministry. About the same time, Cavour returned to power. The Rattazzi ministry was no match for the difficult and complicated situation, and Cavour became President of the Council, after six months of absence from affairs, in January 1860. The first thing he did\*was to arrange with the Emperor that a popular vote should be taken in the disputed provinces.

But, still true to his character, the Emperor could not frankly and openly give way. He still endeavoured to impose conditions on the popular vote, conditions which delayed the actual union and created great embarrassment and irritation to Ricasoli. The Emperor insisted on the people voting first on the question whether the annexation should take place, or whether the central states should be formed into a new kingdom, and then as to the person who should rule this new kingdom if formed. Ricasoli, irritated, writes: "Say to the King, and say to Cavour, that we must have decided action and firm resolutions: firmness and promptness in executing them. I should like to inspire the King with my own faith; he is the providential man. But beware of uncertainty: in great moments like this, prudence is that course which seems most hazardous. We want no half measures. The King cannot consent to name a king from his own family for Central Italy: he would ruin himself." The good sense of Farini and Ricasoli, ultimately supported by Cavour, at length triumphed over all opposition, and on the 11th of March the plébiscite in the central provinces declared for union in the Italian kingdom. But the representative of France at Florence still protested, and demanded that a vice-regent should be appointed from Turin. Ricasoli replied that this was a free and

spontaneous action of the people, and that he was surprised that France should oppose popular government; he hoped that the French cabinet would not persist in its disapproval, otherwise it would only succeed in making France detested instead of Austria. Montanelli wrote that the Emperor had declared he would never consent to the annexation of Tuscany, to which intimation the people of Florence responded with enthusiastic demonstrations for Vittorio Emanuele. But this was the last of the French opposition. On the 24th of March Cavour signed the treaty ceding Savoy and Nice. "Now," he said to the French plenipotentiary, "you are our accomplices." Guizot was right when he said, "Two men are now foremost in Europe, Napoleon and M. de Cavour. The stakes are laid: I back M. de Cavour."

On the 20th of March, Baron Ricasoli read to the Assembly, which met for the last time on that day, a message in which he rendered an account of what the government had done both in administration and legislation and in general policy. "Our national mission," he concluded, "is finished on that day in which the municipality has fused itself in the nation. It only remains to us now to send to the King an expression of the popular will, and on you to declare your high mandate exhausted. We surrender power with the consciousness of having exercised it for the good of the country; to the King and to Parliament belongs now the government of the nation." Being charged with the duty of carrying the formal result of the Tuscan vote, he was received with great festivities at Genoa and at Turin, where, on the 22nd, he presented the record of the vote to the King. On the same day, a royal decree, which was to be sanctioned by Parliament, declared that the province of Tuscany had become part of Italy. A similar process took place in the Duchies and Romagna, where an enormous majority voted for union in the Italian kingdom. On the 12th of April the decree of annexation was presented to the Parliament formed of the deputies of the

provinces of the Sardinian kingdom and those of Lombardy, Emilia and Tuscany, and by a vote almost unanimous—one vote in the chamber and two in the senate being adverse—the law was approved. Three days later, the decree of annexation became a law of the state, and the kingdom of Italy was legally and effectually constituted.

The King had submitted to the loss of Savoy and Nice not merely as a set-off against the new provinces, but as an earnest of further progress towards complete emancipation from Austria, and Cavour undoubtedly felt that, in his future relations with Napoleon III and in regard to the southern provinces, he had secured French co-operation or at least acquiescence in the steps which might be proposed. But though the King and Cavour had assented, the cession of the western provinces had still to be approved by Italy. Cavour, on taking office in January, had stipulated for the immediate summons of a Parliament, in which members from Lombardy sat for the first time along with their Piedmontese compatriots. This body was now to give way to a parliament representative of the nation. On the 25th of March, elections were held by which for the first time an Italian parliament was legally constituted.

The approval of the cession of Savoy and Nice to France was the great difficulty which Cavour met with in this first session of the Italian parliament. The Savoyards and the Piedmontese were in fact the most solid and conservative peoples of the dominions of Vittorio Emanuele; those upon whom political calculations might be based most firmly, and whose political education had been, if not the most advanced, certainly the soundest and most trustworthy. The Kings of Sardinia, now to become Kings of Italy, had been originally Dukes of Savoy, and to cut themselves adrift from the cradle of their race added an injury of sentiment to one of interest. But the arrangement having been made in the treaties before the war, the payment of the price was insisted on

by the brute force of the French Empire. The pretext of a plébiscite, which was simply a device to cover a compulsory vote, was the means by which Napoleon concealed all his nefarious operations. Myself a witness of the entire transaction, a resident in Savoy during the process of transference from one allegiance to another, I could see that the whole process was one of coercion. On the eve of the vote I had an opportunity to ascertain the opinions of those who were about to participate in it as to whether the population favoured the transfer, and the reply I received was this: "What can you expect? We are sold like sheep; what have we to say to the bargain?" The entire pressure of the Church and of the priests was at the service of Napoleon III, who had made his bargain with the clergy of France, and the officials of the old kingdom destined to transference to the empire were mute instruments of the combined will of France and Sardinia. Thus the decisive vote was a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless in the new parliament there were those who did not hesitate to repudiate the diplomatic agreement and refuse their sanction to its legalization. A violent debate in the chamber of deputies took place on the law for the cession of Savoy and Nice, but after summing up gain and loss from a practical point of view, parliament accepted the "*fait accompli*" by a majority of two hundred and twenty-nine, there being thirty-three negative votes and twenty-three abstentions.

But France lost more than she won. The limitations which Napoleon III had sought to place on Italian liberty led to a separation of interests between the two countries, while the threat to the power of the Pope implied in the project of a central kingdom under a Napoleon alienated the catholic sentiment of Europe from the Emperor. Thus, in the end, nothing resulted to him from his colossal plans, beyond the acquisition of Savoy and Nice—a poor compensation for a much more serious loss—the loss of the friendship of Italy. The consequences were seen when, in 1870, France appealed

to Italy and was refused assistance except on conditions which, owing to his pledges to the Church, he could not accept. Meanwhile nothing more was heard of the reforms which, according to the agreements of Villafranca and Zürich, were to be pressed upon the Pope and the King of Naples. To all such proposals, Pius IX returned but one answer, "Non possumus," and the new King of Naples, Francis II, followed in the steps of his father. Thus they prepared the way for their own destruction, and for the absorption of the fair lands, which they had so long oppressed, into the new kingdom of Italy.

(4) *The Conquest of Sicily and Naples.*

In the southern kingdoms of Italy, the years which intervened between the restoration of Bourbon tyranny in 1849, and the Garibaldian expedition of 1860, were years of depression and misery. Despotism, engaged in a struggle for existence, doubled its severity, and the Neapolitan prisons were crammed with suffering wretches. The governments of France and England, disgusted by the inhumanities of Bomba's paternal rule, protested in vain, and finally withdrew their ministers and dismissed those of Naples. But nothing could teach a Bourbon. Few events of any note break the terrible monotony of this period. The people seemed to have lost the capacity for indignation.

In these conditions, it is easy enough to understand such acts as that of Agesilao Milano, who enlisted in the Neapolitan army in order to get a better chance of killing the King. In the attempt to accomplish this he failed, and paid the anticipated penalty. Such a deed throws lurid light upon the dull picture of misery and discontent stifled everywhere and anyhow. In 1857 took place the expedition of Carlo Pisacane, rivalling that of the Bandieras in the insufficiency of its means and the ignorance of the field where it should plant its seed.

and predestined like it to failure. A few confederates were ready, but the people was still unprepared for a spontaneous movement, and the majority of Pisacane's associates were from the north of Italy. His plan was to embark with his companions on a Genoese steamer which was going to Tunis, and once at sea to take on board a supply of arms to be brought out by Rosalino Pilo, the Sicilian patriot, then to liberate the prisoners at the island of Ponza, with whom they would disembark on the Neapolitan coast and raise the Cilento. A storm, however, compelled Pilo to throw overboard the cargo of his little boat, and the expedition was postponed. On the 25th of June of the same year they started on the ill-fated expedition of Sapri. They had found and seized 150 muskets on board the steamer, and, landing at Ponza as at first intended, they released the galley slaves and sailed for their destination, which they reached on the 28th. Like the *Bandieras*, they found no friends, and being attacked by the peasantry as well as by the troops, they were driven into the interior, pursued and finally surrounded. The greater part of their number were killed in the fight, or murdered by the populace, or taken prisoners, but Pisacane, with Nicotera and fifty others, escaped to the mountains, where they hoped to raise the population. Here they were again beset by troops and attacked by masses of the people of all ages and both sexes. Those who escaped the carnage were taken prisoners, Pisacane being amongst the slain, and Nicotera amongst the prisoners. Put on their trial, Nicotera, Gagliani, Giordano, Valletta, La Sala, de Martino, and Sant'Andrea were condemned to death,—a penalty afterwards commuted: of the rest, some 150 were sentenced to various forms of imprisonment, and 56 were acquitted. The imprisoned were eventually released by the revolution of 1860. The movement of Pisacane was a distinctly republican rising, as much in despite of the house of Savoy as of the Bourbon. It was the last indication of insurrectionary activity in Naples until the coming of Garibaldi.

In the Principalities and in Tuscany revolutionary action had been supported more or less openly by official responsibility. Cavour had used means which, strictly speaking, might be called illegal, to combat an external interference at once unjustified and unauthorized by treaty. The provisional governments under their respective dictators in Emilia and Tuscany had received hearty support from the Piedmontese government. Farini, and Ricasoli were in fact the lieutenants of Vittorio Emanuele. It was naturally expected that a movement in the south would receive the like support, and Central Italy was no sooner secured than it became a basis for plots and revolutionary operations against the provinces remaining under absolute governments.

The Sicilian refugees in England and in Piedmont, taking up again the threads of conspiracy which had more or less existed since 1848, resuscitated the organization suppressed at that time. Francesco Crispi, one of the ministers of the Sicilian provisional government of 1848 and long an exile in England and France, Rosalino Pilo, a Sicilian exile at Genoa, and Francesco Riso, a master-plumber of Palermo, were the prime movers in the revival of the struggle in Sicily. In the course of two journeys through the island which he made as Mazzini's agent, Crispi succeeded in laying down the lines of the new movement, and he then appealed to the governments of North Italy for aid. In December 1859 he went to Modena to arrange with Farini, then Dictator of Emilia, for the assistance necessary to arm and transport the volunteers who might offer themselves for the expedition. Farini accepted Crispi's explanations, and approved his plans. Being practically independent of the government of Turin, he was able, without compromising it, to offer what was necessary: he accordingly promised a million francs. From Rattazzi, then Minister of the Interior at Turin, Crispi received friendly assurances but without practical results. Other revolutionary chiefs, including Pilo, Fabrizi, Bertani, and Nino Bixio, exercised their influence



upon Garibaldi, who had lived in retirement since November 1859, to induce him to take the lead in the projected expedition.

After much debate and long hesitation, with opposition from certain of the Sicilian exiles, jealous of the Mazzinians and apprehensive of losing the lead in any future movements, these men succeeded in determining Garibaldi to move. Rosalino Pilo went to Palermo to prepare the movement in Sicily, in anticipation of Garibaldi's arrival. Unfortunately, accidental delays, added to differences of opinion between the chiefs, retarded the sailing of the expedition from Genoa; and the insurrection which broke out on the 4th of April, 1860, under Francesco Riso, at Palermo was suppressed before the expedition started. The insurgents however took refuge in the mountains, where a few of them under Pilo maintained their organisation despite the activity of the Neapolitan troops.

On the 6th of May, 1860, Garibaldi, finally decided by the arguments and assurances of Crispi<sup>1</sup>, Bixio, and Bertani, and by exaggerated reports of the insurrection in Sicily, sailed with "The Thousand" on two old steamers, the *Lombardo* and the *Piemonte*. The rifles that had been hoped for were not sent, and the steamers were obliged to leave with more than 1000

<sup>1</sup> "Sirtori opposed the undertaking because he did not believe in its success. He abused Crispi, as the principal instigator, and said to La Farina, 'You will be responsible for the blood of Garibaldi; they will say that you have urged him to his ruin.'—'On the 1st of May,' says Saffi, 'Medici also dissuaded Garibaldi from the attempt.' 'On the 2nd,' says Saffi again, 'Crispi and Garibaldi were alone.' 'You alone,' said the General, 'encourage me to go to Sicily--all the others dissuade me.' 'I do so,' replied Crispi, 'because convinced that you will do something useful to the country and highly honourable to yourself. I have only one fear--the uncertainty of the sea.' 'I will answer for the sea,' said Garibaldi. 'And I for the land,' replied Crispi. To this surprising undertaking, three men—Crispi, Bixio and Bertani—certainly contributed; but without Garibaldi, who was not a man to yield to any pressure without being convinced, nothing would have been done" (*Tivaroli*).

volunteers armed with bad muskets, but without ammunition. Undoubtedly the Piedmontese authorities were more or less accomplices of the entire operation. Admiral Persano had orders to close his eyes to the expedition if he encountered it out at sea, but to arrest it if he chanced to meet it in a Sardinian port. After putting in near Orbetello, where Garibaldi, by boldly employing the King's name, succeeded in obtaining from the armoury the ammunition he required and a few obsolete cannon, the steamers went to Marsala, which port they reached on the 11th of May. Two Neapolitan men-of-war arrived in time to witness the landing, but only interfered when it was nearly over, opening fire too late to do any harm. There is a tradition that two British war-vessels, which lay in the harbour, had been sent there with the intention of protecting the landing, and that they took position in the line of fire to prevent the Neapolitans from firing on the Garibaldians. There does not appear to be any foundation for this tradition, and it was evidently impossible for the British ships, being already anchored, to put themselves in the line of fire, which was at the discretion of the Neapolitan commanders; but it is very probable that the notorious sympathy of England for the Sicilians induced the Neapolitans to believe that the ships were prepared to support the landing, and temporarily paralyzed them.

Garibaldi immediately conducted his men to Salemi, a day's march into the interior, where he was reinforced by constantly increasing contingents of Sicilian volunteers. Here a provisional government was organized, with Garibaldi as dictator, Crispi being appointed Secretary of State. Here also the programme of the expedition was announced as union with Italy under Vittorio Emanuele, thus distinctly and authoritatively determining the question of a republic or an annexation to Italy from the very outset. From this moment Crispi practically became the political director of the insurrection. His intimacy with the island and all its personalities gave him

a mastery which Garibaldi, knowing nothing of the island, could not have acquired. From Salemi the Garibaldian forces moved on Palermo. Midway, a Neapolitan force, nearly double that of Garibaldi, with four pieces of artillery, had occupied a steep hill near Calatafimi. A preliminary skirmish in front of the main position was decided in favour of the Garibaldians, and the Neapolitans retreated to the top of the hill. In spite of the numerical superiority of the Neapolitans, the Garibaldians, though twice repulsed, succeeded finally in carrying the key of the position in the third charge, and the Neapolitan troops fell back on Palermo. Garibaldi, following them, was joined near Monreale, five miles from Palermo, by Pilo, who had succeeded in maintaining the insurrection in the interior. Their united forces could not venture to attack the position of the Neapolitans at Monreale. The position was too strong and the numbers holding it too great. Garibaldi was therefore obliged to fall back, Pilo having been killed in a skirmish in the hills. Here under the leadership of local guides a flank march was made, leaving the communications with the west and encircling Palermo through the difficult mountain country south of the city. Thus, while keeping up a demonstration on the side of Monreale, Garibaldi succeeded in moving the main body of his forces to Misilmeri and Gibilrossa, sending his artillery up by a mountain road with a small detachment to mislead the pursuing Neapolitans.

At early dawn on the 27th of May, Garibaldi assaulted Palermo on the east while 5000 of the enemy were searching for him in the mountains. At least 15,000 Neapolitan troops remained as the garrison of Palermo; but the Thousand, led by Garibaldi and Bixio, cut their way through into the heart of the city, where they called out the population to aid in the street fighting. Barricading the streets and constructing hasty defences, the Garibaldians and Palermitans sustained an unequal combat against the garrison. The street-fight ended in the garrison becoming demoralized and taking refuge in the

castle, whence they bombarded the city—an operation in which they were joined by the fleet. On the 30th of May, after a terrible but fruitless bombardment, the Neapolitan commander, Lanza, proposed an armistice; and the British Admiral Mundy, whose ship was anchored in the harbour, offered it as neutral ground for negotiations. The 5000 troops whom Garibaldi had misled into searching for him in the centre of the island, returned to Palermo within an hour of the commencement of the armistice. They were good troops, and under spirited commanders. These men urged the timid Lanza to renew hostilities. There were now 20,000 Neapolitan regulars against the remnant of Garibaldi's Thousand, a few hundred banditti from the hills, and the infuriated but almost unarmed populace of the capital. Never perhaps in the daring life of Garibaldi was his splendid audacity so conspicuously shown as on this occasion. His ammunition was entirely exhausted; he could hardly have offered effective resistance had hostilities been renewed; but, the conditions proposed by the Neapolitan authorities being unacceptable, he broke off the negotiations and denounced the armistice. This audacity cowed the royalists, and a treaty was concluded by which the Neapolitans agreed to evacuate Palermo.

The city was accordingly surrendered to Garibaldi (June 6). A government was organized, and, leaving Crispi at the head of affairs in Palermo, Garibaldi marched eastward on Messina. The Neapolitan forces all over the island were demoralized; the minor fortresses were evacuated, and Messina, Milazzo and Syracuse alone retained their garrisons. Reinforcements came to Garibaldi from Italy under General Medici, while the Italian government, seeing that success had crowned the initiatory movements, relaxed its apparent severity and allowed arms and material to be sent forward with sufficient rapidity. The main body of the Garibaldians, following the northern coast of Sicily, met the first decided opposition at Milazzo. After a desperate fight, in which the Garibaldian losses were

greater than in any other operation in the island, the Neapolitans were driven into the fortress, whence ships subsequently carried them to Naples. With the garrison of Messina a convention was made, allowing them to retain the citadel of that city, under pledge of neutrality (July 25). Garibaldi was now able to prepare for the crossing into Calabria and the movement on Naples.

Meanwhile Francis II, at last fully conscious of the danger, was making convulsive efforts to save his throne. He begged assistance from France: Napoleon replied that it was too late. He proclaimed a free constitution (June 25), but who would trust the promises of a Neapolitan Bourbon? He even humiliated himself so far as to crave the help of Turin, but Cavour reminded him that only a year before, on his accession to the throne, he had rejected the offer of an alliance with France and Piedmont against the common enemy of Italy. It was hardly likely that what had been spurned then, in Piedmont's hour of need, would be proffered again now. The European powers protested against the action of Garibaldi, but none would move. Lord John Russell, acting for Great Britain, frankly approved what was going on, and in a circular to the ambassadors asserted the right of the Italians to settle their own affairs. Thus Garibaldi was left to pursue his course of victory unchecked.

In August he crossed the straits and occupied Reggio on the 21st. His march on Naples was hardly contested, and, as the Garibaldian forces approached, the King evacuated the city (Sept. 6) and took up a position on the Volturno, covering Gaeta—which fortress was made the basis of the Neapolitan operations. On the 7th of September Garibaldi entered Naples. He now issued a proclamation assuming the dictatorship of the kingdom, and in that capacity consigned the Neapolitan navy to Persano, who commanded the Piedmontese fleet. During these operations, the King of Naples, acting, it is said, under the advice of Napoleon III, made

conciliatory propositions to Garibaldi, amongst which was an offer of fifty million francs and the Neapolitan army in aid of the expedition for the liberation of Venice. Even Vittorio Emanuele wrote to Garibaldi that in the event of the King of Naples giving up Sicily, he thought the most reasonable course would be to renounce all ulterior undertakings against the Neapolitan kingdom. The strongest pressure was applied from Paris to induce Garibaldi to halt, and Cavour, with his morbid apprehension of republicanism, unconvinced by Garibaldi's conspicuous declaration of fidelity to the monarchy at Salemi, opposed rather than favoured all his movements henceforward. But the fortunate obstinacy of Garibaldi rejected all considerations of delay or compromise, and he immediately followed up the occupation of Naples by a movement against the King. The royalist army, encamped on the right bank of the Volturno, under cover of the fortress of Capua, had taken up a very strong position against Garibaldi, whose forces were also inferior in number. During the fight, or series of fights, which followed (Sept. 19—Oct. 1), the vigour and audacity of his attacks on the Neapolitan line partly compensated for his disadvantages. But the Neapolitans fought well, and the Garibaldians, though at first successful, were forced to give up the positions which they had won, and were themselves attacked in turn. They repelled their antagonists, and the fighting ended for a time with no decided advantage to either side. It seemed clear that, without the assistance of regular troops, Garibaldi could make little impression on the Neapolitan strongholds. But that assistance was now approaching. The forces of Italy stepped in.

After the annexation of the Romagna, the Pope, foreseeing further trouble, sanctioned the formation of an army consisting mostly of foreign volunteers, which was placed under the command of a French soldier, General Lamoricière. Garibaldi's invasion of Calabria gave the signal for disturbances in the

remaining portions of the Papal territory—in Umbria and the Marches. It was evident that the new Papal army would be used to suppress this movement; it was highly probable that it would also go to the assistance of the King of Naples. Meanwhile the condition of the Neapolitan Kingdom was rapidly becoming anarchical, and serious disorders took place in Sicily. Gaubaldi's attitude had become somewhat suspicious: while ostentatiously declaring for "Italy and Victor Emmanuel," he had omitted to take any steps for uniting Sicily with the Italian kingdom. He made no secret of his intention of going on to Rome, and this was certain to mean a collision with France, whose troops were still guarding the Pope, while he projected an immediate attack on Venice, that is, another war with Austria. At the same time, feeling that Cavour was the chief obstacle to this rash and headstrong policy, he demanded that the King of Italy should dismiss Cavour. It was evident that the whole movement was getting out of hand, and Cavour resolved again to take the lead. Accordingly, on the 7th of September, he requested the Pope to dismiss his foreign levies, and on his refusal ordered the Italian forces to invade the Papal States. One battle, at Castelfidardo (Sept. 18) sufficed to scatter the Papal army. Lamoricière took refuge in Ancona, where, attacked by land and sea, he was speedily forced to surrender (Sept. 29). In three weeks the campaign was over, and all the Papal States, except the portion immediately round Rome—the so called "Patrimony of St Peter"—were in the hands of the Italian government.

This success was promptly followed by the submission of the question of the Two Sicilies to the Italian parliament, which, on the 11th of October, voted for annexation. Ten days later, a plébiscite in Naples and Sicily ratified this decision. But the sovereign "by divine right" was still entrenched in Gaeta and Capua, and it proved no easy matter to turn him out. On the 9th of October, Vittorio Emanuele,

at the head of the army which had occupied the Marches, crossed the frontier of the Neapolitan Kingdom. He joined Garibaldi at Teano, and the patriotic General, who, while detesting Cavour, revered and loved the King, at once placed himself at his sovereign's orders. Capua was taken on November 2, and a week later the King and the national hero entered Naples together. Shortly afterwards Garibaldi, disclaiming all honours and rewards, retired to Caprera, and left the completion of his work to the royal troops. The siege of Gaeta was prolonged for three months, partly owing to the sturdy resistance of the Neapolitan forces, partly to the doubtful attitude of the Emperor Napoleon, who had withdrawn his ambassador from Turin, and whose ships occupied the harbour of Gaeta. At length, yielding to the inevitable, Napoleon withdrew his fleet, and the last stronghold of the Bourbons fell (Feb. 13, 1861). A few days later the first parliament of united Italy met at Turin, and representatives of Naples, Sicily and the Papal States voted, along with the men of Northern and Central Italy, the annexation of the south to the Italian crown.

It was much to be regretted that this splendid accomplishment of a nation's hopes left a soreness behind, and alienated the two great men, Cavour and Garibaldi, who had most contributed thereto. The unfortunate conflict of political tendencies, which had made its appearance soon after the return of Cavour to public affairs, and which to a certain extent justified his predisposition against volunteer as compared to regular service, had developed in his mind a hostility to the former which made it very difficult for him to utilize popular efforts in the direction of freedom or constitutional liberty. It was to be expected that Carlo Alberto, on the appearance of Garibaldi as a volunteer during the war of 1848, should refuse to avail himself of the services of a brilliant revolutionist; for royal prejudices are ineffaceable. But Cavour had had experience of those same prejudices,



sufficient, one would have supposed, to enable him to appreciate and utilize individuality wherever it might offer itself. But his reluctance to make use of any revolutionary force, or of any political agency which was not strictly contained in the formulæ of officialism, led him to suspect not only Mazzini, but also Garibaldi and other irregular agents, whether in military or civil affairs, as dangerous to authority. The consequence was that in this prejudice he no longer distinguished between the men whom he might have employed and those whom he could not. What had been a difficulty only on the mainland, became a positive danger in Sicily, where the conflict between Cavour's agents and the government of Garibaldi threatened to overthrow the new order of things. Garibaldi had installed Crispi as real prodictator, though, for the purpose of maintaining the visible connection with Piedmont, he had appointed Depretis to that office, imposing on him Crispi as Secretary of State. Garibaldi's policy was to organize Sicily as a dictatorship under laws assimilated as nearly as possible to those of Piedmont, allowance being made for the difference of latitude and popular temperament. In accordance with this idea, which was due to the foresight of Crispi, the education of the Sicilians by gradual improvement in the government and assimilation of institutions was provided for. No sudden change either in moral authority or in formal administration was to take place: the insular officials were to remain, while the visible authority was to be vested in an agent of the King.

The central idea of all Garibaldi's endeavours was that Sicily should be used as the base of operations, and that when the provinces of Italy still in slavery had been from this base set free, a general movement for unity should take place, and the kingdom of Italy should be constituted by the voluntary accession of all its parts. The idea of Cavour was, on the contrary, the progressive annexation of the various provinces to Piedmont, so that the kingdom of Italy should be built up

simply by an aggrandizement of the original province. That this was the process by which Italy was to be made one, was shown by what had happened in other parts of the peninsula. But, in the south, local and provincial prejudices presented an obstacle of which Cavour in his rigid theoretical conception of affairs took no account. The Sicilians are a people distinct and different from those of all other provinces of Italy—distinct in origin, in education and tendencies—and their development into constitutional life was much more easy and natural than that of the inhabitants of Naples or of the States of the Church. The island had frequently been the scene of bloody insurrections, followed by violent repression, through all of which the national feelings of the people remained unsuppressed and rose spontaneously at every renewal of an opportunity for national self-assertion. The records of the island are full of splendid instances of this insurrectionary activity, seeking to revert to their independence to the ancient political constitution of the kingdom. The attempts of the Neapolitan monarchy to consolidate Sicily and Naples had met with obstinate and perennial resistance on the part of Sicily. The separate organization of the kingdom during the Napoleonic wars by England, under whose protection the island remained secure within its sea-barriers, had given the people an experience of constitutional government which no section of Italy, not even Piedmont, had at that time received, and the records of British rule have probably never been effaced in the mental history of the island. The insurrection of 1848 had renewed these recollections. In this insurrection Crispi had been one of the prime movers, and it was he who had drafted the constitution under which the island was governed for a year of freedom.

When therefore, in 1860, the Garibaldian dictatorship assumed the place of the Neapolitan régime the maintenance of monarchical forms was easy, and the good faith towards Piedmont of all engaged in the revolutionary movement was

too evident even for Cavour to ignore. The proclamation at Salemi of allegiance to Vittorio Emanuele had been intended as a declaration of faith and a guarantee for the entire obedience of Sicily to the idea of union. But Crispi, who knew his compatriots, and Garibaldi, whose chief counsellor and adviser Crispi was, understood that Sicily needed a political education different from that which was practicable among the sober and conservative populations of the north, as well as from that which Naples and the States of the Church required. They, therefore, had determined on the maintenance of a separate dictatorship in Sicily, owing allegiance to the King, but maintaining its autonomy not only in civil but in military affairs. The administration of the island, retained in the hands of the islanders, meant the election of administrators from the people, and the growth of a practical self-government which could never be attained under substantially foreign rule. Further steps in the movement of emancipation were also to be directed from Sicily, as an independent state— which would be impossible from the moment annexation took place. The autonomy of Sicily was, in the opinion of the Dictator, indispensable to a plan which contemplated the extension of his operations to the States of the Church and to Rome itself, thence, perhaps, to Venice, and which aimed finally, when the process of emancipation should be complete, at a reunion of all Italy with Rome for its capital.

This extensive programme, which had to wait another ten years for its fulfilment, was encompassed, as we have seen, by dangers which Cavour could not ignore; and the apprehensions which Garibaldi's action aroused, added to his abhorrence of Mazzinism, forced him into an attitude of antagonism. He feared Garibaldi in spite of his manifest loyalty to the King, and he had the gravest apprehension of Crispi, whose energy and great influence over the islanders made him a formidable enemy had he chosen to oppose Cavour. Crispi's early political education had, it is true, been under Mazzini, but in

the preparation of the expedition of the Thousand he had given sufficient proof of his fidelity to the kingdom of Italy which was his hope. Had Cavour possessed a knowledge of men equal to his skill in diplomacy, he would have seen that no more faithful instruments for the unity of Italy than Crispi or Garibaldi could have been found to his hand.

As it was, when Garibaldi, in his anxiety to maintain a personal link with the kingdom of Italy, had determined to leave the practical administration of the island in the hands of Crispi, while appointing Depretis as nominal pro-dictator, he exposed himself to the suspicions of Cavour, who discovered under this apparent allegiance plots and projects for the republic, or Heaven knows what other revolutionary schemes. Such were perhaps entertained by Mazzini, but they certainly never existed in the minds of Garibaldi or his Sicilian administrator. Cavour, easily misled as to the character of the men he employed, had fixed on La Farina, one of the early exiles from Sicily, as his adviser in Sicilian matters, and dispatched him to Palermo as the representative of the King. La Farina was a man of narrow, bigoted political ideas, incompetent as an administrator, a bitter partisan, and above all hostile to Crispi and to the Mazzinian sect. He made an early attempt at creating dissensions in Palermo, stimulating hostility to the insular administration, and carrying his intrigue to the point of provoking a violent demonstration against Crispi. Garibaldi therefore arrested him and sent him aboard the Piedmontese man-of-war lying in the harbour. This ended the direct intervention of Cavour in Sicilian matters for the moment, but it increased his animosity to Crispi. Depretis, crafty, treacherous and unstable, consented to promote the views of Cavour while professing fidelity to the Dictator; nominally conforming to the administrative ideas of Crispi, he really began a network of intrigues to precipitate a movement for the immediate annexation at which Cavour aimed. Evidence of this plot coming to the hands of Crispi, he

called Depretis to account; Depretis protested, and avowed ignorance of the proceedings, until Crispi showed him his own correspondence and declared his determination to lay the matter before Garibaldi in person. Depretis declared his intention to accompany him, and they sailed by the same steamer for Naples. After looking over the evidence Garibaldi dismissed Depretis, and proposed to Crispi to appoint him to the vacancy. This Crispi refused, and Garibaldi appointed as pro-dictator Mordini, one of the associates in the expedition of the Thousand. Unfortunately Mordini, though a man of sterling honesty and patriotism, was infected by the same suspicion of Crispi that influenced La Farina and others, and Crispi begged of Garibaldi the privilege of remaining with him in the administration of Naples during the organization of the Neapolitan dictatorship. As in Sicily, Garibaldi maintained the connection with Piedmont by the appointment of Pallavicini as pro-dictator; but Crispi was practically the head of the administration in Naples as he had been in Sicily.

The hostility which Cavour showed to all those whom he considered infected with Mazzinian doctrines was implacable, and the war between him and Crispi was uninterrupted while Cavour lived. It is on record, that Cavour admitted in a conversation with one of his colleagues that Crispi had the stuff of a statesman in him; but practically the relations between them were always those of political hostility. He tolerated Garibaldi as an instrument, while combating all his theories, but for Crispi he had no tolerance. His persistence finally triumphed over Garibaldi, and the plébiscite of annexation was proclaimed by the pro-dictatorial governments both in Sicily and in Naples. When the elections for the parliament of united Italy were held, official pressure was everywhere applied, and, acting in harmony with the enthusiasm caused by the consciousness of becoming part of a great nation, produced a result which strongly confirmed the power of Cavour and the triumph of Piedmont. Crispi was

defeated by official pressure at Palermo, and it was only owing to the forethought of a friend, who had had him nominated in an electoral district under the influence of his family, that he succeeded in entering the first Italian parliament, in the preparation of which he had played so large a part. The most recent history of the kingdom justifies very largely Cavour's distrust of the Republican party, but, had he been a better judge of men, he would have modified instead of intensifying political asperities, and he would have avoided some acts that gravely diminished his political influence towards the end of his career.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE COMPLETION OF ITALY, 1861—1870.

#### (1) *Aspromonte.*

THE first Italian Parliament met on the 18th of February, 1861, in Turin. Ruggiero Settimo, one of the most prominent figures in a generation now passing away, was appointed President of the Senate—a tribute to his constancy, and to that of Sicily, in the cause of constitutional reform; while Rattazzi became President of the Chamber of Deputies. Outside the legal frontiers of Italy, there still remained Rome and Venice; and these omissions were enough to hinder the healthy organization of the State. Conspiracies on both sides of the frontier, with all their consequences, were an inevitable obstacle to prosperity and peace. And to the misfortune of Italy, the master mind, which in all the complications, diplomatic and military, had not for a day lost sight of the end, the fearless and wise pilot, Cavour, died on the 6th of June, 1861. His last important act was to carry through the absorption of the Garibaldian volunteers into the national army, an act which raised a violent storm in the chamber, and bitter recriminations on the part of Garibaldi himself. His next care would have been to find some *modus vivendi* with the Papacy. Whether he would have been successful or not, it is impossible to say. At all events, before he died, he laid down the lines on which the famous law of guarantees was

drafted ten years after his death. He died as an orthodox Catholic, with the words, "libera chiesa in libero stato," on his lips.

What might have been the lot of Italy had the fates called him away a few months sooner, or what advantages the State might have won had he been at the helm in 1866, when discordant counsels and untried hands put his great gains to the risk of total loss, men may, and will, conjecture. The succeeding years of parliamentary education would certainly have been more profitably passed with Cavour at the head of the ministry, for the ablest of all his successors, Ricasoli and Rattazzi, never gained the large mastery of affairs which he possessed. That Cavour was widely popular while he lived can hardly be said, nor were his successors, Ricasoli and Rattazzi, popular men. Political life in Italy, even more than in most other constitutional countries, is exposed to the excesses of hate and partisanship which are the inevitable outcome of a total want of party discipline, and this evil has grown with the State. No one can, however, contest with Cavour the title of the greatest of modern Italians, even when the claims of Garibaldi and Mazzini are allowed. Full credit should be given to the patriotism, courage, and high principle of Vittorio Emanuele. On one occasion, at least—in July 1859—he was wiser than Cavour. But his was not the guiding, the originating mind. Cavour alone had the tact and patience to turn aside the malignity of the counsellors of Napoleon III, and to compel from the Emperor himself the deference due to a superior intellect. He held office for only ten years, but in those years he made Italy.

On the death of Cavour, Ricasoli became premier, and held this post till his resignation in 1862, when he was succeeded by Rattazzi. The greatest difficulty of these years arose from the brigandage of the Neapolitan provinces, openly encouraged and organised from the territory of the Pope, and subsidised by the King of Naples, who had his residence at



Rome. It required the severest measures of military government to put an end to what was in fact a religious war, like that of the Vendée. Unfortunately, while it was carrying on war with the brigands, the Italian government was obliged to treat with the Camorra, which was the permanent curse of the Neapolitan provinces, either to bring it into opposition against the brigands, or to obtain its assistance in asserting authority; and this return to the ancient practices of the Bourbons,—the employment of secret organizations as means of governing—increased with time and became finally the plague-spot of the Italian Parliament. But against brigandage at least the operations were successful. Hundreds of brigands were shot, and many more thrown into prison, priests and friars included, and villages which were the refuge of the brigandage were destroyed. I myself one day witnessed a band of about 200 brigands being driven across the frontier at Olevano, where they were feasted and fêted by the local papal authorities and, dispersing, found their way back again after a few days. Courts martial and oftener short shrift without trial became the exclusive treatment, and even this made slow way, nor was it until roads of the best construction had been driven through the Abruzzi in all directions that brigandage was suppressed.

In Venetia the Austrian repression, if less brutal, was still completely effective. But inextinguishable revolutionary tendencies, stimulated by the constant pressure of Garibaldi and the Extreme Left, the party of action, under the lead of Crispi, Bertani, Mazzini and others, kept up the agitation for the recovery of Venice and Rome. The French Emperor, who had withdrawn his ambassador from Turin in the autumn of 1860, had restored diplomatic relations and recognised the kingdom of Italy after the death of Cavour. Prussia and Russia followed suit. But the French garrison still remained in Rome, and while preventing the government of Italy from taking action, acted as a constant irritant to Italian patriots.

Garibaldi was unable to acquiesce in this state of things. Returning to his old line of action, he organized the expedition against the Papal States which ended in the disaster of Aspromonte. The inner history of this expedition has probably not yet been told. After an unsuccessful attempt in May, 1862, to raise Tirol—an attempt known as the revolt of Sarnico—there was a momentary pause in the unitarian movement. Tivaroni says: "Garibaldi, having returned to Caprera after the failure of Sarnico, communicated to Ripari alone his secret designs. Failure had not moved him; he was impatient to act, could not reconcile himself to leave Venice in the hands of Austria, and Rome in those of the Pope, now that twenty-two millions of Italians were ready. Suddenly, in July 1862, he returned to the continent, and after a secret conversation with the King and an altercation with Rattazzi, went directly to Palermo, where his friend Pallavicino was prefect. The royal princes happened to be there on a journey, and before leaving the town they received him kindly. What is he doing at Palermo? was the question of all Italy. Certainly not preparing for an attack on Venice; but what, then? if on Rome, was it not more simple to start from Tuscany or the Romagna? Garibaldi had left behind him a written declaration that he went to Sicily to allay an autonomist movement which the pending removal of Pallavicino threatened to develop." On the 19th of July, in the cathedral of Marsala, he made the people take the oath "Rome or death." "How can we see Marsala," he said "without determining to complete our interrupted journey?" At Palermo he enrolled volunteers, who were sent to the forest of Ficuzza. Vecchi affirmed that the State gave Garibaldi 1000 muskets, publicly landed. Certainly the prefect Pallavicino, in a banquet to Garibaldi, drank to "that summary of the lives of Plutarch," and proposed the toast of "Venice and Rome."

Shortly afterwards Garibaldi crossed the Straits of Messina with a body of some 4000 men, and made his way northward

through Calabria. At Paternó he encountered a battalion of regulars and showed the major in command a letter with a large red seal, having read which, the officer bowed and retired. Shortly afterwards, however, on August 29, Garibaldi came into collision with the royal troops at Aspromonte, near Reggio. He was ordered to withdraw, but refused. In the conflict that followed he was wounded and taken prisoner. His followers dispersed, and the expedition came to an end.

From these data it is not easy to draw any certain conclusion. The secret history of the affair will possibly never be known. The antecedents of Garibaldi, and what we know of his relations with the crown, lend the highest probability to the hypothesis that Garibaldi was in secret agreement with the king, if not with Rattazzi, and that the expedition had had the distinct assent of the King; but that after it was fairly embarked the Emperor of the French, who, desiring to embarrass the King by compromising him with the party of action, had waited for this juncture to declare himself, suddenly came forward with an imperious demand on the Italian government to stop Garibaldi on his way. Chiala asserts that Napoleon not only threatened active intervention, but actually ordered Admiral Rigault de Genouilly to land a body of troops to arrest Garibaldi's movement, if the Italian forces were insufficient. Troops were therefore sent, and the conflict of Aspromonte ended the expedition—and the friendship of Vittorio Emanuele and Garibaldi.

<sup>1</sup> I was American Consul at Rome when Garibaldi started on this campaign, and one day, shortly before the collision of Aspromonte (having been left by the minister in charge of the Legation), I had occasion to see the Pope on some diplomatic business. I found the Pontiff in a great state of prostration and anxiety. The entire city was in a fever, and it was evident that no one had any other feeling than that the end of the papal rule had come. The Pope said to me: "I see that the great time of tribulation foretold in the Scriptures has come to pass—we shall have our fifty years of affliction, but it will pass and the Church will become more triumphant than ever and will have its millennium." It is impossible not to

*(2) The War of 1866.*

The affair<sup>1</sup> of Aspromonte led to the fall of Rattazzi, who broke with the party of action and fell under the suspicion of yielding, not to his own convictions, but to foreign dictation. He was succeeded (November 1862) by Farini, the former dictator of Emilia, but the new premier soon succumbed to ill health, and made way for the presidency of Minghetti. The new government carried on the organization of Italy with energy and success, on the lines laid down by Cavour. They negotiated treaties of commerce, and pushed on the construction of railways, notably that which traverses the eastern coast, and connects the north and south of Italy by way of Ancona and Brindisi. But the relations between state and church occupied, as they could not but occupy, the chief attention of the ministry. Throughout the new dominions of the King of Italy these relations were assimilated to those already existing in Piedmont. A civil code was established, civil marriage was universally legalized, and many religious houses were suppressed. It was not likely that such measures would tend to mitigate the opposition of the Papacy to the new régime, but this result could not be avoided. The Papal Encyclical of December, 1864, was a manifesto in which the liberal ideas of the time were subjected to absolute and sweeping condemnation, and in which the Holy See displayed to the world its fixed resolve to bate no jot of its ancient pretensions, to make no single change in its methods of government.

This hopeless attitude was not without effect on the policy of Napoleon III. Tired of his repeated failures to influence

feel that the Pope would not have been so despondent, had his information given him any assurance of French intervention; and this would justify us in thinking that the Emperor had not yet disclosed his intentions, but was waiting for Garibaldi's movement to make such progress as to bring him into conflict with the King.

the Pope in a liberal direction, and annoyed by the Pope's rejection of advice tendered by one who was now his only protector, the Emperor at length came to terms<sup>d</sup> with Italy in the Convention of September, 1864. The agreement arrived at between the French and Italian governments was as follows: Italy should protect the papal frontier from all external attacks; France should evacuate the States of the Church within two years; Italy should waive the right of protest against the organization of a papal army unless it became large enough to become a menace to Italy; while the Italian capital should be moved to Florence within six months of the approval of the convention. The dictation by the Emperor of Florence as the future capital of Italy may have been intended to obviate and exclude a later removal to Rome, and at the same time to reconcile the claims of north and south by fixing on an intermediate locality. But it was also susceptible of a different interpretation. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign secretary, remarked to the Italian minister: "Of course the result of all this is that you will eventually go to Rome, but a sufficient interval must elapse to save us from responsibility." The move was not accomplished without disturbance. Riots took place at Turin, which annoyed Vittorio Emanuele, already pained at leaving his old home, but these did not alter the determination of the government, which transferred its head-quarters to Florence in 1865.

But the next great step in the unification of Italy was to be taken with the assistance, not of France, but of Prussia. So far back as the autumn of 1862 Bismarck had sounded the government of Turin as to their intentions in case of war between Austria and Prussia, but it was in the summer of 1865, when the dispute about Sleswick and Holstein began to threaten trouble between the two leading German states, that the first tentative advances towards an actual alliance with Italy were made. The trouble blew over for the time, and

the Convention of Gastein seemed to render it unlikely that Prussia would require Italy's aid. The government of La Marmora—who had replaced Minghetti after the riots at Turin—accordingly tried another tack, and offered to purchase Venice of Austria for a large sum of money—an offer which Francis Joseph declined. But the occasion foreseen by Cavour in 1860, when he told the Prussian minister that, however Prussia might protest against the action of Piedmont then, the time would come when she would follow Piedmont's example—this occasion was now rapidly approaching. War between Austria and Prussia became inevitable, and on the 9th of March, 1866, La Marmora announced to the Italian minister at Berlin the arrival of a special envoy charged by the Italian government with an extraordinary mission. This was to arrange the treaty between Prussia and Italy, which was signed on April 8. Italy in this agreement undertook to aid Prussia in carrying out her projected reforms in the constitution of Germany, while Prussia pledged herself to win Venetia for Italy. Neither party was to make peace without the other's consent. The treaty was hardly concluded when it was subjected to a severe strain. Austria, anxious above all things to retain her supremacy in Germany, attempted to win over Italy by offering, through the agency of Napoleon, to cede Venetia. The temptation was severe, but the King—the *Re Galantuomo*—withstood it, and adhered to his engagement with Prussia.

Thereupon the Emperor Napoleon, eager to prevent the overthrow of that balance of power which kept Germany weak, proposed a congress with a view to so arranging matters as to satisfy Italy, to leave Austria and Prussia on a fairly equal footing, and to revive to a certain extent his uncle's control over the provinces on the Rhine. But the proposal failed through the protests made by Austria against the aggrandisement of any one power at the expense of another, and in the middle of June the war began. The plan of campaign arranged

at Berlin contemplated a joint movement on Vienna, one corps d'armée, under La Marmora, masking the Quadrilateral, while the other, under Cialdini, moving through the Venetian provinces, was to take the road for Vienna. As the price of a war *au fond*, Italy was to have secured the possession of Trent, but on the condition that that province, of which Prussia could not assume the cession in anticipation—as it formed part of the German Confederation—should have actually been occupied by Italy before the conclusion of the war, and thus by virtue of the *uti possidetis* would have to be ceded to her. The French intervention, though only diplomatic, ruined this combination. It is now well known that Napoleon III, by pressure on the King, induced him to abandon the movement on Vienna and the direct cooperation with Prussia, and to adopt instead a less energetic plan. In addition to this cause of confusion, personal and factional politics had their part in the humiliating result of the campaign. La Marmora had no confidence in Cialdini, a general educated in the Spanish school and pledged to certain parliamentary groups, nor in Persano, selected for the command of the fleet through the influence of the Prince di Carignano, whose *compagnon de plaisirs* he was; but, when accused of abandoning the appointment of his subordinates to intrigues in the Chamber of Deputies and in the antechamber, he replied that the war was not serious, Venetia being already ceded in principle, and the Emperor of Austria being too intelligent to employ against Italy forces of which he had need in his operations against Prussia, and too humane to send his soldiers to be killed in Italy without any necessity.

The outcome of this combination of intrigue, incompetence and treachery was the half hearted movement which resulted in the battle of Custoza, in which, owing to the incompetence of their chiefs, the Italians were defeated with grave loss. After crossing the Mincio, the Italian army advanced upon the line of hills between the Mincio and the Adige, to the

west of Verona, and occupied a series of positions the centre of which was the height of Custozza, the ill-omened scene of their defeat eighteen years before. Here they were attacked on the 24th of June by the Archduke Albrecht, whose headquarters had been at Verona. The struggle was long, obstinate and very sanguinary. At one moment the Austrians were on the point of retiring, but, collecting all their forces for a final attack upon Custozza, they broke the Italian centre and obliged the whole army to retreat. The Italians withdrew across the Mincio, but the Austrians were too much exhausted to follow up their victory: nor indeed had they any interest in doing so. They had repelled the invasion of Venetia, and the defeat of the Italian main army prevented Cialdini's advance from Bologna and kept Garibaldi practically inactive in the mountains to the north of Garda. This was probably the result that Napoleon had aimed at, since, in his secret negotiations with Austria, he had fixed this point as that at which the negotiations for peace should commence, and at which Italy should abandon Prussia and accept the gift of Venetia from France.

Meanwhile the Prussians were pressing forward into Bohemia, undeterred by the failure of their ally, and on the 3rd of July the battle of Sadowa decided the fate of Germany. Immediately on receiving the news of this disaster, the Emperor telegraphed to Napoleon, renewing his offer to cede Venetia to Italy, and requesting his intervention. This communication was announced in the *Moniteur* of July 5, in the following terms:—"An important event has taken place. After having saved the honour of his arms in Italy, the Emperor of Austria, yielding to the ideas expressed by the Emperor Napoleon to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, cedes Venetia to the Emperor of the French, and accepts his mediation to make peace between the belligerents." The Emperor Napoleon hastened to yield to this appeal, and immediately addressed himself to the Kings of Prussia and



Italy to obtain an armistice. But to this proposition neither party to the alliance was inclined to consent. Whatever may have been the morality of some influential *Italians* of the day, Ricasoli, who had taken La Marmora's place as President of the Council at the outset of the war, was an honest man, and scorned to betray an ally. Nor was La Marmora, the commander in chief, discredited as he was by the defeat of Custoza, the man to add to the charge of military incapacity that of moral turpitude. Other considerations, besides that of honour, forbade such a step as was proposed. To acquiesce in defeat, and to owe Venetia, like Lombardy, to France, would have ruined the monarchy in Italy and placed the country under the heel of Napoleon. The French alliance was irksome enough before: it would have become infinitely more galling had it now been revived in so disgraceful a fashion. Finally, Napoleon wished to attach to the cession of Venetia a pledge to be given by Italy regarding Rome, and such a pledge no Italian government could give. The King accordingly made answer to Napoleon that he could not consent to an armistice without consulting his ally. At the same time the King of Prussia refused to be checked in the mid career of victory, and the war was therefore continued, both in Germany and Italy. The troubles between La Marmora and Cialdini were patched up, and the latter took over the chief command. The Austrians now retired from Venetia, and were followed by the Italians, who were however prevented by disorganization, want of supplies, and disunion in the supreme command, from doing anything effective to attain what should have been their chief object—the prevention of the Archduke's withdrawal to Austria. Nevertheless they gained possession of Rovigo, Padua and Vicenza, and pressed on even to Treviso. By the middle of July, the whole of Venetia between Venice and the Quadrilateral—which the Austrians still held—was in Italian hands.

The Italian government—or, at all events, the Italian army and people—nourished the hope that they would be able

to add the Trentino and southern Tirol to Venetia, and Garibaldi with his volunteers made some ineffectual efforts in this direction. But such hopes were doomed to disappointment: Italy was not yet at the end of her reverses. To help in the attack on Austrian territory, and also to pacify public opinion, which loudly condemned the inaction of the fleet, Persano was ordered to attack Trieste. He replied that the King had not authorized the demonstration against Trieste, which Kossuth had begged for as the signal for a movement in Hungary, and in order to avoid this movement, which had probably in his prior secret instructions been countermanded, turned aside and attacked Lissa, a fortress off the coast of Istria. Here again bad faith met its meed of disaster. The bombardment of the strong fortifications which protected the island port, carried on through the day, caused serious damage to the fleet, and it withdrew to the open sea to repair. In this condition it was attacked, on July 20, by the Austrian fleet coming out of Pola. The battle which took place was obstinately contested on the part of the individual Italian commanders, but without superior direction, so that the inferior forces of Tegethoff, the Austrian Admiral, gained the victory by superior strategy and discipline. Persano exhibited great timidity and indecision throughout the fight, and at a critical moment abandoned his flag-ship, the *Re d'Italia*, for a smaller and more secure ship, the *Affondatore*, an ironclad of the Monitor type, giving his subordinate commanders no notice of the change. Consequently, the latter, looking for the signals of direction to the flag-ship and seeing none, were left to their individual discretion, and acted without concert. In this confusion a shot struck the rudder of the *Re d'Italia* and disabled her, so that she was quickly rammed and went down with two-thirds of her crew<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> A curious piece of fatuity on the part of the Italian naval officials led to the possibility of this accident. My eldest brother, the head of the great iron-works in New York which machined and cuirassed the *Re d'Italia*,

The emotion caused by this disaster and the want of orders from the Admiral threw the Italian squadron into great confusion, in the midst of which another ironclad vessel (the Palestro), taking fire from a shell, was blown up. Both fleets then withdrew, as if by tacit agreement, from the conflict. The Austrian fleet sailed at once for Pola and the Italian for Ancona, the effects of the battle having been such as to disincline them both for renewal of the combat; for, while the Italian fleet had suffered the severer losses, it still retained a numerical superiority in ships, and the injuries received by the Austrian fleet were so grave, that but for the fatal personal defection of the Italian Admiral and the moral effect of the sinking of the *Re d'Italia*, operations might have been resumed with a possibility of success for the Italians. The testimony of Austrian officers, taken by me immediately after the battle, was in every way honourable to the tenacity and courage of the Italian sailors, and the battle was, from a purely military point of view, a drawn fight rather than a defeat.

Five days after the battle of Lissa—it being now clear that Italy could gain no further advantage by continuing the struggle, and that Prussia was in a position to dictate terms to Austria—an armistice brought the war in Italy to a close. On the next day (July 26) a similar truce was made in Bohemia. Between Prussia and Austria the final peace—the Peace of Prague—was concluded on August 23. Among other stipulations, the King of Prussia undertook to persuade his ally to make peace on the terms already practically agreed upon, so soon as Napoleon should hand over Venetia. That Italy was not included in the peace, was perhaps due to the irritation of Prussia at the inefficiency of Italian assistance, but that the Prussian government had no cause to complain of

and her designer Mr Brown, made every effort possible to induce the officers in supervision of the construction, to allow them to carry the cuirass around the stern so as to protect the rudder. The officials, ridiculing such an innovation, refused to adopt it.

dishonourable conduct on the part of Italy is clear from Bismarck's express avowal in the Prussian Parliament a few months later. "We had (he said) a powerful support in the immutable loyalty of Italy—a loyalty which I cannot sufficiently praise, or too highly appreciate": and he went on to speak of the severe temptation which the Italian government had undergone, and withstood. Moreover, although the Italians were twice beaten, it must not be forgotten that they kept back the best Austrian general and two hundred thousand men, whose presence in Bohemia might easily have changed the issue of the war.

Before the peace between Austria and Prussia was concluded, Napoleon, in a letter to Vittorio Emanuele, dated May 11, expressed his readiness to hand over Venetia: he had only accepted it (he said) in order to save it from the miseries of war. "My object was, that Italy might be free from the Alps to the Adriatic." But more than one obstacle hindered the conclusion of peace. The question of the amount of the public debt to be taken over with Venetia gave some trouble, but the pretensions raised by Italy to the Trentino and southern Tirol—on the ground that these districts, or parts of them, were in Italian occupation at the time of the armistice—formed a more serious difficulty. It was not till Napoleon and the King of Prussia had given Italy plainly to understand that their pledges contemplated nothing more than Venetia, that the Italian government relaxed its claim. Garibaldi and his volunteers were thereupon recalled, Garibaldi obeying with the greatest reluctance, and with a determination to take his revenge in another direction, and on October 3 the Peace of Vienna was signed. Its first article recognises the intervention of France and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. "His Majesty the Emperor of Austria having ceded the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared himself ready to recognise the union of the said province with

the dominions of His Majesty the King of Italy, on condition of the agreement of the populations concerned, &c. &c." In accordance with this treaty, the usual plébiscite followed, and Venetia by six hundred and forty thousand votes to sixty, voted for union with Italy.

### (3) *Mentana.*

The war over, and Venetia annexed to Italy, a new parliament, including the Venetian deputies, met in Florence in December 1866. The French troops had, in virtue of the convention of 1864, evacuated Rome a few days before, and the King, in his opening speech, was able to declare, for the first time, that Italy was free from the foreigner. The attention of the government was immediately called to the condition of confusion in the interior, and of discontent almost grown into insurrection, which with another people than the Italian might have been fatal to the crown. The dissatisfaction of the entire party of progress with the conduct of the war, and with the inaction of the government in regard to Rome, was most outspoken and embarrassing for the ministry. Ricasoli, the leading individuality after the death of Cavour, was one of the most brilliant minds of Italy, and in other conditions, with a stronger predominance of the conservative and monarchical elements, would doubtless have attained a substantial success. The Left had however gained greatly in the last elections, and the conservative Right was not strong enough alone to control the situation. A combination with the more moderate liberals was necessary, and was desired by Ricasoli, and Crispi was accordingly invited to join in forming a ministry. The combination of these two,—Crispi being at that time the head of the Left, and Ricasoli that of the moderate Right—would have formed a government uniting all the soundest and most energetic elements in the chamber. Unfortunately for the nation, they differed on questions of taxation, and Ricasoli

was left alone. Blamed from the outset for military failure and obsequiousness to French dictation, the ministry speedily gave way. A proposal regarding ecclesiastical property being badly received by the chamber, it was dissolved, but the new parliament proving as hostile as its predecessor, Ricasoli resigned.

Rattazzi succeeded, with a more radical policy and a pronounced, if sometimes hesitating, assertion of the favourite doctrines of the party of progress—amongst others, of the necessity of making Rome the capital of Italy. But though the French had left the holy city, the Italian government was bound by the Convention of September to protect the territory still remaining to the Pope. It was clear that Napoleon would insist on the maintenance of this pledge. Rattazzi, with all his progressive tendencies, was a weak man in the presence of political pressure, and dared neither to urge nor to resist the movement on Rome. The radicals, including Mazzini, still in exile, Garibaldi, Crispi, Bertani, and the republicans under Alberto Mario, who refused election to parliament, decided to keep up the agitation for the occupation of Rome, and Garibaldi determined to make another attempt. Rattazzi and his government hesitated and vacillated; they neither prevented nor assisted, and Garibaldi went on with his preparations, while the Pope, on the other hand, enlisted troops for his defence.

Amongst the recruits for the Pope were many soldiers actually on the rolls of the French army, nominally released from military service but, in reality, told off for service in Rome, some of them having lately returned from the unfortunate expedition to Mexico. Of these the legion known as the Antibes Legion was mainly composed. After six weeks of preparation on the part of Garibaldi, Rattazzi ordered his arrest at Sinalunga and he was conveyed to Caprera; men of war were sent to prevent him from making his escape. The King issued a vigorous proclamation bidding all his subjects refrain from acts which would damage Italy in the eyes of

Europe, and might lead to a "fratricidal war" with France. These measures were ineffective, as was proved a few days later by Garibaldi's escaping at night in a little boat and reaching Florence, where he resumed his preparations. But a month or more had been lost, and the papal preparations meanwhile had progressed. The position was now entirely different from what it might have been, had the Italian government never interfered, or had it, from the outset, adopted a decided policy. In vain the King wrote a personal letter to Napoleon begging him not to add to the difficulties of the government by a forcible intervention. Napoleon, driven on by the clerical party in France, could not but adhere to his decision. At this critical juncture, Rattazzi, the victim - and perhaps one of the causes—of the everlasting vacillation and confusion of Italian politics, suggested the desperate policy of opposing by force the military intervention threatened by the French in case of an insurrection. This policy, which proposed to remedy, by a step of the gravest import, an evil which might easily have been prevented, was rejected, and Rattazzi resigned. In the excitement caused by the impending movement of the Garibaldian army, no minister cared to be responsible for the consequences.

On the 20th of October, 1867, Garibaldi left Florence for Terni, where he openly assumed the direction of the movement. At this juncture Menabrea, whose sympathies were French, took the direction of the government, and issued a proclamation declaring the Garibaldians to be rebels and ordering the Italian troops on the frontier to attack them in any case. It is only just to say here that Mazzini opposed Garibaldi's course of action. Both he and Crispi strongly urged that the movement should depend on a rising in Rome, and, to promote this, Menotti Garibaldi and the brothers Cairoli, with a supply of arms, descended the Tiber, landed at Monte Parioli, and made a movement on the city. The expedition was betrayed and abandoned, and the band of volunteers was cut to pieces.

One of the brothers Cairoli was killed and another was mortally wounded. Garibaldi meanwhile crossed the frontier at Passo Cortése and attacked Monte Rotondo, the garrison of which, after a short resistance, surrendered. The battle of Monte Rotondo took place on the 25th of October and the surrender on the 26th.

On the 29th, the French expedition, which had been decided on at the last moment, arrived at Civita Vecchia—a fact of which Garibaldi was in entire ignorance. He, meanwhile, advanced to the vicinity of Rome, and waited for the promised rising within the walls. His information must have been very incomplete, otherwise he would have known that with an army under the Pope, composed of 13,000 men, without reckoning the French, an insurrection in Rome was impossible. He waited until the 1st of November and then retreated to Monte Rotondo, and on the 3rd, ordered an advance by way of Tivoli, the papal troops, together with the French, moving the same day on Monte Rotondo. They met at Mentana, and in the battle which ensued, the Garibaldians, after brilliantly holding their own against the Papal troops, were ultimately defeated with great loss. The action was decided by the French troops, coming fresh on the field with their new breech-loaders, the Chassepots, and Garibaldi gave the order to retreat. He was still ignorant of the actual participation of the French troops in the battle. Unaccustomed to defeat, he determined to end the expedition by utter annihilation or success, and prepared to renew the attack the next morning. The revolutionary committee near the frontier, watching events, had information of the actual arrival and participation of the French troops, and naturally convinced that, as the whole army of the French Empire lay behind the detachment which had landed, success was hopeless, no matter how the battle might be decided, sent Crispi to persuade Garibaldi to recross the frontier. This Crispi succeeded in doing, the committee having first received a promise from the



ministry that Garibaldi should not be molested. In violation of this promise and in spite of the protests of Crispi and his associates, he was arrested at Figline and carried a prisoner to Florence, whence he was sent to the fortress of Varignano. The French troops, having saved the Pope, retired from Rome, but occupied Civita Vecchia for the next three years.

The battle of Mentana, from the military point of view, was doubtless a defeat, but it had the double effect of concentrating the attention of all Italy on the necessity of making Rome the capital, and of opening the way for the co-operation of the "party of action" in Italy with the Prussian government. To the relations of Bismarck with the party of action, and especially with Crispi, is probably to be ascribed the eventual rupture of the intimate relations between that party and France, as well as the animosity towards Crispi which was shown by all the French governments which have since held office. The possibility, that in future contingencies France might find an ally in Italy, ceased on the day of Mentana. Napoleon and his government had declared themselves irrevocably bound to the maintenance of the Pope and the denial of her capital to Italy.

#### (4) *The Roman question.*

During the next three years, spent in struggles between the growing "party of action" and the conservatives, external affairs attracted little attention in Italy at large. Crispi became the head of the parliamentary opposition and waged a bitter, uncompromising war on the conservatives, who were at once the friends of France and of compromise on the Roman question. The government of General Menabrea was occupied in attempting—without much success—to improve the financial condition of the country; in the difficult task of assimilating the administrative system over the various provinces so hastily united in one political whole; and in encouraging education,

which, especially in the south, was deplorably defective. But its principal operation was that of carrying out the dissolution of the monasteries, of taking over ecclesiastical property, and of arranging for the payment of the clergy out of the funds of the state. These radical changes in the relations of church and state had been voted by parliament in June 1866: they met with all possible opposition from Rome. It was in vain that the government bestirred itself to come to terms with the Pope; in vain that it tried to obtain even such concessions as had been granted in Austria and France and other Catholic countries; in vain that it sought to conciliate hostility by pardoning and recalling the bishops who had been imprisoned or sequestered on account of their opposition to the Siccardine and other ecclesiastical laws: the only answer was a stubborn refusal to recognise any acts of him whom Pius IX persisted in calling the King of Sardinia.

Naturally enough, the obstinacy of the Papacy increased the irritation, already chronic, caused by the French occupation of Civita Vecchia. The position was, in itself, humiliating to national pride, and it was all the more galling because it encouraged the Pope in his resistance to the national will. It is not, indeed, to be supposed that the ecclesiastical policy of the government was universally approved in Italy: the clerical party was very influential, and the interests of the nobility, especially in the Papal states and the Neapolitan kingdom, were closely involved with those of the church: still the great majority of the people supported the government, and was therefore all the more anxious to banish the French from Rome. The question became, in the complicated conditions of the day, one of European importance. Prussia had no objection to seeing the Italians in Rome, and was naturally anxious to renew the alliance of 1866. Austria, after the cession of Venetia, showed an increasing friendliness to Italy, and finding the Pope quite impervious to her influence, manifestly cooled in her relations with the Vatican. The

decision depended on the attitude of France. But the French government was obstinate. Napoleon's minister, Rouher, when approached with a view to obtaining the permission of France for an occupation of Rome, replied with the famous words, "Jamais ! jamais !", which echoed through Italy, and finally ruined the Franco-Italian alliance. On the other hand, Prince Jerome Napoleon, cousin of the Emperor, in a brochure<sup>1</sup> on the subject, says : "Italy supported by Austria, has demanded the revocation of the Convention of September. Our troops must be recalled. We should make an engagement never to return to Rome, while allowing Italy to reserve to herself the right of occupying it." It was on this last point that the negotiations failed.

The Menabrea ministry, soon after coming to power, had received overtures for a renewal of the alliance of 1859 between France and Italy, in view of the conflict which had been looming up, ever since Sadowa, between France and Prussia. Menabrea believed in the victory of France in this contingency ; he held that Prussia would be defeated and obliged to pay a war indemnity to the Franco-Italian coalition, which would restore the equilibrium of Italian finances and strengthen the position of Italy in Europe ; he hoped at the same time to obtain the abandonment of Rome by France. Austria-Hungary had, under the influence of Counts Beust and Andrassy, promised adhesion to this policy in principle, with the condition that the Emperor of the French should concede the evacuation of Rome as an indispensable preliminary step to the coalition between France, Austria-Hungary and Italy. This alliance would have given the cabinet of Vienna a basis of action as an armed mediator between France and Italy on one side and Prussia on the other. Beust held himself ready to intervene at the moment of the anticipated victory of the French, a victory which would

<sup>1</sup> Entitled "Les Alliances de l'Empire en 1869 et 1870."

have secured for France the boundary of the Rhine, would have preserved Germany from further invasion by the French, and at the same time would have checked Prussian ambitions with regard to the South-German states.

A change of ministry in November, 1869, throwing out Menabrea, brought in Lanza, Visconti-Venosta and Sella. In this ministry Sella was friendly to Germany, while French tendencies were represented by Visconti-Venosta, the personal sympathies of the King leading him to co-operation with France; but this policy being opposed by the general sentiment of Italy, dissensions arose in the ministry. The French government, by its mistaken policy, strengthened the position of Sella and enabled him to resist successfully any engagement with France. The Empress Eugenie, passing through Venice earlier in 1869, on her way to the opening of the Suez Canal, had had a conversation with Menabrea, in which she expressed to the Italian statesman her determined opposition to any concession on the question of Rome, repeating in substance the "Jamais" of Rouher. The Duke of Grammont, when he was Ambassador in Vienna, had asserted that, if France could control Austria-Hungary, Southern Germany and the Catholics of the Rhine, she could dispense with any cooperation on the part of Italy; and on the opening of hostilities in 1870, Nigra telegraphed from Paris that the Emperor had no need of Italian assistance, but that if the Italians desired to see their soldiers again at the side of their ancient allies, he would receive an Italian corps d'armée.

Austria-Hungary, seeing France about to precipitate a conflict without a sufficient understanding between Vienna and Paris, and beginning, from the moment of the declaration of war, to entertain doubts as to the military and political readiness of Napoleon, who was attempting to drag the cabinet of Vienna into an immediate participation in hostilities, evaded the insistence of France by offering her good offices at Florence to obtain the assistance of Italy. This was the

purpose of the mission of Count Vitzthum to Florence. His proposition was that Italy should take the front line as the ally of France, Austria-Hungary being ready to support this alliance with an army in observation on the German frontier, and with operations in Bavaria *if* the French passed the Rhine. In answer to this invitation, the cabinet of Florence made the counter-proposition that Italy should take active measures in support of Austria-Hungary, if the latter, in consequence of its friendliness towards France, should be menaced by Russia; in which case Italy would have had a sufficient motive for action in the fact that any intervention on the part of Russia against Austria-Hungary might compromise the results of the Crimean war and the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, which Italy had signed. It was seen in the sequel that this indirect connexion between the Franco-Prussian war and the situation of Russia on the Black Sea was not imaginary.

Meanwhile, on August 3, 1870, a direct request for an alliance against Prussia was made. But the condition imposed by Austria and by Italy on intervention, in any shape, was the surrender of Rome to Italy. This condition Napoleon III still refused, and his refusal sealed the fate of the Second Empire. Prince Napoleon, whose Italian sympathies were stronger than those of the Emperor, urged him very strongly to give way. "Sign in any case," said he: "sign the treaty in spite of the faults of orthography; advise Vienna and Florence that you have signed; engage your allies. Modifications may be imposed if we are victorious; if we are beaten, you will at least have an entrenchment and a claim on the support of your friends. But, in the name of God, sign before the fortune of arms had been pronounced." The hesitations of the Emperor were invincible. The clerical influences at home were too strong for him to accept the policy of Prince Jerome. He delayed until the first serious conflict—the battle of Woerth (6 August, 1870)—was decided against him. He had already

—on August 3—recalled his troops from Civita Vecchia: he now hastened to renew the negotiations, but it was too late. Prince Napoleon brought to Vittorio Emanuele a sheet of paper with the signature of the Emperor at the bottom, and said to Lanza, the Prime Minister, "Fill in what you please." Lanza took counsel with the Austrian cabinet, which replied "Too late." The pressure of the Parliamentary Left in this emergency was decisive. The King desired to move, but the opposition of the ministers—who assured him that sufficient forces could not be mobilised in time—and of the "party of action" was such that he was dissuaded<sup>1</sup>. Sorin says that Vittorio Emanuele received in his box at the theatre on the night of the 6th of August a dispatch which he read with emotion. He returned to the Pitti Palace and exclaimed, "The poor Emperor! I pity him, but I have had a lucky escape." This dispatch was the news of the defeat of Woerth.

To the succeeding appeals for succour from France, which had learned too late not to despise the assistance of Italy, the ministry at Florence replied by negotiating with Austria-Hungary and England the well-known league of neutrals for the localization of the war.

### (5) *The occupation of Rome.*

One of the first results of the reverses which Napoleon met with at the outset of the war was to bring Mazzini again upon the scene, with a futile attempt to raise the flag of the Republic. The facts, as recorded in the diary of Stefano Castagnola, then Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, are as follows:—"The first news of the arrival of the great thinker in Sicily came by telegram from General Medici, dated from

<sup>1</sup> When Vittorio Emanuele visited the Emperor William at Berlin, in 1873, he frankly said to the Emperor, "But for these gentlemen (pointing to his ministers, Minghetti and Visconti-Venosta), I should have made war on you at that time (1870)."

Palermo on the 12th of August 1870, followed by another on the 13th: 'As I yesterday warned you, Mazzini arrived here to-day by the mail-steamer from Naples; he was arrested and sent on board the frigate *Ettore Fieramosca*. To avoid possible excitement in the country, I send the frigate to Messina, where it will await my orders according to such dispositions as Your Excellency may communicate to me. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to send him to England.' The order of arrest had been given by the prime minister, Lanza, in consequence of Medici's first telegram. The council of ministers approved the arrest, and decided to have it confirmed by the judicial authorities and then to confine Mazzini in the fortress of Gaeta." The presence of Mazzini gave rise here and there in the peninsula to local republican demonstrations, e.g. on the 15th at Lecco. His followers, Piccoli and Foglia, landed at Catanzaro, and in the night of the 15th-16th of August republican demonstrations were made by some forty persons at Ancona. At Pavia more serious incidents took place; the soldiers were attacked, stones were thrown at the palace of the Prefecture, and the Society of Veterans published insolent proclamations. The government was, however, determined that in settling with Rome it would be master of the time and the manner, and that the occupation should not be the work of a conspiracy, which might in the end turn to a Republican movement. That the Republicans intended to make it such, was evident not only from the return of Mazzini from his exile and his attempt to land in Sicily, where it is known that he intended to raise the flag of the Republic, but from other incidents. To the facts noted in the diary of Castagnola, it may be added that Nicotera had agreed with Mazzini to form a band in the mountains of Naples to act in concert with Mazzini's attempt in Sicily. Mazzini was released from prison at Gaeta on October 9th. In the interval, the occupation of Rome had taken place.

The French Emperor having recalled his troops from Civita Vecchia, early in August, 1870, Italy was finally free from any foreign presence. Shortly afterwards the German victories removed any fear of further French interference. The Italian government, driven on by the "party of action" and apprehensive of revolution and the republic if the popular movement were not responded to, decided to occupy Rome. The King made a final effort, by a personal appeal, to induce the Pope to consent to the occupation; Pius IX civilly but firmly refused. By a striking coincidence, the Ecumenical Council, which had been sitting in Rome since the end of 1869, voted the infallibility of the Pope on the 14th of July, 1870, on the eve of the day on which France declared war on Prussia. Such a decree may well have strengthened the Pope in his determination not to yield, but Pope and Emperor were doomed to fall together.

Of the French element in the Papal garrison, nothing remained except the few volunteers not liable to military service in France; but what with the native troops, the Swiss battalions, and the corps entitled Pontifical Zouaves, who belonged to all nations, the forces at the command of the Pope amounted to 13,700, of whom 11,000 were efficient combatants. Against these the Italian government sent an army of 35,000 men under the command of General Cadorna. A corps under Nino Bixio moved down the Tiber, and after crossing the river at Orte and Civita Castellana marched by Viterbo toward Civita Vecchia. The intention of Bixio appears to have been to drive Charette—the Papal commander—into Civita Vecchia and to shut him up in the fortress, but, owing to a lack of unity in the movements of the Italian forces, he failed to accomplish his purpose, and before he reached Civita Vecchia, Charette had escaped to Rome.

Civita Vecchia, attacked from the sea by Admiral del Caretto and on land by Bixio, surrendered with its garrison



of 1500 men, and Bixio with his forces joined the movement on Rome. Cadorna, with the bulk of the troops, moved down the right bank of the Tiber and occupied the country to the north-east of Castel Giubileo, where he threw the main body of his forces across the river and closed in on the city from the north-east and south-east where the line of papal defences terminated at Monte Aventino. The troops having crossed the temporary bridge at Castel Giubileo on the morning of the 16th of September, Cadorna sent in the afternoon a messenger with a demand for the surrender of Rome. The message was couched in the most conciliatory terms, with a promise of all consideration for the Pope and his interests. The papal General, Kanzler, replied to the message: "General, you and I are on grounds entirely different; you talk of politics and interest; the pontifical army and I only know our duty. You insist on those great words 'humanity and shedding of blood.' You represent to us the horrors of the siege of Strasburg and the battle of Sedan. But who, then, is inhuman? General Cadorna or we? Is it we who defend our Father and our faith; or is it not he who comes to attack us in a city scarcely fortified, without any possible pretext, without any other right than that of the strongest? Is it not clear to every person of good sense that you profit by the opportunity of the struggle between France and Prussia to attack us? You talk to me of demonstrations in the provinces which you have invaded. I do not know what there may be in this; I know only that in many places you have been received with the most eloquent silence. As to Rome, Count San Martino will have told you what he saw on Saturday last on the Piazza di Termini when the Holy Father blessed the Aqua Marcia. For three days in succession, from Monday the 12th to Wednesday the 14th, the people of Rome have flocked, at the invitation of the Holy Father, to pray with him at the tombs of the apostles. My honour and my duty command me to defend the city which God has chosen as the dwelling of His vicar. The devotion

of the Zouaves is not exaggeration but conviction, and from the general to the last soldier we will all die at our posts."

From the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> the troops were occupied in taking their positions on the line indicated, a strong demonstration being made on the right bank of the river above the Vatican along the Janiculum to that part of the fortifications which was attacked by the French in 1849. A feigned attack upon this position was intended to draw the pontifical troops toward a portion of the city,—the Leonine city where the Vatican and the Pope were—which had in the secret orders of the general been exempted from attack. The rest of the army moved by the Via Salaria and Via Nomentana on the highlands about the present railway station. The batteries were placed opposite Porta Pia and near that portion of the wall where the railway enters the city, temporarily fortified, and fire was opened on the 20<sup>th</sup>. The attacks along the railway, at Porta San Giovanni and on the Janiculum were diversions, the real attack being made at Porta Pia, where a breach was effected at 10 o'clock. The defence was maintained until the breach was made, and it is said that the orders of the Pope were simply to make a demonstration of resistance and then to yield, in order to protest against compulsion by force of arms. The zeal of the papal troops retarded the display of the white flag until the breach was actually stormed, and in the attack a number of Italians were killed and wounded. But the conflict only lasted a few minutes. Before nightfall the whole of Rome was occupied, excepting the Leonine city, and the terms of surrender were agreed upon.

The condition of Rome at the moment of the siege undoubtedly justified the statement of Kanzler, for during twenty years the papal authorities had done their best to stamp out liberalism in the city. Myself a resident in Rome during the years preceding Mentana, I can testify that persecution for political objects was never more unsparing nor more searching than in Rome at that time. No manifestation

of Italian sympathies or liberal tendencies was tolerated, and the penalties for every offence against papal absolutism were scarcely less severe than they were three centuries before. When the old Castellani, the head of the great house which restored the ancient art of gold-working in Rome, died, one of the sons was in exile and the other, necessary to the preservation of the important industry which the family had inaugurated, but suspected always for his liberal tendencies, was compelled to follow the corpse of his father alone. The coffin and the solitary mourner were surrounded by the police and not a single sympathizer was allowed to approach them. Every man who had at any time manifested hostility to the papal system of government was exiled or imprisoned, and the better part of the people of Rome, in the political sense of the term, were exiles. The populace was in a perpetual state of ferment, and the news of Garibaldi's progress prior to Aspromonte drove the entire floating ecclesiastical population to the convents and to the mountain-villages. The walls, in spite of all the precautions of the police, were placarded by night with insults to the Pope and attacks on his government, and the constant occupation of the police was the erasure of inscriptions of insurrectionary import. One day a collision accidentally took place between the police and the populace, in the course of which a priest was stabbed, not fatally. The police failed to discover the author of the wound, but found amongst the persons arrested an exile who had secretly returned to visit his friends. No proof of complicity was produced against him, but being tried by the papal court he was condemned to death and executed, in spite of the evidence of an alibi which he brought forward. It was necessary, they said, to make an example. Justice in these times was a question of political influence. The courts were governed entirely by ecclesiastical tendencies. The judges, setting aside all law, gave sentence in accordance with their theological prejudices, and every offence against common morality was ignored in view of the anxiety to suppress offences against the Church.

It was natural, in these circumstances, that the crowd of exiles which followed the royal troops in their entry into Rome should be enormous. Year after year their numbers had accumulated; and now men of all classes and all professions, Garibaldians in their red shirts, workmen, members of all the political societies, flocked in like a crowd of camp-followers. Naturally the records of these days drawn up by the friends of the Church contrast in the strongest colours with those of the friends of Italy. The clericals regarded it as a period of affliction and mourning; the liberals as a great festa of liberalism. There were many who were dissatisfied; there were religious enthusiasts, timid and nervous; there were some, even, who thought that the end of the world was approaching. On the other hand there were those who carried jubilation to extravagance and filled the city with demonstrations of joy. In all the adjoining cities, Viterbo, Civita Vecchia, and the towns of the Agro Romano, the demonstrations of joy which accompanied the return of their exiles were even more extravagant than in Rome.

The first to enter Rome were a band of Roman exiles, under the lead of Giovanni Costa, the famous Roman artist, who is still living. These men following close upon the troops, organized a municipal government even before the royal authorities had taken formal possession of the city. This vanguard of real Romans and of Garibaldians was followed by a motley crowd of "patriots" from all parts of Italy; some curious, some speculators, and undoubtedly some thieves. There was a competition of shopkeepers as to who should first succeed in establishing his industry in the new capital. Amongst them were great speculators of Lombardy and Piedmont to whom, subsequently, was due the fictitious growth and ultimate financial disaster of Rome.

On the entry of the troops, the government of Rome was immediately organized on a military basis by the formation of a *commandement de place*, which was confided to General

Masi, a Roman. General Cadorna was provisionally appointed Governor. The administration drifted on as best it could. The papal troops gathered after the 20th of September in the Leonine city and passed the night in the great square in front of St Peter's; on the next day they received the blessing of the Pope and moved out of Rome with their arms and baggage, drums beating and banners flying, by the Porta Angelica, made a tour of the Leonine city, and at Porta San Pancrazio filed before the Italian army, which saluted them with military honours. They then laid down their arms in the Villa Belvedere and went by rail to Civita Vecchia. The prisoners taken in the various conflicts were released and sent by the same road on the 23rd. In the fighting at the above points the papal troops had lost sixteen killed and fifty-eight wounded, and the Italians twenty-five dead and one hundred and thirty wounded. The intention of the government had been to leave the Leonine city under the control of the Pope, hoping to reconcile the claims of Italy and of the papacy by this preservation of a simulacrum of the temporal power. Early indications seemed to favour the success of this compromise, but influences diplomatic or other induced the Vatican to refuse the concession, while the people resident in Trastevere and the Leonine city insisted on making common cause with Italy. The demonstrations of Italian feeling were such that, on the 22nd of September, Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State to his Holiness, acting on the orders of the Pope, demanded and obtained from General Cadorna the military occupation of the entire district west of the Tiber, with the exception of the Vatican.

The population of the Leonine city refusing to be separated from the rest of Rome, a plébiscite was ordered on the 2nd of October, and its results induced the government, though with some reserves, to decide upon annexation. The difficulties of the position, diplomatic and civil, were undoubtedly great. The necessity of the occupation of Rome and its unification

with Italy was imperious, but at the same time the government, being subject to conservative and, to a certain extent, reactionary influences, favoured a policy of extreme tenderness toward the pretensions and sensibilities of the Pope. A government of transition was indispensable. The clericals about the Pope declared that he could not support the outrage of being voted out of his throne by his own subjects, the first voting box received in the plébiscite having been that of the Trastevere; and the Vatican threatened that, if this measure were adopted, the Pope must abandon Rome and take refuge in some foreign country. In face of actual events, however, the enthusiasm of the clericals cooled; the Pope protested, but remained.

The principal labour of the last session of the parliament of Florence was the so-called "law of guarantees" (passed in May, 1871), which aimed at making the Papacy and the Italian government mutually independent of each other. It guaranteed to the Pope the diplomatic privileges of a sovereign power, with its own ambassadors and its court, in the midst of Rome; separate postal and telegraphic communications with foreign countries; and an allowance of over 3,000,000 francs a year. It allowed the Pope and his successors the use of the Vatican and Lateran palaces and certain other buildings, and precluded all government officials from entering any of these places without leave of the Pontiff or the College. Further, it relinquished the royal "exequatur" and "placet," i.e. the necessity of the King's assent to the publication and execution of acts of the ecclesiastical authority, including the publication of bulls and the appointment of bishops<sup>1</sup>: it exempted the bishops from any oath of allegiance to the crown: it gave the clergy complete freedom of meeting. It put an end to appeals to the civil courts against acts of spiritual discipline, but on the other hand it denied to the church-courts the aid of the temporal tribunals in enforcing their decisions. Thus Cavour's

<sup>1</sup> Except Palatine bishops, who hold their nomination from the Crown.

principle, "*libera chiesa in libero stato*," was realised to a degree which had hitherto been found impracticable in any other European country.

This act, the main lines of which had been found among the papers of Cavour, together with a draft of such a law but with essential differences, was vehemently opposed by the Left, under Crispi's leadership, on the ground that it left the Pope and the Church in far too independent and powerful a position. On this point they would probably have had the support of Cavour<sup>1</sup>, but, being in a minority, they failed. The extreme Right submitted the law of guarantees to the approbation of the powers, desiring to give it an international guarantee, and but for the refusal of England to accept the charge it is probable that the law might have entered into the category of treaties. At first sight the Pope seemed inclined to accept the measure; but the pressure of the extreme and uncompromising clericals and of France, now attempting to regain by diplomatic intervention part of the political influence which it had lost by war, decided him to refuse. The compromise finally arrived at by the Vatican was to remain in Rome and to ignore the Italian government. In this attitude it still remains.

<sup>1</sup> The project of the law of guarantees, found among Cavour's papers after his death, was a part of the general scheme which he had conceived for a concordat between the Papacy and Italy, and to which, in 1861, he had had reason to believe that a majority of the Sacred College was ready to adhere. But according to this plan, the Papacy, limiting the formal assertion of its rights over Rome to the theoretical reserves which are still made as to Avignon, would have recognised the established government as the lesser evil, and would have consented to the presence of the Cardinals in the Italian Senate. There is nothing which would lead us to believe that Cavour would have allowed the Papacy to retain the position of a hostile political power residing in Rome under foreign diplomatic protection,—a position which it shares with the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. The failure of this attempt at conciliation between the Church and the State is due to the influence of France, always quick to seize upon any means of retarding the unity and independence of Italy.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### PARLIAMENTARY ITALY, 1871-1895.

#### (1) *The Right in power, 1871-76.*

IN June, 1871, the King went to Rome, and the government was transferred from Florence to the Eternal City. This first visit was followed by a great flood of the Tiber, from which the Vatican augured disaster, due to the occupation of Rome by Italy. The greatest difficulty in the unification of Italy was precisely in the absorption of the Roman State. The utter want of political education from time immemorial; the absolute subjection to a politically blind and torpid theocracy, ignorant of all human requirements excepting that of religious sentiment; the arbitrary imposition of bureaucratic caprice in place of legality, the natural outcome of an absolutism whose head claimed to be above all law, and beyond blunder or correction, and which was debarred by its constitution from any sympathy with purely civil and domestic humanity—all this had rendered the Roman people incapable of understanding what was meant by law or constitutional government. At the same time it was restive under legal control; it had bred brigandage, revolt, all sorts of social vices, and a general insolvency of character to be found nowhere else in Italy except in the City of Naples. Sexual immorality was, perhaps, less flagrant than that in the southern



capital, but was certainly worse than in any other Italian city. In Naples the example of royalty was always a justification for popular vice, but this was wanting in Rome, where the greater scandals rarely occurred. But if the later Popes without exception—so far as is known—maintained the moral dignity of their position, this was not always the case with their subordinates. Cardinal Antonelli was certainly the cause of great scandal, and the lower clergy were by no means immaculate. On the whole, the condition of the people at large, under papal rule, was one of the most complete intellectual and political lethargy I have ever known or can conceive.

Into this social and political apathy came the invasion of Northern Italy,—enormous numbers of speculators, adventurers, contractors, demagogues and philanthropists, who, with all kinds of principles and aims, individual and political, struggled for influence in the new state and the new capital. The Piedmontese and Lombards had pretensions to political supremacy on account of their political education, while the Romans, considering that Rome belonged to them before it became the capital of Italy, naturally resisted all foreign pretensions; and the southerners, as the Neapolitans and Sicilians were called, acted as a stimulant to these antagonisms.

The day had now arrived for completing the political organization of Italy, made necessary by the final accomplishment of Italian unity. It remained now to develop institutions competent to control a nation, which was not so much a single people, as an assemblage of states differing from time immemorial in education and in institutions. The great parties in face of each other were the Right, or conservative party, and the Left or the Party of Action, which, though hitherto in opposition, had shown its strength by compelling the government to make those political advances which its natural conservatism and apathy had prevented it from making voluntarily. The occupation of Rome would perhaps have

remained many years unaccomplished, and the opportunity of 1870 would have been lost, had the Right been permitted to act on its own impulses; but the opposition of the Left, an active, energetic, concentrated party, always approaching the position of a majority, compelled concessions on the part of the conservative element which resulted in the decision to occupy Rome at this favourable juncture. The Right may indeed be said to have been driven into Rome by the pressure of the opposition. Mazzini, it is true, had attempted to raise the standard of republican revolt in Sicily, and Nicotera, in co-operation with Mazzini, had organized a band in the mountain district of Naples; but the energetic action of Lanza in arresting Mazzini as he landed cut short the enterprise, which had no support in public opinion at large.

In this condition of antagonism between the great forces of the state, the Papacy remained a spectator, taking part with neither of the political parties and sharing the hopes of neither. It despaired of any revulsion of feeling on the part of Italy, and based its expectations entirely on the pressure of foreign powers. The astonishment into which it had been thrown by what it regarded as an act of aggression, an usurpation of the rightful dominion of the Pope, had paralyzed it during the earlier days of the occupation, but its arts and influence were immediately afterwards exerted throughout Europe with the hope of drawing in the catholic powers to unite in protesting against the spoliation of the Holy See. But the confusion of Europe at this moment, the exhaustion of France after her struggle with Germany, the necessity for Austria to conciliate Italy, the absolute indifference of Russia as to the claims of the Roman Church, and the constant friendship of England, prevented any assistance being offered to the Pope by the catholic powers. The good relations between Italy and Germany, the friendship with Austria, and the antagonism between the interests of Italy and France, assured the firm support of the German powers for all the acquisitions of Italy.

This good understanding was emphasized and confirmed by the visits which Vittorio Emanuele paid to Vienna and Berlin in the autumn of 1873, and by the still more striking visit of Francis Joseph to Venice, followed by that of the Emperor William to Milan, in 1875. The hopes of the clericals therefore remained limited to the contingency that the social and political crisis in France might give birth to a catholic monarchy friendly to the temporal power. The clericals of Paris, appealed to by their brethren in Rome, gave them cautious advice: "Protest, refuse, and wait for future mutations in France." France was always there, they said, always catholic, and always devoted to the Pope; some chance might enable her to resume her domination of Italy. And in this disposition the clericals of France and of Italy still remain.

Never perhaps in the history of Europe had so many political changes occurred as in those months between August 1870 and May 1871. Europe was in fact shaken by a tremendous political earthquake into entirely new combinations. The old hostility between Italy and Austria had given way to alliance. The intervention which Prussia had threatened in 1859 in favour of Austria against Italy had been changed into firm friendship for Italy. France had ceased to be the dominant power in Europe; Russia, so long dormant, was now ready to recover the position which it had held prior to 1854. The erection of Italy into a complete and independent state had taken place; her struggles with foreign occupation were at last finished; the great and perhaps even more difficult task of domestic organization still remained. This task occupied all the energies of Italian statesmen for some time. The revival of the Eastern Question in 1876-78 did not closely concern Italy, and though she took part in congresses and protocols as one of the great powers, she took no distinct line, and generally followed the lead of her allies.

Three great problems lay before the government, any one

of which, so far as human wisdom and statecraft are concerned, was more difficult than any mere political change. The adaptation of the Church to the State presented a problem which to this day is not only unsolved but does not seem to have approached solution, and which still constitutes the greatest difficulty of Italy. Ricasoli had the courage to propose a plan which might have put an end to the divorce between the Curia and the people, by giving to the latter, i.e. to the assembly of the faithful, the administration of ecclesiastical estates and the election of the curés, according to a primitive custom still in vigour in parts of the district of Milan. To-day, however, the coalition between the republicans and the clericals has rendered the return to such a policy impossible. This cause of embarrassment is, however, slowly diminishing, as a result of the inflexible and impracticable antagonism of the Church to all reconciliation—an attitude which is producing a slow but constant alienation of the Italian people from the Church. The Church itself is governed far more by foreign influence, its ambitions are stimulated more by foreign politics than by purely ecclesiastical considerations, and it separates itself more and more every day from Italy, so that the final solution of the question appears likely to be found either in the departure of the Pope, or in the less probable reconciliation of the papacy with the state, and the normal and efficient resumption of the functions of the Bishop of Rome—functions entirely suspended since 1870.

The second problem was how to assimilate and combine the different peoples of the peninsula, so long politically separated, so unlike in temperament, pursuits and even racial origin. Common desire of liberty, common hatred of the foreigner, had united them for a time: but, success having been obtained, the necessity of establishing a single government and a general administrative system brought to light all the divergencies which harmonious effort in the national cause had momentarily obscured.

The third problem was how to maintain independence from France. From the time of Charlemagne onwards, and through all the later phases of the development of Italy, the intervention and pressure of France had been the chief obstacle to the union of Italy, the main difficulty in the development of free institutions. So long as the Pope retained his position in Rome, there was always a chance for any French government to recover, under certain conditions and limitations, its domination over Italy. The weakness of successive Italian governments and the immemorial predisposition of the Italian people to regard the French as a friendly power, rendered it difficult to throw off entirely this pseudo-protecting influence. The division of the great political parties on the question of the Church coincided with that on the subject of the French alliance; the Right clinging to the old traditions and accepting the ancient dependence, while the Left rebelled fitfully against the domination which the French pretended to exercise. The Right still retained its numerical superiority and still controlled the successive ministries. It commanded an enormous pecuniary resource in the possession of the property of the Church, the proceeds from which left the country relatively free from taxation and enabled the government to carry its measures without that severe criticism which is inseparable from financial exactions. As this reserve diminished and taxation became indispensable, the strength of the Left increased. From 1870 to 1876 the history of Italy is simply the history of a struggle for more liberal measures and more democratic government against the morbid conservatism and immobility of old parties, old states and old tendencies. The leaders of the Left were at this time, Crispi, Cairoli, Nicotera, Zardinelli, and Depretis; of the Right, Minghetti, Sella and Spaventa. The one side was tinctured with every shade of agitation and revolution, the other was clad in the sober tints of conservative decorum. The tact of the King, perhaps more than any other influence, paved the

way for the accession of the Left to power, which took place in 1876.

The long series of governments drawn from the Right came to an end on the question of the secrets of telegraphic correspondence—a question unimportant in itself and one in respect to which the Right was no more culpable than the succeeding governments of the Left—but the simple fact was that the country was ripe for political change. All the active, energetic and healthy elements of political life had at that moment passed into the body of the Left. It is true that it contained many elements of premature corruption and political decay: but for the moment the vital influences prevailed. The country was tired of the immobility and apathy of the old governments and said frankly, "Let us try something new." The King, widely awake to all manifestations of passing political feeling, accepted the change, which was by all his ancient counsellors considered one of imminent peril, and adopted frankly what to the conservatives seemed the destruction of all institutions—a ministry of the Left. In this ministry each man had, perhaps, his own programme, but at that moment the pronounced republicans—those who accepted no compromise with monarchical forms—had entirely separated themselves from the Left, and under Alberto Mario had declared for abstention from all participation in politics. The practical and efficient head of the Left, so far as intellectual energy and organizing perception are concerned, was Crispi, whose declaration in the moment of uncertainty as to the form of public institutions, "The monarchy unites us and the republic would divide us," became the key-note of the democratic party. This position, assumed by Crispi, brought on him the anathemas of Mazzini and the republicans, and gave rise to one of the most interesting episodes in the constitutional progress of Italy during this period. The Left entered into power with the following programme: electoral reforms and extension of the suffrage; full liberty of conscience;

freedom of speech, of the press, and of association; the renunciation, in principle, of all legislation against political opponents, while reserving the right to repress subversive action, if necessary; in matters of finance, the abolition of the grist-tax, the redemption of the forced paper-currency, and the regularization of the land tax; in public works, an extensive development of state railways and the concession of their working to private societies.

(2) *The Monarchical Left, 1876-1886.*

It was the policy of the Right to consolidate what had been gained, rather than expose it to the risks of change: they avoided indicating the lines of future progress, and claimed support on the ground of good government. Their programme was essentially conservative. On their retirement they had left the finances in good order, military affairs in a fair state, the navy in process of development; but the condition of trade was unsatisfactory; the public works were incompletely organized; the taxes were very oppressive, owing rather to unwise distribution than to their actual weight; public instruction was neglected; the administration of justice was necessarily hampered by the political changes of previous years; and great confusion existed in the relations between the communes and the state. These elements of weakness, probably unavoidable in existing conditions, owing to the incongruity of the different portions of the nation, the difficulties between Church and State, and the general want of political education in the country, were common to both parties and would have weighed on both alike. Thus the real contest between them was rather one of future policy in the department of social and economical progress than of antagonism over the acts or omissions of the past. Rome was won and the unity of the nation finally established: the period of revolution and conflict ended with the "hic optime

manebimus" at length spoken. As the subject of dominant interest in this period of Italian history is therefore rather party organization and party conflict than external relations, it will be necessary to give an outline of these contests between the new power in politics—the Left—now organized finally as the Progressive Party, and the old conservatives.

The Left, having been hitherto only a party of opposition, lacked the organization, the coherence and solidity necessary to resist attacks and to secure uniformity of sentiment or object. It ranged in sentiment from conscientious republicanism, only reconciled to monarchy as the safeguard of Italian unity—as in Crispi,—to unquestioning devotion to the monarchy,—as in Depretis; but the invariable feeling was that the monarchy must develop toward democracy and must reconcile itself to continual progress. But the organization of the party could only be a work of time and patience. The animosity of the old conservative element toward men who, like Crispi, had always been in the front in every aggressive democratic movement, was unappeasable, and party bitterness was carried to an extreme in the conflicts between Crispi and the leaders of the conservatives. The formation indeed of the new ministerial party was one as much of dissolution as of aggregation. Its programme as a "party" could hardly be definite. It was necessary to eliminate the old irreconcilable radicals little by little from those who possessed sufficient tact and political discrimination to extract what was indispensable to good government from the monarchical programme, and in this slow and not always easy process the leaders aimed to acquire by degrees the confidence of the conservative element in the country. Naturally, with their accession to power, came a flood of adhesions from those who only thought to succeed with the successful and whose fidelity lasted as long as the success. There were deserters from the Right and adventurers from all sides, but the prestige of the leaders—the men of action whose names had been prominent in the years during



which Italy was being made—sufficed to keep up a certain kind of party fidelity.

During the early part of 1876 the government of the Left enjoyed all the prestige of success and of confidence in the effectual application of new principles, and the names of certain men untried in administration but distinguished in action, though afterwards disappointing expectation, exercised at first a great fascination over the country. The elections held under the first ministry of the Left, known as *progressista*, resulted in a triumphant and extraordinary victory. Although, or perhaps because, they were held on the simple programme of confidence in the new government, without any definite expression of principles, the results surpassed all the expectations of its most enthusiastic supporters. The Right was reduced to a mere faction, and the new government, with judgment and careful coordination, would have been in possession of power and influence such as no Italian ministry ever had possessed. But inexperience in political conduct, and radical differences in the temperament of individuals, and in provincial interests and tendencies, made a complete accord in the government impossible. Certain measures of the old régime were attacked with great vehemence; chief amongst these was the grist-tax or impost on the grinding of grain. The abolition of this tax proved ultimately one of the most disastrous financial steps which the Left ever took, nor did many years pass without repentance; but for the moment it was a popular measure because it seemed to appeal to the poorer classes. The name applied to the grist-tax,—“The tax on Hunger”—sufficed to make it universally hateful. In point of fact, it was so wide spread and so evenly laid that perhaps no tax ever oppressed the lower classes less, and the proof that its incidence was insignificant was that its abolition produced not the most trifling difference in the price of bread. The abolition of the tax meant simply an additional profit to the bakers and the dealers in grain.

The active policy of the new ministry consisted chiefly in combating clerical influence. The system of education was made more laic, and little by little the authority and field of operations of the church was restricted. It also paid much attention to public works, in which it seemed to find a means of consulting the interests of the masses. The ambitions of the various chiefs of this undisciplined and energetic democracy led to changes as frequent as would have resulted from the antagonism of two distinct and evenly balanced parties. As one or the other chief acquired predominant influence in the parliament, different tendencies became supreme. Corsi divides the ten years' government of the monarchical Left, as an organised party, into five distinct periods. The first was from March 1876 to December 1878, when it was practically controlled by Nicotera (March 1876-December 1877) and by Crispi (December 1877-March 1878), and during this period the government maintained its full authority. The second period was from March to December 1878, in which a weak government under the leadership of Cairoli and Zanardelli was overpowered by the combined opposition of the Radicals and Moderates. During the third period, which lasted until July 1879, the party under Depretis, with Crispi in the Home Office, recovered authority to a certain extent, and the war against the Radicals was energetic and effective. The fourth period under Cairoli and Villa, from July to November 1879, was one of weakness and vacillation. The fifth, under Depretis (1879-1886), developed that fusion and confusion in Italian politics, since known as "Transformism," which has been the ruin of all healthy party-organisation and the corruption of Italian politics.

While Crispi was for the first time minister of the interior, and thus responsible for the internal government of the country and the preservation of order, there occurred two events which called for all possible firmness of hand in the government. These were the deaths, within a short time of each other, of

Vittorio Emanuele and Pope Pius IX. The presence of Crispi at the Home Office at this crisis was a great good fortune for Italy. The King had proved himself, during the most difficult period in the formation of the kingdom, a wise and determined ruler. His devotion to liberal principles no one could question, while his maintenance of the dynastic rights had, on the one hand, opposed an impassable barrier to the schemes of Mazzini and the republicans, and on the other had justified the confidence of Crispi and his followers. That his successor would possess the same firmness of character no one was assured, and the first days of the reign offered to unquiet spirits opportunities for movements which would have been recognised as folly in that of Vittorio Emanuele. If, however, any subversive projects existed in the minds of the inflexible and theoretical republicans who, like Mazzini, only tolerated monarchy as a transition government, the measures which Crispi took to meet them left no possibility of success, and the crown passed without disturbance to Umberto I (January, 1878).

On the death of Pius IX, which took place in February, 1878, the election of his successor presented manifold and great difficulties. Intrigues from without, in a question as to which no one could deny the right of foreign powers to interest themselves, were set on foot, and great efforts were made to induce the Conclave to remove to some other country for the election, under the pretext that, in a condition of political imprisonment, a free election to the Papacy was impossible. These intrigues were so far successful that the College of Cardinals, by a preliminary vote, actually decided to go abroad. The tact of Crispi saved the situation, though, as events have turned out, it is a question if the removal would not have been a real gain for Italy. Crispi had at one time had intimate personal relations with Cardinal San Pietro. At this juncture he sent for the Cardinal and assured him that the freedom of the Conclave was absolute, and that, in whichever sense they

decided to act, they would be protected, either in their deliberations in Rome or in their passage to the frontier; but that, if the Sacred College once evacuated the Vatican, it would be taken possession of by the Italian government and the new Pope would not be allowed to reside there. The meeting next day revoked the vote of the day before and the Conclave was held in Rome. The burial of Pius IX did not, however, take place without much disorder, and all the efforts of the police did not suffice to keep down hostile demonstrations, though it is certain that the authorities did their best to maintain order. Nothing serious took place, but the sentiments of devout Catholics were offended by the hostile demonstrations which obliged the funeral procession to take a circuitous route rather than that which, perhaps with a view to a manifestation of its own, it desired to take. It was disgraceful, but one who had witnessed, as I had, the severities of the deceased Pope, could hardly wonder that the returned victims of the former government should manifest their resentment in their own way.

The connexion of Crispi with the government came to an end in July 1879, through an accusation of bigamy<sup>1</sup>, too gladly brought by his many political enemies. He resigned office, in order to appear in the tribunal, and though the charge was not sustained, and a verdict of not guilty was given, the hostility of Court circles was so bitter that the King was unwilling or unable to allow his return to office. The scandal, industriously stimulated by his numerous enemies, became so vociferous

<sup>1</sup> The facts of the case, stated with the brevity this record demands, are that a washerwoman who had been Crispi's mistress in his days of exile and imprisonment, and with whom he had gone through a ceremony of marriage which he considered legal, became by her conduct such a disgrace to him that he decided to abandon public life, when he was informed by one who had been in the secret, that the marriage was not legal, and that nothing prevented him from liberating himself from the connection. He left her at once, having assured her a maintenance, and when, some years after, he married the woman who is now his wife, the accusation of bigamy was brought.

that Crispi seemed to be definitely excluded from public life, and in fact, with this period, his influence on the government under the régime of his own party came to an end.

The return of Cairoli to power in July 1879 resuscitated old aspirations. In the party called the "Irredentists," revolutionary vitality awoke from its long sleep, and began to demand the completion of Italy by the conquest from Austria of Trent and Trieste,—the districts known as *Italia Irredenta*. The recent acquisitions of Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia excited the envy of the extreme Italian party, and a compensation was demanded in the extension of Italy to her natural limits, including the frontier of the Julian Alps. Fortunately the prudence of the King, aided by the conservative elements and the wisdom of General Robilant, then Italian Ambassador at Vienna, averted the difficulties which threatened to grow out of this ill-timed ambition. It was rather the restlessness of a few adventurous spirits, surviving from the Garibaldian epoch, who had not been absorbed by parliamentary activity or by the antagonism of the factions, than any genuine patriotic feeling, which produced this movement. Consequently the agitation was momentary, and was allayed by vague assurances, rather officious than official, that when the position of Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia should be secured and the next readjustment of frontiers should take place, the claims of Italy should find consideration.

The second government of Cairoli was terminated in April, 1881, by a violent explosion of public indignation at his apathy on the occasion of the French occupation of Tunis. Cairoli was a partisan of France, and having received personal assurance that no action should be taken in Tunis without the consent of Italy, had allowed the French preparations to go on without notice. The occupation, in violation of this promise, put an end to the entente with France and the ministry of Cairoli at the same moment.

An important consequence of the Tunisian incident was the entry of Italy into the Triple Alliance, which took place in 1882. This step was due, however, not merely to resentment at the blow which the occupation of Tunis dealt at the position of Italy in the Mediterranean, but also to the growing perception on the part of most public men in Italy that the new form of government in France, which it had been hoped would be more favourable to Italy than its predecessor, had determined to continue the alliance with the Vatican which had been the most offensive feature of Napoleon's policy, and that the Republic, like the Empire before it, was aiming at the subjection of the peninsula to the interests of France. As the treaty of the Triple Alliance was first negotiated, it assured to Germany and Austria-Hungary the defensive co-operation of Italy, in the case of the peace of Europe being menaced by a war for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, and in compensation it secured for Italy the assistance of Germany and Austria-Hungary in case England, already anxious to put an end to the Dual Control with France in Egypt, should substitute a condominium with Italy, and France should offer armed resistance. The Italian government had proposed to insert in the treaty a clause by which the "*casus foederis*" should not be extended to hostilities with Russia, so long as that power should not make common cause with the *revanche* of France, but Austria-Hungary, on account of her eastern interests, insisted on its including the case of a conflict between Russia and Austria; and the cooperation of Italy with England in Egypt was, at Berlin and Vienna, regarded as sufficient compensation for the responsibility assumed by Italy in favour of Austria-Hungary. Mancini and the Court not having the courage, when the moment arrived for co-operation with England, to accept her invitation, the first treaty of the Triple Alliance remained advantageous only to Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the renewal, five years later, Robilant being minister of Foreign Affairs, the effect of

the Alliance was extended to an equal participation in all defensive interests of central Europe, no one of the three powers being bound to take up arms in aid of any aggression by either of the others; and as, under the Mancini government, Massowah had been occupied by Italy, under circumstances which will be explained later, while France was manifesting aggressive tendencies in the direction of Tripoli and Morocco, the second treaty of the Triple Alliance assured Italy of the support of the central powers against any infringement, in Africa, of legitimate Italian interests.

But there is no justice in the allegation that the Italian authors of the Triple Alliance had incurred the obligation to increase their armaments: indeed, the advice given by the military experts of Germany and the general staff, was to reduce the effective of the Italian army to 300,000 men, while establishing thorough discipline and an organization directed towards the highest mobility, so that Italy without overburthening her finances might have an army ready at any moment for the outbreak of war, and not leave to her allies the charge of meeting alone a sudden aggression. As ordinarily happens in such cases, the other powers interested in opposing the Triple Alliance demanded engagements from Italy which excluded any hostile intentions. In these circumstances Depretis publicly declined to keep the army, during the term of the Triple Alliance, in readiness for immediate action, and he increased it by four divisions without increasing the army budget. The subsequent organization of the army in twelve corps d'armée, scant in numbers and defective in equipment; intentionally sacrificed its mobility and efficiency to the exigencies of the powers opposed to the Triple Alliance, and to the views of the Court, always disposed to inaction, and anxious to multiply the number of military appointments. In acting thus, the ministry maintained that unfortunate subjection of the military interests of the kingdom to politics, which had produced such disastrous

consequences in 1849 and 1866, and was to have the same result in Abyssinia in 1895.

In the negotiation of this treaty, which has been shown by subsequent events to have been one of the wisest steps in the history of Italian relations with other powers, and one of the gravest importance to all Europe, Italian parties were divided, not frankly and professedly, but largely owing to secret influences, exerted, on the one side, by the Court and the French government, and, on the other, by England in support of Germany and Austria-Hungary, whose alliance established the defence of central Europe on the East and West, and who had invited Italy to join the defensive compact, with the object of securing it against danger from the South. Crispi, then leader of the Left, Robilant, Ambassador at Vienna, and Di Launay, Ambassador at Berlin, were the chief advocates of the treaty. The far-seeing Bismarck had, from the date of the war of Sadowa, comprehended the help which an alliance with Italy would give to the maintenance of peace in Europe, and had then cultivated intimate relations with the party of action through Crispi. But the earliest decisive advocacy was probably that of Robilant, whose influence with the King was deservedly great, for few Italian statesmen of his generation had his sagacity and inflexible honesty. The affair of Tunis threw in the weight which turned the scale and determined the entry of Italy into the Alliance, in spite of Mancini, minister of Foreign Affairs, and Depretis, the Premier, who remained always French in their sympathies, but whose views on foreign policy were too weak to be decisive.

It was under Depretis' long government (1879-87) that the political system known as "transformism" was developed. In that disastrous condition of Italian politics, all party distinctions were finally merged in the policy of selecting the men who commanded most votes from each faction in the chamber, and parties disappear from the government though not from



personalities. There was no longer a question of common principles or even of common policy. The government was conducted on purely opportunist principles, and under Depretis, an easy-going man, personally honest, but indifferent to the means of success in politics, there gradually grew up a system of purchasing support by measures involving public expenditure, which contributed more than anything else in this phase of Italian politics to bring about financial disaster. Little by little all party-distinction disappeared, but the rancour and malignity of old party-conflicts still embittered personal antagonism. The ghosts of party, like the phantoms in the *Inferno*, gnawed each others' skulls and inflicted infinite and immitigable punishment for offences committed long ago. Never perhaps in the history of any country, since the Italian republics of the middle ages, was such venomous and unscrupulous hostility shown between public men. The policy developed by Depretis, of purchasing public favour and the votes of the electoral colleges by public works, led to a multiplication of railways and of other public enterprises far in excess of the resources of the country. Railways were voted by the thousand kilometres, the pretext being that the development of the country and its interests depended on the increase of facilities for communication; but these railways and provincial roads, being made without regard to any other criterion than the insatiable demands of the electorate, were rather burdens on the public purse than stimulants to local prosperity. The army claimed enormous concessions, and involved expenditure beyond all relation to its efficiency.

The traditional sympathy between England and Italy brought into view at this time proofs of its persistent vitality, in the proposition of the former power to Italy to join her in the occupation of Egypt. In 1882, England, compelled to secure the tranquillity of the Khedivate then menaced by revolutionary movements, had invited France as well as Italy to join her in occupation for that purpose.

France refused, having from the beginning had her own interests in those movements, and probably expecting that England would shrink from a solitary occupation, or that she would fail in maintaining it, and would be obliged to leave it to France as her successor. In the long and studiously prepared disorders which led to the insurrection of Arabi Pasha, a position had been created which (it was hoped) would subsequently enable France, by refusing cooperation, to rule alone. The invitation extended to Italy by England was refused by Mancini, owing to the threat by France that her participation would be regarded as a *casus belli*.

It was probably in large part owing to annoyance at having, by this refusal, lost so brilliant an opportunity of participating in the direction of European policy, that the government decided later on to take part in the conquest of Africa by establishing the colony of Massowah—one of the most disastrous and ill-considered schemes of which Africa has been the scene. This colony was initiated as a commercial enterprise, with the approbation of England, but the subsequent transformation to a military establishment was planned in secret agreement with France, as a step towards the creation of a condominium of three in the valley of the Nile. The occupation of Suakim by England, whether due to sagacious foresight or to secret knowledge of the intentions of France, partially thwarted the scheme; but that the occupation of Massowah by Italy was intended as the first step in a movement on the Nile is shown by the instructions of the minister of war (Ricotti) to the commander of the expedition "to make a point on Khartoum," instructions showing the most curious ignorance of the geography and conditions of Abyssinia which can be conceived in a government. The understanding between France and Italy was completed in 1885 by a formal though still secret agreement, in opposition to the interest of England. Whether the British government was aware of this, or not, I cannot say; but if it was cognisant of it, it must also have been

conscious that the scheme would be rendered fruitless, not only by its own timely occupation of Suakim, but also by the difficulties in Abyssinia which lay before the combination, difficulties with which the Abyssinian expedition of 1867 had made England familiar. In compensation to Italy for this agreement, France agreed that the *status quo* should be maintained in Tripoli and Morocco, while the lowering of the Egyptian flag at Massowah and the substitution of the Italian was agreed on as the sign of conquest, as distinguished from that of occupation, as recognised by England. The subsequent assent of England to this substitution (always, however, with a tacit objection to the establishment of a military post on the Red Sea, as was stated by Lord Hartington in the House of Commons) does not invalidate the statement that the intentions of the Italian government were directed by a secret accord with France and in prejudice of British interests. The published correspondence shows that, so late as March, 1885, France and Italy were agreed in regarding the continued occupation of Egypt by England as prejudicial to both powers, and that the combination between them was due to the apprehension that the occupation would be converted into a protectorate. It was a continuation of the immemorial and mediæval policy of the Italian states, to be always prepared on both sides in any European quarrel.

In 1887 the garrison of the port of Massowah, finding the position constrained, attempted to establish a sanitary settlement on the uplands of the interior. The Italian authorities made propositions for an amicable settlement with Abyssinia, but the Abyssinians, who had always coveted the possession of Massowah, but had been unable to wrest it from the Egyptians, determined to drive them out. Under Ras Alula, chief of Tigré, they made a vigorous attack on the newly fortified upland position, and were defeated with grave loss; but on the next day, Jan. 26, 1887, surprising a battalion on its way to the fort, they annihilated it. This event, of little importance from

the military point of view, produced a disastrous revulsion of feeling against the ministry and led to the gradual adoption of a policy of conquest, which, being ill directed, ultimately turned to the serious embarrassment of Italy. In a speech in the chamber on the first vote of credit for Massowah, Crispi had expressed views not in sympathy with the establishment of the colony, and, in words which now seem prophetic, had warned the ministry of the dangers of the undertaking. In the ministerial crisis which now took place, he was called to form part of the ministry. Popular opinion was so strongly in favour of avenging the affront to the military honour of the country, and so opposed to the withdrawal of the flag, that preparations were made for the sending out of an expedition of 20,000 men under General San Marzano. The Abyssinians now retreated, and eventually the country as far as Asmara was taken possession of by Italy and fortified so as to be unassailable by the forces of Abyssinia.

Giovanni, then Negus, being attacked in the rear by the Dervishes, and harassed by rebellions at home, decided to finish with the Dervishes before resuming the war against the Italians. At this moment Menelik, King of Shoa, a rival pretendant to the imperial crown, proposed an alliance with Italy against Giovanni, and the latter being shortly afterwards killed in the battle of Metemmeh by the Dervishes, Menelik succeeded him, and was recognized by Italy as Negus Negesti, ruler of all Abyssinia. The frontier of the colony at this juncture was settled by treaty with the Negus as the line of the rivers Mareb and the Balesi, at which it remained until at a later period an attempt by the Abyssinians to reconquer the ceded country led to a new series of hostilities.

## CHAPTER XV.

### DISORGANIZATION.

IN the recomposition of the ministry consequent on the crisis of February, 1887, Depretis passed to the Foreign Office, vacated by Robilant, who resented the insults of the Radicals and the manner in which the disaster of Dogali had been commented on by them, although he had no official responsibility for it; while Crispi resumed the Home Office, which he held until the death of Depretis in July, 1887. In this position he waged untiring war on Radicalism, and maintained public order with a severity which had not lately been known. This drew on him the bitter animosity of his old associates, the Mazzinians, who never forgave him for his desertion of the Republic. Mazzini, an idealist by nature, and clinging to the Republic as the ideal form of government, was unable to perceive that the population of a large part of Italy had been demoralised by the years of despotism in which they had learned to look at government and tyranny as synonymous. He was therefore not qualified to judge of practical results, while Crispi, a man of government by constitution and experience, had learned that his people was not yet in the state to profit by unlimited self-control, and had as the result of that experience, rallied to the monarchy. Naturally the antagonism between the Radicals and Crispi was bitterer than that which

they entertained for any other of his colleagues, and has in effect coloured all his official career.

After the death of Depretis, Crispi assumed the Presidency of the Council, with almost unanimous public approbation, while he retained the Home Office, and took temporary charge of the Foreign Office as well—an accumulation of duties which was in the end disastrous, subjecting him to an excessive strain which proved too much for his health and his efficiency. At this moment he was in a position of authority and influence which no man since Cavour had enjoyed, and, like that statesman, he held definite ideas on public policy and the conduct of government, in which few of his colleagues were able to follow him. His insistence on their adherence to the policy which he adopted was considered autocratic—so little conception had the men in office of the conditions of ministerial responsibility in constitutional government. He was accused of usurping the functions of his colleagues in the ministry when he simply refused assent to measures which he could not bring into accord with his own ideas of public policy; he was stigmatised as dictatorial when he was simply rigorous in his ideas of discipline. Sometimes, no doubt, these charges appeared to have some justification: for instance, when he found that the minister of war, General Bertole-Viale, was determined on carrying military operations in the African colony beyond the limits which he considered admissible, he transferred the colony to the Foreign Office, to keep it under his own control. Had he taken a similar step in financial affairs, the great banking catastrophe of later years would not have occurred; but in this department he accepted, even against his own judgment, the advice of the financial ministers. The conditions of ministerial responsibility obtaining in Italy are inconceivable in English politics. Each minister is responsible to Parliament for his own measures, and, the defeat of one of them in no way involving his colleagues, he resigns and another takes his place. This system Crispi was obliged,

against his better disposition, to accept, but he did his best to mend it in the execution.

The "Transformism" of Depretis had been largely responsible for the chaotic condition of politics, but worse consequences were to follow. Legislation no longer kept in view the larger interests of the country, but, through the necessity of consulting merely local and partial interests in order to obtain a majority, was absorbed in petty measures, adopted to conciliate constituencies, which inevitably opened the way to extravagant expenditure. Sound party organization had utterly disappeared, and with it parliamentary independence. The pressure of government on the elections destroyed their liberty, and any ministry could secure a majority. Sectional antipathies and jealousies were fostered by the corruption in giving out public works. A hazardous and finally disastrous financial system grew out of this condition, and the corruption of the constituencies and the Chamber of Deputies—not personally, but with the pseudo-justification of the good of their constituents—brought Italy to the state in which we find her a few years later, on the verge of bankruptcy. Amongst the measures which contributed most largely to this end were those connected with the reconstruction of Rome, and the new Capital of the nation provoked the most reckless expenditure.

Unfortunately the steps which the government took only opened the way, first to municipal extravagance and corruption, and then to private speculation, which, owing to exalted and fanciful anticipations of the future of the Capital, ended in disaster to individuals, the municipality and the nation. Government had no means of controlling this craze, and the financial resources at the ordinary command of the business world were soon involved, beyond recall, in enterprises which too late were seen to be unprofitable. When the excited public demanded the adoption of official measures for financial relief, the note circulation was extended, by tacit consent of

the ministry, beyond the resources of the banks, through loans made on real estate in violation of the law concerning banks of circulation. The inevitable consequence was an industrial and financial crisis of the most disastrous kind. The banking capital of the entire country was involved to an extent from which it has not yet recovered; and as the law for the resumption of specie payments had never been carried into effect, the extension of the paper currency beyond its legal relation to the specie reserves produced its natural effect.

The legal term of the duration of the Chamber of Deputies having still in 1890 a year to run, a dissolution was urged by a majority of the cabinet, and, though opposed to it as unprovoked and unnecessary, Crispi yielded. In the elections which followed he obtained, on his programme of establishing an equilibrium in the budget by administrative economies, while maintaining the Triple Alliance, a majority so large as to become dangerous to its coherence. It comprised about 400 Deputies out of the 508 of which the Chamber is composed. In fact so general and strong was the sentiment of public confidence in Crispi, that some of his oldest and most bitter opponents in the past, and as it proved, also in the future, were obliged to go to the poll under his colours. There had probably never been in the history of Italian elections such unanimity in the support of a ministry as in this case. Crispi's tenure of office had secured the tranquillity of the country, and heightened the consideration in which it was held abroad. Though the opposition had assailed him bitterly on account of alleged extravagance and colossal projects of expenditure, the facts were that he had never imposed a new tax, but had removed some which existed at his accession to power; that not one of the huge public works which are to this day the amazement of foreign observers, was projected or constructed during his term of office; and that even in regard to the military expenditure of which he was accused of being the author, he had only spent the amounts appropriated to this



purpose before he took office. Quietly and without calling attention to the process, he had introduced economies to the amount of 140,500,000 lire (over £5,000,000) a year on the previous expenditure; and he had announced his intention to compel a reform of the banking system, reducing the banks of circulation to one, on the models of the Banks of England and France, in order to correct with greater facility the irregularities of the circulation. This resolution was one of the immediate causes of his overthrow. Another was the hostility of France, due to his early and inveterate opposition to that control which, in spite of the Triple Alliance, France had persistently exercised over the foreign policy of Italy during the governments of his predecessors. Thirdly, his determined maintenance of the prerogatives of the State against the pretensions of the Vatican had made the ecclesiastical authorities bitterly hostile to him. All these agencies worked in secret, and the tie of union between them was the small section of the old Right, whose hatred of the ex-radical—due to the savage and (it must be admitted) not always justifiable animosity which he had shown to their party in his days of combat—was, notwithstanding his efforts at conciliation, implacable. Beyond these influences there was among that class of politicians which composes a large part of every Italian Chamber, especially since the advent of Transformism, a tacit rebellion against any insistence on parliamentary discipline which interfered with the personal and often corrupt interests of the Deputies. The final cause of this parliamentary rebellion, which so curiously contrasted with Crispi's enormous popularity with the nation at large, was to be found in the often injudicious and sometimes weak choice of his subordinate officials.

In the month of October or early in November, 1890, negotiations had been opened between the section of the old Right led by Rudini, and the radical group of Nicotera, for a combination against Crispi. They were suspended

during the elections, and the actual lead in the subsequent combination against him was taken by the Deputies in the interest of the Banca Romana, that one of the banks of circulation which had most to fear from Crispi's scheme of reform and which at the same time had the greatest control of the votes of the Chamber. The section of the Right which was most opposed to Crispi, and which formed the most important element in the combination, was that which was in favour of reconciliation with France and opposed to the assumption by Italy of a part in the general politics of Europe through the Triple Alliance. Added to these were various Deputies of the Left, personally hostile to Crispi, and some who honestly opposed him on account of his immediate following, which was distrusted. The support of the Vatican was assured in case of a dissolution by a promise to revoke certain measures hostile to the privileges of the Church. Early in the session, one of the leaders of the Right demanded of Crispi that he should find places in the ministry for two of that party, in default of which they intended to attack him. Crispi replied that he had no power of dismissing ministers, which was the prerogative of the King—in him it would be unconstitutional. The combination was then definitely concluded, and on a trivial pretext a vote was sprung on the ministry, which was defeated (Feb. 1891).

The new ministry was nominally headed by Rudini, but its ruling spirit was Nicotera. With this incongruity of elements there was, as might have been expected, no efficiency in its action, and after little more than a year of troubled life, it fell before an attack similar to that which had brought it into existence.

This first Rudini ministry produced little effect on the home policy of the government or the condition of the country, but it gravely changed the foreign situation. Rudini had obtained the support of the Radicals by his promise not to renew the Triple Alliance, which expired in 1891. But

owing to the gravitation of Germany and Austria towards Russia, which had already begun, it had become the interest even of Russia that Italy should remain in the Triple Alliance, instead of becoming—according to the former policy of Cavour, later adopted by Mancini—a link which might serve to revive the Anglo-French combination that had dominated the East in 1855. The pressure of the three empires on the Rudini cabinet obliged it to renew the Triple Alliance, but a meeting took place at Monza in 1891, at which M. Giers was present, and in which a remedy was sought for this “inevitable evil,” as it was called—this injury to the friendship with France, which the Radicals had so much at heart. It was there agreed that Russia should offer her mediation with France in any difficulty, and especially in that of the *casus foederis* being invoked by Germany on the occasion of an attack on Germany by France. On this condition the Italian government pledged itself to leave Abyssinia to the religious protection of Russia and to embrace a favourable occasion to evacuate Erythrea, only preserving Massowah as a position of international interest for the control of the Red Sea. But, the military position being inseparably connected with the Alliance, it was settled that the army budget should not be increased, while the cadres should remain as they were, although disproportionate (perhaps because so), viz. for twelve corps d’armée, in a state which made mobilization too slow to be effective. In this way Italy, though a member of the Alliance, would be disabled from exercising any immediate influence on the course of hostilities in case of a war between France and Russia on one side and the Triple Alliance on the other.

This policy, diametrically opposed to that of Crispi, was that of the Court clique, always influential with the King; and the ministry which, in May, 1892, succeeded that of Rudini, being mainly under Radical influences, accepted the international position bequeathed to them. This ministry was formed by Giolitti, a Piedmontese deputy, enjoying the

confidence of the Radicals and the Court. Giolitti was finance minister under Crispi, and had been accused of tacit acquiescence in the irregularities of the banks. While in the Crispi ministry, he had in fact been responsible for these irregularities not coming earlier to light, and was subsequently inefficient in finding a remedy for them or in meeting the consequent financial crisis, which culminated in the failure of the Banca Romana and the serious embarrassment of all the other banks of circulation except those of Tuscany. These events led to the appointment of a parliamentary commission to enquire into the causes of the crisis. The report proved culpable laxity in the government and gross corruption in some of the officials. It was no sooner presented than the ministry resigned, without waiting for a vote of the Chamber.

In the meanwhile, advantage had been taken of the administrative weakness of the late ministries and the freedom accorded to Radical and Socialist propaganda. Preparations had been made for an insurrectionary movement, which broke out in the latter days of the Giolitti ministry. In Sicily and in the great mining district of Lunigiana in Tuscany armed conflicts took place between the bands of insurgents and the police and military, with bloodshed on both sides. The Romagna was preparing to follow. The outgoing ministry, its resignation having been already accepted, was paralyzed, while the formation of a new one encountered great obstacles. Public opinion called loudly for Crispi, but the hostility of the Court was such that he was not sent for till December, 1893, when the state of the country had become critical. Sonnino, a Tuscan deputy, long recognized as the soundest financier of the kingdom, and Saracco, a veteran Piedmontese deputy of the highest probity and great experience in public affairs, respectively assumed the Treasury and the Public Works, the two most important portfolios in regard to their influence on the finances of the country. Crispi, in the Home Office, speedily repressed the insurrectionary movement, and the financial measures

adopted restored public confidence. The agio on gold, which, in the last days of the Giolitti régime, had risen to 16, fell rapidly to 5, and the public securities rose from 75 to 95. No better proof could be afforded that public security and financial credit had suffered more by the gross inefficiency of the late ministries than by the intrinsic weakness of the country.

The Chamber, though elected under Giolitti, with unusually strong official pressure, was awed by the danger of the situation through which the country had passed, and for a time supported Crispi in his remedial measures. But with returning tranquillity the opposition resumed its tactics, and a dissolution took place. The elections, probably the least affected by official pressure of all that had taken place since the days of the Lanza administration, returned a Chamber of relatively high independence and intellectual ability, though under the system obtaining in Italy neither absolute independence nor the best representation of the intellect of the country are to be hoped for. With the support of this Chamber, the ministry held office, to the profit of the country, for nearly three years. The history of its fall is an epitome of Italian politics, foreign and domestic. It will show, better than any abstract statement, the vices inherent in the present Italian government, unsupported, as it is, by an efficient sentiment of national independence within, and subject to continual interference from irresponsible sources without, to which the Crown is unable, for various reasons, to offer any effectual resistance.

When Crispi in 1893 returned to office for the second time as head of the government, there seemed a great probability that he would be able to maintain his position so long as his age permitted. His success in mastering the difficulties of the financial and political crisis, the immense popularity which accrued from this success, and the general recognition of his ability to meet all the exigencies of the European situation,

compelled many of his former conscientious opponents to accept him as the man for the emergency. Even abroad his position seemed so strong as to induce the French government to make advances to him with a view of detaching him from his Anglo-Italian policy. The republic offered him, in exchange for the abandonment of the understanding with England concerning Egypt and Morocco, a treaty of commerce and such commercial facilities as would have been accorded to the government of Rudini, had he abandoned the Triple Alliance. These overtures Crispi repelled, and his refusal determined the international position of Italy.

The foreign policy to which Crispi at all times adhered was diametrically opposed to that adopted by Rudini, which was supported by the Radicals and a large part of the old Right, and which formed the bond between these otherwise antagonistic elements. Ever since 1881 Crispi had maintained that Italy should become the bond between England and Germany; he had blamed Mancini for having refused the English proposition for a joint occupation of Egypt, and he valued the African colony only as a means of promoting community of action between England and Italy in the Mediterranean and on the upper Nile. This community of action would have eventually nullified the Rudinian tendencies, and would have established the Anglo-Italian concert for the Mediterranean on a definite basis. With such a programme, and especially with the recollection that it was a former Crispi ministry which had prevented the nomination of a Russian governor for Bulgaria, it was hardly to be expected that Italy would escape the worst consequences of the hostility of the Franco-Russian entente. This hostility was made more acute by the renewal, on the return of Lord Salisbury to office in 1895, of an agreement between England, Austria and Italy for common action in the Eastern question, originally made in 1887. In virtue of this agreement Italy sent her fleet to the Aegean to support Great Britain at the opening of the

Armenian question, and the consequence was, that France and Russia put pressure on Abyssinia to renew hostilities against Italy. This new campaign Crispi was ill-prepared to meet, as he had detailed a corps d'armée for an expedition to Asia Minor in conjunction with the naval preparations, and the strength of the forces under arms did not enable the minister of war to detach another corps to Erythrea. To complete the difficulties of the position, a coolness arose between the Emperor of Germany and the government of Crispi, the latter having notified the German government that he should at the proper time denounce the Treaty of the Triple Alliance with the object of providing better security for Italian interests in Africa. The Emperor in reply advised the King of Italy that Crispi was becoming importunate and must be got rid of. This defection probably determined the fall of Crispi. It gave such strength to the opposition at home, that the intrigues of the Court and military circles succeeded in paralyzing all his military plans, and especially in preventing him from superseding Baratieri, now recognised as incompetent for the enlarged operations which were in view. The King refused to consent to the supersession until it became imperative through the increase of the force to a point at which a superior officer was necessitated by the regulations, when Baldissera was appointed to the superior command. But before Baldissera could enter on his command, Baratieri, against the distinct orders of the government, attacked with a force of 14,000 men the impregnable positions near Adowah which Menelek held with 80,000. He was met by the most crushing defeat that Italy has had to undergo in modern times. Out of the total force no less than 6,000 perished.

The history of this affair still remains more or less a secret, the court-martial which followed being rather calculated to bury than expose the facts of the case, but the immediate effect was to induce the ministry to resign without waiting for the assembling of parliament. The magnitude of the disaster

made it evident that, considering the Italian temperament and its tendency to panic, the responsibility for it would be visited on the ministry, though it was only responsible in so far as it had submitted to the Royal decision deferring the recall of Baratieri.

The King, unwilling to accept the programme of Rudini, gave the formation of the new ministry to General Ricotti, a Senator, Rudini taking the portfolio of home affairs (March, 1896). By one of those revolutions which for many years past have been the principal cause of Italy's weakness abroad, and of that want of consideration which even her declared allies have shown for her interests, the foreign policy of 1891 was at once revived. One of the first steps of the new government was the disgraceful publication of the confidential correspondence with England on the African affairs, a step which met with such disapprobation that it led to the resignation of the Duke of Sermoneta, the minister of foreign affairs. The scheme of army reorganisation proposed by Ricotti, which aimed at improving the efficiency of the force by devoting money rather to the instruction of the rank and file than to the maintenance of superfluous officers, was opposed by the supporters of the Monza understanding (p. 386) as well as by the Court-party, interested more in the number of commissions to bestow than in the mobility of the force. Consequently the law was defeated in the chamber, and Ricotti gave place to Rudini as President of the Council. The rejection of Ricotti's plan was a triumph for the Franco-Russian party, which had re-assumed the direction of foreign affairs. Africa, under this policy, being excluded from the Italian sphere of action, peace was made with Menelek on terms which practically implied withdrawal from Erythrea to the port of Massowah. This measure satisfied the exigencies of the old Right, while the Radicals were conciliated by the exclusion and proscription of Crispi and by the understanding with France, as well as by the reversal of the repressive policy towards the



extreme members of their party. Thus the year 1897 saw Italy reduced to inertia abroad and apathy within.

The animosities of the factions and the corruptness of the agencies which have by this time pervaded all branches of the Italian government, have developed a discontent with, and even a contempt for, parliamentary institutions which is at this moment the greatest danger in the condition of the nation. The wisdom of Garibaldi and Crispi in insisting, though fruitlessly, on the separate government of the southern provinces until they should have become more fit to take part in governing themselves, has now become clear. Southern corruption, the Camorra, and the insubordination of the Neapolitan provinces, as well as the lawlessness of the Sicilian population, half controlled by the Mafia, have penetrated the national government. On the one hand the northern provinces, especially Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, are revolted by the abuses imported from Naples and the Papal States, and by the brigandage still lingering there and compromising the reputation of all Italy, as well as alarmed by the perils contained in the condition of Sicily; on the other, the southern provinces, under a lax and inert government, are incapable of keeping pace with Northern Italy in prosperity or order, and rebel against the restraint which the northern provinces would impose on them. A dispassionate observer can hardly fail to see that Italy tends towards a dissolution, rather than a consolidation, of her unity; but the federal system, which is the aspiration of Italian Radicals, would inevitably bring about the destruction at once of the monarchy and of the coherence of the state. It would have been, as a preliminary condition, a healthy step towards unity; as a retrograde measure it would be the prelude of disorganization and anarchy.

Such is the condition of Italy at home. Abroad, the vacillations and contradictions of her foreign policy make it impossible to form those stable alliances which are indispensable to the welfare of a state conterminous with others

whose interests, often mutually antagonistic, must involve those of Italy. The continuity of foreign policy is the indispensable condition of consideration abroad, but the vacillation of Italy between two extremes makes it impossible for any other state to set much value on Italy as an ally. The healthy natural tendencies of the Italian state have always been towards an intimate understanding and cooperation with England, and latterly with the central states of Europe, disinterested in the Mediterranean question, which is to Italy a vital one. But the Italian factions, while always professing a consonance of views with England, have alternated between cordial cooperation with her, as under Crispi, and practical deference to the views of Russia and France, as under Mancini, Depretis and Rudini. It may even be said that the net result of these alternations is a gradual approximation towards Russia, for the Anglophile sentiment of Piedmont, once dominant in the government, has been steadily yielding, since the change of capital, to the tendencies of Naples, always, under the Bourbons, friendly to Russia.

The premature annexation of Naples, and the unfortunate necessity for the transfer of the capital to Rome, have introduced elements of discord into the kingdom that menace gravely, if not invincibly, the existing political system. The Italy to which Cavour aspired was an enlarged Piedmont, and, so far as the differences of nature permitted, he desired to make it a new England; but the migrations of the government and the weaknesses of its governors have made it rather an enlarged Naples, without the vigorous, if treacherous, internal rule, and the consistent and uniform foreign policy of the Bourbons. If the virtues of the past survive their former possessors, the end may yet be well; but there rings in my ears the ominous judgment, pronounced by more than one of those who had a part in the making of Italy—"Too quickly and too easily was Italy made."

## EPILOGUE. 1909.

THE note of extreme pessimism on which Stillman's book closes, must be discounted on two considerations. First, that the author was too constant and warm-hearted a friend of Crispi's to judge fairly of the nation which had just rejected with rage the man who had led her to the disaster of Adowah. Secondly, that the book was completed at the very lowest moment of Italy's fortunes, which has happily proved to be the trough of the wave rather than a midway point in a continuous descent. Ten years have passed, and there has been no fulfilment of the prophecy of coming dissolution for "the existing political system," described by Stillman as "gravely if not invincibly menaced."

The union of all Italy under a constitutional monarchy is not now (1909) threatened in any serious way. The old Republicanism has been, at least as a living political force, largely replaced by Socialism, of which the strongest party, the *Riformisti*, "accept the Monarchy so long as it is not ranged against them." The present king, Vittorio Emanuele III, more democratic and constitutional by conviction than his brave and unfortunate father, the murdered Umberto I, issues no challenge to the advanced parties. There is indeed no engrained monarchical sentiment in Italy such as we find in England and Germany. But, if there is little instinctive loyalty, on the other hand there is in Italy at present much less to say against the House of Savoy and the wearer of the crown than can be said with too much justice against successive Cabinets

and Parliaments, against the Church and the Civil Service, against Capital and Labour. Thus the Liberal Monarchy is rendered increasingly secure by its real merits.

During the social troubles culminating in 1898, the policy of blind repression, imitated from the methods of the Italian governments of the old régime, bade fair to bring the country to civil war and dissolution. But this policy was speedily reversed in 1900 by the good sense of the Italian people, acting through the safety-valves offered by a free constitution. In the same way the socialist and trades-union reaction that followed has in turn received its check. The social problems of Italy are acute, aggravated by the weight of a most unscientific system of taxation and by primitive methods of agriculture which have been reformed only in certain districts. But in her worst social troubles Italy has had the advantage of being a thoroughly constitutional country, and a nation bound together by a common feeling of patriotism embracing all classes. If the political and national problems had not been solved by the events of 1859—1870, the social and administrative problems of our own generation might well have torn society to pieces.

The Church, too, though hostile to the Modernist movement within her own borders, and opposed to all intellectual advance, has politically accepted the fact of the Italian Kingdom; and even Italy's presence in Rome is no longer challenged in any practical manner. The present Pope, though he has quarrelled with the Republic of France, is a "good Italian." Faithful Catholics are at last permitted and even encouraged to vote, and that not with the object of forming a reactionary party to undermine the Monarchy or the nation, but in order to strengthen the normal Conservative party, and thereby to secure from it in return more favourable treatment for the Church.

The fact is that the national sentiment of Italians, if it was a conscious creation of the nineteenth century, is in the

twentieth century a permanent force; and from it the forces of political disintegration have recently received a check which Stillman did not foresee. In spite of the heavy and ill-adjusted burden of taxation to support those armaments which, are held, rightly or wrongly, to be the condition of Italy's independence as a nation, the terrible price of unity and independence is paid year by year with a meekness that testifies at once to Italian patriotism and to Italian incompetence in respect of financial and social reform.

And yet both finance and commerce have made much progress during the last decade. The budgets now show a surplus instead of a large deficit. Italian paper-money is very nearly, and sometimes altogether, at par. Commerce in the north has made great strides. The rapidly increasing silk and cotton industries of the Milan district are known as rivals at Lyons and even in Lancashire. The industrial recovery has been in part due to the reversal of Crispi's policy of hostility to France, and the suspension of the Tariff War between the two countries. The term put by the disaster of Adowah to Crispi's "megalomania" and his African ventures was the first condition of national and economic revival. The growing use of water-electric power, the growth of co operative banks, and the higher standards and demands introduced by the emigrants returning from America, have also contributed to the progress of recent years.

But no one can deny that this progress is confined too much to the north. If there are only 17·7% of illiterates in Piedmont, there are 75·4% in the Basilicata (statistics of 1901). Sicily, even before the earthquake, was in a terrible condition, though the revolutionary movements of some years before had passed away<sup>1</sup>. No one can deny the corruption and incompetence of too many branches and grades of the

<sup>1</sup> It is too early to estimate the effects of the earthquake on Italian life and politics. It is also too early to estimate the effect of the State taking over the railways.

civil service, or can imagine that the Italy of to-day realizes the ideals either of Mazzini or of Cavour. No one can pretend that a great statesman has arisen in our day, or that Signor Giolitti is more than a very skilful manipulator of elections in the country and of parties in Parliament.

Stillman attributes most of the evils of modern Italy to the fact that the progressive north was forced into union too complete and too rapid with the backward, illiterate and corrupt southern kingdoms ruled by the Popes and the Spanish Bourbons. No doubt the south, and to some extent Rome herself, have dragged down the standard of Italian politics and administration below what it would be if "Italy" only meant North Italy. But the south exists and has to be governed somehow. The Pope and the Bourbon Kings had become impossible to their own subjects, and after 1859 were an intolerable menace and danger to the new kingdom in the north. The ideal of national unity was in 1860, and is now in spite of all disillusionments, a fundamental passion in Italy.

Moreover it is difficult to see how any federative scheme could have been worked, or how the southern populations, just set free from the corrupting servitude of centuries, would have governed themselves without aid from the north. The history of Crispi's administration during the Garibaldian dictatorship of 1860, backed though it was by the prestige of the Liberator, then at the summit of his prodigious popularity, does not appear to have been a signal success. If it was no worse, it was certainly no better than the subsequent "Piedmontese" rule in the island. There seems, then, no reason to believe that any expedient of Crispi's would have enabled Sicily and the south to evade the terrible consequences of a thousand years of feudal and royal oppression, of superstition, ignorance and poverty, and of all the corruption that they have bred into the bones of those unhappy populations. That northern politicians have abused their position in the south, and used its ignorant voters to build up for themselves parliamentary

careers and influence at the expense of the best interests of the country, may well be true. But, whatever system of union had been adopted, evils in some form must have resulted; and it was frankly impossible to avoid union, even if union had not been in itself desirable.

In the last sentence of this book Stillman expresses the fear that Italy was "too quickly and too easily made." Probably the men of 1860, whose fathers and grandfathers before them had suffered in the cause, did not think that Italy had been made either easily or fast. They may indeed have been wrong. Yet at least it is better to be made "too quickly and too easily" than never to be made at all. It is better to be Italy than Poland. And if Italy had not seized her opportunity, it might have gone by for ever. All Europe, except England, was opposed to her union. If the golden moment of 1860 had not been seized, it may be that she would even now be one half dependent on France, and the other half divided between Austria, Pope and Bourbon. The present is not perfect, but there is much to be thankful for.

G. M. TREVELYAN.

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\* The asterisk is appended to the most important books.

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